The Center for Cooperative Research
U:     P:    
Not registered yet? Register here
 
Search
 
Current timeline only
Advanced Search


Main Menu
Home 
History Engine Sub-Menu
Timelines 
Entities 
Forum 
Miscellaneous Sub-Menu
Donate 
Links 
End of Main Menu

Volunteers Needed!
Submit a timeline entry
Donate: If you think this site is important, please help us out financially. We need your help!
Email updates
 



  View mode (info):
  Ordering (info):
  Time period (info):

General Topic Areas

Rendition (35)
legalProceedings (41)
Human Rights Groups (45)
Coverup
Impunity (21)
Prisoner deaths (20)
High-level decisions and actions (131)
Indications of Abuse (36)
Statements/writings about torture (8)
Public statements (53)
Detainments (48)
Independent investigations (1)
Reports/Investigations (41)
Suicides (1)
Private contractors (4)
Criticisms of US (41)
Indefinate Detention (3)
Military commissions (32)
Disciplinary actions (15)
Supreme Court Decisions (4)
Media (26)
Aftermath (14)

Types of abuses performed by Americans

Use of dogs (11)
Forced confessions (9)
Mental abuse (7)
Sexual humiliation (34)
Physical assault (73)
Stress positions (22)
Electrodes (3)
Intimidation/threats (22)
Sleep deprivation (23)
Poor conditions (18)
Suppression Religion (7)
Medical services denied (7)
Abrogation of rights (7)
Involuntary drugs (4)
Deception (1)
Isolation (16)
Extreme temperatures (16)
Insufficient food (11)
Dangerous conditions (5)
Ghost detainees (5)
Sexual temptation (2)

Documents

Presidential directives (3)
Internal memos/reports (33)

Specific Events

Qala-i-Janghi massacre (20)

US Bases and Interrogation Centers

Guantanamo (141)
Abu Ghraib (145)
Camp Cropper (10)
Camp Bucca (8)
Camp Rhino (2)
Ariana (1)
Al Jafr (5)
Bagram (40)
Camp Iron Horse (1)
Fire Base Tycze (1)
BIF (1)
LSA Diamondback (1)
Diego Garcia (3)
Asadabad (1)
Kandahar (18)
USS Peleliu (3)
USS Bataan (1)
Sheberghan (1)
Gardez (2)
Far' Falastin (5)
Sednaya (1)
Al Qaim (4)
Palestine Street Base (1)
US Base at Adhamiya (3)
Kabul (2)
Kohat (1)
Jalalabad (1)
Camp Whitehorse (2)
Packhorse (1)

People who have been detained

John Walker Lindh (32)
Maher Arar (11)
Abdullah (1)
Amanullah (1)
Jose Padilla (13)
Yaser Esam Hamdi (21)
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (2)
Jamal Udeen (10)
Ali Sale Kayla al-Marri (5)
Mohamed al Chastaini (1)
Tarek Dergoul (11)
Ahmed Agiza (2)
Muhammed Al-Zery (2)
Abdul Razaq (2)
Noor Aghah (1)
Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni (5)
6 men in Bosnia (4)
Mohammed Saghir (1)
Mohamedou Oulad Slahi (1)
Mamdouh Habib (4)
Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed (1)
Mohammed Haydar Zammar (2)
Talaat Fouad Qassem (1)
5 men in Albania (1)
Sayed Abassin (3)
Omar al-Faruq (1)
Mullah Habibullah (2)
Dilawar (4)
Abdul Qayyum (1)
Saif ur-Rahman (1)
Khreisan Khalis Aballey (1)
Abdallah Khudhran al-Shamran (1)
Abd al-Rahman (1)
Najem Sa'doun Hattab (2)
Ibrahim Habaci (3)
Arif Ulusam (3)
Faha al Bahli (3)
Mahmud Sardar Issa (3)
Khalifa Abdi (3)
Saeed Abou Taleb (1)
Sohail Karimi (1)
Adil Al-Jazeeri (1)
Abed Hamed Mowhoush (4)
Saddam Salah al-Rawi (8)
Manadel al-Jamadi (3)
Bisher al-Rawi (4)
Jamil al-Banna (4)
Abdullah El-Janoudi (2)
Zakhim Shah (1)
Wahab al-Rawi (1)
Abdur Rahim (1)
Parkhudin (1)
Wazir Muhammad (2)
Mohammed Ismail Agha (1)
Abdurahman Khadr (2)
Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin (1)
Moazzam Begg (7)
Martin Mubanga (4)
Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul (3)
Abdul Wali (1)
Ala' Jassem Sa'ad (1)
Mohamed al-Khatani (4)
Saifullah Paracha (2)
David Hicks (3)
Feroz Abbasi (3)
Salim Ahmed Hamdan (6)
Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al-Bahlul (2)
Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi (2)
Adullah Almalk (1)
Ameen Saeed al-Sheikh (1)
Amjed Isail Waleed (2)
Haj Ali Shallal Abbas (1)
Abd Alwhab Youss (1)
Huda al-Azzawi (10)
Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh (1)
Assad (3)
Nori al-Yasseri (1)
Hussein Mohssein Mata al-Zayiadi (1)
Haidar (1)
Ahmed (1)
Ahzem (1)
Hashiem (1)
Mustafa (1)
Nahla al-Azzawi (4)
Ayad al-Azzawi (3)
Ali al-Azzawi (5)
Mu'taz al-Azzawi (4)
Khalid el-Masri (5)
Mehdi Ghezali (5)
Adil (1)
Abu Abdul Rahman (3)
Mourad Benchellali (1)
Nizar Sassi (2)
Imad Kanouni (1)
Brahim Yadel (1)
Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed (1)
Yasin Qasem Muhammad Ismail (1)
Khalid Abdullah Mishal al-Mutairi (1)
Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad al-Odah (1)
Wael Kishk (1)
Ashraf Ibrahim (1)
A.Z. (1)
Mohammad Naim (1)
Sherbat Naim (1)
Ahmadullah (1)
Amadullah (0)
Muhammad Naim Farooq (1)
Wesam Abdulrahman Ahmed Al Deemawi (1)
Hussein Abdelkadr Youssouf Mustafa (3)
Shafiq Rasul (20)
Rhuhel Ahmed (21)
Asif Iqbal (21)
Khoja Mohammad (1)
Jamaal Belmar (1)
Haji Rohullah Wakil (1)
Abu Zubaida (1)
Alif Khan (2)
Ibrahim Fauzee (1)
Shah Mohammed (1)
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (2)
Sahim Alwan (3)
Mukhtar al-Bakri (3)
Faysal Galab (3)
Yahya Goba (3)
Yaseinn Taher (3)
Abdul Jabar (1)
Mullah Rocketti (1)
Mohammed Ahmed al-Kandari (1)
Thamir Issawi (0)
Haydar Sabbar Abed (1)
Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri (1)
Jan Baz Khan (1)
Unnamed prisoners (42)
Click here to join: Suggest changes to existing data, add new data to the website, or compile your own timeline. More Info >>

