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DHS & Patriot Act
Posted by: kd7one (IP Logged)
Date: November 19, 2005 07:02AM

Below is a National Security Presidential Directive that calls for the development of the Homeland Security Act and the Patriot Act BEFORE 9-11:

"Proof" - Homeland Security Was Planned Way Before 9/11!

National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD]
George W. Bush Administration

In the new Bush Administration, the directives that are used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters are designated National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs).

As discussed in NSPD 1, this new category of directives replaces both the Presidential Decision Directives and the Presidential Review Directives of the previous Administration. Unless other otherwise indicated, however, past Directives remain in effect until they are superseded.

The first directive, dated 13 February 2001, was formally approved for release by the National Security Council staff on 13 March 2001.

Membership of the National Security Council
(What authority gives them approval power over Congress and/or Judiciary?)
[www.whitehouse.gov]

Quote from:
National Security Presidential Directives - NSPD-1 - Dated: Feb. 13, 2001

[snip]
"Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
(by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);"
[snip]

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council System

This document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives. National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States.


The White House
Washington
February 13, 2001
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
CHIEF OF STAFF AND ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
DIRECTOR, PEACE CORPS
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council System

This document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives. National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States.

National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

The National Security Council (NSC) shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings. The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes both those matters within the Justice Department's jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 U.S.C. 511 to give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

The NSC shall meet at my direction. When I am absent from a meeting of the NSC, at my direction the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, at my direction and in consultation with the other regular attendees of the NSC, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording NSC actions and Presidential decisions. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall perform these tasks in concert.

The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989. The NSC/PC shall have as its regular attendees the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as chair). The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall attend where issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes both those matters within the Justice Department's jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 U.S.C. 511 to give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC/PC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC/PC, the Committee's regular attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (who shall serve as chair for agenda items that principally pertain to international economics), and, when the issues pertain to her responsibilities, the Secretary of Agriculture. The Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President shall attend all meetings of the NSC/PC, as shall the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (who shall serve as Executive Secretary of the NSC/PC). Other heads of departments and agencies, along with additional senior officials, shall be invited where appropriate.

The NSC/PC shall meet at the call of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the regular attendees of the NSC/PC. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers are prepared. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC/PC, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall perform these tasks in concert.

The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groups discussed later in this directive. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC shall have as its regular members the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (who shall serve as chair). When international economic issues are on the agenda, the NSC/DC's regular membership will include the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, a Deputy United States Trade Representative, and, when the issues pertain to his responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and the NSC/DC shall be chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs for agenda items that principally pertain to international economics. Other senior officials shall be invited where appropriate.

The NSC/DC shall meet at the call of its chair, in consultation with the other regular members of the NSC/DC. Any regular member of the NSC/DC may also request a meeting of the Committee for prompt crisis management. For all meetings the chair shall determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers are prepared.

The Vice President and I may attend any and all meetings of any entity established by or under this directive.

Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC.

Six NSC/PCCs are hereby established for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State.

Eleven NSC/PCCs are hereby also established for the following functional topics, each to be chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank designated by the indicated authority:

Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (by the Secretary of State);

Global Environment (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in concert);

International Finance (by the Secretary of the Treasury);

Transnational Economic Issues (by the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy);
Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);
Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (by the Secretary of Defense);
Arms Control (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);
Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);
Intelligence and Counterintelligence (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); and
Records Access and Information Security (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).
The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) will continue to function as an interagency coordinator of trade policy. Issues considered within the TPRG, as with the PCCs, will flow through the NSC and/or NEC process, as appropriate.
Each NSC/PCC shall also have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC, to be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Executive Secretary shall assist the Chairman in scheduling the meetings of the NSC/PCC, determining the agenda, recording the actions taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely responses to the central policymaking committees of the NSC system. The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the NSC/PCC where appropriate.
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, may establish additional NSC/PCCs as appropriate.
The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, may establish subordinate working groups to assist the PCC in the performance of its duties.

