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General Topic Areas

Indoor remediation
Misuse of EPA standards (17)
EPA's reponse (21)
Personal stories (3)
Government statements (34)
Expert opinions/Independent studies (36)
Rescue/recovery workers (18)
Government tests (33)
Deception (22)
Documented cases WTC-related illness (4)

Specific Issues and Cases

The Transfer of the EPA Ombudsman (22)
Asbestos removal in Libby, Montana (7)
USGS assessment (9)
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Environmental Impact of 9/11

 
  

Project: Environmental impact of 911 attacks

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1970

       A Senate report on Section 303 of the Clean Air Act states: “The levels of concentration of air pollution agents or combination of agents which substantially endanger health are levels which should never be reached in any community. When the prediction can reasonably be made that such elevated levels could be reached even for a short period of time—that is that they are imminent—an emergency action plan should be implemented.” [Nadler, 3/11/2003 Sources: Guidance on Use of Section 303 of the Clean Air Act, September 15, 1983]
          

1972

       With the passage of the Clean Water Act of 1972, the scope of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) is extended to cover hazardous substance releases in addition to oil spills. [EPA, n.d.] The NCP is a component of the US government's National Response System, “a multi-layered system of individuals and teams from local, state, and federal agencies, industry, and other organizations that share expertise and resources to ensure that oil spill control and cleanup activities are timely and efficient” and that threats to human health and the environment are minimized. [EPA website, 4/19/2004] When in effect, the plan is administered by the EPA, which is required by law to follow specific procedures and guidelines, including designating an “On-Scene Coordinator” (OSC), who is responsible for directing response efforts and coordinating all other efforts at the scene of a discharge or release. In the event that the EPA delegates any tasks to state or local authorities, the EPA is responsible for ensuring that the response is in accordance with EPA standards. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003; US Law, Title 40, Part 300]
          

January 1995

       The EPA designates 232 homes and businesses in Lorain County, Ohio as Superfund sites. The buildings had been illegally sprayed with the pesticide methyl parathion by an exterminator. [Disease Prevention News, 5/28/1998] The cleanup is performed by the EPA in collaboration with other federal agencies. “Many of the homes had to have wallboard, carpeting, and baseboards removed when repeated surface cleaning failed to remove trace amounts of methyl parathion,” a report in Environmental Health Perspectives explains. “Residents had to be temporarily relocated, personal items replaced, and transportation to schools and workplaces provided.” [Environmental Health Perspectives, 12/2002] The cleanup cost taxpayers more than $20 million. [Disease Prevention News, 5/28/1998]
People and organizations involved: Environmental Protection Agency
          

November 1996

       The EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) discover more than 1,100 homes in Jackson County, Mississippi that were sprayed with methyl parathion illegally by Reuben Brown, an unlicensed exterminator. The EPA designates the homes as Superfund sites and oversees a $50 million cleanup. More than 1,600 people will be relocated during the cleanup. [Environmental Health Perspectives, 12/2002; Disease Prevention News, 5/28/1998; Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
People and organizations involved: Environmental Protection Agency, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Reuben Brown
          

April 1997

       The EPA designates more than 98 homes in the Chicago area as a Superfund site. The homes had been illegally sprayed with the pesticide methyl parathion by Reuben Brown, an unlicensed exterminator. The homes are decontaminated at a cost of around $7.5 million. [Environmental Health Perspectives, 12/2002; Disease Prevention News, 5/28/1998; Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
People and organizations involved: Reuben Brown, Environmental Protection Agency
          

(August 2001)

       The EPA begins removing asbestos from private homes in Libby, Montana where a nearby mining operation contaminated the surrounding area (see November 21, 1999). The EPA conducts the cleanup operation under the authority of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (see 1972). [Jenkins, 12/3/2001; Jenkins, 1/11/2002; Kupferman, 2003; EPA, n.d.] In some cases, it will be necessary for the EPA to take extreme measures to ensure that asbestos levels in certain homes meet EPA standards. For example, the agency will have to completely demolish one home and rebuild it after the standard procedures of replacing carpets, upholstered furniture, and professional abatement fail to reduce the presence of asbestos to an acceptable level. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
People and organizations involved: Environmental Protection Agency
          

September 7, 2001)

       EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman tells residents at a town hall meeting in Libby, Montana, a designated Superfund Site where the EPA is remediating asbestos contamination (see (August 2001)), “It has never been our plan to look to you to pay for any part of this cleanup, including the cleanup of residential properties.” [EPA, 9/7/2001]
People and organizations involved: Christine Todd Whitman
          

After September 11, 2001

       The EPA assigns the NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) with the task of ensuring that Lower Manhattan homes and businesses are safe for re-occupation. The EPA is bound by the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to see that the City of New York adheres to, and enforces, all EPA standards (see 1972). [Jenkins, 7/4/2003; US Law, Title 40, Part 300] The city, in turn, will leave the job of testing and cleanup to the building owners and residents themselves. Neither the city nor the EPA will inform them of the federal regulations that govern asbestos testing and abatement. Instead, the City's health department will provide residents, landlords, and building owners with a tip sheet consisting of instructions “for people reoccupying commercial buildings and residences” that is completely wrong (see September 16, 2001) (see September 17, 2001). [The Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2002; Nadler, 3/18/02]
People and organizations involved: Hugh Granger
          

9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001

       The World Trade Center twin towers collapse—the south tower at 9:59 a.m. and the north tower half an hour later at 10:28 a.m. [New York Times, 9/12/01; AP, 8/19/02; CNN, 9/12/01; MSNBC, 9/22/01; New York Times, 9/12/01; Washington Post, 9/12/01] The collapses create huge dust clouds that roll through the streets of Lower Manhattan, breaking windows and forcing dust and debris into the interior of surrounding buildings.
Composition of dust - Chemicals and materials present in the billowing clouds include pulverized plaster, paint, foam, glass fibers and fragments, fiberglass, cement, vermiculite (used as a fire retardant instead of asbestos), chrysotile asbestos, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), polychlorinated biphenyls, polychlorinated dibenzodioxins, polychlorinated dibenzofurans, pesticides, phthalate esters, brominated diphenyl ethers, cotton fibers and lint, tarry and charred wood, soot, rubber, paper and plastic. [Environmental Perspectives, 7/2002; Chemical and Engineering News, 10/20/2003; CNN, 11/4/2001; Allergy, Asthma & Immunology Online, 9/15/2001]
The dust has an extremely high pH. [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2/10/02]
Distribution of dust and debris - The debris will be distributed very unevenly throughout the city because of their varying weights. Dusts containing relatively heavy components, such as pulverized concrete and glass, will settle near the World Trade Center, whereas dust containing lighter components, like asbestos, will fall to the ground in greater relative concentrations at a further distance. Heavy metals—including zinc, strontium, lead and aluminum—will also be deposited a relatively large distance away from the disaster site. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003; Environmental Health Perspectives, 7/2002]

Composition of smoke/debris plume - Combustible materials buried in the rubble of the towers will provide fuel for a fire that will burn until December. Many of the materials are made of substances that when burned release highly toxic fumes. According to Thomas Cahill, a professor of physics and engineering, “The debris pile acted like a chemical factory. It cooked together the components and the buildings and their contents, including enormous numbers of computers, and gave off gases of toxic metals, acids, and organics for at least six weeks.” [Reuters, 9/11/2003]

The two towers contained as many as 50,000 personal computers, each containing small amounts of mercury and about 4 lbs of lead. The towers also contained roughly 300 mainframe computers. [Kupferman, 2003; Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2002]

Thousands of fluorescent lamps in the buildings contained mercury. [Kupferman, 2003; Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2002]

Thousands of chairs and other office furniture contained chemicals like polybrominated diphenyl ethers, which pose dangers similar to PCBs. [Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2002]

Several of the WTC's tenants are known to have had toxic materials on site. For example, there was a Secret Service shooting range that kept millions of rounds of lead ammunition on hand. And a US Customs lab had in its inventory thousands of pounds of arsenic, lead, mercury, chromium, and other toxic substances. [Kupferman, 2003]

Other products in the buildings included synthetic fabrics, plastics, laminates, the di-electric fluids that encase electrical cables, capacitors, electrical cable insulation and transformers. The toxins resulting from the combustion of these materials include toxic lead, volatile organic compounds, dioxins (see December 27, 2002), mercury, nickel, vandium, sulphur, PAHs, PCBs and furans. [Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2002]