 

Torture, rendition, and other abuses against captives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere

 
  

Project: Prisoner abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

Export to XML Printer Friendly View Email to a Friend Increase Text Size Decrease Text Size


March 14, 2003

       When an Associated Press reporter asks the US military to comment on the accounts of two former Afghan detainees (see December 10, 2002) (see December 3, 2002), spokesman Roger King claims their accounts are mostly untrue. “Some of the stuff they are saying sounds like partial truths, some of it's completely bogus,” he says. “They were stripped naked probably to prevent them from sneaking weapons into the facility. That's why someone may be stripped.... We do force people to stand for an extended period of time.... Disruption of sleep has been reported as an effective way of reducing people's inhibition about talking or their resistance to questioning....They are not allowed to speak to one another. If they do, they can plan together or rely on the comfort of one another. If they're caught speaking out of turn, they can be forced to do things—like stand for a period of time—as payment for speaking out.” [Associated Press, 3/14/03; New York Times, 3/4/2003 cited in Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]
People and organizations involved: Roger King
          

April 18, 2003

       The Pentagon rejects Amnesty International's request to visit the US military base at Bagram. The Defense Department declares that “access to detainees is provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and on a case-by-case basis to selected government officials.” In a letter, Marshall Billingslea, principal deputy to the assistant secretary of defense, writes that “in this war, as in every war, captured enemy combatants have no right to counsel or access to courts for the purpose of challenging their detention.” [Amnesty International, 8/19/2003]
People and organizations involved: Amnesty International
          

June 2003

       Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont, sends letters to the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon with complaints about the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan and “other locations outside the United States.” He writes that according to unnamed officials, the prisoners are being subjected to beatings, lengthy sleep- and food-deprivation, and other “stress and duress” techniques (see April 16, 2003). He asks if these techniques are indeed being employed and urges the administration to issue a clear statement that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees will not be tolerated. The Pentagon and CIA respond with denials that the United States is torturing its prisoners. [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004; USA Today, 5/13/2004]
People and organizations involved: Patrick Leahy
          

October 18, 2003

       The Associated Press submits a list of questions to US command regarding specific accounts from former detainees regarding torture, execution, and poor living conditions at Coalition detention centers in Iraq. US command does not respond. [The Associated Press, 10/29/2004]
          

October 30, 2003

       The Department of Defense denies expedited processing on the ACLU request (see October 7, 2003) for the release of documents.
          

(7:00 a.m.) November 4, 2003

       Spc. Dennis E. Stevanus is summoned to the shower stall of the Hard Site in Abu Ghraib. When he arrives he discovers that detainee Manadel al-Jamadi, interrogated by the CIA less than an hour before (see Between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. November 4, 2003), is dead. Jamadi's body is still shackled to the stall. When the hood is removed, he is found to have severe head wounds. (It is unclear whether these wounds were present when the prisoner was taken in, or whether they were inflicted during the interrogation.) [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004 Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] Stevanus calls a medic and notifies his superiors. Lt. Col. Steven Jordan arrives at the site at around 7:15 a.m. He finds several MPs and medics in the shower stall. The deceased prisoner is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back, lying on the floor face down. When the body is uncuffed and turned over, Jordan notices a small spot of blood on the floor where his head has lain. [Sources: Jason A. Kenner, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] There is also extensive bruising on the body. [The Guardian, 5/20/2004 Sources: Jason A. Kenner] Jordan alerts Col. Thomas M. Pappas. A CIA supervisor is also notified. He arrives and requests that the Hard Site hold the body until the next day. [Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] According to ABC News, Spc. Jason A. Kenner sees the body packed in ice while a “battle” rages between CIA and military intelligence interrogators over who should dispose of the corpse. [The Guardian, 5/20/2004] The body is then put in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. [The New Yorker, 5/5/2004 Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] Photographs are later released of MP Spcs. Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman posing next to the dead body wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice, giving a “thumbs up.” [The New Yorker, 5/5/2004] According to MP Spc. Bruce Brown, an MP with the 372nd, they spray “air freshener to cover the scent.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2004] The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is also alerted. [Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004]
People and organizations involved: Bruce Brown, Sabrina Harman, Jason A. Kenner, Manadel al-Jamadi, Criminal Investigation Division, Charles Graner, Steven L. Jordan, Thomas M. Pappas, Dennis E. Stevanus
          

