Events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq Events Leading to Iraq Invasion complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq iraq_project key_events general_topic_areas specific_allegations specific_cases_and_issues quotes_from_senior_us_officials February 15, 1848 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3262 false 1 ------ In a letter to his law partner, William H. Herndon, Abraham Lincoln disagrees with Herndon's argument for preemptive war. &#8220;Allow the president to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion ... and you allow him to make war at pleasure. ... The provision of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood.&#8221; (( Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon, 2/15/1848 )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Abraham Lincoln )) October 30, 1944 Ahmed Chalabi is Born complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3203 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi is born into a wealthy, oligarchic Shiite family with close ties to Iraq's Hashemite monarchy. [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ Ahmed's mother runs political salons catering to Iraq's elite and his father loans money to members of the ruling family who reward him with top posts in the government, which he uses to advance his business interests. Ahmed's grandfather was also close to the monarchy, holding nine cabinet positions in government during his lifetime. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] ------ But it was Ahmed Chalabi's great grandfather who, as the tax farmer of Kadimiah, a town near Baghdad, established the family's grand fortunes. According to Iraqi historian Hanna Batatu, Ahmed's great grandfather was &#8220;a very harsh man, [who] kept a bodyguard of armed slaves and had a special prison at his disposal&#8221; where, according to a friend of Ahmed Chalabi, he imprisoned serfs who failed to pay their taxes or produce wheat. &#8220;When he died the people of Kadimiah heaved a sigh of relief,&#8221; Batatu writes. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Batatu, 2004 cited in CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) After the 1950s complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_9 false 1 ------ The use of aluminum for rotors in gas centrifuges is discontinued. Other materials, such as maraging steel and carbon fiber, are used instead. [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> 1950s complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_44 false 1 ------ The first &#8220;Zippe-type&#8221; gas centrifuge, named after one of its main developers, German scientist Gernot Zippe, is produced. The centrifuge uses duralumin rotors. Centrifuge rotors are thin-walled tubes that spin at high speeds producing enriched uranium 235. Centrifuge rotors are highly sensitive and must be made from specialized high-strength material. [[ | Institute for Science and International Security, 9/23/02 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Gernot Zippe )) 1958 Ahmed Chalabi Flees Iraq with his Family complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3233 false 1 ------ After the 1958 coup that deposes King Faisal II of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi, 13, and his family flee to Lebanon because of their close ties to the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3203 ]]). The young Ahmed then goes to England where he attends boarding school. [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) 1960s Ahmed Chalabi Studies at University of Chicago; Meets Albert Wohlstetter complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3188 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile, studies for his doctorate in math at the University of Chicago where he gets to know Albert Wohlstetter, a prominent cold-war strategist and a mentor for Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. After receiving his degree, Chalabi moves to Lebanon where he works as a math teacher at the American University of Beirut. His brother, Jawad, is also living in Beirut and runs Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Albert Wohlstetter )) ((+ Jawad Chalabi )) 1963 Chalabi Family and Others Found Middle East Banking Corp. complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3190 false 1 ------ The Chalabi family, with some local partners, found the Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Middle East Banking Corp. )) 1975 US Agrees to Ensure Israel's Energy Security complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3221 false 1 ------ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs a &#8220;Memorandum of Understanding&#8221; with Israel obligating the US to ensure the security of Israel's oil reserves and energy supply in times of crisis. &#8220;The memorandum ... [is] quietly renewed every five years&#8221; according to the London Observer, &#8220;with special legislation attached whereby the US stocks a strategic oil reserve for Israel even if it entail[s] domestic shortages&#8212;at a cost of $3 billion in 2002 to US taxpayers.&#8221; (( Memorandum of Understanding, 9/1/1975 )) [[,2763,940250,00.html | Observer, 4/20/2003 ]] [[ | Janes Foreign Report, 4/16/03 ]] ------ In the event that commercial shippers refuse to ship oil to Israel, the US is obligated to ship it using its own tankers. [[ | Janes Foreign Report, 4/16/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Israel )) ((+ Henry A. Kissinger )) 1977 Ahmed Chalabi founds Petra Bank in Jordan complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3189 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi moves to Jordan where he founds Petra Bank. His partners include wealthy families from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. [[,3604,936196,00.html | Guardian, 4/142003 ]] [[ | Salon, 5/4/2004 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Petra Bank )) 1979-1989 Petra Bank in Jordan Appears to Flourish complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3191 false 1 ------ Two years after its founding, Petra Bank, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the second largest bank in Jordan. The bank's success is attributed to the Chalabi family's vast network of international connections which has enabled Petra to move money in and out of Jordan several steps ahead of the Jordon's strict exchange controls. &#8220;They were far more efficient than the other banks,&#8221; a Jordanian businessman tells Salon. Chalabi's bank lends money to several influential figures, including Prince Hasan, now a close acquaintance of Chalabi, to whom the bank lends $30 million. Chalabi's friendship with Hassan enables Petra to open a chain of branches in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Salon, 5/4/2004 ]] [[,3604,936196,00.html | Guardian, 4/142003 ]] ------ During this period, Petra bank even does business with Saddam Hussein, helping the dictator finance Iraqi trade with Jordan. [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Hasan bin Talal )) ((+ Petra Bank )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) Early 1980s complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_37 false 1 ------ At this time, an engineer named &#8220;Joe T.,&#8221; is working in the gas centrifuge program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. His work pertains not to actual centrifuges, but to the platforms upon which the centrifuges are installed. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) Mid-1980s-late 1990s complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_38 false 1 ------ Joe T., an engineer, begins working for the CIA. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) (Late 1980s) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1216 false 1 ------ Iraq begins developing &#8220;Zippe-type&#8221; centrifuges (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_44 ]]). The centrifuges use rotors made from maraging steel and carbon fiber, which are more advanced than aluminum and allow the rotor to spin at significantly higher speeds. But Iraq has problems building them&#8212;even with considerable assistance from German experts. [[ | Institute for Science and International Security, 9/23/02 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> 1985 Ahmed Chalabi Introduced to Richard Perle complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3202 false 1 ------ Albert Wohlstetter introduces Ahmed Chalabi to Richard Perle, undersecretary of defense for international-security policy. [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Albert Wohlstetter )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) After 1989 Jordanian Investigators Discover that Petra Bank's Auxiliary US &#8216;Office&#8217; Is a Chalabi-Owned Estate in Middleburg, Virginia complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3218 false 1 ------ Jordanian investigators spend 45 days in the US looking for hidden assets belonging to a Washington, D.C. subsidiary of Petra Bank, a Chalabi-controlled enterprise that collapsed in 1989 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3192 ]]). Nearly all of the US assets listed in Petra Bank's books turn out to be worthless, with the notable exception of an auxiliary office where valuable bank records are presumably kept. The &#8220;office&#8221; is a country estate with a swimming pool in upscale Middleburg, Virginia. It belongs to the Chalabi family, which had been charging the bank a monthly rent. &#8220;There was not one business record in the whole place,&#8221; an official will later recall. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((- Petra Bank )) August 2, 1989 Petra Bank Collapses; Ahmed Chalabi Flees complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3192 false 1 ------ Mohammed Said Nabulsi, Jordan's central bank governor, orders the country's banks to deposit 30 percent of their foreign exchange holdings with the central bank. The measure is part of an effort to enforce regulations on liquidity ratios and reduce the outflow of foreign exchange from Jordan. Petra, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the only bank among the 20 that is unable to comply with the order. At the urging of Nabulsi, King Hussein puts Petra under government supervision and orders an audit of the bank's books. Petra's board of directors are replaced and an investigation begins. Two weeks later, in August 1989, Chalabi flees the country&#8212;reportedly with $70 million. According to Hudson Institute's Max Singer, Prince Hassan personally drives Chalabi to the Jordanian border, helping him escape. The investigation subsequently uncovers evidence of massive fraud. &#8220;The scale of fraud at Petra Bank was enormous,&#8221; Nabulsi will later recall. &#8220;It was like a tiny Enron.&#8221; Arthur Andersen determines that the bank's assets are overstated by $200 million. The bank is found to have enormous bad debts (about $80 million); &#8220;unsupported foreign currency balances at counter-party banks&#8221; (about $20 million); and money purportedly owed to the bank which could not be found (about $60 million). Millions of dollars of depositors' money had been routed to the Chalabi family empire in Switzerland, Lebanon, and London, in the form of loans that had not been repaid. The Chalabi family's Swiss and Lebanese firms, Mebco and Socofi, are later put into liquidation. As a result of the fraud, the Jordanian government is forced to pay $200 million to depositors whose money had disappeared, and to avert a potential collapse of the country's entire banking system. [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] [[,3604,936196,00.html | Guardian, 4/142003 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] [[ | Salon, 5/4/2004 ]] ------ Chalabi later provides a different account of what happened. According to Zaab Sethna, a spokesman for the Iraqi National Congress, King Hussein of Jordan turned on Chalabi in coordination with Iraq because Chalabi was &#8220;using the bank to fund [Iraqi] opposition groups and learning a lot about illegal arms transfers to Saddam.&#8221; Petra Bank was also providing the CIA with information on the Jordanian-Iraqi trade. [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Middle East Banking Corp. )) ((+ Petra Bank )) ((+ Hussein bin Talal )) ((+ Mohammed Said Nabulsi )) ((+ Arthur Andersen )) January 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1833 false 1 ------ Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director William acknowledges the West's increasing dependency on Middle East oil. [[ | Cited in Ahmed, 10/2/01 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ William H. Webster )) May 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1834 false 1 ------ The US National Security Council presents a white paper to President Bush in which it describes Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq as the optimum contender &#8220;to replace the Warsaw Pact&#8221; and on that basis argues for the continuation of Cold War-level military spending. [[ | Pilger, 1991 cited in Davidsson, n.d. ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ George W. Bush )) June 10, 1990 Investigation Finds Ahmed Chalabi Responsible for Collapse of Petra Bank complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3193 false 1 ------ A 500-page report completed on behalf of the Jordanian military attorney-general charges that Ahmed Chalabi was directly responsible for the collapse of Petra Bank (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3192 ]]). It accuses him of making &#8220;fictitious deposits and entries to make the income ... appear larger; losses on shares and investments; [and] bad debts ... to Abhara company and Al Rimal company.&#8221; The technical report contains 106 chapters, each of which addresses a different irregularity. Most of them are attributed to Chalabi. [[,3604,936196,00.html | Guardian, 4/142003 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((- Petra Bank )) Mid-1990s complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_186 false 1 ------ Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian, moves to Europe where he forms al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim it is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan. While in Europe, Al Zarqawi and other members of his group make plans to attack Jews and Israeli targets in Germany. (( Shadi Abdallah )) [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 6/25/03 ]] ------ In late 1999, Al Zarqawi is allegedly involved in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan, whose customers are frequently Israeli and American tourists. (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[ | Washington Post, 2/7/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] ------ At some point during this period, Al Zarqawi establishes a training camp near Herat, Afghanistan, which competes with al-Qaeda for new recruits. According to the Bush administration, the training camp specializes in poisons and explosives. While in Afghanistan, Zarqawi maintains contact with his cells in Europe. (( Shadi Abdallah )) [[ | Newsweek, 6/25/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] ====== << alZarqawi >> ((+ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) Mid-September 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1816 false 1 ------ The Pentagon, citing top-secret satellite images, claims that some 250,000 Iraqi troops and 1,500 tanks are gathering on Saudi Arabia's border in preparation for an attack. But two commercial Soviet satellite images of the border area, taken at the same time, obtained by Florida's St. Petersburg Times, show only an empty desert. &#8220;The bulk of the mighty Iraqi army, said to number more than 500,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq, couldn't be found,&#8221; Newsday reports. [[ | St. Petersburg Times, 1/6/91 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 1/5/03 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor 9/6/02 [b] ]] ====== << propaganda >> August 2, 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1829 false 1 ------ The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 660 condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanding that Iraq &#8220;withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.&#8221; (( UN Resolution 660 )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ United Nations Security Council )) August 2, 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1830 false 1 ------ The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 678 authorizing &#8220;Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.&#8221; (( UN Resolution 678 )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ United Nations Security Council )) Late 1990 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1817 false 1 ------ An unconfirmed report of Iraqi soldiers entering a Kuwaiti hospital and removing newborns from their incubators is distributed widely. The rumor, which later turns out to be false, is seized upon by senior executives of the PR firm Hill and Knowlton, which has a $10 million contract from the Kuwaiti royal family to win support for a US-led intervention against Iraq. The PR firm, which has very close ties to the Bush administration, helps a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, known only as &#8220;Nayirah,&#8221; prepare to speak before a congressional caucus. In her testimony, she describes in detail how she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers storm the hospital where she was an intern and steal the incubators, leaving 312 babies &#8220;on the cold floor to die.&#8221; President Bush refers to the incident numerous times as he lobbies Congress to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. But it is later discovered that Nayirah is actually the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to Washington and that she was never an intern at the Kuwait hospital. The story was a complete fabrication. [[ | Christian Science Monitor 9/6/02 [a] ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor 9/6/02 [b] ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 1/5/03 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ George Herbert Walker Bush )) ((+ Hill and Knowlton )) ((- US Congress )) 1991-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_6 false 1 ------ The British MI6 establishes Operation Mass Appeal, a British intelligence mission &#8220;designed to exaggerate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction&#8221; in order to shape public opinion. [[ | BBC, 11/21/03 ]] ------ The operation plants stories in the US, British, and foreign media from the 1990s through 2003. Intelligence used by Mass Appeal is said to be &#8220;single source data of dubious quality.&#8221; After the First Gulf War, the operation seeks to justify the UN sanctions policy. But after the September 11 attacks, its objective is to secure public support for an invasion of Iraq. The mission is similar to Operation Rockingham (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_5 ]]), another British intelligence disinformation program. (( Former Clinton Administration official )) (( Scott Ritter )) [[ | New Yorker, 3/31/03 ]] [[ | Scotsman, 11/21/03 ]] [[ | BBC, 11/21/03 ]] ------ Former US Marine intelligence officer Scott Ritter says in late in 2003 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_98 ]]) that he supplied Mass Appeal with intelligence while serving as UN chief weapons inspector from the summer of 1997 until August 1998 and that he met with British agents involved in the operation several times in both New York and London. (( Scott Ritter )) [[ | BBC, 11/21/03 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) {{ statement_scott_ritter_11 }} {{ commentary_unnamed_clinton_administration_official_2 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_10 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_9 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_8 }} {{ commentary_seymour_hersh_4 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_28 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_27 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_29 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_25 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_26 }} 1991-March 2003 Secret British Intelligence Cell &#8216;Cherry-Picked&#8217; Intelligence complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_5 false 1 ------ After the First Gulf War, the British Defense Ministry's Defense Intelligence Staff creates a secret intelligence office known as Operation Rockingham. The purpose of the top secret cell is to collect intelligence that can be used by the US and British to support the case for maintaining UN sanctions on Iraq. After the September 11 attacks, Rockingham helps build Britain's case for the need to use military force against Iraq. (( Unnamed British intelligence officials )) (( Scott Ritter )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 6/8/03b ]] [[,3604,1089931,00.html | Guardian, 11/21/03 ]] [[ | Sunday Herald, 6/8/03a ]] [[,12956,1095955,00.html | Guardian, 11/29/03 ]] [[ | BBC, 11/21/03 ]] [[ | Scotsman, 11/21/03 ]] ------ Former US Marine intelligence officer Scott Ritter, who has first-hand knowledge of the operation, will later tell reporters that &#8220;Rockingham was spinning reports and emphasizing reports that showed noncompliance (by Iraq with UN inspections) and quashing those which showed compliance. It was cherry-picking intelligence.