Distribution of smoke/debris plume - The aerosol plume will move from the WTC site in Lower Manhattan directly over Brooklyn where it will drop much of its toxic debris, contaminating the neighborhoods of Brooklyn Heights, DUMBO (Down Under the Manhattan Bridge Overpass), Cobble Hill, Boerum Hill, Park Slope and beyond. New York City Council member David Yassky, who is in Brooklyn campaigning on this day, will later recount in an interview with Newsday, “ There was a film of dust on everything—on cars, stores, everywhere in Brooklyn Heights. If you were there, as I was, you saw several hours of debris rain down on your neighborhood.” [Newsday, 9/30/2002; Newsday, 8/23/2002]

          

5:20 p.m. September 11, 2001

       The 47-story WTC Building 7 collapses. It housed New York City's emergency command center, offices of the FBI, CIA, and various commercial offices. The collapse of the building buries an electrical substation containing more than 130,000 gallons of oil from transformers and high-voltage lines—most of which contain low levels of hazardous PCBs—that will provide fuel for a fire that will burn for more than three months contaminating the city's air with a number of toxins including dibenzo-p-dioxins, dibenzofurans and other polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons. [Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, 1/9/02; Kupferman, 2003; Stanford Report, 12/5/01; The Washington Post, 9/12/01; Environmental Law, 12/26/2001; New York Daily News, 11/27/2001; New York Daily News, 11/29/2001 Sources: letter, 11/26/01]
          

(September 13, 2001)

       EPA administrator Christie Whitman recommends that New Yorkers who evacuated their homes after the collapse of the World Trade Center “vacuum everything, including air conditioning filters, and wipe all surfaces with a damp cloth,” Newsweek reports. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003; Newsweek, 9/14/2001] The recommendation is made despite two studies completed for the EPA in 1993 demonstrating that HEPA vacuums do not effectively remove asbestos from carpets and upholstery (see 1993) and that vacuuming actually increases asbestos levels in the air during use (see 1993).
People and organizations involved: Environmental Protection Agency, Christine Todd Whitman
          

September 16, 2001

       The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issues a public notice advising building owners and building maintenance managers located south of 14th Street to replace filters in air circulation systems and to run their systems on the recirculation mode until fires at the World Trade Center are extinguished. The agency also recommends that owners and managers contract professionals to test their buildings for the presence of asbestos and other hazardous materials prior to beginning cleanup by maintenance employees. If the presence of harmful contaminants are detected, they must telephone the DEP, where a staff employee will review each case and provide verbal approval. [New York City Department of Health, 9/16/01]
People and organizations involved: The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
          

Shortly after September 17, 2001

       Residents at 150 Franklin Street, a seven-story cooperatively owned building several blocks north of Ground Zero, clean their apartments according to the instructions provided by the New York City Department of Health (see September 17, 2001). They also sweep the roof and other common areas. Despite their efforts, the building will test positive for asbestos in April 2002 (see April 15, 2002-April 18, 2002). [The Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2002]
          

September 17, 2001

       The New York City Department of Health (DOH) issues recommendations for people reoccupying commercial buildings and residences. [New York City Department of Health, 9/17/2001]
Recommendations -

The NYC DOH advises residents not return to apartments or workplaces south of Warren Street, west of Broadway, and north of Exchange Street, until the buildings have been approved to resume tenancy by building management.

The DOH recommends that people wear dust masks upon re-entering their indoor areas. After indoor spaces have been cleaned as per instructions, it should not be necessary to wear dust masks.

The advisory recommends that residents and people working downtown clean homes and offices using “a wet rag or wet mop.”

Additional suggestions include shampooing and vacuuming carpets and upholstery with a HEPA vacuum or a normal vacuum fitted with a HEPA filter. The recommendation is made despite two studies completed for the EPA in 1993 demonstrating that HEPA vacuums do not effectively remove asbestos from carpets and upholstery (see 1993) and that vacuuming actually increases asbestos levels in the air during use (see 1993).

The advisory recommends that residents filter the air in their homes with HEPA air purifiers.

NYC DOH instructs residents to “wash heavily soiled or dusty clothing or linens twice” and remove “lint from washing machines and filters in the dryers with each laundry load.”

The recommendations say that if the “apartment is very dusty,” curtains should be washed or HEPA vacuumed. “If curtains need to be taken down, take them down slowly to keep dust from circulating in the air,” it adds.