November 5, 2003

       The body of deceased Abu Ghraib detainee Manadel al-Jamadi is taken away on a litter to make it appear he is only ill. [Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] Medics soon arrive, put his body on a stretcher with a fake IV in his arm, and take him away. The identity of the prisoner is never recorded in the prison's files and the man is never assigned a detainee identification number. [The New Yorker, 5/5/2004 Sources: Ivan L. Frederick II] An autopsy is performed at the morgue of the prison facility at Baghdad International Airport concluding that the Iraqi “died of a blood clot in the head, likely a result of injuries he sustained during apprehension.” [Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] According to an internal Pentagon report later obtained by the Denver Post, the “autopsy revealed the cause of death was blunt force trauma complicated by compromised respiration.” [Denver Post, 5/19/2004] However, others will say they believe the prisoner died as a result of harsh interrogation tactics. Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick will later write in one of his letters home (see (Mid-January 2004)), “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away.” [The New Yorker, 5/5/2004] The CIA's inspector general will eventually investigate the case as a possible criminal homicide. [New York Times, 5/17/2004]
People and organizations involved: Manadel al-Jamadi, Ivan L. Frederick II
          

November 18, 2003

       Department of Defense Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell'Orto writes to Senator Patrick Leahy and confirms that earlier Pentagon statements (see June 25, 2003) about the treatment of detainees bind the entire executive branch. But he fails to answer specific questions about interrogation guidelines and adds that articles reporting improper treatment of detainees “often contain allegations that are untrue.” [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]
People and organizations involved: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Patrick Leahy
          

December 4-22, 2003

       Saddam Salah al-Rawi is taken to Abu Ghraib and registered under number 200144. [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] For the first 18 days of his detention at Abu Ghraib, he will be subjected to a series of techniques. Interrogations follow only after this period. The first MP Al-Rawi encounters puts a hood over his head, cuffs his hands, and leads him away, “intentionally smashing [his] face against several doors along the way.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] “He locked his arm under mine and holding the back of my head he beat my head against the doors of the cells,” Al-Rawi will later recall. [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] In another testimony, Al-Rawi repeats the same allegation: “Wherever he saw a wall, he would hit me against it. Wherever there's a door, he would push me and hit me against it.” [ABC News, 8/8/2004] He is left in a cell, still hooded and cuffed, with three or four other prisoners, who are also tied up but have no hoods on. He asks one of them, whom he later names as Thamir Issawi, to lift up his hood to allow him to breathe more easily. “When he opened my hood I could see his back. He was naked. All of them around me were naked.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] It was, according to Al-Rawi, “something I have never seen in my life. A man's buttocks were facing me.” [ABC News, 8/8/2004] “I was so shocked and disgraced that I asked the man to put my hood back on, which he did.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] An hour later, soldiers take him into the hall, and order him to strip. “I refused to because it is forbidden for Muslims.” Al-Rawi faces the inevitable. “They forced off my clothes and beat me,” he says. [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] “I was completely naked with two bags on my head.” [ABC News, 8/8/2004] The soldiers then force him to stand on a box with his hands on his head. “I stood like this for an hour, or an hour and a quarter. Then some American soldiers came and they were laughing and some were beating me. They were beating me on my back and my legs. They were beating and laughing.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] His next experience is an example of the “stress positions” tactic. “Next, they made me hold a plastic chair over my head for a long time. All along, I could hear them laughing and snapping photographs.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] Elsewhere, he reportedly says, “I remember them taking pictures. I remember there were these prisoners standing beside me. I was hooded but I remember a flash from the camera and the sound of a click when they took the picture.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] At one point, he cannot take it any longer. “I became so exhausted that I fell down and hit my head on the wall.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] At that moment, “I lost consciousness.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] The soldiers then remove his hood, [ABC News, 8/8/2004] and when he regains consciousness, Al-Rawi comes face to face with his attackers. “I saw Sgt. Joyner, an Egyptian translator who wore fatigues, named Abu Hamed, two male soldiers, one with glasses, and one female soldier. ... Then a soldier from another group came and peed on me.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] [In a May 30, 2005 email to the Center for Cooperative Research, Sgt. Joyner denied abusing detainees] Next, Al-Rawi later recounts, “they started to drop cold water on me.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] “Other soldiers then dragged me along the floor in the hall and did other similar things to keep me awake all night.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] In the morning he is put in cell 42 in Tier 1-A, and allowed a few moments alone. His cell has a water tap, a loo, and a metal bunk bed, but no sheets, blanket, or mattress. [The Guardian, 5/13/2004 Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] “I was still naked and very tired. I sat against the wall, shivering and trying to sleep. I could see through some small openings in the wall that the sun was rising.” Somewhat later that morning, Al-Rawi meets with Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick and a female sergeant who take him to another room. “I was still unhooded and untied. They gave me some cloth to cover myself. Sergeant Ivan threatened me, saying that if I didn't give up any information, he would have other soldiers rape me. (Abu Hamed was translating.) I was so stunned that I couldn't reply.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] Al-Rawi is often left in his cell with his hands and feet bound; sometimes in a way designed to be highly uncomfortable. One such “stress position” leaves him with his hands and feet stuck through the metal bars of his cell door and tied together at the outside. A civilian American with a goatee beard, whom Al-Rawi identifies as “Steven,” possibly private contractor Steven Stephanowicz, forces him to adopt the so-called “scorpion” position. “They tied my hands to my feet behind my back,” explains Al-Rawi. “My left hand to my right foot and my right hand to my left foot. I was lying face down and they were beating me like this.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] During his first 18 days at Abu Ghraib, Al-Rawi says he is almost constantly tortured, “for 23 hours per day.” During this time, there are no interrogations, no investigations, and no medical treatment. He encounters the whole range of techniques, starting with the familiar nudity. “They left me naked the entire time.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] He is also subjected to sleep deprivation. “There was a stereo inside the cell and it played music with a sound so loud I couldn't sleep. I stayed like that for 23 hours.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] Al-Rawi is beaten repeatedly. “One time they knocked out two of my teeth [lower left molars].” He is also threatened with dogs. “Whenever they took me out of my cell, they used dogs to threaten me.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] On one occasion a naked Al-Rawi is pushed from behind by a guard towards another guard holding a dog on a leash. At some point the experience becomes too much to bear. “In my cell I was shouting,” said Al-Rawi, “ ‘Please come and take me. Please kill me. I am Osama bin Laden, I was in the plane that hit the World Trade Centre.’ I wished for death at that time,” he says. “I wanted to be dead 1,000 times. I asked my God to take my soul.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] After these 18 days, his preparation for interrogation has finished. He has his clothes returned and is finally questioned. Having lost all defenses he gives any answer his interrogators want. “I just didn't care anymore.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi] “Whatever they asked me, I said yes. They told me I was from Ansar al-Islam [a militant Iraqi group] and I said yes. I told them the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad [another Iraqi militant group] was my cousin. They asked me about Zarqawi [a Jordanian militant thought to be in Iraq] and al-Qaeda and I said yes even though I don't know who they are.” [The Guardian, 5/13/2004] He even declared being Osama bin Laden himself. “I did the explosions on September 11,” he said. “The interrogators just said, ‘Bullsh_t!’ to all of my answers and beat me.” [Sources: Testimony of Saddam Saleh Al Rawi]
People and organizations involved: Abu Hamed, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Saddam Salah al-Rawi, Steven Stephanowicz, Ivan L. Frederick II, Thamir Issawi
          