&#8221; He also says that members of the cell were backed by officials &#8220;from the very highest levels,&#8221; including military and intelligence officers, as well as civilian officials from the ministry of defense. (( Scott Ritter )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 6/8/03b ]] [[ | Sunday Herald, 6/8/03a ]] ------ The operation is similar to Operation Mass Appeal (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_6 ]]), another British intelligence disinformation program. ------ Rockingham is also compared to the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_73 ]]), which has also been accused of producing misleading assessments on Iraq based on the selective use of intelligence. (( Scott Ritter )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 6/8/03a ]] [[,3604,1089931,00.html | Guardian, 11/21/03 ]] ====== << deception >> << DSM >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) {{ statement_scott_ritter_7 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_2 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_7 }} {{ statement_unnamed_report_2 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_5 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_6 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_3 }} 1991-1997 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_419 false 1 ------ Under the supervision of UNSCOM weapons inspectors, Iraq destroys more than 38,000 filled and unfilled chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical warfare agents, over 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, more than 400 pieces of production equipment, 48 missiles, 6 missile launchers, and 30 missile warheads modified to carry chemical or biological agents. (( UNSCOM report, S/1998/332, April 16, 1998 )) [[ | Congressional Research Service Reports, 4/98 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/29/02 ]] [[ | Foreign Policy in Focus, 8/02 ]] ------ After cross-referencing weapons-making materials found in Iraq with sales records from other countries, UNSCOM inspectors conclude that at least 90% of Iraq's weapons have been destroyed or dismantled. Chief UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter believes that a good portion of the remaining 10% was destroyed during the First Gulf War, thus leaving only a small fraction unaccounted for. [[ | Pitt, 7/24/02 ]] [[ | Newsday, 7/30/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) May 1991 President Bush Authorizes CIA to Create Conditions for Removal of Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3217 false 1 ------ President George H. W. Bush signs a covert &#8220;lethal finding&#8221; authorizing the CIA to spend a hundred million dollars to &#8220;create the conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ The CIA forms the Iraqi Opposition Group within its Directorate of Operations to implement this policy. [[ | Ritter, 2005, pp 128 ]] ------ Awash in cash, the agency hires the Rendon Group to influence global political opinion on matters related to Iraq. According to Francis Brooke, an employee of the company who's paid $22,000 per month, the Rendon Group's contract with the CIA provides it with a ten percent &#8220;management fee&#8221; on top of whatever money it spends. &#8220;We tried to burn through $40 million a year,&#8221; Brooke will tell the New Yorker. &#8220;It was a very nice job.&#8221; The work involves planting false stories in the foreign press. The company begins supplying British journalists with misinformation which then shows up in the London press. In some cases, these stories are later picked up by the American press, in violation of laws prohibiting domestic propaganda. &#8220;It was amazing how well it worked. It was like magic,&#8221; Brooke later recalls. Another one of the company's tasks is to help the CIA create a viable and unified opposition movement against Saddam Hussein (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3198 ]]). This brings the Rendon Group and Francis Brooke into contact with Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3234 ]]). [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Rendon Group )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ George Herbert Walker Bush )) After May 1991 CIA Contacts Ahmed Chalabi complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3234 false 1 ------ CIA Agent Whitley Bruner contacts Ahmed Chalabi in London as part of an effort to organize Iraqi exiles into a unified opposition movement against Saddam Hussein (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3217 ]]). [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/5/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Whitley Bruner )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) 1992-1996 CIA Provides Support to the Iraqi National Congress; INC Misuses Funds complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3200 false 1 ------ Over a period of four years, the CIA's Iraq Operation Group provides the Iraqi National Congress (INC) with $100 million, which the organization uses to set up training camps and propaganda operations in Northern Iraq. [[ | Ritter, 2005, pp 128 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] ------ During this time span, Chalabi allegedly misuses a lot of the funds. &#8220;There was a lot of hanky-panky with the accounting: triple billing, things that weren't mentioned, things inflated ... It was a nightmare,&#8221; a US intelligence official who works with Chalabi will say in 2004. [[ | Newsweek, 4/5/2004 ]] ------ Chalabi refuses to share the organization's books with other members of the INC, and even with the US government itself. According to a former CIA officer, &#8220;[T]hey argued that it would breach the secrecy of the operation.&#8221; One night, government investigators break into the INC's offices to do an audit. They find that although the books are in order, many of the group's expenditures are wasteful. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ Chalabi spends much of his time in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Robert Baer, a CIA officer who is also working in Iraq, later recalls: &#8220;He was like the American Ambassador to Iraq. He could get to the White House and the CIA. He would move around Iraq with five or six Land Cruisers.&#8221; Hundreds of thousands of dollars flow &#8220;to this shadowy operator&#8212;in cars, salaries&#8212;and it was just a Potemkin village. He was reporting no intel; it was total trash. The INC's intelligence was so bad, we weren't even sending it in.&#8221; Chalabi tries to portray Saddam's regime as &#8220;a leaking warehouse of gas, and all we had to do was light a match,&#8221; Baer says. Chalabi, at certain points, claims to know about Iraqi troop movements and palace plans. But &#8220;there was no detail, no sourcing&#8212;you couldn't see it on a satellite.&#8221; (( Robert Baer )) [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Robert Baer )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) March 8, 1992 Raw US World Dominance Plan Is Leaked to the Media a030892dominanceplan false 1 ------ The Defense Planning Guidance, &#8220;a blueprint for the department's spending priorities in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union,&#8221; is leaked to the New York Times. [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt030892.html | New York Times, 3/8/92 ]] [[,0,4720975.story | Newsday, 3/16/03 ]] ------ The document causes controversy, because it hadn't yet been &#8220;scrubbed&#8221; to replace candid language with euphemisms. [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt031192.html | New York Times, 3/11/92 ]] [[,3858,4388919,00.html | Observer, 4/7/02 ]] [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt031092.html | New York Times, 3/10/92 ]] ------ The document argues that the US dominates the world as sole superpower, and to maintain that role, it &#8220;must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.&#8221; [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt030892b.html | New York Times, 3/8/92 (B) ]] [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt030892.html | New York Times, 3/8/92 ]] ------ As the Observer summarizes it, &#8220;America's friends are potential enemies. They must be in a state of dependence and seek solutions to their problems in Washington.&#8221; [[,3858,4388919,00.html | Observer, 4/7/02 ]] ------ The document is mainly written by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis &#8220;Scooter&#8221; Libby, who hold relatively low posts at the time, but become deputy defense secretary and Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, respectively, under George W. Bush. [[,0,4720975.story | Newsday, 3/16/03 ]] ------ The authors conspicuously avoid mention of collective security arrangements through the United Nations, instead suggesting the US &#8220;should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted.&#8221; [[ /timeline/1990s/nyt030892.html | New York Times, 3/8/92 ]] ------ They call for &#8220;punishing&#8221; or &#8220;threatening punishment&#8221; against regional aggressors before they act. Interests to be defended preemptively include &#8220;access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, [and] threats to US citizens from terrorism.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2002/harpers1002.html | Harper's, 10/02 ]] ------ Senator Lincoln Chafee (R) later says, &#8220;It is my opinion that [George W. Bush's] plan for preemptive strikes was formed back at the end of the first Bush administration with that 1992 report.&#8221; [[,0,4720975.story | Newsday, 3/16/03 ]] ------ In response to the controversy, US releases an updated version of the document in May 1992, which stresses that the US will work with the United Nations and its allies. [[ /timeline/1990s/wpost052492.html | Washington Post, 5/24/92 ]] [[ /timeline/2002/harpers1002.html | Harper's, 10/02 ]] ====== << centralAsia >> << pre911Plans >> ((@ Lincoln Chafee )) ((+ United States )) ((- Soviet Union )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) April 9, 1992 Ahmed Chalabi is Convicted of Embezzlement and Sentenced to 22 Years. complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3194 false 1 ------ After a two-year investigation, Ahmed Chalabi is convicted in abstentia and sentenced by a military court to 22 years of hard labor and ordered to return $230 million in embezzled funds. The 223-page verdict charges Chalabi with 31 counts of embezzlement, theft, forgery, currency speculation, making false statements, and making millions of dollars in bad loans to himself, to his friends, and to his family's other financial enterprises in Lebanon and Switzerland (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3198 ]]). [[,3604,936196,00.html | Guardian, 4/142003 ]] [[ | Salon, 5/4/2004 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/5/2004 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) June 1992 Iraqi National Congress Formed complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3198 false 1 ------ The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Masud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani, meet in Vienna along with nearly 200 delegates from dozens of Iraqi opposition groups to form an umbrella organization for Iraqi dissident groups. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Federation of American Scientists, 8/8/1998 ]] ------ The event is organized by the Rendon Group, which has been contracted by the CIA to organize the wide spectrum of Iraqi dissidents into a unified movement against Saddam Hussein. Rendon names the group the &#8220;Iraqi National Congress&#8221; (INC). The CIA pays the Rendon Group $326,000 per month for the work, funneled to the company and the INC through various front organizations. (( Unnamed former CIA operative )) [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] [[;pageregion=mainRegion&amp;rnd=1132263116421&amp;has-player=true&amp;version= | Rolling Stone, 11/17/2005 ]] ------ Thomas Twetten, the CIA's deputy directorate of operations, will later recall: &#8220;The INC was clueless. They needed a lot of help and didn't know where to start.&#8221; [[;s=foer052002 | The New Republic, 5/20/2002 ]] [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 296-297 ]] ------ Rendon hires freelance journalist Paul Moran and Zaab Sethna as contract employees to do public relations and &#8220;anti-Saddam propaganda&#8221; for the new organization. [[ | SBS Dateline, 7/23/2003 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Masud Barzani )) ((+ Jalal Talabani )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Patriotic Union of Kurdistan )) ((+ Kurdistan Democratic Party )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Rendon Group )) ((+ Paul Moran )) ((+ Zaab Sethna )) ((+ Thomas Twetten )) October 1992 Shiite Groups Join INC; Individuals Chosen to Lead Group complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3199 false 1 ------ Prominent Shiite Iraqi opposition groups join the Iraqi National Congress, a creation of the CIA (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3198 ]]), and hold a meeting in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq where they select a three-man leadership council and a 26-member executive council. The three leaders include moderate Shiite Muslim cleric Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum; ex-Iraqi general Hasan Naqib; and Masud Barzani. Ahmed Chalabi, who is reportedly not at all popular among the exiles present, is somehow selected to chair the executive council. This event represents the first major attempt to bring together the many different groups in Iraq opposed to Saddam Hussein. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Federation of American Scientists, 8/8/1998 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Hasan Naqib )) ((+ Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum )) ((+ Kurdistan Democratic Party )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Masud Barzani )) (1994) Ahmed Chalabi Fabricates Intelligence, Forges Documents complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3219 false 1 ------ The Iraqi National Congress sets up &#8220;a forgery shop&#8221; inside an abandoned schoolhouse in the Kurdish town of Salahuddin. &#8220;It was something like a spy novel,&#8221; CIA agent Robert Baer later recalls. &#8220;It was a room where people were scanning Iraqi intelligence documents into computers, and doing disinformation. There was a whole wing of it that he did forgeries in. ... He was forging back then, in order to bring down Saddam.&#8221; One of the documents fabricated by the INC is a copy of a purported letter to Chalabi from President Clinton's National Security Council. The letter requests Chalabi's help in a plot to assassinate Saddam Hussein. Baer believes Chalabi's intent is to trick the Iranians into believing that the Americans will kill Hussein, thus inspiring them into joining a plot against the dictator. According to Francis Brooke, a Rendon Group employee working with the INC, Chalabi did not create the forged letter. &#8220;That would be illegal,&#8221; he says. (( Robert Baer )) [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Rendon Group )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) March 1995 Chalabi Military Operation against Saddam Hussein Fails complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3220 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi creates a militia army of about 1,000 fighters in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq and bribes tribal leaders in the city of Mosul to support a planned rebellion against Saddam Hussein. He is also hosting members of Iranian intelligence who promise that when the operation is launched, Iran will simultaneously hit Iraq from the south. But the CIA learns that Baathist officials have caught wind of the plot and the CIA instructs agent Robert Baer to tell Chalabi that &#8220;any decision to proceed will be on your own.&#8221; Chalabi, who has no military experience, decides to go through with the plot anyways. But the operation quickly flounders when many of Chalabi's fighters desert, the bribed Iraqi tribal leaders stay home, and the Iranians do nothing. The CIA is furious that it funded the operation, which becomes known within the agency as the &#8220;Bay of Goats.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Rendon Group )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Robert Baer )) August 22, 1995 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_424 false 1 ------ Hussein Kamel, Iraq's former minister of military industry&#8212;who was Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and who had overseen Saddam's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons programs for almost a decade&#8212;is interviewed shortly after defecting by UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus, Professor Maurizio Zifferero, deputy director of the Internal Atomic Energy Agency,and Nikita Smidovick of UNSCOM. During the interview, Kamel says that Iraq had destroyed all of its banned weapons after the First Gulf War. &#8220;I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons&#8212;biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed,&#8221; he tells his interviewers. With regard to Anthrax, which Kamel says had been the &#8220;main focus&#8221; of Iraq's biological program, Kamel says, &#8220;nothing remained.&#8221; Regarding the nerve gas, VX, Kamel says, &#8220;they put it in bombs during last days of the Iran-Iraq war. They were not used and the program was terminated.&#8221; When asked if the program had been reconstituted, Kamel replies, &#8220;We changed the factory into pesticide production. Part of the establishment started to produce medicine ... We gave instructions not to produce chemical weapons.&#8221; On the issue of prohibited missiles, Kamel states: &#8220;[N]ot a single missile left but they had blueprints and molds for production. All missiles were destroyed.&#8221; Kamel also says that inspections worked in Iraq. &#8220;You have important role in Iraq with this. You should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective in Iraq,&#8221; he reveals. (( UNSCOM Interview with Hussein Kamel, August 22, 1995 )) ------ But this information is not made public. Newsweek reports in March 2003 that according to its sources, &#8220;Kamel's revelations about the destruction of Iraq's WMD stocks were hushed up by the UN inspectors ... for two reasons. Saddam did not know how much Kamel had revealed, and the inspectors hoped to bluff Saddam into disclosing still more.&#8221; [[ | Newsweek, 3/3/03 ]] [[ | Scotsman, 2/24/03 ]] ------ Kamel also says that Khidhir Hamza, an Iraqi nuclear scientist who defected in 1994 and who will be a source for claims regarding Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is &#8220;a professional liar.&#8221; &#8220;He worked with us, but he was useless and always looking for promotions,&#8221; he tells his interviewers. &#8220;He consulted with me but could not deliver anything. . . . He was even interrogated by a team before he left and was allowed to go.&#8221; [[ | New York Review of Books, 2/26/04 ]] ------ At around the same time, Kamel is also interviewed by the CIA and Britain's MI6. According to sources interviewed by Newsweek, Kamel provides them with the same information. (( Unnamed sources )) [[ | Newsweek, 3/3/03 ]] [[ | Scotsman, 2/24/03 ]] ------ But after this is revealed on February 24, 2003 by Newsweek's John Barry, the CIA issues a strong denial. &#8220;It is incorrect, bogus, wrong, untrue,&#8221; CIA spokesman Bill Harlow will say. [[ | Reuters, 2/24/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Nikita Smidovick )) ((+ Rolf Ekeus )) ((+ Maurizio Zifferero )) ((+ Hussein Kamel )) ((+ Bill Harlow )) ((+ John Barry )) After 1996 Ahmed Chalabi Moves to Washington to Lobby US Government complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3211 false 1 ------ After the failed coup attempt in Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3220 ]]), Ahmed Chalabi comes to Washington to lobby the US government to pursue a policy of regime change. Chalabi sets up shop in a million-dollar brick row house in Georgetown, owned by Levantine Holdings, a Chalabi family corporation based in Luxembourg. The house will serve as both the Iraqi National Congress' Washington headquarters and as Chalabi's home. Francis Brooke, Chalabi's aide, and Brooke's family will live in the house for free. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 11/24/2003, pp C01 ]] ------ Brooke is reportedly a devout Christian who, the New Yorker reports, &#8220;has brought an evangelical ardor to the cause of defeating Saddam.&#8221; Brooke tells the magazine: &#8220;I do have a religious motivation for doing what I do. I see Iraq as our neighbor. And the Bible says, when your neighbor is in a ditch, God means for you to help him.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ Brooke believes that Saddam Hussein is of such an evil nature, that even the most extreme measures would be justified to remove him. Charles Glass of Harper's will report that Brooke &#8220;says he would support the elimination of Saddam, even if every single Iraqi were killed in the process. He means it. &#8216;I'm coming from a place different from you.... I believe in good and evil. That man is absolute evil and must be destroyed.&#8217; ... He says he believes in Jesus and in resurrection and in eternity. If all the Iraqis die, he says, they will live in eternity. But the &#8216;human Satan&#8217; must go, no matter what.&#8221; [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ------ As part of their lobbying strategy, Chalabi and Brookes examine the successes of various American Jewish lobby groups. &#8220;We knew we had to create a domestic constituency with some electoral clout, so we decided to use the AIPAC [American Israel Political Action Committee] model,&#8221; Brooke later the New Yorker. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) January 1996 CIA Ends Its Relationship with Chalabi complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3264 false 1 ------ The CIA&#8212;concerned about Chalabi's contacts with Iran and convinced that he is not capable of delivering on his promises&#8212;severs its ties with him and the Iraqi National Congress. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) July 8, 1996 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_74 false 1 ------ The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, publishes a paper titled &#8220;A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.&#8221; [[,7792,785394,00.html | Guardian, 9/3/02 ]] [[ | Washington Times, 10/7/03 ]] [[ | Chicago Sun-Times, 3/6/03 ]] ------ The paper, whose lead author is Richard Perle, advises the new, right-wing Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to break with the policies of the previous government by adopting a strategy &#8220;based on an entirely new intellectual foundation, one that restores strategic initiative and provides the nation the room to engage every possible energy on rebuilding Zionism ....&#8221; Much along the lines of an earlier paper by Israeli Oded Yinon <ref key="2049"/>, the document urges the Israelis to aggressively seek the downfall of their Arab neighbors&#8212;especially Syria and Iraq&#8212;by exploiting the inherent tensions within and among the Arab States. Specifically, it recommends that Israel work with Turkey and Jordan to remove Saddam Hussein from power as a means of &#8220;foiling Syria's regional ambitions.&#8221; (( A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm )) [[ | Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 7/8/96 ]] [[;PublicationID=1214 | Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 3/19/03 ]] [[,7792,785394,00.html | Guardian, 9/3/02 ]] ------ Other suggestions for Israel include abandoning the Oslo Accords, developing a foreign policy based on a traditional balance of power strategy, reserving its right to invade the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of a strategy of &#8220;self-defense,&#8221; abandoning any notion of &#8220;land for peace,&#8221; reestablishing a policy of preemptive strikes, forging closer ties to the US while taking steps towards self-reliance, and seeking an alternative to Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO. (( A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm )) [[,7792,785394,00.html | Guardian, 9/3/02 ]] [[ | Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 7/8/96 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Jeffrey T. Bergner )) ((+ Richard Armitage )) ((+ Richard V. Allen )) ((+ Benjamin Netanyahu )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm )) ((+ James Colbert )) ((+ Charles Fairbanks, Jr. )) ((+ Jonathan Torop )) ((+ Meyrav Wurmser )) ((+ Robert Loewenberg )) ((+ David Wurmser )) {{ duplicate_a_clean_break:_a_new_strategy_for_securing_the_realm_2 }} August 1996 Iraqi Forces Invade Kurdistan complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3201 false 1 ------ One of the Kurdish groups within the Iraqi National Congress (INC) invites Iraqi forces into Kurdistan to crush a rival faction allied with Chalabi. Saddam Hussein sends 40,000 Iraqi soldiers and 300 tanks into the Kurdish city of Irbil. Saddam's forces capture, torture, and kill hundreds of Chalabi's followers and some INC officials. At this time, Chalabi is in London. The Clinton administration eventually evacuates 7,000 supporters. [[,3604,654016,00.html | Guardian, 2/22/2002 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 11/18/2002 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ A few years later, Chalabi and his aide, Francis Brooke, will help ABC News produce a documentary that puts the blame on the CIA. ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) 1997 Ahmed Chalabi Says He Supports Normal Relations between Iraq and Israel complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3214 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi, speaking before an audience at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), insists that with just minimal support from the US, Saddam Hussein's government could easily be toppled and replaced with a government friendly to Israel. Chalabi's ideas reportedly catch the attention of neoconservatives Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. [[ | Newsweek, 5/31/2003 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) (1997-1998) Ahmed Chalabi Befriends Neoconservatives complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3196 false 1 ------ According to Middle East expert Judith Kipper, around this time, Ahmed Chalabi makes &#8220;a deliberate decision to turn to the right,&#8221; having realized that conservatives are more likely than liberals to support his plan to use force to topple Saddam Hussein's government. Chalabi's aide, Francis Brooke, later explains to the New Yorker: &#8220;We thought very carefully about this, and realized there were only a couple of hundred people&#8221; in Washington capable of influencing US policy toward Iraq. He also attends social functions with Richard Perle, whom he met in 1985 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3202 ]]) and who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Dick Cheney, the CEO of Halliburton. According to Brooke, &#8220;from the beginning, Cheney was in philosophical agreement with this plan. Cheney has said, &#8216;Very seldom in life do you get a chance to fix something that went wrong.&#8217; &#8221; Paul Wolfowitz is said to be enamored with Chalabi. According to an American friend of Chalabi, &#8220;Chalabi really charmed him. He told me they are both intellectuals. Paul is a bit of a dreamer.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ He also becomes friends with L. Marc Zell and Douglas Feith of the Washington-Tel Aviv law, Feith and Zell. [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] ------ Chalabi tells his neoconservatives friends that if he replaces Saddam Hussein as Iraq's leader, he would establish normal diplomatic and trade ties with Israel, eschew pan-Arab nationalism, and allow the construction of a pipeline from Mosul to the Israeli port of Haifa, Zell later tells Salon magazine. Having a pro-Israeli regime in Iraq would &#8220;take[] off the board&#8221; one of the only remaining major Arab threats to Israeli security, a senior administration official says in 2003. It would do this &#8220;without the need for an accommodation with either the Palestinians or the existing Arab states,&#8221; notes Salon. (( L. Marc Zell )) [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/2003 ]] ------ But Chalabi has a different story for his Arab friends. He tells his friend, Moh'd Asad, the managing director of the Amman, Jordan-based International Investment Arabian Group, &#8220;that he just need[s] the Jews in order to get what he want[s] from Washington, and that he [will] turn on them after that.&#8221; [[ | Salon, 5/5/2004 ]] ------ Chalabi also says that the Iraqis would welcome a US liberation force with open arms. [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Moh'd Asad )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ L. Marc Zell )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) 1997-2002 OPCW Achieves Worldwide Reduction in Chemical Weapons and Chemical Weapon Facilities complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2875 false 1 ------ Under the leadership of Jose Bustani, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees the destruction of 2 million chemical weapons and two-thirds of the world's chemical weapon facilities. The organization also enlists 63 new member-states bringing its total membership to 145. According to George Monbiot of the Guardian of London, OPCW's surge in membership represents &#8220;the fastest growth rate of any multilateral body in recent times.&#8221; Bustani also steps up efforts to bring Iraq and other Arab states into the chemical weapons treaty. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2002 ]] [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons )) October 6, 1997 UN Nuclear Watchdog Agency Says Iraq Free of Nuclear Weapons complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2975 false 1 ------ Hans Blix, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, writes in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that there is no evidence that Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program. Blix says that the agency now has a &#8220;technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program,&#8221; despite some missing evidence and gaps in knowledge. He states with certainty the following: (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalization of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available program documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the program was interrupted.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU [high-enriched uranium] through the EMIS [electromagnetic isotope separation] process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more that a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its &#8216;crash program,&#8217; was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) --- * --- &#8220;There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.&#8221; (( IAEA Letter UN, 10/6/1997 )) ====== << wmd >> ((+ International Atomic Energy Agency )) ((- Iraq )) ((+ Kofi Annan )) ((+ Hans Blix )) November 12, 1997 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_465 false 1 ------ David Wurmser, director of the Middle East program at the American Enterprise Institute, writes an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that the US government should support Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress [INC] and work to foment &#8220;an Iraqi insurgency to depose the butcher of Baghdad.&#8221; Wurmser writes: &#8220;Washington has no choice now but to abandon the coup option and resurrect the INC. An insurgency may be able to defeat Saddam's weak and demoralized conventional army. But one thing is clear: There is no cost-free way to depose Saddam. He is more resolute, wily and brutal than we. His strength lies in his weapons of terror; that is why he is so attached to them.... Organizing an insurgency to liberate Iraq under the INC may provoke Saddam to use these weapons on the way down. Better that, though, than current policy, which will lead him to use them on his way back up.&#8221; [[ | Wall Street Journal, 11/12/97 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << chalabi >> ((+ David Wurmser )) ((- Ahmed Chalabi )) December 1997 Ahmed Chalabi Tells Scott Ritter He Has Close Ties to Iranian Intelligence complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3231 false 1 ------ UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter meets with Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress. According to Ritter, Chalabi tells him that he has close contacts with Iranian Intelligence and offers to set up a meeting between Ritter and the head of Iranian intelligence. (Chalabi later claims this is &#8220;an absolute falsehood.&#8221;) [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) 1998 Ahmed Chalabi Speaks of Restoring Iraqi Oil Pipeline to Israel complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3222 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi suggests in an interview with the Jerusalem Post that if the INC is successful in its efforts to topple Saddam Hussein's government, the new government will restore the oil pipeline from Kirkuk, Iraq to Haifa, Israel. The pipeline has been inoperative since the state of Israel was established in 1948. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) 1998 Ahmed Chalabi Makes Friends with Republican Senators complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3216 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi and Francis Brooke find allies in the US Senate's Republican leadership. They provide the Republicans with details about the events surrounding the INC-CIA's 1995 failed plot against Saddam Hussein (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3220 ]]) and Iraq's subsequent incursion into Kurdish territory (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3201 ]]) which the Republican senators use against the Clinton White House and the CIA. &#8220;Clinton gave us a huge opportunity,&#8221; Brooke later recalls. &#8220;We took a Republican Congress and pitted it against a Democratic White House. We really hurt and embarrassed the president.&#8221; The Republican leadership in Congress, he acknowledges, &#8220;didn't care that much about the ammunition. They just wanted to beat up the president.&#8221; Senior Republican senators, according to Brooke, are &#8220;very receptive, right away&#8221; to Chalabi and Brooke's information, and Chalabi is soon on a first-name basis with 30 members of Congress, including senators Trent Lott, Jesse Helms, and Newt Gingrich. [[ | Alternet, 5/21/2004 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Newt Gingrich )) ((+ Trent Lott )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Jesse Helms )) 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_420 false 1 ------ Expert committees report that Iraq has failed to adequately account for 500 mustard-gas shells, 25 &#8220;special warheads,&#8221; 150 aerial bombs, 2 scud missiles, 520 kilograms of yeast extract growth medium specifically for anthrax, 15,000 122 mm artillery shells, 25,000 rockets and several hundred tons of chemicals for the nerve agent VX. [[ | BBC, 9/11/02 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/29/02 ]] [[ | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6/02 ]] [[ | Newsmax, 9/4/02 ]] --- 25 Special Warheads --- Iraq failed to account for 25 &#8220;special warheads&#8221; . Former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter will tell the Christian Science Monitor in mid-2002, &#8220;Even if he hid some warheads, they would have degenerated by now.&#8221; [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/29/02 ]] --- Scud Missiles --- Iraq has accounted for or destroyed 817 of its 819 Scud missiles. (( Kofi Annan )) [[ | Foreign Policy in Focus, 8/02 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/29/02 ]] ------ It is later suggested by experts, such as former UN inspector Scott Ritter and Charles Duelfer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, that Iraq could possibly salvage and manufacture enough components to build up a store of between five and 25 missiles. [[ | BBC, 9/11/02 ]] ------ But as the San Francisco Chronicle later notes, citing unspecified weapons experts, &#8220;there is no evidence that these have been tested or that Iraq has any functional launchers.&#8221; [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] --- 8,5000 liters of anthrax --- Iraq maintains that these remaining stores of Anthrax were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991, however they offer no evidence of this. [[ | Scotsman, 2/24/03 ]] ------ Scott Ritter, a former Marine intelligence officer and chief weapons inspector, will later say that evidence indicates that Iraq's liquid bulk anthrax has not been produced by Iraq since 1991. Furthermore, he adds, the factory where Iraq had produced the pathogen was destroyed in 1996. He says that any anthrax produced before then is no longer a threat to anyone because after three years liquid bulk anthrax becomes &#8220;useless sludge.&#8221; [[ | Reuters, 2/8/02 ]] --- Several hundred tons of chemicals for the nerve agent VX --- UNSCOM is unable to account for several hundred tons of chemicals for the nerve agent VX. ------ Iraq maintains that these remaining stocks were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. [[ | Scotsman, 2/24/03 ]] ------ In March 2003, UNMOVIC, the successor to UNSCOM, will report &#8220;that Iraq's production method created nerve agent that lasted only six to eight weeks.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 6/1/03 ]] ------ Critics believe that most of these stocks were destroyed during the First Gulf War. Scott Ritter, a former chief weapons inspector, speaking at the Suffolk Law School building in downtown Boston, will say on July of 2002: &#8220;The research and development factory is destroyed [a Gulf War bomb destroyed the production facility on January 23, 1991]. The product of that factory is destroyed. The weapons they loaded up have been destroyed. More importantly, the equipment procured from Europe that was going to be used for their large-scale VX nerve agent factory was identified by the special commission&#8212;still packed in its crates in 1997&#8212;and destroyed. Is there a VX nerve agent factory in Iraq today? Not on your life.&#8221; [[ | Pitt, 7/24/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> {{ statement_scott_ritter_19 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_20 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_18 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_21 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_16 }} {{ commentary_robin_cook_3 }} {{ statement_richard_butler_3 }} 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_161 false 1 ------ Radio Free Europe, headquartered in Prague, begins transmitting anti-Saddam programs into Iraq. Late in the year, Iraqi diplomat Jabir Salim defects and tells Czech officials that before leaving Iraq he had been given $150,000 in cash to finance a plot to blow up Radio Free Europe's headquarters. This information is apparently passed on to Washington and US officials warn Tom Dine, program director of Radio Free Europe, about the plot. In response, Radio Free Europe begins 24-hour video surveillance of the building. (( Unnamed sources )) (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/01 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 5/1/02 ]] [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 10/26/01 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Jabir Salim )) ((+ Radio Free Europe )) ((+ Tom Dine )) 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1813 false 1 ------ The National Security Council (NSC) completes a review of Iraq and terrorism. In an interview with journalist Robert Dreyfuss four years later, Daniel Benjamin, then-director of counterterrorism at the NSC, summarizes the report's conclusions: &#8220;[W]e went through every piece of intelligence we could find to see if there was a link [between] al-Qaeda and Iraq, says Benjamin. We came to the conclusion that our intelligence agencies had it right: There was no noteworthy relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. I know that for a fact. No other issue has been as closely scrutinized as this one.&#8221; [[ | The American Prospect, 12/16/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Daniel Benjamin )) January 26, 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_482 false 1 ------ The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an influential neoconservative think tank, publishes a letter to President Clinton urging war against Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein because he is a &#8220;hazard&#8221; to &#8220;a significant portion of the world's supply of oil.&#8221; In a foretaste of what eventually happens, the letter calls for the US to go to war alone, attacks the United Nations, and says the US should not be &#8220;crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.&#8221; The letter is signed by many who will later lead the 2003 Iraq war. 10 of the 18 signatories later join the Bush Administration, including (future) Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretaries of State John Bolton and Paula Dobriansky, presidential adviser for the Middle East Elliott Abrams, and Bush's special Iraq envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. (( January 26, 1998 Open Letter to Bill Clinton )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 3/16/03 ]] ------ Clinton does heavily bomb Iraq in late 1998, but the bombing doesn't last long and its long term effect is the break off of United Nations weapons inspections. [[;position=top | New York Times, 3/22/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << pre911Plans >> << DSM >> ((+ William J. Bennett )) ((+ Vin Weber )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ James Woolsey )) ((+ William Schneider Jr. )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) ((+ Robert B. Zoellick )) ((+ Peter Rodman )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Elliott Abrams )) ((+ Richard Armitage )) ((+ Jeffrey T. Bergner )) ((+ Zalmay M. Khalilzad )) ((+ William Kristol )) ((+ Paula J. Dobriansky )) ((+ Robert Kagan )) ((+ Francis Fukuyama )) ((+ Richard Perle )) January 27, 1998 Scott Ritter Discloses Knowledge Gaps on Iraqi WMD to Chalabi complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3223 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi meets Scott Ritter, a liaison for the UN weapons inspectors program, in his London apartment. When Chalabi asks Ritter what kind of information inspectors need, Ritter discloses all of inspectors' intelligence gaps. &#8220;I should have asked him what he could give me,&#8221; Ritter later tells the New Yorker. &#8220;We made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps.&#8221; The New Yorker reports: &#8220;Ritter outlines most of the UN inspectors' capabilities and theories, telling Chalabi how they had searched for underground bunkers with ground-penetrating radar. He also told Chalabi of his suspicion that Saddam may have had mobile chemical- or biological-weapons laboratories. ... &#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << trailers >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) February 18, 1998 Former CIA Director Says First Gulf War Motivated by Oil complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3259 false 1 ------ Former CIA director James Woolsey participates in an online discussion on Time's weekly forum on the topic of Iraq. At one point, he is asked if he thinks the US is capable of launching a successful military attack against Iraq given the lack of support from US allies. Woolsey responds: &#8220;It will be harder but perhaps not impossible. The key holdout is Saudi Arabia&#8212;and it is indeed aggravating that even though we went to war in 1991 principally to protect its oil, they are unwilling to let us launch air strikes from their country.&#8221; [[ | Time, 2/18/1998 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ James Woolsey )) February 19, 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_75 false 1 ------ The Committee for Peace and Security publishes an open letter to President Bill Clinton outlining a 9-point &#8220;comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime.&#8221; The letter is signed by a litany of former US government officials known for their neoconservative viewpoints. Several of the signatories are also involved with the Project for the New American Century and had endorsed a similar letter published by that organization the previous month. (( February 19, 1998 Open Letter to Bill Clinton )) [[ | CNN, 2/20/98 ]] [[ | Committee For Peace and Security, 2/19/98 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> ((+ Richard Armitage )) ((+ Peter Rodman )) ((+ Roger Robinson )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Joshua Muravchik )) ((+ Martin Peretz )) ((+ Robert A. Pastor )) ((+ Max Singer )) ((+ Peter Rosenblatt )) ((+ Helmut Sonnenfeldt )) ((+ Leon Wienseltier )) ((+ Caspar Weinberger )) ((+ Richard V. Allen )) ((+ Frank Carlucci )) ((+ Paula J. Dobriansky )) ((+ William B. Clark )) ((+ Jeffrey T. Bergner )) ((+ Stephen Bryen )) ((+ Richard Burt )) ((+ Frank Gaffney )) ((+ Jeffrey Gedmin )) ((+ Sven F. Kraemer )) ((+ Gary Schmitt )) ((+ Zalmay M. Khalilzad )) ((+ Bernard Lewis )) ((+ Frederick L. Lewis )) ((+ Jarvis Lynch )) ((+ Robert C. McFarlane )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Fred C. Ikle )) ((+ Stephen Solarz )) ((+ David Wurmser )) ((+ Dov S. Zakheim )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ William Kristol )) ((+ Elliott Abrams )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Robert Kagan )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) May 29, 1998 PNAC Calls on Republican Congressional Leaders to Lead Congress in Asserting US Interests in Gulf complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2891 false 1 ------ The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) publishes a letter addressed to Congressman Newt Gingrich and Senator Trent Lott. The letter argues that the Clinton administration has capitulated to Saddam Hussein and calls on the two legislators to lead Congress to &#8220;establish and maintain a strong US military presence in the region, and be prepared to use that force to protect [US] vital interests in the Gulf&#8212;and, if necessary, to help removed Saddam from power.&#8221; (( PNAC letter to Gingrich and Lott, 5/29/1998 )) ====== << pre911Plans >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Clinton administration )) ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Project for the New American Century )) ((+ Trent Lott )) ((+ Newt Gingrich )) (July 1998) Ahmed Chalabi Asks Scott Ritter to Do Intelligence Work for INC; Reveals His Own Ambitions for Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3224 false 1 ------ Scott Ritter has a second meeting with Ahmed Chalabi (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3223 ]]), this time at Chalabi's house in Georgetown. Inspectors have recently discovered trace evidence of VX nerve gas on warheads in Iraq and Ritter is concerned that the Iraqis are still hiding something. During the meeting, they discuss the VX discovery and Chalabi suggests that Ritter do intelligence work for the INC. He shows Ritter two studies advocating Hussein's overthrow. One of the studies is a military plan, written, in part, by retired General Wayne Downing, who commanded the Special Forces in the first Gulf War. Downing's study suggests that the Baathist regime could easily be toppled by Iraqi fighters alone. But the plan would nonetheless require some American troop support. Chalabi wants to sell the plan to Congress. Ritter, a former marine, isn't impressed and tells Chalabi he thinks it's a ploy to get the US involved. He asks Chalabi, &#8220;So how come the fact that you'd need more American assistance is not in the plan?&#8221; Chalabi replies, &#8220;Because it's too sensitive.&#8221; Chalabi then shares with Ritter his plans to rule Iraq. Ritter later tells the New Yorker: &#8220;He told me that, if I played ball, when he became president he'd control all of the oil concessions, and he'd make sure I was well taken care of. I guess it was supposed to be a sweetener.&#8221; (Chalabi's office will tell the New Yorker that Ritter is a &#8220;liar.&#8221;) [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Scott Ritter )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) (July 1998) Prominent Neoconservative Says INC Control of Northern Iraq Would Increase Israeli Security complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3213 false 1 ------ David Wurmser says that having a region in northern Iraq controlled by the Iraqi National Congress would provide the missing piece to complete an anti-Syria, anti-Iran block. &#8220;If Ahmed [Chalabi] extends a no-fly, no-drive in northern Iraq, it puts scuds out of the range of Israel and provides the geographic beachhead between Turkey, Jordan and Israel,&#8221; Wurmser says. &#8220;This should anchor the Middle East pro-Western coalition.&#8221; [[ | Forward, 7/31/2003 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((- Iraqi National Congress )) ((- Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ David Wurmser )) July 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_421 false 1 ------ UNSCOM weapons inspector Richard Butler states, &#8220;If Iraqi disarmament were a five-lap race, we would be three quarters of the way around the fifth and final lap.&#8221; [[ | Boston Globe, 3/22/99 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Robin Cook )) {{ duplicate_richard_butler_3 }} July 24, 1998 Chalabi Supporters Ask Israel to Pressure Congress to Grant Funding for INC complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3212 false 1 ------ Francis Brooke and David Wurmser meet with Dore Gold, Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations, with hopes to get Israel to pressure US Congress into approving a $10 million grant to the Iraqi National Congress to fund an effort to facilitate regime change in Iraq. &#8220;I went to speak to [Ambassador Gold] just to say that I think it's in Israel's best interest to help the Iraqi people get this thing done,&#8221; Brooke says. &#8220;The basic case I made was that we need help here in the US to get this thing going.&#8221; Commenting on the effort, Richard Perle tells Forward, a Jewish-American Magazine, &#8220;Israel has not devoted the political or rhetorical time or energy to Saddam that they have to the Iranians. The case for the Iraqi opposition in Congress would be a lot more favorable with Israeli support.&#8221; [[ | Forward, 7/31/2003 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((@ Richard Perle )) ((+ David Wurmser )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Dore Gold )) October 31, 1998 President Clinton Signs the Iraq Liberation Act into Law complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3215 false 1 ------ President Clinton Signs the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 into law. The act, which passed with overwhelming support from Democrats and Republicans in both the House and Senate, was written by Trent Lott and other Republicans with significant input from Ahmed Chalabi and his aide, Francis Brooke. The act makes it &#8220;the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.&#8221; To that end, the act requires that the president designate one or more Iraqi opposition groups to receive up to $97 million in US military equipment and nonlethal training. The act authorizes another $43 million for humanitarian, broadcasting, and information-collection activities. To be eligible for US assistance, an organization must be &#8220;committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, to maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.&#8221; (( Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 )) [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 1/25/2002 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Trent Lott )) ((+ William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) December 16, 1998 Richard Butler Orders the Withdrawal of UN Weapons Inspectors from Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2976 false 1 ------ UNSCOM executive chairman Richard Butler orders the withdrawal of weapons inspectors from Iraq accusing the Iraqis of not cooperating. His actions follow a phone conversation with Peter Burleigh, the American representative to the United Nations [[;pincamp=archive:search | New York Times, 12/18/1998 ]] ------ , basically warning Butler that the US intends to strike Iraq. In his book, Saddam Defiant, Butler will recall: &#8220;I received a telephone call from US Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission... Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be &#8216;prudent to take measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.&#8217;... I told him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq.&#8221; Butler's order to withdraw is made without the permission of the UN Security Council. [[,,2087-1660300,00.html | Butler, 2000, pp 224 ]] [[;ItemID=5829 | Znet, 7/6/2004 ]] ------ Years later, the American press and government will say that on this day Saddam Hussein &#8220;kicked out&#8221; inspectors. [[ | Extra!, 10/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> ((+ Peter Burleigh )) ((+ International Atomic Energy Agency )) ((+ Richard Butler )) ((+ United Nations Special Commission )) (Late 1998) General Zinni Ridicules Ahmed Chalabi's Plan to Topple Saddam Hussein's Government complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3204 false 1 ------ General Anthony Zinni, commander of CENTCOM, which has operational control of US combat forces in the Middle East, is provided with a copy of Chalabi's military plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein. &#8220;It got me pretty angry,&#8221; he later recalls. He warns Congress that Chalabi's plan is a &#8220;pie in the sky, a fairy tale.&#8221; He tells the New Yorker: &#8220;They were saying if you put a thousand troops on the ground Saddam's regime will collapse, they won't fight. I said, &#8216;I fly over them every day, and they shoot at us. We hit them, and they shoot at us again. No way a thousand forces would end it.&#8217; The exile group was giving them inaccurate intelligence. Their scheme was ridiculous.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Anthony Zinni )) ((+ US Congress )) ((- Ahmed Chalabi )) Late December 1998 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_183 false 1 ------ According to US intelligence sources, Farouk Hijazi, the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, visits Afghanistan in late 1998 after US cruise missiles are fired on al Qaeda training camps following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hijazi, who is also a longtime intelligence officer, meets Osama bin Laden in Kandahar and extends an offer from Baghdad to provide refuge for him and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. Bin Laden reportedly rejects the offer because he doesn't want his organization dominated by Saddam Hussein. After the 9/11 attacks, proponents of invading Iraq will claim the visit makes Hijazi a key link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Hijazi will be captured by US troops in late April 2003 after the US/British invasion of Iraq begins. When interrogated by US authorities, he will deny any Iraq-al-Qaeda ties. [[,3604,314700,00.html | Associated Press, 4/25/03 ]] [[ | USA Today, 7/13/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/7/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 9/27/01 ]] [[,3604,314700,00.html | Guardian, 2/16/99 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Farouk Hijaz )) ((+ Osama bin Laden )) ((- Mullah Mohammed Omar )) 1999 US Ready to Fight For Oil, Especially in Persian Gulf and Caspian Regions a99uswantsoil false 1 ------ A top level US policy document explicitly confirms the US military's readiness to fight a war for oil. The report, Strategic Assessment 1999, prepared for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense, states, &#8220;energy and resource issues will continue to shape international security,&#8221; and if an oil &#8220;problem&#8221; arises, &#8220;US forces might be used to ensure adequate supplies.&#8221; Oil conflicts over production facilities and transport routes, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Caspian regions, are specifically envisaged. [[ | Sydney Morning Herald, 5/20/03 ]] ====== << pipelinePolitics >> << iraq >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ United States )) (1999) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_39 false 1 ------ Joe T. begins working in the Winpac unit of the CIA, which analyzes intelligence related to dual-use technology and export controls. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) Late 1990s 1999 Iraqi National Congress Sets up Office in Iran with US Money complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3230 false 1 ------ An associate of Ahmed Chalabi later tells journalist Andrew Cockburn that in the late '90s, &#8220;Ahmed opened an INC office in Tehran, spending the Americans' money, and he joked to me that &#8216;the Americans are breaching their embargo on Iran.&#8217; &#8221; [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) 1999 George W. Bush Hints at Invading Iraq in Future Presidency complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2874 false 1 ------ Presidential candidate George W. Bush tells prominent Texas author and Bush family friend Mickey Herskowitz, who is helping Bush write an autobiography, that as president he would invade Iraq if given the opportunity. &#8220;One of the keys to being seen as a great leader is to be seen as a commander-in-chief,&#8221; Herskowitz remembers Bush saying. &#8220;My father had all this political capital built up when he drove the Iraqis out of [Kuwait] and he wasted it. If I have a chance to invade Iraq, if I had that much capital, I'm not going to waste it. I'm going to get everything passed I want to get passed and I'm going to have a successful presidency.&#8221; Herskowitz later says he believes Bush's comments were intended to distinguish himself from his father, rather than express a desire to invade Iraq. [[ | Houston Chronicle, 10/31/2004 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Mickey Herskowitz )) Between 1999 and 2000 France Concerned About Its Uranium Supplies in Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3139 false 1 ------ Intelligence reports suggesting that &#8220;rogue states&#8221; are trying to obtain uranium sparks concern within the French government about the security of France's uranium supplies in Niger, as well as the security of the two French consortiums that control Niger's uranium industry. [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] ------ France has reportedly learned that uranium is being extracted from abandoned mines and being sold on the international black market. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ France )) 1999 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_162 false 1 ------ Iraqi diplomat and suspected intelligence officer Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani arrives in Prague to replace his predecessor, Jabir Salim, who had defected (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_161 ]]). Fearing that Al-Ani had a similar mission to that of Salim, Czech intelligence closely monitors al-Ani's activities. Sometime in 1999, al-Ani is reportedly videotaped loitering around and photographing the Radio Free Europe building. Al-Ani is sometimes seen with a thinner, taller man wearing a Shell Oil jacket who is never identified. The pictures are passed onto the Czech intelligence agency [BIS]. (( Jan Kavan )) (( Unnamed sources )) [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/01 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 5/1/02 ]] [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Radio Free Europe )) ((- Jabir Salim )) February 1999 David Wurmser Urges US to Support Insurgency in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2869 false 1 ------ In his book, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, David Wurmser of the American Enterprise Institute urges the US to support an insurgency aimed at toppling the Bath'ist government of Saddam Hussein as part of a broader policy to defeat pan-Arabism in Iraq. In its place, the US should encourage the creation of a &#8220;loosely unified Iraqi confederal government, shaped around strong sectarian and provincial entities,&#8221; Wurmser argues. [[ | Wurmser, 1999, pp 136-137 ]] ------ What happens in Iraq is vitally important, Wurmser notes, because the country is of extreme strategic importance. &#8220;It is a key transportation route, and it is rich in both geographic endowments and human talent,&#8221; he explains. &#8220;Its location on pathways between Asia and Europe, Africa and Asia, and Europe and Africa makes it an ideal route for armies, pipelines, and trade from both the eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf. Iraq also has large, proven oil reserves, water, and other important resources. Its geographic centrality and abundance of natural advantages alone make the country a regionally important center.&#8221; [[ | Wurmser, 1999, pp 116-117 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ David Wurmser )) February 1999 Iraqi Ambassador's Trip to Africa is Widely Reported; US Shows No Concern complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_94 false 1 ------ Wissam al-Zahawie, Iraq's ambassador to the Vatican, sets off on a trip to several African countries as part of an effort to convince African heads of state to visit Iraq. Saddam Hussein hopes that these visits will help break the embargo on flights to Iraq, and undermine the UN sanctions regime. Zahawie's first stop is Niger, where he meets with the country's president, President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, for one hour. Mainassara promises that he will visit Baghdad the following April (He's assasinated before he has an opportunity to do this). (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) (( Charles O. Cecil )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 7/13/2003 ]] [[,8599,491666,00.html | Time, 10/2/2003 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 8/10/03a ]] ------ Zahawie's visit is reported in the local newspaper as well as by a French news agency. The US and British governments are also aware of the trip but show no concern. No one suggests that the trip's motives have anything to do with acquiring uranium. At this time, Niger is actively seeking economic assistance from the United States. (( Charles O. Cecil )) (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ------ In early 2002, the Italian military intelligence service, SISMI, will allege in a report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) sent to the US that the motive behind the visit was to discuss the future purchase of uranium oxide, also known as &#8220;yellowcake&#8221; (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]). (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) (( Unnamed US intelligence sources )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Ibrahim Bare Mainassara )) ((+ Wissam al-Zahawie )) February 4, 1999 President Clinton Designates 7 Iraqi Opposition Groups as Eligible for US Funding complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3238 false 1 ------ President Clinton signs Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 99-13 designating seven Iraqi opposition groups as being eligible to receive US federal funds under the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3215 ]]). The act stated that the policy of the US should be to support regime change in Iraq. The seven groups include the Iraqi National Accord, the Iraqi National Congress, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. [[ | White House, 2/4/1999 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Iraqi National Accord )) ((+ Patriotic Union of Kurdistan )) ((+ Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq )) ((+ Kurdistan Democratic Party )) ((+ Movement for Constitutional Monarchy )) ((+ William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) March 1999 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_422 false 1 ------ A special panel of the UN Security Council reports that &#8220;the declared facilities of Iraq's biological weapons program have been destroyed and rendered harmless.