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US confrontation with Iran

 
  

Project: US confrontation with Iran

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1975

       The administration of Gerald Ford produces a strategy paper commending Iran's decision to develop a massive nuclear energy industry. The document cites Iran's energy security as a prime reason for supporting the plan. Tehran needs to “prepare against the time—about 15 years in the future—when Iranian oil production is expected to decline sharply,” the paper says. The “introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals.” [Washington Post, 3/27/2005]
          

April 22, 1975

       Secretary of State Henry Kissinger circulates National Security Decision Memorandum 292 on “US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation” outlining the administration's negotiating strategy for the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran. The document states the government would permit “US material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own reactors and for pass through to third countries with whom [the US has] agreements.” According to the document, the administration would “[a]gree to set the fuel ceiling at the level reflecting the approximate number of nuclear reactors planned for purchase from US suppliers,” but would consider increasing the ceiling “to cover Iran's entitlement” from their proposed $1 billion investment in a 20 percent stake in one of the private US uranium enrichment facilities that would be supplying Iran. The strategy paper also explains under what terms the Ford administration would be willing to grant Iran approval to reprocess US supplied fuel. [Washington Post, 3/27/2005; Source: National Security Decision Memorandum 292] Three decades later, Kissinger will tell the Washington Post that the Ford administration was never concerned about the possibility of Iran building nuclear weapons or the potential for proliferation. “I don't think the issue of proliferation came up,” he will recall. “ They were an allied country, and this was a commercial transaction. We didn't address the question of them one day moving toward nuclear weapons,” he also says. [Washington Post, 3/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: Henry A. Kissinger
          

1976

       President Gerald R. Ford signs a presidential directive giving the Iranian government the opportunity to purchase a US-built nuclear reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. Iran, with support from the US, wants to develop a massive nuclear energy industry that has complete “nuclear fuel cycle” capability so fissile materials can be supplied self-sustaining basis. US companies, chief among them Westinghouse, stands to make $6.4 billion from the sale of six to eight nuclear reactors and parts. The shah has argued that Iran needs a nuclear energy program in order to meet Iran's growing energy demand. Iran is known to have massive oil and gas reserves, but the shah considers these finite reserves too valuable to be spent satisfying daily energy needs. In a 1975 strategy paper, the Ford administration supported this view saying that “introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals.” Top officials in the Ford administration—including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Chief of Staff Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz, who is responsible for nonproliferation issues at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—are strong supporters of Iran's ambitions. Kissinger will tell the Washington Post 30 years later that the Ford administration was not concerned about the possibility of Iran using the facilities to produce nuclear weapons. “I don't think the issue of proliferation came up,” he says. But Charles Naas, deputy US ambassador to Iran at this time, will tell the Post that nuclear experts had serious concerns about potential proliferation. Naas will explain that the administration was attracted to the nuclear deal “terms of commerce” and interested in maintaining good relations with the shah. [Washington Post, 3/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: Gerald Rudolph Ford, Jr, Henry A. Kissinger, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
          

1983

       A Dutch court sentences Abdul Qadeer Khan to four years in jail after convicting him in absentia for espionage. Khan denies that he stole plans from URENCO, a maker of uranium enrichment centrifuges, when he worked there translating documents in the 1970s. Khan was employed by Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, or FDO, a company that was sub-contracted by the URENCO consortium. [NBC News, 2004; CNN, 2/5/2004]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

1987

       In Dubai, Sri Lankan businessman Mohamed Farouqand and German engineer Heinz Mebus meet with as many as three Iranian officials, presenting them with an offer to sell Iran the expertise and materials needed to develop a nuclear weapons program. Both Farouqand and Mebus are connected to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the head of Pakistan's nuclear program who also operates a network of nuclear manufacturers and suppliers located in more than 30 countries. According to two Western diplomats interviewed by the Washington Post in 2005, the offer lays out a five-step plan which would begin with the provision of technical drawings for Pakistani centrifuges. In phase two of the plan, the network would supply Iran with a starter kit of one or two centrifuges. This would be followed by the sale of as many as 2,000 centrifuges, which could then be used to enrich uranium. In the final phases of the plan, Iran would be provided with auxiliary items for the centrifuges and enrichment process as well as reconversion and casting equipment for building the core of a bomb. It is not known whether or not the Iranians accept this particular deal; however, at some point the Iranians do eventually obtain centrifuge parts from Khan (see March 10, 2005). [Washington Post, 2/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