The existing system of Interagency Working Groups is abolished.
 The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 to Executive Committees of the Deputies Committee will be performed by the appropriate regional NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.
 The Counter-Terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, Consequences Management and Protection Group, and the interagency working group on Enduring Constitutional Government are reconstituted as various forms of the NSC/PCC on Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness.
 The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-75 to the National Counterintelligence Policy Group will be performed in the NSC/PCC on Intelligence and Counterintelligence, meeting with appropriate attendees.
 The duties assigned to the Security Policy Board and other entities established in PDD/NSC-29 will be transferred to various NSC/PCCs, depending on the particular security problem being addressed.
 The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-41 to the Standing Committee on Nonproliferation will be transferred to the PCC on Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense.
 The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-35 to the Interagency Working Group for Intelligence Priorities will be transferred to the PCC on Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
 The duties of the Human Rights Treaties Interagency Working Group established in E.O. 13107 are transferred to the PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.
 The Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group established in E.O. 13110 shall be reconstituted, under the terms of that order and until its work ends in January 2002, as a Working Group of the NSC/PCC for Records Access and Information Security.

Except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date. Cabinet officers, the heads of other executive agencies, and the directors of offices within the Executive Office of the President shall advise the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of those specific NSC interagency groups chaired by their respective departments or agencies that are either mandated by statute or are otherwise of sufficient importance and vitality as to warrant being reestablished. In each case the Cabinet officer, agency head, or office director should describe the scope of the activities proposed for or now carried out by the interagency group, the relevant statutory mandate if any, and the particular NSC/PCC that should coordinate this work. The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee established in E.O. 12870 shall continue its work, however, in the manner specified in that order. As to those committees expressly established in the National Security Act, the NSC/PC and/or NSC/DC shall serve as those committees and perform the functions assigned to those committees by the Act.

To further clarify responsibilities and effective accountability within the NSC system, those positions relating to foreign policy that are designated as special presidential emissaries, special envoys for the President, senior advisors to the President and the Secretary of State, and special advisors to the President and the Secretary of State are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically redesignated or reestablished by the Secretary of State as positions in that Department.

This Directive shall supersede all other existing presidential guidance on the organization of the National Security Council system. With regard to application of this document to economic matters, this document shall be interpreted in concert with any Executive Order governing the National Economic Council and with presidential decision documents signed hereafter that implement either this directive or that Executive Order.

[signed: George W. Bush]

cc: The Executive Clerk

Source Notes
Source: NSC hardcopy
Approved for release: March 13, 2001
[www.fas.org]

We now have six - secret NSPD's
National Security Presidential Directive
[www.fas.org]

On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued the first of a new series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) governing homeland security policy.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive - (Now 3)
[www.fas.org]

PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: PDD 63
[www.fas.org]

Presidential Decision Directives [PDD]
Clinton Administration 1993-2000
[www.fas.org]

What is the National Infrastructure Protection Center? - Miami FBI
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed into policy, Presidential Decision Directive 63, which mandates that the National Infrastructure Protection Center, also known as NIPC, assures the continuity and viability of our country's Critical Infrastructures
[www.fbi.gov]

On May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed into policy, Presidential Decision Directive 63, which mandates that the National Infrastructure Protection Center, also known as NIPC, assures the continuity and viability of our country's Critical Infrastructures. Thereby, establishing that the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our nation's critical infrastructures, especially our nation's cyber-based systems.

Consequently, the FBI's Miami Office Cyber Crimes Investigation Team in conjunction with the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and with the concurrence of the United States Attorney's Office, investigates violations of:

18 U.S.C. 1030 - Fraud and related activity in connection with computer systems
18 U.S.C. 1029 - Fraud and related activities in connection with access devices
18 U.S.C. 1362 - Malicious mischief as it relates to communication lines, stations, or systems
18 U.S.C. 1366 - Malicious mischief as it relates to the damage or destruction of energy facilities
18 U.S.C. 2319 - Criminal infringement of copyright
18 U.S.C. 2320 - Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services
The Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996

Examples of such a violation could include, but are not limited to, the impairment, intrusion or theft of a governmental, financial, or most medical and federal interest computer system, by traditional criminal means, or by a foreign power or terrorist groups. Other types of computer violations which the FBI investigates
include:
Intrusions of public switched networks (telephonic systems)
Network integrity violations
Industrial espionage
Crimes where the computer is a major factor in committing a criminal offense

Miami's Computer Analysis Response Team (CART)

The Miami Computer Analysis Response Team is made up of some of the finest computer forensic professionals in the country. This team is responsible for the collection, processing and the preservation of computer and computer related evidence related to both FBI and other law enforcement agency case work.