December 24, 2003

       The US military replies to the Red Cross' November 6 letter (see November 6, 2003), claiming that the prisoners being held in cell bocks 1A and 2A of Abu Ghraib are “security detainees” who are not entitled to “full GC protection as recognized in GCIV/5 [Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention].” The 3-page letter adds that “such protection will be afforded as soon as the security situation in Iraq allows it.” Article 5 allows an occupying power to exempt captives from the protection of the Conventions if they can be shown to be a continuing threat to the occupying force. However according to critics of the administration's judgment, the provision is supposed to be applied on a case-by-case basis and is not meant to include people who have valuable intelligence. [New York Times, 5/22/2004 Sources: December 24 letter From Gen. Karpinski to the International Comnmittee on the Red Cross] The letter also says that the Red Cross should schedule its visits to the cell bocks 1A and 2A ahead of time instead of showing up unannounced. The response letter—written by Army lawyers in Washington but signed by Army Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski in Baghdad—claims that such visits could interrupt interrogations. [New York Times, 5/19/2004]
People and organizations involved: Janis L. Karpinski
          

Late 2003

       At Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, MPs hide prisoners from a Red Cross delegation by shifting them around the complex. These prisoners, or “ghost detainees,” are a group of detainees that have been imprisoned without names, charges, or other documentation. According to Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba's February 26 report (see February 26, 2004), a number of jails operated by the 800th Military Police Brigade “routinely held” such prisoners “without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention.” Taguba will note that the practice is a “violation of international law.” [Los Angeles Times, 5/5/2004; Washington Post, 5/8/2004; Washington Post, 5/11/2004 Sources: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade]
People and organizations involved: Antonio M. Taguba  Additional Info 
          

January 13, 2004

       The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent who received the Abu Ghraib prison photographs from Spc. Joseph Darby (see January 13, 2004), calls his boss, a colonel, who takes them to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. [Signal Newspaper of Santa Clara, 7/4/2004] Within three days, a report on the photos makes its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who informs President Bush. [The New Yorker, 5/15/2004] Within the Pentagon, few people are informed—unusually few—according to Hersh, who will later write that knowledge of the abuses were “severely, and unusually restricted.” A former intelligence official will tell him: “I haven't talked to anybody on the inside who knew; nowhere. It's got them scratching their heads.” Rumsfeld and his civilian staff, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and Gen. John P. Abizaid, reportedly try to suppress the issue during the first months of the year. “They foresaw major diplomatic problems,” according to a Pentagon official. [The New Yorker, 5/17/2004] According to one former intelligence official, the Defense Secretary's attitude is: “We've got a glitch in the program. We'll prosecute it.” The former official explains to Seymour Hersh, “The cover story was that some kids got out of control.” [The New Yorker, 5/15/2004]
People and organizations involved: John P. Abizaid, George W. Bush, The New Yorker, Criminal Investigation Division, Donald Rumsfeld, Seymour Hersh, Ricardo S. Sanchez
          

January 19, 2004

       Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez orders a high level administrative investigation into the 800th Military Police Brigade apart from the criminal investigation that was announced three days earlier (see January 16, 2004). He appoints Major General Antonio M. Taguba to conduct the inquiry and limits the scope of the investigation to the conduct of the military police brigade. Taguba's report will be filed on February 26 (see February 26, 2004). [New York Times, 5/10/2004; Sydney Morning Herald, 5/4/2004 Sources: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade] As preparations for investigation are underway, investigators reportedly give the MPs at Abu Ghraib “a week's notice before inspecting their possessions.” [Sources: Several unnamed soldiers] Whether it is an attempt to sabotage the investigation, or a matter of clumsiness on the part of the military leadership or the CID, the result may well be that evidence of abuse is deliberately destroyed. “That shows you how lax they are about discipline. ‘We are going to look for contraband in here, so hint, hint, get rid of the stuff,’ that's the way things work in the Guard,” MP Ramone Leal will say. [Reuters, 5/6/2004]
People and organizations involved: Antonio M. Taguba, Ramone Leal, Ricardo S. Sanchez
          