January 20, 1992

       The US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee concludes that by the end of 1991 there was a “98 percent certainty that Iran already had all [or virtually all] of the components required for two to three operational nuclear weapons [aerial bombs and SSM warheads] made with parts purchased in the ex-Soviet Muslim republics.” Shai Feldman, director of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, will say in 1998 that he “didn't give these reports credibility at the time,” and that it “seemed like the kind of information that the Iranian opposition put out.” He will also recall that at the time “everybody said there was no evidence of a warhead transfer.” [Jerusalem Post, 4/9/1998]
          

1994

       Abdul Qadeer Khan sells uranium enrichment equipment to Iran for $3 million in cash. Sri Lankan businessman Bukhary Syed Abu Tahir, Khan's key associate, arranges for two containers containing used centrifuge units to be delivered from Pakistan to Iran via an Iranian-owned merchant ship. [Washington Times, 9/9/2004; Associated Press, 2/20/2004; BBC, 2/12/2004]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir
          

2001

       Illegal arms dealers sell 12 Soviet Kh55 (X-55) cruise missiles to Iran and six to China. The missiles, with a range of 1550 miles, would give Iran the capability to strike Israel. The missiles, designed to carry nuclear warheads, were manufactured in 1987 with a reported service life of eight years. [GlobalSecurity, n.d.; The Daily Star, 3/18/2005; BBC, 3/18/2005; Itar Tass News, 3/18/2005; Financial Times, 3/18/2005]
          

August 2002

       Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), supplies the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with information about two hidden sites in Iran—an underground uranium enrichment at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant at Arak. Iran will later declare both sites to the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [Reuters, 3/24/2005]
          

December 12, 2002

       The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) releases a report saying that satellite photos indicate that Iran is constructing two nuclear facilities. The report says the first facility, near Arak, is a heavy-water production facility, which raises concerns that Iran might be constructing a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water. Lending further suspicion to the purpose behind the heavy-water facility is the fact that the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor does not use heavy water. Additionally, the ISIS reports, Iran's existing research reactors do not consume enough heavy water to warrant the need for a heavy-water plant. The report also says that Iran appears to be building a uranium enrichment plant, possibly using gas centrifuge technology, at a site called Natanz, 25 miles southeast of the city of Kashan. [Nuclear Threat Initiative, 12/13/2002; ISIS, 12/12/2002] The following day, Iran's UN Ambassador Javad Zarif tells CNN that his country is not developing nuclear weapons. “No. Absolutely not,” Zarif says in response to a question on whether Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program. “Iran is a member of the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty. We have safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction do not have a place in our defense doctrine. We have stated that clearly. And we have shown it.” [CNN, 12/13/2002]
People and organizations involved: Mujahedeen-e Khalq
          

December 2003

       In an interview with a Pakistani satellite channel, Abdul Qadeer Khan denies allegations that he was involved in selling nuclear secrets or equipment to Iran. “I am being accused for nothing, I never visited Iran, I don't know any Iranian, nor do I know any Iranian scientist,” he says. “I will be targeted naturally because I made the nuclear bomb, I made the missile.” [Guardian, 1/31/2004]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

December 2003

       Several Middle Eastern countries respond positively to Libya's pledge to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, including Iran. “Iran welcomes any step taken by any country to dismantle weapons of mass destruction,” says Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. “But it is the time for the world to push for Israel's disarmament, as the main threat to the region,” he adds. Israel reportedly has more than 200 nuclear weapons. [BBC, 8/23/2000; BBC, 7/5/2000; BBC, 10/21/2003; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 06/1998]
          