I n f r a G a r d
The National InfraGard Program began as a pilot project in 1996, when the Cleveland FBI Field Office asked local computer security professionals to assist the FBI in determining how to better protect critical information systems in the public and private sectors. From this new partnership, the first InfraGard Chapter was formed to address both cyber and physical threats. Thus, InfraGard is a membership organization which enhances relationships, trust, and two way information sharing between industry and law enforcement through a Neighborhood Watch" environment.

Benefits of participating in the InfraGard Program are:
Forum for members to communicate
Prompt dissemination of threat warnings
Help in protecting computer systems
Education and training on infrastructure vulnerabilities
A community that shares information in a trusted environment

What can you do. . .?

If you have information concerning:
an instance where a computer was the target of an apparent criminal act?
an instance in which someone accessed or damaged a computer, or stole information from a computer?
an instance where a computer was used as a tool to commit a crime (i.e. bank fraud, interstate transportation of obscene material, or espionage)?

or any other matter related to knowledge of computer fraud and abuse, please contact the Miami Office of the
FBI by calling (305) 944-9101 or (954)-463-9111 and ask to speak to a computer crimes investigator.

Terms and Definitions

Critical Infrastructures:
Those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operation of the economy and government
of the United States of America. These include, but are not limited to the following:
Telecommunication
Electric Energy
Banking and Finance
Transportation
Water Supply Systems
Emergency Services
Governmental Operations
Gas and Oil Storage and Delivery

Federal Interest:
Those computers defined by law as; two or more computers, each located in different states, utilized in a
criminal offense.
Return to the section containing the term: "Federal Interest"

[www.fbi.gov]

You can conclude from these NSPD's that we have lost the authority of the three Branches of Government. The Judicial Branch and the Congressional Branch now have no authority over the Executive Branch.
Three Branches of Government
[www.voteutah.org]

If these conclusions are in fact, "FACT"! We do indeed have TYRANNY!

NOW WHAT?

"A dictatorship would be a heck of a lot easier, no question about it." --
George Walker Bush, July 26, 2000
[www.greatdreams.com]
[www.turnyourbackonbush.com]

Are Americans Ready to Crown a King? -
By Chuck Baldwin - chuck@chuckbaldwinlive.com
[www.covenantnews.com]

The Spy Who Reads Your Meter
Ashcroft's Plan To Turn Your Neighbors Into Snoops

Jennifer Bauduy is the associate editor at TomPaine.com.

Six months ago the Bush administration quietly announced a domestic informants program that would
involve mail carriers, truck drivers, and utility workers, among others. But soon after the media focused a
spotlight on the project, just weeks before it was supposed to begin, the Justice Department began
backpedaling, downplaying the program.

The Terrorism Information and Prevention System (Operation TIPS), is scheduled to begin in August. In its
pilot stage, TIPS involves training one million Americans to report suspicious "terrorist" activity, according to the
original statement on its Web site.

Legal experts, intelligence analysts and civil liberties groups likened TIPS to a civilian-spying program likely to
spread mass paranoia and silence political dissent.

"This is one more alarming step that the government is taking to make it easier to surveil people, to intimidate
people and then cut back on civil liberties," said Marjorie Cohn, associate professor at the Thomas Jefferson
School of Law in San Diego and member of the national executive committee of the National Lawyers Guild. "It's
asking neighbors to spy on each other and inform."

In a sign that even Republicans are distancing themselves from the administration's plan, House Majority Leader
Dick Armey recently rejected Operation TIPS in his markup of a bill to create a Homeland Security Department.

Information on the TIPS Web site said it is slated to begin in 10 American cities. But little other details were
available on the massive undertaking. The Web site did not say how much training volunteers would get, nor did it define "suspicious activity."

Since the terrorist attacks last fall, fear has caused many people to imagine suspicious activity at every corner. On July 16, CNN reported that fighter jets escorted an airline to New York, after a passenger reported "suspicious" activity by other passengers. The suspicious activity? A traveling entertainment troupe was passing notes, and changing seats.

"Anything that, within the normal stream of America, is not 'regular,' which is to say anything politically, either
presumably right or left, could be picked up and reported as suspicious activity," said Michael Ratner, president of the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights.

The TIPS project, part of the Citizen Corps, announced by President Bush in his State of the Union address, is
intended to enlist public participation in homeland security. TIPS received little attention until a July 14
Washington Post editorial raised questions about its feasibility or purpose.