February 26, 2004

       Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba files a 53-page classified report which finds that between October and December of 2003, members of the 372nd Military Police Company and US intelligence community engaged in numerous incidents of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” against prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. As evidence, he cites “detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence.” The photographs—which are later leaked to the press (see Mid-April 2004), causing an enormous international public outcry—are not included in the report. [The New Yorker, 5/10/2004; The New Yorker, 5/17/2004 Sources: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade] Taguba also takes issue with the November 5 (see November 5, 2003) Ryder report which concluded that the military police units had not intentionally used inappropriate confinement practices. “Contrary to the findings of MG [Maj. Gen.] Ryder's report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, CIA agents, and private contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.” [The New Yorker, 5/10/2004 Sources: Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade] He presents his report to his commander on March 3 (see March 3, 2004).
People and organizations involved: Antonio M. Taguba  Additional Info 
          

March 27, 2004

       In response to a request by Human Rights First, the Department of Defense says, “The number of detainees within Afghanistan is classified due to ongoing military operations and force protection concerns.” [Human Rights First, 6/2004]
People and organizations involved: Human Rights First
          

May 2004

       The US restricts the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) access to the Kandahar base, where there is a detention facility. “If Kandahar is being used as a detention facility and people are being detained there, we would expect to have access to them,” ICRC Kabul spokeswoman Jessica Barry says. [Reuters, 5/15/2004] Private non-profit organizations like Amnesty International also find it difficult or impossible to access US-run prisons in Afghanistan. “We have asked for access many times but in general there has been no response,” says Amnesty International's Nazia Hussein, “so it is very difficult to determine what conditions are like.” [The Guardian, 6/23/2004]
People and organizations involved: Nazia Hussein, Jessica Barry, International Committee of the Red Cross
          

May 4, 2004

       MPs evacuate all the prisoners from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib, except Huda al-Azzawi and a small number of other women in the upstairs cells. The guard assigned to her, “Mrs. Palmer,” tells them, according to Al-Azzawi, that during the inspection prisoners must lie quietly on their beds. They are promised with more time outside of their cells if they behave well. [The Guardian, 9/20/2004]
People and organizations involved: Huda al-Azzawi
          

May 5, 2004

       For the first time, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller leads a group of journalists around the Abu Ghraib prison. When prisoner Huda al-Azzawi sees Miller with the group of reporters, she shouts out: “We are not the killers. You are the killers. This is our country. You have invaded it.” [The Guardian, 9/20/2004] Journalists notice five women screaming and waving their arms through the iron bars. One of them, possibly Al-Azzawi, shouts in Arabic: “I've been here five months. I don't belong to the resistance. I have children at home.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004] The women had been instructed the day before to keep quiet (see May 4, 2004). Al-Azzawi recalls: “After that they didn't let me out of my cell for an entire month. A US officer came to me and said: ‘Because of you we have all been punished.’ ” [The Guardian, 9/20/2004] Elsewhere at Abu Ghraib, prisoners run out shouting as the bus with journalists drives by. A man with one leg waves his prosthetic leg in the air, shouting in Arabic: “Why? Why? Nobody has told me why I am here.” [CBS News, 5/5/2004]
People and organizations involved: Geoffrey D. Miller, Huda al-Azzawi
          

May 7, 2004

       US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Any suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened, and the damage it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding.” [Washington Post, 5/7/2004]
People and organizations involved: Donald Rumsfeld  Additional Info 
          

May 12, 2004

       Nouri Badranm, a former interior minister of Iraq's Governing Council, tells Reuters that US soldiers running detention camps in Baghdad concealed the conditions of the prison from Iraqi officials who came to inspect the facility. “Every time they had pressure on them and there was a visit, they arranged things in advance,” he explains. “They cleaned up the prison and fixed the situation of the prisoners. So when a council member or another official went there they saw nothing.” The former council member also says that occupation officials were aware that abuses were going on. “The abuses have been happening for a long time and the occupation forces knew about them. We heard about them from prisoners who were released. The occupation officials said nothing when we asked them.” [London Mirror, 5/13/2004; Reuters, 5/12/2004; China Central Television, 5/13/2004]
People and organizations involved: Nouri Badranm
          

May 12, 2004

       Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III reports to journalists the results of his review of prison operations at Guantanamo conducted the week before (see May 6-7, 2004). He finds: “There is a very, we have a very professional organization in place. With very detailed and understood roles and responsibilities. Strong leadership, strong chain of command, and a very positive command climate. The directions to the secretary of defense with respect to humane treatment of detainees and the interrogation techniques were being carried out as best we could determine.” Over a period going back to 2002, he only finds eight cases of mistreatment, which he repeatedly refers to as “minor infractions.” Four of the eight cases involved guards; three involved interrogators; and one involved a barber who gave a prisoner an “unauthorized” Mohawk-style haircut. Punishments, Church says, “ranged from admonishment to reduction in rate, and some cases maybe more.” One person, he says, was court-martialed. But, he says, “We found no evidence of current abuse ....” Church says he is “very impressed” with the small amount of infractions by prison guards and interrogators, when taking into account the stressful conditions they were working under, “particularly when you look at the other side, the 14 incidents against the guards weekly.” He says he was told that each week on average prison personnel are the victim of about 14 acts of abuse by prisoners against guards: “verbal harassment, throwing of excrement, that type of thing.” [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004] Church did not interview a single detainee during the course of his investigation. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004]
People and organizations involved: Donald Rumsfeld, Albert T. Church III
          

Before May 18, 2004

       Sgt. Samuel Provance of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion is interviewed by Maj. Gen. George Fay. But according to Provance, the general seems interested only in the part played by the military police, not the interrogators. Fay, who has been charged with determining the role of military intelligence in the abuses committed against detainees, also appears to discourage Provance from testifying, threatening to recommend administrative action against him that would bar promotions for failing to report what he knew sooner. [ABC News, 5/18/2004] Shortly after the interview, Provance receives written orders not to discuss Abu Ghraib. [The Chicago Tribune, 5/20/2004] He becomes convinced that the government is engaged in a cover-up. [ABC News, 5/18/2004]
People and organizations involved: George R. Fay, Samuel Provance
          