2004

       Iran, despite being OPEC's second largest oil exporter, is forced to import a billion dollars worth of gasoline due to demand outstripping the country's limited refining capacity. “We use 50 million liters of fuel each day, 10 percent more than just a year ago,” Seyyed Reza Kasaizadeh, planning director for the national refining and distribution company NIORDC, tells the Persian daily Khorasan. Roughly a quarter of that amount is purchased by the government on the open market, and then sold to the public at the same subsidized price as domestically refined fuel—roughly 35 cents per gallon. [Iran Daily, 12/12/2004] In addition to the subsidy program's actual costs, the program also represents “a huge opportunity cost, because they could be selling that at world prices,” Ben Faulks, an analyst for the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit, tells the Washington Post in mid-2005. Iran hopes that its nuclear energy program will solve this problem by reducing the country's industrial oil consumption needs. The country would then be able to sell more of its oil at market prices and substantially increase its revenue. [Washington Post, 7/4/2005]
          

February 3, 2004

       During a visit to Russia, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton tells the Russian daily Kyodo News that Iran is pursuing a secret nuclear weapons development program unbeknownst to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [Antiatom News, 2/3/2004]
People and organizations involved: International Atomic Energy Agency, John R. Bolton
          

February 12, 2004

       International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors say they have found designs for an advanced “P-2” centrifuge used to enrich uranium. The designs, which Iran should have declared to the IAEA, match drawings of enrichment equipment that were found in Libya and supplied by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. [Associated Press, 2/12/2004]
People and organizations involved: International Atomic Energy Agency, Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

June 24, 2004

       John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control, tells the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia that Iran is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. “[Iran's] activities [go] well beyond any conceivable peaceful nuclear program,” he says, stating that no “comparable oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities.” He notes that Iran's uranium reserves account for less than one percent of its vast oil reserves and that its gas reserves are the second largest in the world. [US Department of State, 6/24/2004]
People and organizations involved: John R. Bolton
          

September 2, 2004

       The International Atomic Energy Agency announces that weapons inspectors have found no evidence to support accusations that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear weapon. [CNN, 9/2/2004]
People and organizations involved: International Atomic Energy Agency
          

November 2004

       The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) begins investigating a 1987 meeting (See also 1987) where two associates of Abdul Qadeer Khan presented Iranian officials with an offer to sell Iran nuclear technology and materials . [Washington Post, 2/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: International Atomic Energy Agency, Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

December 2, 2004

       The New York Times reports that according to unnamed diplomats, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes that satellite photographs indicate Iran may be testing high explosives and that procurement records suggest Iran may have the equipment necessary for making bomb-grade uranium. [Reuters, 12/2/2004] This information was reportedly provided by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). [BBC, 11/18/2004] UN diplomats tell Reuters that inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would like to inspect Iranian military sites at Parchin, southeast of Tehran, and Lavizan II, in northeastern Tehran. However, the IAEA is not permitted to inspect those sites because it only has legal authority to visit sites where there are declared civilian nuclear programs. [Reuters, 12/2/2004] Five buildings in Parchin will later be inspected by the IAEA in January 2005 (see Mid-January 2005).
          

January 2005

       Iran hands over documents from a 1987 meeting in Dubai (See also 1987) to a International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation (See also November 2004). During the 1987 meeting, associates of Abdul Qadeer Khan presented Iranian officials with an offer to sell Iran the technology and materials to build a nuclear bomb. However, the IAEA does not uncover any evidence suggesting that the equipment was used in anything other than Iran's civilian nuclear energy program. The violations are technical and based only on the fact that Iran failed to report the program. Despite its recent findings, the IAEA investigation claims it still lacks a clear understanding of Iran's nuclear program. [Washington Post, 2/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

Mid-January 2005

       Iran allows International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit five buildings at the Parchin military site in response to US allegations that Iran has used the site to test explosives components for a nuclear bomb. Other buildings in the area, and four other areas at the Parchin site that the agency has identified as being of potential interest, remain off limits to inspectors. During their visit, the inspectors take samples from Parchin to test for the presence of nuclear activity. [BBC, 1/19/2005; Global Security (.org), 2005; The Weekend Australian, 1/13/2005; BBC, 1/5/2005; BBC, 1/19/2005]
          