At that time, the project's Web site gave only a brief three-paragraph description, one of which announced with
much fanfare a sticker with the toll-free reporting number, which informants would get to stick on their car.

"It's altogether amateurish," said Steven Aftergood, of the Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy, chuckling about the sticker announcement. "I can easily imagine the program being overwhelmed by spurious or unproductive leads. I wouldn't want to be the person who answers the phone."

With the spotlight suddenly on TIPS, the Internet description was expanded to five paragraphs, and
reference to the sticker deleted. In another sign that support for the project was crumbling, the Postal Service
announced on July 17 that it would not be participating in the program at this time, according to an Associated
Press report.

A Justice Department spokesman said the project was still in its beginning stages and no further information was available.

Others echoed Aftergood's concern about the FBI's ability to process the millions of so-called tips likely to pour in from informants.

"The FBI should first look to their own house and correct what's wrong and have a public hearing on what happened -- that they missed 9/11 -- before they start giving new powers, and certainly before they start making spies out of your service people," Ratner said.

Once an informant has reported a "suspicious" activity --perhaps an Arabic book on a bookshelf, or a poster of
Che Guevara -- that information will be noted in a computer file accessible to a web of agencies, presumably without the individual's knowledge. Ratner questioned how this would affect the lives of individuals on
a daily basis; for example, would the database be accessible to prospective employers?

"People's suspicions and reports depend very much on 'the length of their own arm,'" Ratner said. "So if a guy
comes into my house in the city and sees an Arab head dress, or a scarf of my wife's, he's going to say, 'Jesus,
there's Muslims in this house, maybe I ought to report Michael Ratner."

A St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial on July 18 noted that libertarians from the political left, like the American Civil
Liberties Union, and right, like the Rutherford Institute, had come out against Operation TIPS.

Historians likened the program to techniques used in the former Soviet Union, or by the East German Stasi secret police, which encouraged civilian spying.

"Stalin made it clear in World War II that the Germans were trying to corrupt the Soviet Union and called on
citizens to report any secret activity -- wives were informing on husbands, children on parents, neighbors on
neighbors," Melvin Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a professor of international security at the National War College. He said such programs fueled a culture of paranoia. "We could create paranoia. Sometimes I think the government is trying to create paranoia," he said.

Ratner and other legal experts questioned the Justice Department's motives, saying the government may be
attempting to circumvent the fourth amendment, which requires authorities to get a warrant before searching a
home.

"If a meter reader comes to your house, if he has one of those stickers, I think you have an argument to keep him
out, under the fourth amendment -- that he's been essentially deputized and is a police agent, and he needs a warrant to come into your house," Ratner said.

The Justice Department issued a statement on July 16 defending the project, as public concern spread. "None of
the Operation TIPS materials published on the Web or elsewhere have made reference to entry or access to the
homes of individuals," the statement said.

But for a program slated to begin within weeks, and expected to involve one million Americans, too many
questions remain unanswered.

"I think it's going to hold back the attempt to prevent terrorism," Ratner said. "It's going to actually impede it,
because it's going to put agents on all kinds of wild goose chases."

*********
Related links:

The TIPS Web site.
[www.citizencorps.gov]
----------------------------------------------------------------------

`In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.'
Without Justice, their is JUST_US!
[disc.server.com]

APFN CONTENTS PAGE:
[www.apfn.org]

911: THE ROAD TO TYRANNY -- WATCH THE ENTIRE FILM ONLINE
[64.245.24.77]

911 - Attack on America
[www.apfn.org]

Find elected officials, including the president, members of Congress, governors, state legislators, local officials, and more.
[congress.org]

"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."
-- Theodore Roosevelt
[www.turnyourbackonbush.com]

"When the Government fears the people, there is liberty. When the people fear the government there is tyranny"
---- Thomas Jefferson
[disc.server.com]
================================================================================

The USA PATRIOT Act Was Planned Before 9/11
by Jennifer Van Bergen
t r u t h o u t | 20 May, 2002

Many people do not know that the USA PATRIOT Act was already written and ready to go long before September 11th. Recent criticism of Bush's admission that he had received warnings only weeks before September 11th has made it more important to understand the origins of the USAPA.