Residents are advised to bathe pets “with running water from a hose or faucet.” The advisory adds that “their paws should be wiped to avoid tracking dust inside the home.”

The advisory also states to “[k]eep outdoor dust from entering the home” by keeping the “windows closed” and setting the “conditioner to re-circulate air (closed vents).”

The advisory repeats earlier assertions that air monitoring indicates levels of airborne asbestos fibers detected in outside air does not pose a significant threat to human health. “Based on the asbestos test results received thus far, there are no significant health risks to occupants in the affected area or to the general public,” the agency claims. The DOH's recommendations are criticized by industrial hygienists and other experts. The advisory is criticized for failing to mention that the “dust” inside these homes could possibly contain asbestos and other toxic substances and for neglecting to inform people that stringent national statutes regulate asbestos removal, requiring professional abatement of materials or dust that contain asbestos or other hazardous substances. US statutory code does not permit unlicensed individuals or contractors, much less residents, to perform asbestos removal. [The Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2002; New York Daily News, 11/20/2001; NYC DOH, 9/16/2001; Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
In spite of these problems, the EPA website will link to the notice. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 2/10/02] and refer people to it who email the agency with questions about the safety of indoor air (see After November 1, 2001) (see After November 10, 2001). Some people, however, never even learn of this advisory and—after hearing repeated assurances from officials about safe environmental conditions—clean their indoor spaces as they otherwise would under normal conditions. [Nadler, 3/18/02] Residents who do hire professional cleaners will find that their homes are still not safe. In November, American Medical News reports numerous doctors in NYC are seeing patients with respiratory conditions.“Their apartments were covered in dust, and have since been professionally cleaned” Ira Finegold, MD, chief of allergy at St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center, will say. “But they return, and after 20 minutes, they're developing a raspy cough.” [American Medical News, 11/26/2001]
People and organizations involved: New York City Department of Health, Ira Finegold  Additional Info 
          

September 22, 2001

       The New York City Department of Health issues a press release reiterating earlier public statements regarding the air quality in Manhattan and announces that the agency has distributed over 50,000 copies of the New York City Department of Health's recommendations for tenant re-occupancy (see September 17, 2001). The press release quotes New York City Health Commissioner Neal L. Cohen, MD, who asserts that “there are no significant adverse health risks to the general public....” and “all residents and business owners should check with their building managers or owners to make sure that their buildings are safe, and have been certified for re-occupancy.” Residents and business owners who are permitted to return to their buildings “should follow Health Department recommendations to minimize exposure to dust and other particulate matter that may cause throat and eye irritation,” he says. The statement goes on to say that only people who live or work “within the general vicinity of the blast zone ... and who have been approved to resume tenancy are advised to wear a dust mask while outside. Dust masks are not necessary for residents in other areas.” Tenants following the DEP's cleanup guidelines should find it “unnecessary to wear a mask while inside buildings,” the statement says. [New York City Department of Health, 9/22/01]
People and organizations involved: New York City Department of Health, Neal L. Cohen, M.D.
          

September 26, 2001

       The American Lung Association announces plans to distribute more than 10,000 cleanup kits to assist people returning to their homes. Each “Operation Return Home” kit will include recommendations (see September 17, 2001) from the city's department of health on how to properly clean their residences as well as a dust mask and a pair of latex gloves for cleaning. [Associated Press, 9/26/01 cited in Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
People and organizations involved: American Lung Association
          

October 2001

       Residents living close to the World Trade Center site complain of ailments they suspect are tied to airborne toxins and dust particles. For example, David Dallow, a resident of Battery Park City apartment, located roughly 100 yards away from the ruins, tells New York Magazine that every time he goes back to his apartment he gets a sore throat, a headache, and a rash. [New York Magazine, 10/22/01]
People and organizations involved: David Dallow
          