Early February 2005

       Sri Lankan, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, is accused by President Bush of being the chief financial officer for an international nuclear black market linked to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. Tahir sat on the board Kaspudu Sendirian Berhad- owned my the Malaysian prime minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah. The Associated Press claim that a search of publicly accessible files reveal the paper trail that outlines links between Kamaluddin Abdullah and Buhary Syed Abu Tahir. The paperwork revealed that Tahir and Kamaluddin Abdullah were both executives at Kaspudu Sendirian Berhad when Tahir made a deal for Scomi Precision Engineering to build components that Western intelligence sources claim were for use in Libya's nuclear program. The Scomi Group fulfilled a $3.5 million manufacturing contract for machine parts negotiated by Tahir. Scomi officials say the did know what the parts were for while Nonproliferation authorities claim they were for 14 centrifuges. US officials insist the components, tubes made up of thousands of small pieces, could only be used in a uranium-enrichment program. A Scomi spokeswoman insisted that the company was told the parts were for the oil and gas industry. After the revelation Kamaluddin Abdullah severed ties to Tahir. Malaysian Police say neither Tahir or Scomi have committed any crime and no arrests have been made, which the official government report backed up. President Bush has accused Tahir of using a Dubai based company (Gulf Technical Industries) as a front for Khan's network. (See also: February 12, 2004 ) [Time, 2/16/2005; CNN, 2/18/2005; Malaysian Government Report, 2/21/2004]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

February 25, 2005

       Hassan Rowhani, Tehran's chief nuclear negotiator, tells France's Le Monde newspaper that Iran may be hiding its nuclear technology inside special tunnels because of threats of attack by the United States. Rowhani is asked, “Is it accurate that Iran has built tunnels meant to serve Iran's nuclear activities?” He responds that these reports “could be true.” “From the moment the Americans threaten to attack our nuclear sites, what are we to do? We have to put them somewhere,” Rowhani says. [USA Today, 2/25/2005]
          

February 27, 2005

       Alexander Rumyantsev, head of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, and Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh sign a nuclear fuel supply deal. Under the provisions of the agreement, Russia will supply Iran with uranium fuel for Iran's Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant, which once complete will produce 1,000 megawatts of electricity. Iran will be required to return all of the spent fuel to Russia to prevent the possibility that some of it will be used to produce bomb-grade plutonium. According to Rumyantsev, the first batch of enriched uranium fuel is waiting in Siberia ready to be shipped. [Los Angeles Times, 2/28/2005; Reuters, 2/27/2005] Russia's more than $1 billion contract to build the reactor is said to have played a significant role in maintaining the strength of Russia's nuclear energy industry. Russia, which has sent more than 2,000 workers to work with 3,000 Iranians at Bushehr, is keen on securing more contracts with the Iranian government. An additional 1,500 Russian specialists are scheduled to go to Bushehr soon to install more equipment. [Los Angeles Times, 2/28/2005]
          

March 1, 2005

       The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports in a statement to its 35-member board that the agency's inspectors continue to have lingering questions about Iranian activities at the Parchin military site and that Iran has denied requests for additional visits to the complex. [BBC, 3/1/2005] Iran claims that it is not legally required to allow further inspections at Parchin, reasoning in a February 27 note to the IAEA that the “expectation of the Safeguards Department in visiting specified zones and points in Parchin Complex are fulfilled and thus there is no justification for any additional visit.” The agency disagrees. [New York Times, 3/1/2005] Additionally, the agency says in its statement that Iran has failed to provide information on how Iran obtained its advanced P-2 centrifuge equipment. The inspectors also say they are concerned about certain dual-use technologies at the Lavisan site, which Iran is also refusing to open to inspectors. [New York Times, 3/1/2005] A Western diplomat says the statement demonstrates “another failure to disclose activities, which fits a disturbing pattern,” adding, “It's more evidence that the Iranians are unwilling to provide full disclosure.” [New York Times, 3/1/2005] But other officials note that the statement contains no evidence that Iran has an active weapons program. “The facts don't support an innocent or guilty verdict at this point,” one agency official observes. [New York Times, 3/1/2005]
          