May 18, 2004

       Sgt. Samuel Provance of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion tells ABC News that the US military is engaged in a cover-up of the Abu Ghraib abuses. “There's definitely a cover-up,” he says. “People are either telling themselves or being told to be quiet.” He also says the MPs seen in the photos with naked Iraqi prisoners at the prison were acting under orders from military intelligence. “Anything [the MPs] were to do legally or otherwise, they were to take those commands from the interrogators.... One interrogator told me about how commonly the detainees were stripped naked, and in some occasions, wearing women's underwear. If it's your job to strip people naked, yell at them, scream at them, humiliate them, it's not going to be too hard to move from that to another level.” [ABC News, 5/18/2004; Washington Post, 5/20/2004]
People and organizations involved: Samuel Provance
          

May 19, 2004

       Lt. Col. Tucker Mansager tells reporters that the media will not be permitted access to secret detention facilities in Afghanistan, claiming that to do so would violate the prisoners' rights under the Geneva Conventions. However in February 2002, the administration had denied “prisoner of war” status to all Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan (see February 7, 2002) on grounds they were “illegal combatants.” Since then, the US has maintained that these prisoners are not protected by the Conventions. Nonetheless, Mansager explains: “Part of ... spirit [of the Geneva Conventions] is to ensure that the persons under confinement are not subject to any kind of exploitation. It is the coalition's position that allowing media into the facilities would compromise that protection.” [Reuters, 5/19/2004]
People and organizations involved: Tucker Mansager
          

May 20, 2004

       FBI Director Robert Mueller appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee and is asked if the FBI is aware of prisoner abuse by the military or the CIA similar to what happened at Abu Ghraib. Mueller is said to appear “uneasy and unusually hesitant.” Sen. Dianne Feinstein says: “He gave me a kind of gobbledygook answer. At best his answer was confusing and at worst it was obfuscatory.” Mueller's response is that FBI agents “on occasion ... may disagree with the handling of a particular interview.” [Newsweek, 1/6/2005]
People and organizations involved: Robert S. Mueller III, Dianne Feinstein
          

May 20-21, 2004

       Lt. Col. Ricardo S. Sanchez and Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller appear before a classified session of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The following day, Representative Jane Harman shoots a letter off to Miller saying there were “gaps and discrepancies” in his presentation and accuses him of selectively withholding information. She also tells him that she now questions his candor. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004]
People and organizations involved: Ricardo S. Sanchez, Geoffrey D. Miller, Jane Harman, US Congress
          

May 21, 2004

       After speaking to the media (see May 18, 2004) (see May 19, 2004), Sgt. Samuel Provance receives a disciplinary order from his battalion commander, Lt. Col. James Norwood, notifying him that he has been stripped of his security clearance, transferred to a different platoon, and made ineligible for promotions or awards. He is also informed that he may be prosecuted for speaking out because his comments were “not in the national interest.” [ABC News, 5/21/2004] Norwood says: “There is reason for me to believe that you may have been aware of the improper treatment of the detainees at Abu Ghraib before they were reported by other soldiers.” The conclusions of Maj. Gen. George Fay's investigation (see August 25, 2004), Norwood warns, “may reveal that you should face adverse action for your failure to report.” [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] Indeed, the Fay report will conclude that Provance “[f]ailed to report detainee abuse” and “[f]ailed to obey a direct order.” Maj. Gen. Fay will also write, “He interfered with this investigation by talking about the investigation, giving interviews to the media, and passing the questions being asked by investigators to others via a website.” [Sources: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 8/23/2004] Provance's attorney, Scott Horton, believes the military is intimidating soldiers in an effort to prevent them from speaking out about what they know. “I see it as an effort to intimidate Sgt. Provance and any other soldier whose conscience is bothering him, and who wants to come forward and tell what really happened at Abu Ghraib,” he says. [ABC News, 5/21/2004]
People and organizations involved: James Norwood, Samuel Provance, Scott Horton, George R. Fay
          

May 21, 2004

       White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales stresses in an interview that President Bush had urged interrogation and detention policy to be legally sound. Gonzales says, “Anytime a discussion came up about interrogations with the president, ... the directive was, ‘Make sure it is lawful. Make sure it meets all of our obligations under the Constitution, US federal statutes and applicable treaties.’ ” [Washington Post, 6/9/2004]
People and organizations involved: Alberto R. Gonzales
          

May 24, 2004

       When the Taguba report (see March 9, 2004), which together with all its 106 annexes includes 6,000 pages, is delivered by the Pentagon to the Senate Armed Services Committee, some 2,000 pages are missing, withheld by the Defense Department. Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita calls this an “oversight.” [Associated Press, 5/24/2004] Nevertheless, the missing pages contain key documents, internal Army memos and e-mails, sworn statements by soldiers, officers, contractors, and prisoners. It also includes the final section of Taguba's interview with Col. Thomas M. Pappas. [Newsweek, 6/7/2004] The missing annexes of the Taguba report hold evidence that the abuse was not conducted solely by a few MPs acting on their own, but instead at the instigation and with the involvement of military intelligence personnel.
People and organizations involved: US Congress, Thomas M. Pappas, Larry DiRita
          

June 2, 2004

       The American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and four other independent organizations file a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act demanding the release of information about detainees held by the United States at military bases and other detention facilities overseas. “The government's ongoing refusal to release these records is absolutely unacceptable, particularly in light of the severity of the abuses we know to have occurred,” says Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU staff lawyer. More than seven months have passed since the initial request (see October 7, 2003) was made to the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security and Justice, and the CIA for these documents. [ACLU, 6/2/2004]
People and organizations involved: American Civil Liberties Union
          

June 7, 2004

       Cpt. Bruce Frame, a US Army spokesman for CENTCOM, tells Human Rights First that there “may or may not” be detention centers in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan. [Human Rights First, 6/2004]
People and organizations involved: Human Rights First, Bruce Frame
          