October 3, 2001-March 1, 2004

       EPA Region 2 says at least four times, and the New York City Department of Health and Environmental Protection at least once, that they are using a protective standard under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) to determine whether indoor and outdoor air pose a threat to public health. They assert that the standard is regularly used to determine whether it is safe for school children to return to school buildings after asbestos has been removed or abated. According to the agencies, the standard designates an asbestos level of 70 or fewer structures per square millimeter as safe. [Jenkins memo, March 11, 2002] For example, on a page explaining its “benchmarks, standards and guidelines established to protect public health,” the EPA states: “In evaluating data from the World Trade Center and the surrounding areas, EPA is using a protective standard under AHERA, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, to evaluate the risk from asbestos in the outdoor and indoor air. This is a very stringent standard that is used to determine whether children may re-enter a school building after asbestos has been removed or abated.... To determine asbestos levels, air filters are collected from monitoring equipment through which air in the school building has passed and viewed through a microscope. The number of structures—material that has asbestos fibers on or in it—is then counted. The measurements must be 70 or fewer structures per square millimeter before children are allowed inside.” [EPA, 3/1/2004] But according to Title 40, part 763.90, of the Code of Federal Regulations, the 70 s/mm [Jenkins, 3/11/2002] Instead, AHERA sets as the EPA's cleanup goal an exposure level which scientists have determined has a risk level lower than the EPA's maximum risk level of 10 [Sources: EPA, CASRN 1332-21-4, n.d., Jenkins memo, March 11, 2002] The significance of the two agencies' misstatements cannot be overstated as the 70 s/mm [Jenkins, 3/11/2002]
People and organizations involved: New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), Cate Jenkins, PhD., Environmental Protection Agency  Additional Info 
          

After November 1, 2001

       The EPA uses a form letter to respond to inquiries from people who live and work in Manhattan asking how they should clean their interior spaces. The letter instructs them to follow the procedures outlined in the New York Department of Health's September 17 advisory (see September 17, 2001). “The EPA does not have jurisdiction or oversight of indoor air quality or indoor cleanups,” the letter explains. “New York City (NYC) has the primary authority and responsibility for reoccupancy of buildings and health issues. Since you work very close to the WTC it is important that the recommendations of the New York City Department of Health (NYCDOH) and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) on how to clean up be followed.... The NYCDOH fact sheet on the internet (http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doh/html/alerts/wtc3.html) contains recommendations for people reoccupying commercial buildings and residents re-entering their homes. Should the need arise to investigate the requirements for remediation of your residence, the NYCDEP has compiled a list of asbestos investigators, remediation contractors and air monitoring firms.” [cited in Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
          

After November 1, 2001

       The EPA will repeatedly claim that it does not have jurisdiction or oversight over indoor tests or cleanups of residences and businesses. Critics who disagree note that:
The EPA's response to the 9/11 attacks were coordinated under the authority of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (see (8:50 a.m. EST) September 11, 2001), which requires that when the EPA delegates any tasks to state or local authorities, the agency ensures that their responses are in accordance with EPA standards (see 1972). Therefore, according to the NCP, the EPA does have jurisdiction over inside air.

Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, the EPA commenced the abatement of homes in Libby, Montana where a nearby mining operation had contaminated the surrounding area (see (August 2001)). Libby asbestos remediation commenced under the authority of the National Contingency Plan (NCP). [Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
In Libby, the highest level of asbestos found in a home was 3,658 structures per square centimeter (s/cm [MSNBC, 1/11/2002; Jenkins, 7/4/2003 Sources: Chatfield Technical Consulting Limited, 10/12/2001] In December, the EPA will “fast-track” the Libby site to a place on the National Priorities List as a Superfund site after a request from Montana's governor (see December 20, 2001). In New York, Governor Pataki will make no similar request for the areas affected by World Trade Center collapse. [Kupferman, 2003; Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
The EPA is taking responsibility for the indoor environmental conditions at numerous contaminated sites across the US, including at Herculaneum, Missouri; McFarland, California; and Kellogg, Idaho. [Nadler, 1/7/2002]

The EPA has decontaminated more than 1400 homes and businesses in Illinois, Mississippi, and Ohio after the buildings were illegally sprayed with the pesticide methyl parathion (see January 1995) (see April 1997) (see November 1996).