March 2, 2005

       Jackie Sanders, chief US delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors, accuses Iran of “cynically” pursuing the development of nuclear weapons and attempting to deceive the world with claims that its nuclear program is peaceful. Her comments are in response to a recent report by the IAEA that said that Iran is not cooperating fully with inspectors, is continuing to construct a heavy water reactor despite agency requests to stop building, and is not fulfilling its reporting requirements in a timely fashion. Sanders called the IAEA report a “startling list of Iranian attempts to hide and mislead and delay the work” of the IAEA. [Associated Press, 3/2/2005]
          

March 4, 2005

       The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) releases satellite images that show a heavy water plant under construction in Iran. Critics of Iran's nuclear program say that once the plant is complete, it will be capable of supplying a heavy water reactor with enough heavy water to produce enough plutonium for one atomic bomb a year. But the heavy water plant is not illegal and Iran does not yet have a heavy water reactor. Iran claims its nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes only. [Reuters, 3/4/2005; Institute for Science and International Security, 3/4/2005]
          

March 4, 2005

       The Bush administration says it will not back Europe's plan to offer Iran economic and political incentives to abandon its uranium enrichment program unless there is a way to enforce it. The Bush administration favors an arrangement where the issue would be hauled before the UN Security Council, which has the authority to impose sanctions, in the event of Iranian non-compliance. [Reuters, 3/4/2005]
          

March 10, 2005

       Pakistan Minister for Information and Broadcasting Sheikh Rashid Ahmed says that the now pardoned A.Q. Khan was involved in black market nuclear arms deals and that he gave the Iranians centrifuge parts. “[Khan] had given centrifuges to Iran in his individual capacity and the government of Pakistan had nothing to do with this,” Ahmed tells reporters. Despite these acknowledgments, Ahmed says Pakistan “will not hand over [Dr Khan] to any other country.” The Pakistani government insists that it had no knowledge of Dr Khan's activities, but numerous experts have questioned these claims noting that it would have been impossible for him to keep his activities secret. [BBC, March 10, 2005; CNN, March 10, 2005]
People and organizations involved: Abdul Qadeer Khan
          

March 11, 2005

       The United States and European Union (EU) indicate that they are ready to work together on a diplomatic approach to encourage Iran to give up its nuclear program. Condoleezza Rice says that the US is willing to drop it objections to Iran's application to the WTO and “consider, on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts of Iranian civilian aircraft.” Europe, on the other hand, which has been under pressure from the Bush administration to harden its policy toward Iran, says it will have “no choice” but to support the issue being brought up at the UN Security Council if Iran does not discontinue its suspected nuclear weapons program. Up until now, the US and EU have been unable to agree on a single approach to dealing with Iran. [New York Times, 3/12/2005]
People and organizations involved: Condoleezza Rice
          

March 12, 2005

       Iran says that incentives put forward by Europe and the United States the previous day (see March 11, 2005) are meaningless. “The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to use peaceful nuclear technology and no pressure, intimidation or threat can make Iran give up its right,” says Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. The European Union and United States unveiled a “carrot and stick” approach to pressure Tehran to give up uranium enrichment which can be used to make bomb-grade fuel. Asefi argues that US prohibitions against the sale of aircraft spare parts to Iran should never have been imposed in the first place. “Lifting them is no concession and entering the WTO is a clear right of all countries.” He also says that Iran would be happy to implement measures—such as allowing intrusive UN inspections of its nuclear sites—in order to provide “objective guarantees” that it is not developing nuclear weapons. [Reuters, 3/12/05; Voice of America, 3/12/05]
          

March 21, 2005

       Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, tells pilgrims in Mashad that it is “fiction” that Iran is developing an atomic bomb. He says that he would give his life on the battlefield if Iran were attacked by the US and adds that he would not go into hiding if that were to occur, referring to President Bush's low profile during the September 11 attacks. [Al Jazeera, 3/21/2005]
          

March 24, 2005

       Iran presents the European Union with a proposal whereby Iran would be permitted to produce enriched uranium on a small scale. The proposed pilot plant would have a small number of centrifuges, arranged in successive order to refine out enriched uranium. Experts say the plan would involve 500 to 2,000 centrifuges as opposed to the 54,000 that Iran currently has planned for large-scale industrial use. As part of the proposed agreement, Iranian officials would allow close monitoring of the pilot facility by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [Agence France-Presse, 3/24/2005]
          