June 8, 2004

       Attorney General John Ashcroft tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that he will not discuss the contents of the August 2002 memo (see August 1, 2002), recently leaked to the press, nor turn it over to the committee. “I believe it is essential to the operation of the executive branch that the president has the opportunity to get information from the attorney general that is confidential,” he says. [Washington Post, 6/8/2004]
People and organizations involved: John Ashcroft
          

Shortly Before June 12, 2004

       The legal office of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo issues a warning to military and civilian personnel at Guantanamo, titled Interaction with Defense Counsel, informing them that they are not required to provide the attorneys of detainees statements on the “personal treatment of detainees” or any “failure to report actions of others.” Refusing to cooperate with the attorneys, the document states, “will not impact your career.” [USA Today, 6/12/2004]
          

June 23, 2004

       The Guardian of London, during the course of an in-depth investigation of the Bagram air base in Afghanistan, learns that while some of the base's prisoners are being transferred to Guantanamo, others are being purposely kept off the books, a practice that a human rights organization has coined, “RPing,” or “Rumsfeld Processing.” These detainees are sometimes rendered to the intelligence services of Egypt or other foreign governments for interrogation. [The Guardian, 6/23/2004]
          

June 25, 2004

       In an “Urgent Report” addressed to FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, an FBI official says that an unidentified individual has “observed numerous physical abuse incidents of Iraqi civilian detainees conducted in ... Iraq.” According to the FBI official, the informant said that the abuses included “strangulation, beatings, placement of lit cigarettes into the detainees ear openings, and unauthorized interrogations.” The FBI official also says that the informant provided the name of a person involved in covering up these abuses. The report is later released to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in a heavily redacted state, with several paragraphs blanked out. [Sources: FBI urgent report, 6/25/2004]
People and organizations involved: American Civil Liberties Union, Robert S. Mueller III
          

Early July 2004

       A CD is found during a routine clean-up of the office of a captain at Bagram. The CD contains half a dozen photographs showing uniformed but masked US soldiers pointing their M-4 rifles and 9-mm guns at the heads of handcuffed and hooded or blindfolded detainees. In one photo, a detainee has his head pushed against the wall of a cage. The shots were apparently taken in and around a US base in southern Afghanistan near the village of Deh Rawod, called Fire Base Tycze, between December 2003 and February 2004. The unit responsible for the photographs is the 2nd platoon of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, based at Fort Drum, NY. Soldiers of this unit admit to Army investigators that similar photos were purposely destroyed after the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted. A specialist explains in a report dated July 8, 2004, “After seeing the problems they had in Iraq, I knew this was a problem and should have never been done. I realized there would be another public outrage if these photographs got out, so they were destroyed. I knew it was wrong after I [saw] the reports in the newspaper on the prison abuse scandal in Iraq.” The destruction is an apparently unit-wide effort. A staff sergeant tells a specialist to “get rid of the pictures” and a specialist says he “verbally counseled” a soldier to “get rid of” his photographs. Another says, “I realize it makes me and my unit look bad, and in no way meant for this to happen.” The destroyed pictures allegedly depicted detainees being kicked and beaten. [Los Angeles Times, 2/18/2005 Sources: Memo, US Department of Army, 8/5/2004, Memo, US Department of Army, 8/2/2004, Memo, US Department of Army, 8/25/2004, Memo, US Department of Army, 7/8/2004, Commander Report, 10/11/2004]
          

July 2004

       Scott Horton of the New York City Bar Association says that investigations by the Pentagon “have a reputation for tending to whitewash, but even taking this into account, the current investigations seem to be setting new standards.” He adds: “Rumsfeld has completely rigged the investigations. My friends say we should expect something much akin to the army inspector general's report— ‘just a few rotten apples.’ ” [The Guardian, 9/13/2004]
People and organizations involved: Scott Horton, Donald Rumsfeld
          

Mid-August 2004

       The UN's independent expert on human rights in Afghanistan, Cherif Bassiouni, visits the Afghan government's Pul-i-Charkhi prison in Kabul where 725 Taliban members and Pakistani supporters are being held. After his visit, he describes conditions at the prison as “inhuman” and says that the prisoners should be released. He also wanted to visit the US-run detention centers in Afghanistan but US authorities rejected his request. Bassiouni says the US's lack of transparency “raises serious concerns about the legality of detention and conditions of those detainees.” [Reuters, 8/22/2004]
People and organizations involved: Cherif Bassiouni
          

Mid-May 2004

       A native German speaker visits Khalid el-Masri in the US prison in Kabul but does not identify himself. “I asked him,” El-Masri recalls, “ ‘Are you from the German authorities?’ He says: ‘I do not want to answer that question.’ When I asked him if the German authorities knew that I was there, he answered: ‘I can't answer this question.’ ” What the German is able to tell him, is that one of the obstacles to his release is that the Americans do not want to leave any evidence that el-Masri has ever been in the prison. [The Guardian, 1/14/2005]
People and organizations involved: Khalid el-Masri
          

July 15, 2004

       After months of ignoring requests from the Senate Armed Services Committee for Red Cross reports on detention operations at US-run prisons in Iraq, [New York Times (Editorial), 7/24/2004] the Pentagon finally delivers 24 of the organization's 25 reports. [New York Times, 7/16/2004] But the reports are shown only briefly to senators and a few members of the Armed Services Committee staff before being taken back to the Pentagon. [New York Times, 7/16/2004]
People and organizations involved: International Committee of the Red Cross  Additional Info 
          