 Additional Info 
          

November 1, 2001

       Several government experts testify at a New York City Council meeting on environmental conditions following the collapse of the World Trade Center towers. [New York Daily News, 11/1/2001] Kathleen Callahan, deputy regional director of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), insists that New Yorkers living and working near the World Trade Center site are not in danger. “The vast majority of our tests find levels of these contaminants pose no significant long term health risks to residents, business employees and visitors beyond Ground Zero,” she says, repeating what earlier EPA statements have asserted. Downplaying the danger of those areas where higher asbestos levels have been found, she states—falsely (see September 1989) (see October 3, 2001-March 1, 2004) —that “EPA and Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards are set many times below the level at which you would expect health impacts.” She advises New Yorkers who live or work in the affected areas to “follow the recommendations of the New York City Departments of Health and Environmental Protection on how to clean up properly (see September 17, 2001).” [EPA, 11/1/2001] Another expert, Dr. Jessica Leighton, assistant city health commissioner for environmental risk assessment, similarly states that people living and working in Lower Manhattan have little to worry about. She says in response to a question whether or not “people are safe at the present level” of contamination: “As far as the science has shown us right now, that is absolutely correct.” Like Callahan, she claims that EPA standards are overly protective. “The standards or tolerance levels that are being used are very conservative,” she claims. “For example, for asbestos, we are using the standard that is used for indoor air quality for reentry into a school after asbestos removal, which is the most stringent standard, as the tolerance level or standard for outdoor air quality in the residential areas. This is also true for other substances, such as dioxins, identified at the perimeter of the site.... Moreover, these standards have been designed to include many safety factors so that acceptable levels of exposure are far below the levels at which health effects are expected to occur.” [New York City Department of Health, 11/1/2001] Joel Kupferman, executive director of the New York Environmental Law and Justice Project, questions the accuracy of Leighton's and Callahan's statements and accuses them of withholding some test results. [New York Daily News, 11/1/2001] Kathryn Freed, a New York City Council Member who represents Lower Manhattan, said she was not convinced by agency assurances, noting that firemen are already showing symptoms of emphysema, a terminal disease for which there is no cure. “Just because it doesn't reach a certain level is really irrelevant when people are sick,” says Marc Ameruso, a member of the area's community board. [New York Times, 11/1/2001]
People and organizations involved: Kathleen Callahan, Jessica Leighton, PhD., Joel R Kupferman, Kathryn Freed
          

After November 10, 2001

       EPA Region 2 responds to an inquiry from a woman concerned about the asbestos levels in the building where her husband works, which is across the street from the World Trade Center site. The EPA informs her that “ that the owner/manager of the building [should] follow the cleanup guidelines in the September 16 City of New York Public Notice (see September 16, 2001) .... In addition, the New York City Department of Health has a fact sheet (see September 17, 2001) on the internet ... that contains recommendations for people re-occupying commercial buildings and residents re-entering their homes. ” [Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
          

(November 19, 2001)

       Walter Mugdan, the EPA's regional counsel, disputes allegations (see November 15, 2001) that EPA employee Cate Jenkins recently made against the agency in a memo. Jenkins claimed that EPA officials “effectively waived” the EPA's “strict national regulations for removal and disposal of asbestos contaminated dust.” Mugdan argues that Jenkins “assumes that they [the regulations] apply to the cleaning up of dust in residential or office buildings in Lower Manhattan.” According to him, “When they were written, they were never intended to apply to something like a terrorist act. These regulations apply to owners and operators of a facility who are carrying out a demolition or renovation. They were never contemplated to apply to someone cleaning an apartment.” [Nadler, 1/7/2002; New York Daily News, 11/20/2001] In response to Mugdan's claim, Jenkins says, “This is not an academic or scientific argument. Our regulations are very specific. They don't allow you to do this. We've had a breakdown where the federal EPA and the city are scrambling to get everything back to normal, and they're ignoring the law.” [New York Daily News, 11/20/2001] Mugdan's assertions are contradicted by the fact that the EPA has recently removed asbestos from private homes in Libby, Montana and has tested for, and removed, other types of hazardous materials in other regions of the US (see After November 1, 2001). [Nadler, 1/7/2002] Furthermore, in May 2000 (see May 2000), the EPA affirmed that in the event of a terrorist attack, the EPA would respond under the authority of the NCP (see 1972) —which binds the EPA to the very rules Mugdan's claims would not apply.
People and organizations involved: Walter Mugdan
          

December 3, 2001

       New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYC Health Commissioner Neal Cohen hold a joint press conference in which they state that vehicles contaminated with World Trade Center dust and debris would not be returned because cleaning the vehicles would be “too difficult.” And even if cars were cleaned, safety would be “inconclusive,” they explain. [New York Times, 12/4/2001 cited in Jenkins, 7/4/2003]
People and organizations involved: Neal L. Cohen, M.D., Rudolph ("Rudy") Giuliani
          

December 27, 2001

       New York City Health Commissioner Neal Cohen says the vehicles affected by dust from the collapse of the World Trade Center “are contaminated” and should be condemned. “The cleanup of them is not practical, and I'll do whatever I can in my authority and recommend to the mayor that they be condemned,” he explains. [CBS News, 12/27/2001]
People and organizations involved: Neal L. Cohen, M.D.
          