The USA PATRIOT Act - the so-called "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," a.k.a. the USAPA -- was enacted in the immediate wake of 9/11, riding a wave of fear that spread over the nation. This Act has caused much concern amongst civil rights advocates. The Administration, however, responded to such concerns by calling critics unpatriotic. Now, the White House has had a similar response to critics of Bush's recent admission of early warnings.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Friday: "I think that any time anybody suggests or implies to the American people that this president had specific information that could have prevented the attacks on our country on September 11, that crosses the lines."

Dick Cheney came out on Thursday with the statement that Democratic criticism of Bush's handling of pre-Sept. 11 terror warnings was "thoroughly irresponsible." Cheney added an ominous remark to his "Democratic friends ... that they need to be very cautious not to seek political advantage by making incendiary suggestions."

Cynthia McKinney responded: "If committed and patriotic people had not been pushing for disclosure, today's revelations would have been hidden by the White House," she says. "Ever since I came to Congress in 1992, there are those who have been trying to silence my voice. I've been told to "sit down and shut up" over and over again. Well, I won't sit down and I won't shut up until the full and unvarnished truth is placed before the American people."

House Minority leader Dick Gephardt said: "Our nation is not well served when the charge of 'partisan politics' is leveled at those who simply seek information that the American people need and deserve to know." Oddly, following Democratic criticism of Bush's admission, came the weekend news that the White House now anticipates an even terrorist greater attack on American soil. Intrepid investigative journalist Michael Ruppert, best known for his reports claiming government's prior knowledge of 9/11, states that Fox TV cancelled his Saturday appearance on the Geraldo Rivera Show due to these reports.

These may be mere coincidences. Time Magazine just released a lengthy article by Michael Elliott, "How the U.S. Missed the Clues," in which he states: "Last summer the White House suspected that a terrorist attack was coming. But four key mistakes kept the U.S. from knowing what to do."

Whether the Administration could have anticipated 9/11 or not, the proponents of the USAPA were waiting to go long before that day. Similar antiterrorism legislation was enacted in the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, which however did little to prevent the events of 9/11, and many provisions had either been declared unconstitutional or were about to be repealed when 9/11 occurred.

James X. Dempsey and David Cole state in their book, "Terrorism & the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security," that the most troubling provisions of the pre-USAPA anti-terrorism laws, enacted in 1996 and expanded now by the USAPA, "were developed long before the bombings that triggered their final enactment."

Dempsey is the former assistant counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and Deputy Director at the Center for Democracy & Technology, and Cole is professor of law at Georgetown University and an attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights.

Looking back at the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, Dempsey and Cole declare that "the much-touted gains in law enforcement powers" under that Act, "produced no visible concrete results in the fight against terrorism." They add that the principles espoused in the Act "were shown in case after case to be both unconstitutional and ineffective in the fight against terrorism." And importantly, the authors comment that the United States government has not shown that the expanded powers it has asserted in the USAPA are necessary to fight terrorism.

Dempsey and Cole trace the origins of the national security trend back to the "intolerant approaches of the 1950s," when association with Communist or anarchist groups was made a ground for exclusion and deportation. Congress removed the guilt by association law in 1990, but it was revived only six years later by law enforcement proponents in the 1996 Antiterrorism Act, immediately following the Oklahoma City Bombing.

More specifically, however, Dempsey and Cole show that it was the Reagan Administration which initially proposed some of the most troubling provisions which eventually became part of the USAPA. When Reagan proposed these provisions, Congress rejected them on constitutional grounds. The first Bush Administration then made similar proposals, which were again rejected by lawmakers. Congress twice refused to enact the secret evidence provisions proposed by Bush I. (Indeed, just prior to 9/11, Congress was about to pass a law repealing the secret evidence provisions of the 1996 Antiterrorism Act.)

The troublesome provisions proposed by Reagan and the first Bush included the resurrection of guilt by association, association as grounds for exclusion or deportation, the ban on supporting lawful activities of groups labeled terrorist, the use of secret evidence, and the empowerment of the Secretary of State to designate groups as terrorist organizations, without judicial or congressional review.

Despite the Reagan and Bush proposals and one-sided hearings, there was broad-based opposition to such legislation. According to Dempsey and Cole, "several members of the House Judiciary Committee, both Democrat and Republican, questioned the need for the legislation." Lawmakers repeatedly asked why new legislation was needed and how it would help. Administration witnesses literally refused to answer lawmakers' questions, finally causing Representative John Conyers to exclaim, "I've never seen this much law created as a result of prosecutions that we agree worked very effectively!"