March 24, 2005

       Alireza Jafarzadeh—a former spokesman of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an organization that is listed by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization (see August 15, 2003)—says that according to “well-placed sources” within the Iranian regime, “Iran has completed an underground tunnel-like facility in Parchin, which is now engaged in laser enrichment.” Jafarzadeh, who now heads the Washington-based think-tank Strategic Policy Consulting and regularly serves as a Fox News foreign affairs analyst, also says that “the underground site is camouflaged and built in an area of Parchin that deals with the chemical industry.” It is connected to “Iran's secret nuclear weapons program,” he further claims. The underground facility is reportedly located in an area known as “Plan 1.” [Seattle Times, 3/25/2005; Strategic Policy Consulting, 2/20/2005; Reuters, 3/24/2005; Associated Press, 3/24/2005] Iran has refused to give inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unfettered access to Parchin (see March 1, 2005), and the US alleges that Iran is testing explosive devices there that could be used in nuclear weapons.
          

March 30, 2005

       Iranian President Mohammad Khatami personally accompanies about 30 journalists deep into the underground nuclear plant at Natanz, a uranium enrichment facility located 250 km (150 miles) south of Tehran. The group of foreign and local journalists is permitted to film and take video footage of the complex. Natanz is built more than 18 meters (54 feet) below ground due to “security problems.” The journalists are shown another facility in the city of Isfahan. “If we were looking to make atomic weapons, we could have completed these [facilities] in hiding,” Khatami tells the reporters. The gesture is viewed by many as an attempt to undermine support for a possible aerial attack by the United States or Israel. [Reuters, 3/30/2005]
          

March 31, 2005

       The Mujahedeen-e Khalq's (MEK) political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), holds a press conference in Paris. Mohammad Mohaddessin of the NCRI tells reporters, “In mid-2004, Khamenei allocated $2.5 billion to obtain three nuclear warheads.” Mohaddessin claims the Iranian regime is accelerating work on a reactor in Arak, 150 miles south of Tehran, which could produce enough plutonium for one atomic bomb per year. “The regime told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the reactor would be operational in 2014, but in reality, they want to start it in 2006 or 2007,” he says. In August 2002, the NCRI first revealed information about the Arak heavy-water production plant, along with the Natanz uranium enrichment plant (see August 2002) describing it then as part of a secret nuclear weapons program. Iran later declared both sites to the IAEA. [Reuters, 3/31/05; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 5/12/2005]
People and organizations involved: Mujahedeen-e Khalq
          

April 14, 2005

       Speaking at a forum on Middle East peace sponsored by The Week magazine, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warns that if Iran succeeds in building nuclear weapons it could touch off an arms race that could lead to the end of civilization. “I do not believe that living in a world with 20 or 30 nuclear states is a situation that civilized life can support,” he says. [New York Daily News, 4/15/2005] But during the 1970s, Kissinger and other US officials had supported Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear energy program (see 1976 and April 22, 1975). At the time, they were not concerned about the potential for Iran to use the technology to develop nuclear weapons. Nor were they concerned about proliferation. Kissinger told the Washington Post in March that he didn't “think the issue of proliferation came up.” [Washington Post, 3/27/2005]
People and organizations involved: Henry A. Kissinger
          

April 28, 2005

       Russian President Vladimir Putin dismisses Israeli concerns that Russian sales of nuclear components to Iran represent a threat to Israel's security. According to the terms of Russia's agreement with Iran, Putin explains, Iran must return all of its spent nuclear fuel to Russia so it cannot be used for military purposes. [Associated Press, 4/28/2005]
          

May 1, 2005

       Iran announces that it will resume nuclear enrichment-related activities within a week following unsuccessful talks with European nations. In remarks that follow the announcement, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran has the right to develop a nuclear energy program. “Anybody who comes to power through the presidential elections will not want, nor will the nation allow him to, take a step against the people's interests,” he says. [Associated Press, 5/1/05]
          


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