January 2002

       Joe Martyak, spokesman for EPA in Administrator Christie Todd Whitman's office, tells MSNBC that “indoor air is beyond EPA's jurisdiction.” [MSNBC, 1/11/2002] Martyak's assertion is contradicted by recent EPA activities and the agency's obligations under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (see After November 1, 2001).
People and organizations involved: Joe Martyak, Environmental Protection Agency
          

January 11, 2002

       Dr. Cate Jenkins writes a memorandum comparing the data from a major asbestos-contaminated site in Libby, Montana—where the EPA tested and cleaned homes (see (August 2001)) —to that of the WTC disaster site where the EPA has so far refused to take responsibility for the abatement of private residences. She argues that Lower Manhattan should be designated a Superfund site, as was Libby, Montana (see December 20, 2001), in order to reduce the public's exposure to harmful substances such as asbestos, fiberglass, fine particulates, mercury and lead. Superfund designation would shift the financial burden from individual citizens to the government. In the memo, she also summarizes the calculated cancer risks for people occupying Lower Manhattan buildings. [Sources: Cate Jenkins memo January 11, 2002]
People and organizations involved: Cate Jenkins, PhD.
          

(January 13, 2002)

       Bonnie Bellow, spokeswoman for the EPA's region II office in New York tells the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that the EPA is not responsible for testing homes and businesses. “That's not our job and we have no policies or procedures for doing that type of testing,” she claims. “We've never had to worry about asbestos in houses before.” [St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1/13/02; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1/14/2002] Bellow's statement is contradicted by the EPA's record and the agency's obligations under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (see After November 1, 2001).
People and organizations involved: Bonnie Bellow, Environmental Protection Agency
          

(January 22, 2002)

       An unnamed EPA Region II spokeswoman is cited in the Downtown Express stating, “The EPA's job was to monitor outdoor air. Monitoring indoors—that wasn't our job. That's what the city took care of.” This assertion is contradicted by the EPA's record and the agency's obligations under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (see After November 1, 2001). According to the paper she adds that she felt the city had done a good job of testing and monitoring indoor air. [Downtown Express, 1/22/2002 cited in Nadler, 3/11/2002]
          

February 2002-May 2002

       R. Radhakrishnan, Director of the Asbestos Control Program in the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), sends letters to owners of buildings located within the zone of WTC contamination requesting “copies of the environmental hazard assessments including bulk sampling results and air monitoring results and a summary of cleanup activities” at their buildings within 5 days. The letter recalls that they had been advised in September (see September 16, 2001) to have their buildings professionally tested for asbestos and other contaminants. If tests proved positive for any dangerous contaminants, they were to have had them abated professionally. The letter also says that building owners “are responsible for the cleaning of building exteriors, grounds, and common areas.” The letter contains no reference to the federal regulations that govern asbestos and other hazardous materials. [Jenkins, 7/4/2003] The DEP makes no effort to enforce compliance with this request. By September 2002, only 354 of the roughly 1900 buildings that were required to provide the agency with data and documentation will have responded to Radhakrishnan's request. Of those, 31 buildings will say they found dangerous levels of asbestos requiring professional abatement. Others will provide records that are incomplete or inadequate. The DEP does not issue a single citation for building owners or managers that do not respond. [Nadler, 2/10/2003; New York Daily News, 9/11/2003]
People and organizations involved: Radhakrishnan
          

May 7, 2002

       The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) releases its “Report on Residential Air and Dust Sampling in Lower Manhattan,” which explains the agency found “low” levels of asbestos in 17.5 percent of the residential units sampled, 19.2 percent of the common area samples and 33 percent of the outdoor areas samples. But the study says there were extremely high levels of fibrous glass, which ranged from 2 to 15 percent in almost half the residential areas sampled and 64 percent of the outdoor samples. The ATSDR recommends “that people continue to conduct frequent cleaning with HEPA vacuums and damp cloths/mops to reduce the potential for exposure in accordance with NYC Department of Health (NYC DEP) guidance (see September 17, 2001).” But the NYC DEP's instructions have been highly criticized (see September 17, 2001) (see September 22, 2001) and its recommendation to use a HEPA vacuum to remove asbestos contradicts previous EPA commissioned studies (see 1993) (see 1993). [ATSDR, 5/7/02]
People and organizations involved: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
          