"The legislation languished and seemed headed for defeat," say Dempsey and Cole. Until Oklahoma City.
The Oklahoma City bombing, for which there exists a significant body of evidence of a shadow government operation, was used as justification for the enactment of the very provisions lawmakers had previously found most constitutionally troublesome.

Included in the resulting 1996 Antiterrorism Act, although it had nothing to do with terrorism at all, was Republican Senator Orrin Hatch's long-sought provision to limit the right of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the procedure whereby a person convicted by a state court can challenge that conviction in a federal court. The thing is, terrorism cases are brought in federal, not state, courts. "Senator Hatch wanted to make it more difficult for federal courts to order retrials of prisoners where state courts had violated the U.S. Constitution," according to Dempsey and Cole.

The USAPA clearly furthers the goals of making it more difficult for anyone to review or appeal government wrongdoing. It allows for indefinite detention of suspected (not "proven") alien terrorists, without probable cause of a crime, without a hearing or an opportunity to defend or challenge the evidence against them, when they have not even been proven to be a threat and have already established a legal right to remain here. The only process allowed the suspected alien is the "right" to go to federal court and sue the government for its actions.

The USAPA expands the Secretary of State's power to designate terrorist groups without any court or congressional review and allows for secret searches without probable cause. Dempsey and Cole state that these changes "go far beyond what was needed to respond to terrorism." Indeed, they point out that in many instances, "the changes are not limited to terrorist investigations at all, but apply across the board to all criminal investigations."

A good example of the kind of change brought about under the USAPA, which illustrates the underlying and pre-existing agenda of its proponents, is section 218, which amends a single phrase in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The purpose of FISA was to allow intelligence agencies to gather information about foreign powers without the restrictions imposed on them by the Constitution. The reasoning for this was that the purpose of foreign intelligence gathering is not to detect crimes but to gather information about foreign agents.

Under FISA, when an agent wanted to obtain authority to conduct electronic surveillance or secret physical searches, a designated official of the executive office had to certify that "the purpose" for the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Section 218 of the USAPA modifies that clause so that intelligence gathering need not be "the purpose," - in other words, it need no longer be the primary purpose, -- but may be only "a significant purpose" of the surveillance.

This means that if an official can certify that obtaining foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of a surveillance action (the other purpose clearly being criminal investigation), he can avoid the requirement that he first show probable cause of criminal activity. It means the FBI, the CIA, or any other intelligence agency, can surveil you without probable cause, as long as they say the surveillance has something to do with a foreign intelligence investigation of some sort (which may otherwise not even involve you directly).

Because courts have consistently refused to "second guess" FISA surveillance certifications, there is effectively no judicial review of such activities. This small change has enormous ramifications. For all practical purposes, the section 218 USAPA amendment of FISA allows government to completely avoid Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements for searches and seizures of American citizens (not just immigrants).

The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress notes: "From the beginning, defendants have questioned whether authorities had used a FISA surveillance order against them in order to avoid the predicate crime threshold..."

In 1980, the 4th Circuit court stated in the landmark case of U.S. v. Truong Dinh Hung that "the executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons." Another circuit court declared in 1991 that "the investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of [FISA] surveillance."

In other words, courts have pretty consistently thrown out intelligence information gathered under FISA where it has been established that foreign intelligence gathering was not the primary purpose of the surveillance.

It is clear that intelligence agencies have wanted to change this law for some time. It is clear that they have been frustrated by the "primary purpose rule." However, it is not merely the result of intelligence agency wishes or a matter of history that this restriction has now been overridden. History shows that Congress has consistently resisted enacting these types of changes. History also shows that the Reagan and Bush I Administrations repeatedly attempted to push such laws through. Oklahoma City proved that only a "real" terrorist attack would convince Congress.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the proponents of this amendment know it is an end-run around the Fourth Amendment. They have had many years to think about it and have repeatedly shown their willingness to enact carefully crafted, unconstitutional laws. They know the amendment allows intelligence to conduct criminal investigations on American citizens without adherence to basic constitutional protections. Furthermore, under the information sharing provision of section 203 of the USAPA, information gathered in this way can now be shared with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, for whatever uses they want.

Most significantly, it is clear that the events of 9/11 gave the proponents of this amendment the opportunity they needed to slip it by Congress.
[www.truthout.org]




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