Morning July 22, 2004

       The US Army's inspector general, Lt. Gen. Paul T. Mikolashek, presents a 300-page report listing 94 documented cases of prisoner abuse to the Senate Armed Services Committee. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004] Of the 94 cases cited in the report, 39 are deaths. Twenty of those are suspected homicides. [Los Angeles Times, 10/15/2004] In preparing the report, Mikolashek's team visited more than two dozen US military installations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the US. Unlike previous investigations, Mikolashek did not look at individual cases. Instead, his team reviewed records of reported cases and the findings of previous investigations. Team members also interviewed 650 soldiers and officers and looked at broad Army doctrine and training. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004] Mikolashek's report concludes that abuses were not due to “systemic” problems. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004] For example, it found no evidence that there was a “pattern of abuse” in the central command's area of responsibility. [New York Times, 6/6/2004] The report's conclusions are made in spite of the fact that the investigative team identified numerous problems at the prison stemming from poorly trained US military personnel, inadequate supervision, and vague and contradictory policies and orders. According to Mikolashek, documented cases of abuse were “aberrations” that did not follow from Army doctrine but from the “the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline.” They were, the report stressed, “unauthorized actions taken by a few individuals.” The conduct of most of the soldiers, however, exhibited “military professionalism, ingrained Army values, and moral courage,” the report insisted. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004] The report's conclusions stand in stark contrast to the Red Cross's report (see February 24, 2004), released in late February, which concluded that problems in the US detention system were widespread and systemic. Though the report will be heavily criticized for its conclusion that military and administration officials should not be blamed for the atrocities, it does contain an abundant amount of evidence that they created an environment that encouraged the abuses to happen. For example, Mikolashek's team found:
The military hired private contractors to interrogate detainees because the military had too few translators and interrogators in the field. More than a third of these private contractors were not sufficiently trained. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

Almost two thirds of the prisoners were kept in makeshift prison camps, or collection points, for as many as 30 days—60 times the 12-hour limit set by Army doctrine. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

Preventive medical services were insufficient. Not one of the US-run facilities visited by the team met the Army's medical screening requirements. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

Copies of the Geneva Conventions in the detainees' native languages were present at only four of the 16 facilities visited by Mikolashek's team, in contravention of international law. There was not a single US-run facility in Afghanistan that had a copy. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

At Abu Ghraib, the conditions were extremely unsanitary. The prison was seriously overcrowded, lacked an adequate supply of potable water, and had garbage and sewage strewn on the grounds of the outdoor camps. There were only 12 showers available for 600 to 700 detainees. Meals provided to the detainees were often contaminated with dirt and rodent droppings. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

The Bagram base in Afghanistan had a leaking roof and no sanitary system. “Human waste spills were frequent on the main floor,” the reports says. Sections of the base were contaminated with toxic chemicals leftover from previous airport operations. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

The military's interrogation policy was confusing and instructions were often conflicting. “While the language of the approved policies could be viewed as a careful attempt to draw the line between lawful and unlawful conduct, the published instructions left considerable room for misapplication.” This could “create settings in which unsanctioned behavior, including detainee abuse, could occur,” the report's authors conclude. [Washington Post, 7/23/2004]

People and organizations involved: Paul T. Mikolashek, International Committee of the Red Cross
          

August 2004

       Portions of the Fay report (see August 25, 2004) are leaked to the Baltimore Sun. It is quickly characterized as a deliberate cover-up to protect senior military and civilian officials. [Sunday Telegraph, 8/15/2004]
          

August 2004

       Referring to the forthcoming Fay report (see August 25, 2004), an unnamed Pentagon adviser tells the Telegraph of London: “Some of the military lawyers are incandescent. There's been a deliberate attempt to make sure the buck stops well before it gets to the doors of the civilian hierarchy.” [Sunday Telegraph, 8/15/2004]
          

August 2004

       A lawyer, who has been in regular communication with military officials about the problem of prisoner abuse, tells the Telegraph of London that the soon-to-be-released Fay report (see August 25, 2004) is a whitewash: “This is a whitewash—a carefully orchestrated one. People in the Pentagon have been coming to me in a fury because of the way this has been handled. By naming military intelligence officials as well as the seven military police who have been charged, it will look like action has been taken. But basically it's still the same storyline of just a few bad apples, way down the food chain.” [Sunday Telegraph, 8/15/2004]
          

Shortly before August 24, 2004

       An unnamed Defense Department official tells the Washington Post that the soon-to-be-released Fay report (see August 25, 2004), authored by Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones and Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, will demonstrate that the prisoner abuses “were bad, illegal, unauthorized, and some of it was sadistic.” But the report will conclude that they were “the actions of a few; actions that went unnoticed because of leadership failures.” [Washington Post, 8/24/2004]
People and organizations involved: Anthony R. Jones, George R. Fay
          

Shortly before August 24, 2004

       An unnamed Army officer, interviewed by the Washington Post, says that an incident involving two MP dog handlers who were competing to be the first to make juvenile detainees urinate on themselves had “nothing to do with interrogation.” Rather, “It was just them on their own being weird,” he contends. [Washington Post, 8/24/2004]
          

October 2004

       The FBI prepares a detailed 300-page report in response to follow-up questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee about Director Mueller's earlier testimony on May 20, 2004 (see May 20, 2004) regarding incidents of abuse known by the FBI. However the Justice Department refuses to release the report saying that it must first review it. [Newsweek, 1/06/2005]
People and organizations involved: Robert S. Mueller III
          

October 15, 2004

       The CIA says in a court filing that it cannot confirm or deny the existence of documents being sought after by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) “because to do so would tend to reveal classified information and intelligence sources and methods that are protected from disclosure.” The ACLU sued the government for access to the documents two months earlier. The documents, which a US District Court ordered the government to provide (see August 12, 2004), relate to the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo and Afghanistan. [Boston Globe, 12/27/2004]
People and organizations involved: American Civil Liberties Union
          


Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under the Creative Commons License below:

Creative Commons License Home |  About this Site |  Development |  Donate |  Contact Us
Privacy Policy  |  Terms of Use