May 8, 2002

       The EPA's regional office in New York announces that the agency will assume responsibility for testing and cleaning residences south of Canal, Allen and Pike Streets in Manhattan for asbestos contamination—if requested by the resident. The EPA claims the decision was made in order to calm residents' fears, and that decontamination is not necessary. “While the scientific data about any immediate health risks from indoor air is very reassuring, people should not have to live with uncertainty about their futures,” says Jane Kenny, EPA regional administrator. “There is no emergency here.” [New York Daily News, 5/9/2002 cited in Jenkins, 7/4/2003; The Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2002] Similarly, Mary Mears, spokeswoman for Region II of the EPA, states, “This is to assuage concerns from residents in Lower Manhattan who continue to have concerns over air in their apartments.” [United Press International, 5/9/2002]
Criticisms of the EPA's volunteer cleanup program -

The EPA does not include other areas like Brooklyn, which was in the direct path of the September 11 smoke plume (see September 12, 2001), or Chinatown, whose residents have also complained of ailments they attribute to WTC contamination. [New York Daily News, 5/20/2002; Jenkins, 7/4/2003]

The EPA does not acknowledge that there is a public health emergency

The program is voluntary.

The EPA program targets asbestos, although the agency will also randomly test for other toxins to determine if additional measures should be taken. “We will test for asbestos in air. This is the substance of greatest concern, and air is the pathway of exposure. By cleaning up the dust, many other substances will also be removed,” an EPA public notice explains. [EPA, n.d.]
However according to Cate Jenkins, “too few homes [are sampled] to have any statistical power to establish that these substances are not occurring elsewhere.” [Jenkins, 7/4/2003] A panel of experts convened by the EPA in October will agree, and suggest that the EPA conduct tests for additional toxins (see Mid-October 2002).
The program is limited to private residences. Office buildings, the common areas of apartment buildings, stores and restaurants are not eligible for the program. [Newsday, 10/29/2002]

Only apartments which appear upon visual inspection to be contaminated will qualify for cleaning. [Salon, 4/15/2003]

The plan does not require that all apartments in a building be evacuated and cleaned—just those whose residents have filed requests. Consequently, recontamination and cross-contamination will occur from ventilation systems connecting cleaned and uncleaned apartments and from dust tracked in on residents' shoes and clothing. [Salon, 4/15/2003]

People and organizations involved: Jane Kenny, Environmental Protection Agency, Mary Mears  Additional Info 
          

Mid-October 2002

       A panel of experts convene for two days, at the request of the EPA, and make recommendations for the EPA's indoor cleanup program (see May 8, 2002) in Manhattan. The panel suggests expanding the testing to “include a wider array of toxic contaminants;” lowering “the EPA's proposed danger benchmarks to take into account more vulnerable populations, such as children;” and establishing “safety standards for both residential and commercial buildings in Lower Manhattan.” [Newsday, 10/29/2002]
People and organizations involved: Environmental Protection Agency
          

February 5, 2003

       The Stone Street apartment of Bob and Diane Van Dyke is cleaned as part of the EPA's volunteer residential cleaning program (see September 17, 2001). “Seven workers spent four hours on the 2,200 square foot space,” Salon magazine will report. “None of them wore the waist-level air monitors [EPA spokesperson Mary] Mears insisted all crews would have as a safety precaution. No one wore facemasks, respirators, or even plastic gloves, even though the site supervisor had determined that all of the Van Dykes' upholstered furniture, mattresses and bedding were contaminated and should be thrown out. Hot water was used to remove dust from ventilation grates; Murphy's Oil was spread on the floors. The carpets, which remained, were not vacuumed using the wet methods prescribed on the EPA's Web site. Neither were the drapes. HEPA vacuums were used, but when a hose abruptly popped off the machine and dust spewed onto the freshly vacuumed floor, the hose was simply reattached and the floor was not re-vacuumed. The cleaning process appeared no different from a standard housecleaning.” [Salon, 4/15/2003]
 Additional Info 
          


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