&#8221; [[ | Guardian, 5/15/02 ]] [[ | Daily Mirror, 4/5/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> (After June or July 1999) Italian Businessman Rocco Martino Provides France with Documents Suggesting Iraq Wants to Expand Trade with Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1608 false 1 ------ Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler and former SISMI agent, provides French officials with documents suggesting that Iraq intends to expand its &#8220;trade&#8221; with Niger. It is not known from where he obtains these documents. The French assume the trade being discussed concerns uranium, Niger's main export. At French intelligence's request, Martino continues supplying them with documents. [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] [[ | Sunday Times, 8/1/04 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ France )) ((+ Rocco Martino )) June 1999 Iraqi Delegation Reportedly Discusses &#8216;Expanding Commercial Relations&#8217; with Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3260 false 1 ------ A businessman reportedly approaches Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki and insists that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss &#8220;expanding commercial relations&#8221; between Niger and Iraq. Mayaki reportedly interprets &#8220;expanding commercial relations&#8221; to mean that Iraq is interested in discussing uranium sales. According to Mayaki, he does meet the delegation but avoids discussion of trade issues because of UN sanctions on the country. They reportedly never discuss what the businessman had meant when he said Iraq was interested in &#8220;expanding commercial relations.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Ibrahim Mayaki )) November 19, 1999 Congress Allocates $10 Million for Iraq Opposition Groups complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3239 false 1 ------ Congress allocates $10 million &#8220;to support efforts to bring about political transition in Iraq, of which not less than $8 million shall be made available only to Iraqi opposition groups designated under the ILA [Iraq Liberation Act of 1998] for political, economic humanitarian, and other activities of such groups, and not more than $2 million may be made available for groups and activities seeking the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi Government officials for war crimes.&#8221; President Clinton signs the appropriation bill into law on November 29. (( Public Law 106-113 )) [[ | The Library of Congress Thomas Database, n.d. ]] ------ This $10 million dollars is the first allocation of funds to Iraqi opposition groups out of the total $97 million that was authorized by the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3215 ]]). ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) December 2, 1999 Bush Says He Would Support Opposition Groups In Iraq and Take Out WMD Arsenal complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2914 false 1 ------ Speaking in Manchester, New Hampshire, presidential candidate George Bush says as president he would not lift the sanctions on Iraq nor attempt to negotiate with Saddam Hussein. &#8220;I'd make darn sure that he lived up to the agreements that he signed back in the early '90s. I'd be helping the opposition groups. And if I found, in any way shape or form, that he was developing weapons of mass destruction, I'd take them out. I'm surprised he's still there. I think a lot of other people are as well.&#8221; [[;p_theme=bg&amp;p_action=search&amp;p_maxdocs=200&amp;p_text_search-0=It%20AND%20was%20AND%20a%20AND%20gaffe-free%20AND%20evening%20AND%20for%20AND%20the%20AND%20rookie%20AND%20front-runner,%20AND%20till%20AND%20he%20AND%20was%20AND%20asked%20AND%20about%20AND%20Saddam%92s%20AND%20weapons%20AND%20stash&amp;s_dispstring=It%20was%20a%20gaffe-free%20evening%20for%20the%20rookie%20front-runner,%20till%20he%20was%20asked%20about%20Saddam%92s%20weapons%20stash&amp;p_perpage=10&amp;p_sort=YMD_date:D&amp;xcal_useweights=no | Boston Globe, 12/3/1999 ]] [[ | Federal Document Clearing House, 12/2/1999 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) December 17, 1999 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_297 false 1 ------ With the passing of UN Resolution 1284, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is created to assist in the disarming of Iraq. The new body replaces the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNMOVIC is deliberately designed to prevent infiltration by spies of the UN Security Council member states, specifically the US and Britain. This had been a problem with its predecessor, UNSCOM. The UN diminishes the role of Americans in the new commission by abolishing the powerful office of deputy chairman, which had always been held by an American, and by appointing non-Americans to important positions. In the new inspections body, &#8220;The highest-ranking American in the agency now has a relatively lowly job, in charge of the training division.&#8221; A Chinese official holds the senior &#8220;activity evaluation&#8221; position and a Russian official is in charge of &#8220;liaising with foreign governments and companies.&#8221; Another reform is that the inspectors will use commercial satellite companies, instead of US spy satellites, to monitor Iraq's activities. [[ | The Times, 9/18/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> 2000 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_40 false 1 ------ US intelligence learns from the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) that Iraq has made arrangements to purchase tubes, made of 7075-T6 aluminum, from China through Garry Cordukes, the director of the Australian company International Aluminum Supply. The company is associated with Kam Kiu Propriety Limited, a subsidiary of the Chinese company that will manufacture the aluminum tubes. Concerned that the tubes may be related to Iraqi efforts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, an Australian intelligence agent contacts Cordukes to obtain a sample of the tubes for examination. A CIA agent, Joe T., is said to have played a significant part in this discovery. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) 2000-2002 State Department Begins Funding Iraqi National Congress complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3265 false 1 ------ The State Department begins funding the Iraqi National Congress' &#8220;information collection&#8221; program to the tune of $150,000 per month. The program is part of the US government's larger goal of effecting a regime change in Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3215 ]]). According to the agreement between the State Department and the INC, the group is permitted to use the money to &#8220;implement a public information campaign to communicate with Iraqis inside and outside of Iraq and also to promulgate its message to the international community at large.&#8221; The INC is prohibited from engaging in activities &#8220;associated with, or that could appear to be associated with, attempting to influence the policies of the United States Government or Congress or propagandizing the American people.&#8221; But according to Francis Brooke, an INC spokesman, some of the State Department's funds are used to finance the expenses of Iraqi defectors who serve as the sources for several US news stories. Brookes claims that there are &#8220;no restrictions&#8221; on the use of US federal funds to make defectors available to the media. Another Chalabi spokesman will say: &#8220;The INC paid some living and travel expenses of defectors with USG funds. None of these expenses was related to meeting journalists.&#8221; He adds that the INC &#8220;did not violate any US laws.&#8221; [[ | Newsweek, 4/5/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ US Department of State )) 2000 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1609 false 1 ------ Former CIA director James Woolsey serves as a corporate officer for the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation which manages the Iraqi National Congress' US funding. Also during this time, Woolsey and his former law firm, Shea and Gardner, provide the INC and Iraqi exiles with pro bono work. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Shea and Gardner )) ((+ James Woolsey )) 2000 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_483 false 1 ------ During the 2000 presidential campaign, the Republican Party calls for &#8220;a comprehensive plan for the removal of Saddam Hussein.&#8221; Similarly, the Democratic Party's platform supports using &#8220;America's military might against Iraq when and where it is necessary.&#8221; (( Republican National Committee )) (( Democratic National Committee )) [[ | Project for the New American Century, 7/6/00 ]] [[ | Strategic Affairs. 11/1/00 ]] [[ | NewsMax, 2/3/01 ]] [[ | Democratic National Committee, 2000 Platform, pg 46 ]] [[ | Republican National Committee, 2000 Platform ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> ((+ Republican National Committee )) ((+ Democratic National Committee )) 2000 Michael Ledeen: Leaders May Have to &#8216;Enter into Evil&#8217; under Certain Circumstances complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3165 false 1 ------ In his book, Machiavelli on Modern Leadership, neoconservative Michael Ledeen measures modern leaders against Machiavelli's rules for leadership and concludes that &#8220;[e]ven after a half a millennium, Machiavelli's advice to leaders is as contemporary as tomorrow.&#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 185 ]] ------ He laments that contemporary Western leaders, &#8220;like their counterparts in the rest of the world, have fallen short of Machiavelli's standards.&#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 187 ]] ------ According to Ledeen, &#8220;[I]f new and more virtuous leaders do not emerge, it is only a matter of time before we are either dominated by our enemies or sink into a more profound crisis.&#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 187 ]] ------ Such a situation, he explains, would put the US in the &#8220;same desperate crisis that drove Machiavelli to call for a new dictator to set things aright.&#8221; He adds, &#8220;In either case, we need Machiavellian wisdom and leadership.&#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 188 ]] ------ Throughout the book Ledeen highlights certain qualities that he believes make strong leaders. A leader &#8220;must be prepared to fight at all times,&#8221; he writes, and must be of &#8220;manly vigor.&#8221; Women, he says, are rarely strong leaders because women generally cannot achieve virtue for they lack the &#8220;physical wherewithal and the passionate desire to achieve&#8221; military glory. To Ledeen, the ends may justify the means. In some situations, &#8220;[i]n order to achieve the most noble accomplishments, the leader may have to &#8216;enter into evil.&#8217; &#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 90 ]] ------ According to Ledeen, the Christian god sanctions this view. Machiavelli, he notes approvingly, wrote: &#8220;I believe that the greatest good that one can do, and the most gratifying to God is that which one does for one's country.&#8221; Ledeen thus adds: &#8220;Since it is the highest good, the defense of the country is one of those extreme situation in which a leader is justified in committing evil.&#8221; [[ | Ledeen, 2000, pp 117 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Michael Ledeen )) {{ duplicate_michael_ledeen_5 }} Early 2000 Italian Intelligence Agent Offers Information Peddler Source for Information on Niger's Uranium Dealings complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1610 false 1 ------ Antonio Nucera, deputy chief of the SISMI center in Viale Pasteur in Rome, telephones Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler and former SISMI agent and tells Martino of a SISMI intelligence asset working in the Niger Embassy in Rome who is in need of money and who can provide him with documents to sell. (( Antonio Nucera )) (( Rocco Martino )) [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | Il Giornale, 11/6/2005 ]] [[ | Il Giornale, 9/21/2004 ]] [[ | Sunday Times, 8/1/04 ]] [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] ------ According to Martino, &#8220;SISMI wanted me to pass on the documents but they didn't want anyone to know they had been involved.&#8221; [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] [[ | Sunday Times, 8/1/04 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ SISMI )) ((+ Antonio Nucera )) ((+ Rocco Martino )) March 2000 Italian Information Peddler Meets with Niger Embassy Source complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3140 false 1 ------ Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler and former SISMI agent, meets with an Italian intelligence source who is an employee at the Niger embassy in Rome. The employee is a 60-year-old lady known only as &#8220;La Signora.&#8221; What happens next is not clear. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | Sunday Times, 8/1/04 ]] [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] [[ | Talking Points Memo, 11/10/2005 ]] --- According to Rocco Martino --- Over the next several months, La Signora provides Martino with numerous documents. First comes a &#8220;codebook,&#8221; then a dossier, which includes a mixture of fake and genuine documents, and then finally, a purported agreement between Niger and Iraq on the sale of 500 tons of uranium oxide, also known as &#8220;yellowcake.&#8221; [[ | Talking Points Memo, 11/10/2005 ]] --- According to La Repubblica --- With the blessing of Antonio Nucera, the deputy chief of the SISMI center in Viale Pasteur in Rome, Martino and La Signora hatch a plan to break into the Niger embassy (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1182 ]]) to steal material that could be used to create a collection of forged documents that Martino would then sell to French intelligence. They reportedly solicit the help of Nigerien First Embassy Counselor Zakaria Yaou Maiga. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Zakaria Yaou Maiga )) ((+ Antonio Nucera )) ((+ Rocco Martino )) May 2000 Jose Bustani Reelected as Head of OPCW complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2881 false 1 ------ Jose Bustani is reelected to the position of director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the 2001-2005 term by a unanimous vote. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) (May 17, 2000) Bush Says He Will Take Saddam Hussein Out complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2859 false 1 ------ Presidential candidate George W. Bush allegedly tells Osama Siblani, publisher of the Arab American newspaper, that if he becomes president he will remove Saddam Hussein from power. &#8220;He told me that he was going to take him out, &#8221; Siblani says in a radio interview on Democracy Now! almost five years later. Siblani will also recall that Bush &#8220;wanted to go to Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction, and he considered the regime an imminent and gathering threat against the United States.&#8221; As Siblani will later note, as a presidential candidate Bush has no access to classified intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs. (( Osama Siblani )) [[ | Democracy Now!, 3/11/05 ]] ====== << decision >> << pre911Plans >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Osama Siblani )) September 2000 PNAC Report Recommends Policies That Need New Pearl Harbor for Quick Implementation a0900paxamericana false 1 ------ PNAC drafts a strategy document, &#8220;Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century,&#8221; for George W. Bush's team before the 2000 Presidential election. The document was commissioned by future Vice President Cheney, future Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, future Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Florida Governor Jeb Bush (Bush's brother), and future Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff Lewis Libby. (( Rebuilding America's Defenses )) --- * --- The document outlines a &#8220;blueprint for maintaining global US preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.&#8221; --- * --- PNAC states further: &#8220;The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.&#8221; --- * --- PNAC calls for the control of space through a new &#8220;US Space Forces,&#8221; the political control of the Internet, and the subversion of any growth in political power of even close allies, and advocates &#8220;regime change&#8221; in China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and other countries. --- * --- It also mentions that &#8220;advanced forms of biological warfare that can &#8216;target&#8217; specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.&#8221; --- * --- However, PNAC complains that thes changes are likely to take a long time, &#8220;absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event&#8212;like a new Pearl Harbor.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2003/latimes011203.html | Los Angeles Times, 1/12/03 ]] ------ Notably, while Cheney commissioned this plan (along with other future key leaders of the Bush administration), he defends Bush's position of maintaining Clinton's policy not to attack Iraq during an NBC interview in the midst of the 2000 presidential campaign, asserting that the US should not act as though &#8220;we were an imperialist power, willy-nilly moving into capitals in that part of the world, taking down governments.&#8221; [[;node=&amp;contentId=A43909-2003Jan11&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 1/12/02 ]] ------ A British member of Parliament will later say of the report: &#8220;This is a blueprint for US world domination&#8212;a new world order of their making. These are the thought processes of fantasist Americans who want to control the world.&#8221; [[ | Sunday Herald, 9/7/02 ]] ------ Both PNAC and its strategy plan for Bush are almost virtually ignored by the media until a few weeks before the start of the Iraq war (see [[ a0203pnacnews ]]). ====== << centralAsia >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Aaron Friedberg )) ((+ Steve Forbes )) ((+ Elliott Abrams )) ((+ Francis Fukuyama )) ((+ Norman Podhoretz )) ((+ Henry S. Rowen )) ((+ Vin Weber )) ((+ Eliot A. Cohen )) ((+ Hasam Amin )) ((+ William J. Bennett )) ((+ Midge Decter )) ((+ George Weigel )) ((+ John Ellis ("Jeb") Bush )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Project for the New American Century )) ((+ Paula J. Dobriansky )) ((+ Frank Gaffney )) ((+ Donald Kagan )) ((+ Steve Rosen )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Peter Rodman )) ((+ Zalmay M. Khalilzad )) ((+ Dan Quayle )) ((- Syria )) ((- China )) ((- United States )) ((- Lybia )) ((- North Korea )) ((- Iraq )) ((+ Fred C. Ikle )) [[ | People involved in the 2000 PNAC report (from top left): Vice President Cheney, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis Libby, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Undersecretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, and author Eliot Cohen. ]] September 2000 Chalabi's Brothers Convicted in Geneva for Forging Documents complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3229 false 1 ------ Chalabi's brothers, Jawad and Hazem, are convicted and sentenced in absentia by a Geneva court for fabricating fake documents. [[ | CounterPunch, 5/20/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Hazem Chalabi )) ((+ Jawad Chalabi )) September 2000 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_76 false 1 ------ The neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century writes a &#8220;blueprint&#8221; for the &#8220;creation of a &#8216;global Pax Americana&#8217; &#8221; (see also June 3, 1997). The document, titled, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century, was written for the Bush team even before the 2000 Presidential election. It was written for future Vice President Cheney, future Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, future Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Florida Governor and President Bush's brother Jeb Bush, and future Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff Lewis Libby. The report calls itself a &#8220;blueprint for maintaining global US preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.&#8221; The plan shows that the Bush team intended to take military control of Persian Gulf oil whether or not Saddam Hussein was in power and should retain control of the region even if there is no threat. It says: &#8220;The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.&#8221; The report calls for the control of space through a new &#8220;US Space Forces,&#8221; the political control of the internet, the subversion of any growth in political power of even close allies, and advocates &#8220;regime change&#8221; in China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran and other countries. It also mentions that &#8220;advanced forms of biological warfare that can &#8216;target&#8217; specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.&#8221; (see also Spring 2001 and April 2001 (D)). (( Rebuilding America's Defenses )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 9/7/02 ]] ------ However, the report complains that these changes are likely to take a long time, &#8220;absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event&#8212;like a new Pearl Harbor.&#8221; [[ | Los Angeles Times, 1/12/03 ]] ------ In an NBC interview at about the same time, Vice Presidential candidate Cheney defends Bush Jr.'s position of maintaining Clinton's policy not to attack Iraq because the US should not act as though &#8220;we were an imperialist power, willy-nilly moving into capitals in that part of the world, taking down governments.&#8221; [[;node=&amp;contentId=A43909-2003Jan11&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 1/12/02 ]] ------ This report and the Project for the New American Century generally are mostly ignored until a few weeks before the start of the Iraq war (see February-March 20, 2003). ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << pre911Plans >> << DSM >> ((+ William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Roger Barnett )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Alvin Bernstein )) ((+ John Ellis ("Jeb") Bush )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Stephen A. Cambone )) ((+ Eliot A. Cohen )) ((+ Barry Watts )) ((+ Abram Shulsky )) ((+ Gary Schmitt )) ((+ Steve Rosen )) ((+ Dov S. Zakheim )) ((+ Michael Vickers )) ((+ Mackubin Owens )) ((+ Phil Meilinger )) ((+ Dan Goure )) ((+ Donald Kagan )) ((+ David Fautua )) ((+ Devon Gaffney Cross )) ((+ Thomas Donnelly )) ((+ David Epstein )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Robert Martinage )) ((+ James Lasswell )) ((+ Mark P. Lagon )) ((+ Robert Kagan )) ((+ Fred Kagan )) ((+ William Kristol )) ((+ Robert Killebrew )) {{ duplicate_rebuilding_america_s_defenses_2 }} {{ commentary_tam_dalyel_2 }} {{ duplicate_rebuilding_america_s_defenses_3 }} October 5, 2000 Vice Presidential Candidates Advocate Tough Stance Toward Iraq; Cheney Says the Use of Force against Iraq May Be Necessary complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2916 false 1 ------ During the vice presidential debates, both Joe Lieberman and Dick Cheney advocate a tough stance toward Saddam Hussein. Lieberman says he and Gore would continue to support Iraqi opposition groups &#8220;until the Iraqi people rise up and do what the people of Serbia have done in the last few days: get rid of a despot.&#8221; Cheney says it might be necessary &#8220;to take military action to forcibly remove Saddam from power.&#8221; [[ | CATO Daily Dispatch, 10/6/2000 ]] ====== << decision >> << pre911Plans >> ((- George W. Bush )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Joseph Lieberman )) October 25, 2000 Congress Allocates $25 Million for Iraq Opposition Groups complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3240 false 1 ------ Congress substantially increases its support for Iraqi opposition organizations, more than doubling the groups' funding to $25 million for 2001. Of this amount, $18 million is specifically designated for the Iraqi National Congress: $12 million for &#8220;food, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance,&#8221; and $6 million for the &#8220;production and broadcasting inside Iraq of radio and satellite television programming.&#8221; In addition, $2 million is allocated for groups and activities seeking the prosecution of Saddam Hussein, while the remaining $5 million is &#8220;to support efforts to bring about political transition in Iraq.&#8221; (( Public Law 106-429 )) [[ | The Library of Congress Thomas Database, n.d. ]] ====== << chalabi >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) November 1, 2000 David Wurmser Urges US and Israel To &#8216;Strike Fatally&#8217; Against Arab Radicalism complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2868 false 1 ------ In an op-ed piece published by the Washington Times, David Wurmser of the American Enterprise Institute calls on the US and Israel to &#8220;broaden&#8221; the conflict in the Middle East. The US, he says, needs &#8220;to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region&#8212;the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza&#8221; &#8212; in order to &#8220;reestablish the recognition that fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal.&#8221; This is necessary, according to Wurmser, because the policies of the US and Israel during the last decade have strengthened Arab radicalism in the Middle East. Wurmser complains that the two countries have mistakenly identified the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their own behavior as the primary causes of anti-Israeli and anti-American violence instead of focusing on what he claims are the real sources of resentment among Arab leaders&#8212;Israeli and American values. &#8220;Few anti-American outbursts or Arab-Israeli confrontations initially have much to do with Israel's or America's behavior; they have more to do with what these two countries are: free societies,&#8221; Wurmser writes. &#8220;These upheavals originate in the conditions of Arab politics, specifically in the requirements of tyrannies to seek external conflict to sustain internal repression. ... A regime built on opposition to freedom will view free nations, such as the United States and Israel, as mortal threats.&#8221; The US and Israeli failure to grasp this reality, along with the Clinton administration's reluctance to remove Saddam from power, according to Wurmser, has only empowered Arab radicalism. The answer, he argues, is to forcefully reassert US and Israeli power. [[,filter.all/pub_detail.asp | Washington Times, 11/1/2000 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> ((+ David Wurmser )) After November 2000 Neoconservative Michael Ledeen Regularly Provides Karl Rove with Advice, which Sometimes Becomes Official Policy complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3169 false 1 ------ After the 2000 Presidential Election, Bush's White House political adviser, Karl Rove, tells neoconservative Michael Ledeen &#8220;Anytime you have a good idea, tell me.&#8221; From that point on, according to a Washington Post interview with Ledeen, every month or six weeks, Ledeen offers Rove &#8220;something you should be thinking about.&#8221; On more than one occasion, ideas faxed to Rove by Ledeen, &#8220;become official policy or rhetoric,&#8221; the Post reports. [[;contentId=A2674-2003Mar9&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 3/10/2003 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Karl Rove )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) December 16, 2000 Powell: US Might Have to &#8216;Confront&#8217; Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2915 false 1 ------ President-elect George W. Bush announces his nomination of Powell to the position of Secretary of State. Powell, in his remarks, suggests that the US might have to &#8220;confront&#8221; Saddam Hussein. Powell says: &#8220;Saddam Hussein is sitting on a failed regime that is not going to be around in a few years' time. The world is going to leave him behind and that regime behind as the world marches to new drummers, drummers of democracy and the free enterprise system. And I don't know what it will take to bring him to his senses. But we are in the strong position. He is in the weak position. And I think it is possible to re-energize those sanctions and to continue to contain him and then confront him, should that become necessary again.&#8221; [[ | Journal of the Air Force Association, 2/2001 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ George W. Bush )) (Between Late 2000 and September 11, 2001) Niger Documents Allegedly Fabricated complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2977 false 1 ------ According to an October 2005 report by the Italian weekly La Repubblica, official stamps and letterhead stolen (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1182 ]]) from the Niger embassy are used to fabricate a set of forged documents implicating Iraq in an attempt to purchase 500 tons of uranium oxide, also known as &#8220;yellowcake,&#8221; from Niger. (( Unnamed Senior US intelligence officials )) [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | Corriere della Sera, date unknown, cited in Talking Points Memo, 10/31/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Agence France Presse, 7/19/03 ]] [[;cd=2003-07-19 | Reuters, 7/19/03 ]] ------ Material taken from real SISMI documents from the 1980s concerning Iraq's yellowcake purchases from Niger during that period are also incorporated into the set of forged documents. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/30/2005 ]] ------ It is not clear who precisely forges the documents. La Repubblica, in a 2005 article, seems to imply that the deed is done by Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler, and Antonio Nucera, the deputy chief of the SISMI center in Viale Pasteur in Rome. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] ------ An August 2004 report in the Financial Times, however, reports that according to Martino, &#8220;Italian foreign intelligence service, the SISMI, had forged the documents and had arranged for them to be passed to him by an official of Niger's embassy in Rome (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3140 ]]).&#8221; [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Antonio Nucera )) ((+ Rocco Martino )) ((+ SISMI )) ((+ France )) Early 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_11 false 1 ------ Shortly after Bush is inaugurated into office, Greg Thielmann, an analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), is appointed to serve as the intelligence liaison to John Bolton. But Thielmann's intelligence briefings do not support Bolton's assumptions about Iraq, and Thielmann is soon barred from attending the meetings. According to Thielmann: &#8220;Bolton seemed to be troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear. I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, &#8216;The undersecretary doesn't need you to attend this meeting anymore. The undersecretary wants to keep this in the family.&#8217;&#8221; (( Greg Thielmann )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << deception >> ((- Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) ((+ Greg Thielmann )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) {{ statement_john_r._bolton_3 }} {{ statement_john_r._bolton_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_3 }} 2001 Colin Powell Commends Jose Bustani for his Work as OPCW Head complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2882 false 1 ------ US Secretary of State Colin Powell sends a letter of appreciation to Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, commending him for his &#8220;impressive&#8221; work. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) 2001-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_474 false 1 ------ The US intelligence community&#8212;most notably the intelligence gatherers working in the Pentagon offices under Douglas Feith (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 ]]) &#8212;bases several of its intelligence assessments concerning Iraq on information offered by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and by Iraqi defectors provided by the INC, despite warnings from the State Department and some CIA analysts that the lobbying group cannot be trusted. (( Greg Thielmann )) (( Unnamed administration official )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/30/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] ------ The INC's primary intelligence organization is its Information Collection Program (ICP), which conducts about 20 percent of all US intelligence's verbal debriefings of Iraqi prisoners, insurgents, and defectors. [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 336-337 ]] ------ Some of the INC's intelligence on Iraq is reportedly funneled directly to the office of Vice President Dick Cheney by Francis Brooke, the DC lobbyist for the group. (( Francis Brooke )) (( Memo )) [[ | Newsweek, 12/15/03 ]] ------ Brooke will later acknowedge that the information provided by the INC was driven by an agenda. &#8220;I told them [the INC], as their campaign manager, &#8216;Go get me a terrorist and some WMD, because that's what the Bush administration is interested in.&#8217; &#8221; [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 230 ]] ------ Brooke had previously worked for the Rendon Group, &#8220;a shadowy CIA-connected public-relations firm.&#8221; [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << deception >> << wmd >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((- Douglas Feith )) ((+ Frank Gaffney )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((- Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) {{ commentary_vincent_cannistraro_5 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_23 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_24 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_12 }} Before January 20, 2001 2001-01-19 Pre-Inaugural Discussions about Removing Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2230 false 1 ------ There are discussions among future members of the Bush administration, including Bush himself, about making the removal of Saddam Hussein a top priority once they are in office. After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Richard Clarke, who serves as Bush's counterterrorism advisor, will say that the Bush team had been planning regime change in Iraq since before coming to office. &#8220;Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for a war with Iraq,&#8221; he will write in his book, Against All Enemies. &#8220;My friends in the Pentagon had been telling me that the word was we would be invading Iraq sometime in 2002.&#8221; [[ | Clarke, 2004 ]] ------ During an appearance on Good Morning America on March 22, 2004, he will say, &#8220;[T]hey had been planning to do something about Iraq from before the time they came into office.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2004/abcnews032204.html | ABC News, 3/22/04 ]] ------ Evidence of pre-inaugural discussions on regime change in Iraq comes from other sources as well. Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini, who heads the Islamic Center of America in Detroit, will tell the New York Times in early 2004 that he spoke with Bush about removing Saddam Hussein six or seven times, both before and after the 2000 elections. (( Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini )) [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_188 false 1 ------ Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, a Jordanian Muslim militant later alleged by the Bush administration to have ties to Osama bin Laden, is arrested in Jordan sometime in 2001 for his involvement in a late 1999 plot to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan, whose customers are frequently Israeli and American tourists. Some time after his arrest, he is released. (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[ | Washington Post, 2/7/03 ]] [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] ------ At some point he is convicted for his role in the plot and sentenced to death by a Jordanian court in absentia. [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] ====== << alZarqawi >> ((+ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) January 2, 2001 Niger Embassy in Rome Burglarized complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1182 false 1 ------ The Italian police discover that the Niger Embassy in Rome has been ransacked. It appears that the people involved in the break-in searched through the embassy's documents and files. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 7/28/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> January 10, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_434 false 1 ------ During a National Press Club Newsmakers luncheon, outgoing Defense Secretary William Cohen says: &#8220;Well, Saddam Hussein's forces are in a state where he cannot pose a threat to his neighbors at this point. We have been successful, through the sanctions regime, to really shut off most of the revenue that will be going to build his&#8212;rebuild his military.&#8221; [[ | Jordan Times, 2002 ]] [[,4273,4309594,00.html | US Department of Defense, 1/10/01 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ William S. Cohen )) After January 20, 2001 George Tenet Accompanies Daily Morning CIA Briefer to Oval Office complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2967 false 1 ------ After George W. Bush is inaugurated into office, the manner in which the daily intelligence briefings are presented to the president changes. President Bill Clinton read the PDBs, usually about 12 pages in length, himself and often had no need for the follow-up oral briefings. Bush, on the other hand, prefers a shorter seven-to-10-page PDB containing &#8220;more targeted hard intelligence&#8221; items. The PDB is delivered to him orally, as he reads along. According to the Washington Post, the CIA's top officials personally review the PDB before it is presented to Bush. &#8220;Tenet reviews the PDB with the briefer as they drive from the director's Maryland home to the White House. On the way, Tenet often makes notes and looks over the backup material the briefer has brought. Tenet and, often, the deputy director for intelligence have already looked it over before going to bed the night before, though it is finished by staffers who go to work at midnight and monitor incoming intelligence throughout the night.&#8221; Tenet is present during the actual briefing and &#8220;expands where he believes necessary and responds to questions by Bush and others,&#8221; the Post reports. [[ | CNN, 1/18/2001 ]] [[;node=&amp;contentId=A2130-2002May23&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 5/24/2002, pp A33 ]] ------ According to retired veteran CIA analyst Ray McGovern, the CIA director's presence during these briefing is highly unusual. The daily briefings began during the Reagan administration at the suggestion of then-Vice President George H. W. Bush. According to McGovern, the briefings were done at that time by a &#8220;small team of briefers ... comprised of senior analysts who had been around long enough to earn respect and trust.&#8221; McGovern, who did such briefings for the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the national security assistant from 1981 to 1985, says that briefers &#8220;had the full confidence of the CIA director, who ... rarely inserted himself into the PDB process. .... The last thing we briefers needed was the director breathing down our necks.&#8221; McGovern suggests that Tenet's presence at the briefings possibly influenced the content of the briefing. [[ | McGovern, 3/5/2005 ]] ====== << deception >> ((@ Ray McGovern )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((- William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton )) Between January 20, 2001 and June 2001 Bush Administration Becomes Agitated with OPCW Efforts to Work with Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2886 false 1 ------ Undersecretary of State John Bolton and others in the US State Department's arms-control bureau grow increasingly irritated with Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Bustani is attempting to convince Saddam Hussein to sign the chemical weapons convention with hopes of eventually sending chemical weapons inspectors to Baghdad. But the Bush administration is opposed to these efforts, insisting that Iraq's alleged arsenal of chemical weapons is an issue that needs to be addressed by the UN Security Council, not the OPCW. (( A unnamed State Department official who served as a deputy under Bolton )) (( Jose M. Bustani )) [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ------ At some point, someone in the Bush administration suggests removing Bustani. Bolton reportedly &#8220;leap[s] on it enthusiastically&#8221; and subsequently becomes &#8220;very much in charge of the whole campaign&#8221; to oust him. (( Avis Bohlen )) [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ------ Bustani will later tell the Guardian that he believes the Bush administration does not want Iraq to become a member of the OPCW because it might interfere with the administration's plan to secure a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ------ Bustani's view is supported by others. Retired Swiss diplomat Heinrich Reimann tells the Associated Press in 2005: &#8220;Many believed the US delegation didn't want meddling from outside in the Iraq business&#8212;that could be the case.&#8221; Similarly, former Bustani aide Bob Rigg, a New Zealander, says in no uncertain terms: &#8220;Why did they not want OPCW involved in Iraq? They felt they couldn't rely on OPCW to come up with the findings the US wanted.&#8221; A different perpective is offered by Ralph Earle, a veteran US arms negotiator who was part of Bolton's arms-control bureau. According to Earle, his group was unhappy with what they considered Bustani's mismanagement. Bustani &#8220;had a big ego,&#8221; Earle claims in an interview with the Associated Press. &#8220;He did things on his own,&#8221; and did not consider the interests of other countries like the US. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) Shortly after January 20, 2001 January 21, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_83 false 1 ------ Shortly after George W. Bush is inaugurated, &#8220;[k]ey personnel, long-time civilian professionals&#8221; at the Pentagon's Near East South Asia (NESA) desk are moved or replaced with people from neoconservative think tanks. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] ------ Joe McMillan, the Office Director, is moved to a new location outside of the Pentagon, which according to Karen Kwiatkowski, who works at the NESA desk, is odd because &#8220;the whole reason for the Office Director being a permanent civilian (occasionally military) professional is to help bring the new appointee up to speed, ensure office continuity, and act as a resource relating to regional histories and policies.&#8221; (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Salon, 3/10/04 ]] [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] ------ Larry Hanauer, who has long been at the Israel-Syria-Lebanon desk and who is known to be &#8220;even-handed with Israel,&#8221; is replaced by David Schenker of the Washington Institute. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] ------ Other veteran NESA employees who are banished include James Russell, who has served as the country director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and Marybeth McDevitt, the country director for Egypt. [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << deception >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Marybeth McDevitt )) ((+ James Russell )) ((+ Joe McMillan )) ((+ Larry Hanauer )) ((+ David Schenker )) {{ statement_bob_kerrey_3 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_12 }} January 29, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_459 false 1 ------ Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini, who heads the Islamic Center of America in Detroit, one of the nation's largest mosques, meets with President Bush in the White House about the administration's policy towards Iraq. The president says he supports a policy aimed at removing Saddam Hussein from power, though he does not discuss by what means. &#8220;No method was discussed at all,&#8221; al-Qazwini will tell the New York Times two years later. &#8220;It was a general desire for regime change.&#8221; He will also tell the newspaper that he had spoken with Bush about removing Saddam Hussein a total of six or seven times, both before and after the 2000 elections. (( Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini )) [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Imam Sayed Hassan al-Qazwini )) (January 30, 2001) First National Security Council Meeting Focuses on Iraq and Israel, Not Terrorism complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_457 false 1 ------ The Bush White House holds its first National Security Council meeting. The focus is on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (( Paul O'Neill )) [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 261 ]] --- Israeli-Palestinian conflict --- &#8220;We're going to correct the imbalances of the previous administration on the Mideast conflict,&#8221; Bush reportedly tells his national security team. &#8220;We're going to tilt it back toward Israel.&#8221; His view is that the Israeli government, currently headed by Ariel Sharon, should be left alone to deal as it sees fit with the Palestinians. &#8220;I'm not going to go by past reputations when it comes to Sharon. I'm going to take him at face value. We'll work on a relationship based on how things go.&#8221; Justifying his position, he recalls a recent trip he took to Israel with the Republican Jewish Coalition. &#8220;We flew over the Palestinian camps. Looked real bad down there. ... I don't see much we can do over there at this point.&#8221; Powell, surprised by Bush's intended policy towards the 50-year old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, objects. According to Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neil, Powell &#8220;stresse[s] that a pullback by the United States would unleash Sharon and the Israeli army.&#8221; When Powell warns the president that the &#8220;consequences of that [policy] could be dire, especially for the Palestinians,&#8221; Bush shrugs. &#8220;Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things,&#8221; he suggests. [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 265-266 ]] --- Iraq --- The meeting then moves on to the subject of Iraq. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice begins noting &#8220;that Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire region.&#8221; She turns the meeting over to CIA director George Tenet who summarizes current intelligence on Iraq. He mentions a factory that &#8220;might&#8221; be producing &#8220;either chemical or biological materials for weapons manufacture.&#8221; The evidence he provides is a picture of the factory with some truck activity, a water tower, and railroad tracks going into a building. He admits that there is &#8220;no confirming intelligence.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 267 ]] ------ US Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neill, later recalls: &#8220;From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go ... From the very first instance, it was about Iraq. It was about what we can do to change this regime. Day one, these things were laid and sealed.&#8221; O'Neill will say officials never questioned the logic behind this policy. No one ever asked, &#8220;Why Saddam?&#8221; and &#8220;Why now?&#8221; Instead, the issue that needed to be resolved was how this could be accomplished. &#8220;It was all about finding a way to do it,&#8221; O'Neill will explain. &#8220;That was the tone of it. The president saying &#8216;Go find me a way to do this.&#8217; &#8221; (( Paul O'Neill )) [[ | CBS News, 1/10/04 ]] [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] [[,12271,1120959,00.html | Guardian, 1/12/04 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 234 ]] ------ Another official who attends the meeting will later say that the tone of the meeting implied a policy much more aggressive than that of the previous administration. &#8220;The president told his Pentagon officials to explore the military options, including use of ground forces,&#8221; the official will tell ABC News. &#8220;That went beyond the Clinton administration's halfhearted attempts to overthrow Hussein without force.&#8221; (( Unnamed senior official of the Bush administration )) [[ | ABC News, 1/13/04 ]] ------ The council does more than just discuss Iraq. It makes a decision to allow the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an Iraqi opposition group, to use $4 million to fund efforts inside Iraq to compile information relating to Baghdad's war crimes, military operations, and other internal developments. The money had been authorized by Congress in late 2004. The US has not directly funded Iraqi opposition activities inside Iraq itself since 1996. [[,2763,432865,00.html | Guardian, 2/3/2005 ]] ------ After Paul O'Neill first provides his account of this meeting in 2004, the White House will attempt to downplay its significance. &#8220;... The stated policy of my administration toward Saddam Hussein was very clear,&#8221; Bush will tell reporters during a visit to Mexico In January 2004. &#8220;Like the previous administration, we were for regime change. ... And in the initial stages of the administration, as you might remember, we were dealing with desert badger or fly-overs and fly-betweens and looks, and so we were fashioning policy along those lines.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Richard B. Myers )) ((+ Paul O'Neill )) ((- Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) February 2001 Paul Wolfowitz Promises that Saddam Will Be Removed on Bush's Watch complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3225 false 1 ------ Paul Wolfowitz reportedly calls Francis Brooke, an aide to Ahmed Chalabi, late one night and promises that Saddam Hussein will be toppled while Bush is in office. According to Brooke, Wolfowitz says he will resign if it doesn't happen. Wolfowitz will later deny this account and call it &#8220;nonsense.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> << decision >> ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) (Between February 2001 and February 2003) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2333 false 1 ------ Falah Aljibury, an Iraqi-born oil industry consultant with strong ties to OPEC and Big Oil, interviews potential successors to Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Bush administration. One of the candidates that he will consider is Gen. Nizar Khazrahi, who is under house arrest in Denmark awaiting trial for war crimes. (( Falah Aljibury )) [[ | BBC Newsnight, 3/17/05 ]] [[ | Democracy Now!, 3/21/05 ]] [[,6903,825103,00.html | Harpers Magazine, 4/05, pp 74-76 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << decision >> ((+ Falah Aljibury )) ((- Nizar Khazrahi )) (February 2001 and After) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2332 false 1 ------ &#8220;Within weeks&#8221; of taking office, the Bush administration begins planning for a post-Saddam Iraqi government. The State Department convenes a series of secret discussions attended by prominent Iraqi expatriates, many with ties to US industries, to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. The meetings are held in the home of Falah Aljibury, an adviser to OPEC, Goldman Sachs, and Amerada Hess's oil trading arm. He also served as Ronald Reagan's backchannel to Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. According to Aljibury, the discussion group, led by Pamela Quanrud, an NSC economics expert, quickly evolves into an &#8220;oil group.&#8221; The plan they develop is said to represent the views of the oil industry and the State Department. According to the plan, Saddam Hussein would be replaced by some former Baathist general, while the rest of the government would continue to function as before. One of the candidates that is considered to head post-Saddam Iraq is Gen. Nizar Khazrahi (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2333 ]]), who is under house arrest in Denmark awaiting trial for war crimes. &#8220;The petroleum industry, the chemical industry, the banking industry&#8212;they'd hoped that Iraq would go for a revolution like in the past and government was shut down for two or three days,&#8221; Aljibury will later tell reporter Greg Palast. &#8220;You have martial law ... and say Iraq is being liberated and everybody stay where they are ... Everything as is.&#8221; (( Unnamed inside sources )) [[ | Democracy Now!, 3/21/05 ]] [[ | BBC Newsnight, 3/17/05 ]] [[,6903,825103,00.html | Harpers Magazine, 4/05, pp 74-76 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Pamela Quanrud )) ((+ Falah Aljibury )) ((- Nizar Khazrahi )) ((- Bush administration )) February 1, 2001 Rumsfeld Envisions Post-Saddam Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_458 false 1 ------ The Bush White House holds its second National Security Council meeting. Like the first meeting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_457 ]]), the issue of regime change in Iraq is a central topic. [[ | CBS News, 1/10/04 ]] [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] ------ Officials discuss a memo titled &#8220;Plan for post-Saddam Iraq,&#8221; which talks about troop requirements, establishing war crimes tribunals, and divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. (( Paul O'Neill )) ------ Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argues that by removing Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration would &#8220;demonstrate what US policy is all about.&#8221; It would also help transform the Middle East, he claims. According to Paul O'Neill, Rumsfeld talks at the meeting &#8220;in general terms about post-Saddam Iraq, dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the reconstruction of the country's economy, and the &#8216;freeing of the Iraqi people.&#8217; &#8221; (( Paul O'Neill )) [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] ------ Other people, in addition to O'Neill, Bush, and Rumsfeld, who are likely in attendance include Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers. (( National Security Presidential Directives&mdash;NSPD-1, 2/13/01] )) ====== << pre911Plans >> << preWarPlanning >> << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Paul O'Neill )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Richard B. Myers )) ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) February 12, 2001 Iraqi Opposition Group to Recieve US-Funded Fire-Arms Training complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2984 false 1 ------ The Washington Times reports that the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella Iraqi opposition group, is negotiating a $98,000 contract with the Guidry Group to train INC security officers &#8220;how to use pistols, Kalishnikov rifles, 12-gauge shotguns, and a variety of other fire-arms.&#8221; Funding for the training is being provided by the US government. Francis Brooke, the group's Washington lobbyist, says, &#8220;This is important because this is the first time we are receiving lethal training with the United States government funding.&#8221; [[ | United Press International, 2/12/2001 ]] ====== << decision >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Guidry Group )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) February 20, 2001 Colin Powell Says Saddam Hussein is Contained complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_118 false 1 ------ At a joint press conference with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Colin Powell says that Iraq has been successfully contained. &#8220;What we and other allies have been doing in the region, have succeeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his ambitions. His forces are about one-third their original size. They don't really possess the capability to attack their neighbors the way they did ten years ago. ... Containment has been a successful policy.&#8221; [[ | US Department of State, 2/20/2001 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Joschka Fischer )) February 23, 2001 Powell Says Iraq Is Not a Threat complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2961 false 1 ------ During a press briefing held aboard a plane en route to Cairo, Egypt, Colin Powell says: &#8220;Though [the Iraqis] may be pursuing weapons of mass destruction of all kinds. It is not clear how successful they have been. We ought to declare [sanctions] a success. We have kept [Saddam Hussein] contained, kept him in his box.&#8221; [[ | Minneapolis Star Tribune, 1/28/2004 ]] [[ | Time, 3/24/2003 ]] [[ /timeline/2001/statedepartment022301.html | US Department of State, 2/23/2001 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> ((+ Colin Powell )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_36 }} February 24, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_435 false 1 ------ Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to Cairo and meets with his counterpart Amre Moussa. During a press conference, Powell says: &#8220;He [Saddam Hussein] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.&#8221; [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 2/24/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 9/25/03 ]] ------ Some nineteen months later, when Powell is asked to explain why his assessment of Iraq had so drastically changed over such a short span of time, Powell says, &#8220;... I did not say he (Iraqi President Saddam Hussein) didn't have weapons of mass destruction.... He was a threat then. The extent of his holdings were yet to be determined. It was early in the administration and the fact of the matter is it was long before 9/11 (the date of the 2001 attacks on the United States).... A lot changed between February 2001 (and the invasion), but I don't find anything inconsistent between what I said then and what I've said all along.&#8221; [[ | US Department of State, 9/25/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/26/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 9/25/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Amre Moussa )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_27 }} March 2001 Cheney's Energy Task Force Eyes Iraq's Oil Reserves complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_460 false 1 ------ Cheney's Energy Task Force authors a variety of documents relating to the oil industries of Iraq, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [[ | New York Times, 1/12/04 ]] [[ | CBS News, 1/10/04 ]] [[ | Judicial Watch, 7/17/03 ]] --- Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts --- This document, dated March 5, 2001, includes a table listing 30 countries which have interests in Iraq's oil industry. The document also includes the names of companies that have interests, the oil fields with which those interests are associated, as well as the statuses of those interests. (( Iraq Oil Foreign Suitors, page 2 )) (( Iraq Oil Foreign Suitors, page 1 )) --- Map of Iraq's oil fields --- The map includes markings for &#8220;supergiant&#8221; oil fields of 5 billion barrels or more, other oilfields, fields &#8220;earmarked for production sharing,&#8221; oil pipelines, operational refineries, and tanker terminals. (( Iraq Oil Map )) --- Other documents --- Other documents include oil field maps and project tables for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (( UAE Oil Map )) (( Saudia Arabia Oil Map )) (( UAE Oil Project Table )) (( Saudi Arabia Oil Project Table )) ====== << decision >> << pre911Plans >> << motivesBehindWar >> << iraq >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) Between April 2001 and September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1224 false 1 ------ The CIA writes at least 15 reports about Iraq's interest in purchasing 7075-T6 aluminum tubes. Several of the assessments are distributed only to high-level policy makers, including President Bush, and are not sent to other intelligence agencies for peer review. According to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation, all the assessments rely on the same evidence and they all fail to note that the opinions of leading centrifuge experts at the Energy Department conflict with the CIA's view. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ George W. Bush )) April 2001 Wolfowitz Claims that Iraq is Involved in Terrorism complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_494 false 1 ------ During a National Security Council deputy principals meeting, Paul Wolfowitz is challenged by White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke after asserting that Iraq is involved in terrorism. Recalling the meeting, Clarke tells The Guardian in a March 2004 interview: &#8220;April was an initial discussion of terrorism policy writ large and at that meeting I said we had to talk about al-Qaeda. And because it was terrorism policy writ large [Paul] Wolfowitz said we have to talk about Iraqi terrorism and I said that's interesting because there hasn't been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States. There hasn't been any for 8 years. And he said something derisive about how I shouldn't believe the CIA and FBI, that they've been wrong. And I said if you know more than I know tell me what it is, because I've been doing this for 8 years and I don't know about any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993. When I said let's start talking about bin Laden, he said bin Laden couldn't possibly have attacked the World Trade Center in '93. One little terrorist group like that couldn't possibly have staged that operation. It must have been Iraq.&#8221; [[,11209,1175817,00.html | The Guardian, 3/23/04 ]] ====== << decision >> << terroristTies >> << iraq >> ((+ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) April 8, 2001 Czech Intelligence Informant Claims Atta Met Iraqi Agent in Prague complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 false 1 ------ An informant for the BIS, the Czech intelligence agency, reportedly sees Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani meeting in a restaurant outside Prague with an Arab man in his 20s. This draws concern from the intelligence community because the informant suggests the person is &#8220;a visiting &#8216;student&#8217; from Hamburg&#8212;and ... potentially dangerous.&#8221; (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ------ The young man is never positively identified or seen again. Fearing that al-Ani may have been attempting to recruit the young man for a mission to blow-up Radio Free Europe headquarters, the diplomat is told to leave the country on April 18. (( Unnamed US officials )) (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | UPI, 10/21/02 ]] [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/27/01 ]] ------ Information about the incident is passed on to US intelligence. After the 9/11 attacks and after it is reported on the news that Atta had likely visited Prague, the BIS informant will say the young man at the restaurant was Atta. (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_165 ]]) This information leads hawks to come up with the so-called &#8220;Prague Connection&#8221; theory, which will hold that 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta flew to Prague on April 8, met with al-Ani to discuss the planning and financing of the 9/11 attacks, and returned to the US on either April 9 or 10. (( Jan Kavan )) (( Unnamed BIS informant )) (( Unnamed US officials )) [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/27/01 ]] [[ | UPI, 10/21/02 ]] ------ The theory will be widely discounted by October 2002. (( Unnamed BIS informant )) (( Unnamed US officials )) [[ | New York Times, 10/21/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << terroristTies >> << iraq >> ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Radio Free Europe )) ((+ Jabir Salim )) April 10, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1217 false 1 ------ A classified intelligence report, based primarily on the work of junior CIA analyst Joe T., concludes that the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes sought by Iraq from China (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_40 ]]) &#8220;have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program.&#8221; But the report also notes that &#8220;using aluminum tubes in a centrifuge effort would be inefficient and a step backward from the specialty steel machines Iraq was poised to mass produce at the onset of the Gulf War.&#8221; The report is passed on to the White House. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) April 11, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1218 false 1 ------ US officials in the Energy Department respond to an intelligence report released the previous day (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1217 ]]) which contended that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) are destined for use as centrifuge rotors in a uranium enrichment program. The Energy Department argues that the tubes are too narrow, too heavy, and too long to be used in a gas centrifuge. Furthermore, the officials note, there is no evidence that Iraq is seeking to acquire other materials that would be needed to construct a centrifuge. And if the Iraqis intend to use the tubes for uranium enrichment, they ask, why are they making no effort to conceal their interest in acquiring the tubes? [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ US Department of Energy )) April 12, 2001 Report on Energy Security Argues US Needs to Review Policy on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_77 false 1 ------ A report commissioned by former US Secretary of State James Baker and the Council on Foreign Relations, titled &#8220;Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century,&#8221; is completed and submitted to Vice President Dick Cheney. The report was drafted by the James A.Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Edward L. Morse, an energy industry analyst, chaired the project, and Amy Myers Jaffe was the project's director. The paper urges the US to formulate a comprehensive, integrated strategic energy policy to address the current energy crisis, which it attributes to infrastructural restraints, rapid global economic expansion, and the presence of obstacles to foreign investment in the oil-rich Middle East. The report says the world's supply of oil is not a factor in the crisis. &#8220;The reasons for the energy challenge have nothing to do with the global hydrocarbon resource base. ... The world will not run short of hydrocarbons in the foreseeable future,&#8221; the paper insists. One of the report's recommendations is to &#8220;[r]eview policies toward Iraq&#8221; with the ultimate goal of &#8220;eas[ing] Iraqi oil-field investment restrictions.&#8221; Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein remains a &#8220;destabilizing influence ... to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East.&#8221; It also notes, &#8220;Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets.&#8221; Therefore, the report says, the &#8220;United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments.&#8221; (( Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century )) [[ | Sunday Herald, 10/05/02 ]] [[ | Sydney Morning Herald, 12/26/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << pre911Plans >> << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University )) ((+ Amy Myers Jaffe )) ((+ Edward L. Morse )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ James Baker )) ((+ Council on Foreign Relations )) {{ excerpt_strategic_energy_policy_challenges_for_the_21st_century_2 }} {{ excerpt_strategic_energy_policy_challenges_for_the_21st_century_3 }} {{ excerpt_strategic_energy_policy_challenges_for_the_21st_century_4 }} April 20, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_164 false 1 ------ Hynek Kmonicek, the Czech Republic's deputy foreign minister, informs the Iraqi charge d'affaires in Prague that al-Ani must leave the Czech Republic within 24-hours because his &#8220;presence [is] not in the security interests of the Czech Republic&#8221; and because his activities are &#8220;incompatible with his diplomatic status.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/27/01 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/16/01 ]] [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 10/26/01 ]] ------ Kmonicek will later deny that the dismissal is related to the meeting that allegedly took place on April 8 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). A Newsweek report in April 2002 will suggest the dismissal is related to video surveillance footage showing al-Ani photographing the Radio Free Europe building on several occasions. [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/01 ]] ------ But a November 2003 report in Slate will say that the dismissal is indeed related to the alleged meeting, explaining that Czech intelligence had become nervous after learning of the meeting. (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ------ The real cause for his dismissal is never officially disclosed. ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((+ Hynek Kmonicek )) April 30, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_139 false 1 ------ The US State Department's 2000 annual report states in its section on state-sponsored terrorism that the Ba'ath regime's &#8220;terrorist&#8221; activities consist primarily of its use of violence to silence dissident exiles. The report also notes that Iraq has not supported any militant operations against the West &#8220;since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.&#8221; Significantly the report does not tie Iraq to international Islamic militant groups like al-Qaeda. (( US Department of State, 4/30/2001 )) [[ | US Department of State, 4/30/01 ]] [[ ../../archive/2001/newsday122101.htm | Newsday, 12/24/01 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> May 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1837 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney's Energy Task Force releases its energy plan. The plan, titled, Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future, warns that the quantity of oil imported per day will need to rise more than fifty percent to 16.7 million barrels by 2020. &#8220;A significant disruption in world oil supplies could adversely affect our economy and our ability to promote key foreign and economic policy objectives, regardless of the level of US dependence on oil imports,&#8221; the report explains. One of these objectives is to open markets to US investors and promote free trade through new investment treaties. To meet the United States' rising demand for imported oil, the plan calls for &#8220;deep water offshore exploration and production in the Atlantic Basin, stretching from offshore Canada to the Caribbean, Brazil and West Africa.&#8221; (( Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America?s Future, Chapter 8 )) [[,2763,880443,00.html | Guardian, 1/23/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) May 9, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1219 false 1 ------ The Energy Department reports that the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes being sought by Iraq from China (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) have the same specifications as tubes previously used by Iraq to produce conventional rocket tubes. The findings are published in the department's classified Daily Intelligence Highlight, which is posted on an intranet network accessible by members of the intelligence community and the White House. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ US Department of Energy )) May 15, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_436 false 1 ------ Powell says that Saddam Hussein has not been able to &#8220;build his military back up or to develop weapons of mass destruction&#8221; for &#8220;the last 10 years,&#8221; adding that the sanctions policy had successfully kept him &#8220;in a box.&#8221; [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Colin Powell )) May 23, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_468 false 1 ------ A container shipment of 3,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes manufactured in China leaves southern China for Hong Kong on a slow barge. From there the shipment will go to Jordan. The tubes' final destination is Iraq. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> May 25, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_469 false 1 ------ The Chinese government contacts a Chinese aluminum manufacturer that has just filled an order for 3,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes, which is now on its way to Iraq. The company is told that the US government has a special interest in the order and is determined to prevent the shipment from reaching its destination. (( Garry Cordukes )) [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> June 2001 John Bolton Calls Jose Bustani and Attempts to &#8216;Interfere&#8217; in His Work complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2876 false 1 ------ John Bolton allegedly telephones Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and, according to Bustani, tries &#8220;to interfere, in a menacing tone, in decisions that are the exclusive responsibility of the director-general.&#8221; Bolton &#8220;tried to order me around,&#8221; Bustani later explains in an interview with the Le Monde newspaper of France. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ------ Bolton and others in the State Department's arms-control bureau are upset that Bustani is attempting to convince Saddam Hussein to sign the chemical weapons convention with hopes of eventually sending chemical weapons inspectors to Baghdad (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2886 ]]). ====== << bustani >> ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) June 14, 2001 CIA Report Suggests Tubes Being Imported by Iraq Are Meant For Iraq's Alleged Nuclear Program complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3273 false 1 ------ The CIA produces a Senior Publish When Ready (SPWR) report stating that the aluminum tubes being imported by Iraq from China are &#8220;controlled items under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Chinese export laws, are suitable for uranium enrichment gas centrifuge rotors and, while less likely, could be used as rocket bodies for multiple rocket launchers.&#8221; The CIA does not explain in this assessment why it believes the tubes are more likely to be used for centrifuge rotors then for rocket bodies. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) Mid-February 2001 Bush Appears Determined &#8216;to Dig Saddam Hussein out of Power&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2974 false 1 ------ David Frum interviews George W. Bush for a biography he is writing on the new president. Some time later, he reviews the notes he took during this interview and is &#8220;startled at how much of what would happen over the next year is prefigured&#8221; in those notes. Bush's statements, he says, demonstrated &#8220;his focus on the danger presented by Iran [and] his determination to dig Saddam Hussein out of power in Iraq.&#8221; [[ | Frum, 2003, pp 26 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ David Frum )) July 2001-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_42 false 1 ------ Joe T. maintains his claim that the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes imported by Iraq but intercepted by the US in Jordan (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) were meant to be used as rotors in centrifuges. Joe T.'s theory becomes one of the most important components of the Bush administration's argument that Saddam Hussein is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. Despite significant criticisms of his theory from prominent experts in the field, Joe T. (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_43 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_47 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_49 ]]) receives an award for exceptional performance from the CIA for his analysis of the intercepted aluminum tubes. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) July 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_487 false 1 ------ The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obtains a few samples of the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes that were seized by the CIA and Jordanian secret service. They examine the tubes and initially are quite skeptical that the Iraqis intended to use them as rotors in a gas centrifuge. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ------ Later this month, CIA agent Joe T. flies to Vienna and presents his case to the IAEA. (( Jacques Bautes )) (( Andrew Wilkie )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ------ But experts at the agency disagree with his conclusions and explain to him why the believe his analysis is wrong. &#8220;They pointed out errors in his calculations. They noted design discrepancies,&#8221; an unnamed senior US official will later tell the New York Times. (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ------ David Albright, a physicist and former weapons inspector, who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, similarly explains to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation: &#8220;The view in Vienna in the summer of 2001 was &#8216;Maybe this guy has a clever idea, but he really is just grabbing at almost straws to prove his case, and when he's debunked in one model, he then shifts it and tries to make his information fit another centrifuge model.&#8217; And yet whenever you confronted him with the facts or the weaknesses in argument, he always came back with the same answer&#8212; &#8216;It's only for centrifuges.&#8217; &#8221; When Joe T. returns to Washington, he tells his superiors at the CIA that the IAEA agrees with his theory. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ------ But according to an unnamed senior US official, scientists at the IAEA send a summary of their views on the tubes to the US government. (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) July 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 false 1 ------ Following leads from the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_40 ]]), a team of CIA agents and Jordanian secret police confiscate a shipment to 3,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes in Jordan. The tubes had been purchased by a Jordanian front company, AT&amp;C, on behalf of Iraq. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ It is later learned that Iraq's supply of rocket body casing tubes is depleted at about this time (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_50 ]]) and that &#8220;[t]housands of warheads, motors and fins [are] ... crated at the assembly lines [in Iraq], awaiting the arrival of tubes.&#8221; (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ It is also later determined that the shipment of tubes is meant to replenish Iraq's supply of rocket casing tubes; they are not for Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program. ====== << aluminumTubes >> (Mid-July 2001)-August 17, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_43 false 1 ------ Almost immediately after Joe T.'s theory is circulated through US intelligence and science circles, a team of centrifuge physicists at the US Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory and other similar institutions review the case. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ The team includes Dr. Jon A. Kreykes, head of Oak Ridge's national security advanced technology group; Dr. Duane F. Starr, an expert on nuclear proliferation threats; and Dr. Edward Von Halle, a retired Oak Ridge nuclear expert. They are advised by Dr. Houston G. Wood III, a retired Oak Ridge physicist considered to be &#8220;among the most eminent living experts&#8221; on centrifuges, and Dr. Gernot Zippe, one of the German scientists who developed an early uranium centrifuge in the 1950s (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_44 ]]). On August 17, the team publishes a classified Technical Intelligence Note which details why they believe the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were not intended for use in a gas centrifuge. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] --- * --- The tubes sought by Iraq are very different from tubes Iraq used previously in its centrifuge prototypes before the first Gulf War. The intercepted aluminum tubes are significantly longer and narrower. [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] --- * --- Aluminum has not been used in gas centrifuges since the 1950s (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_9 ]]). Furthermore, Iraq is known to have had the blueprints for a more efficient centrifuge, which used maraging steel and carbon fiber, not aluminum (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1216 ]]). [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ &#8220;Aluminum was a huge step backwards,&#8221; Dr. Houston Wood will later explain to the New York Times. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] --- * --- There are no known centrifuge machines &#8220;deployed in a production environment&#8221; that use tubes with such a small diameter. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] --- * --- The tubes' walls, measuring 3.3 millimeters, are three times too thick for &#8220;favorable use&#8221; in a &#8220;Zippe-type&#8221; centrifuge, which requires tubes with a thickness of no more than 1.1 millimeter. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] --- * --- The tubes are anodized, which is &#8220;not consistent&#8221; with a uranium centrifuge because the anodized coating can react with uranium gas. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ------ Houston G. Wood later tells The Washington Post in mid-2003 that &#8220;it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges,&#8221; adding that it stretched &#8220;the imagination to come up with a way.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ Though the scientists' report concludes that &#8220;rocket production is the much more likely end use for these tubes,&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ------ Joe T. sticks with his theory. His position is backed by CIA director George Tenet. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) ((+ Gernot Zippe )) ((+ Edward Von Halle )) ((+ Duane F. Starr )) ((+ Jon A. Kreykes )) ((+ Houston G. Wood III )) ((+ George Tenet )) (July 2001-March 2003) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1220 false 1 ------ In meetings and telephone calls, CIA officials inform administration officials that experts at the Department of Energy do not believe that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq are intended for use in a gas centrifuge. According to one senior administration official, who is briefed by the CIA at least 6 times on the tubes, by late 2001, he we aware that there were differing views on the tubes. &#8220;To the best of my knowledge, he never hid anything from me,&#8221; the official later recalls, referring to his counterpart at WINPAC. (( Unnamed Senior CIA official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> Mid-September 2001 Neoconservatives Look to Tie Iraq to 9/11 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_64 false 1 ------ At the behest of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, former CIA director James Woolsey and a team of Justice and Defense Department officials fly to London on a US government plane to look for evidence tying Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. It is the second such mission undertaken by Woolsey this year. He reportedly made an earlier trip in February. Woolsey is looking for evidence to support the theory (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2890 ]]) that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind the 1993 WTC bombing, was actually an Iraqi agent who had assumed the identity of a Pakistani student named Abdul Basit. On at least one of the trips, Woolsey visits the Swansea Institute, where Basit studied, to see if Basit's fingerprints match those of Yousef, who is now serving a life sentence in a Colorado prison. Matching fingerprints would discredit the theory. According to Knight Ridder, &#8220;Several of those with knowledge of the trips said they failed to produce any new evidence that Iraq was behind the attacks.&#8221; [[ | Daily Telegraph, 10/26/01 ]] [[,6903,573893,00.html | Observer 10/14/01 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/11/01 ]] ------ Woolsey's activities in South Wales attract the attention of British authorities who are &#8220;intrigued&#8221; that a former CIA chief is &#8220;asking these questions.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/11/01 ]] ------ The trip, sponsored by the Pentagon, is not approved by Secretary of State Colin Powell or CIA director George Tenet. [[ | The Village Voice, 11/21/01 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/11/01 ]] ====== << decision >> << iraq >> ((- Colin Powell )) ((- George Tenet )) ((- Ramzi Yousef )) ((+ James Woolsey )) ((- Abdul Basit )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) July 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_437 false 1 ------ National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says, &#8220;Saddam does not control the northern part of the country. We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt.&#8221; [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) July 23, 2001-July 25, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1747 false 1 ------ The twenty-fourth negotiating session convenes to negotiate a proposal to add an enforcement and verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. For three days, representatives from more than 50 member-states speak favorably of ending the negotiations and adopting the protocol. The mechanism would require member-states to annually declare their biodefense facilities and programs as well as any industrial facilities with capabilities to produce microbial cultures in quantity. Additionally, all member-states would be subject to random inspections of any plant where biological weapons could be made. Inspections would also be conducted if a facility is suspected of illegally producing bioweapons; there are allegations of bioweapons use; or in the event of a disease outbreak suspected to be the result of the activities of a bioweapons facility. But on July 25, US Ambassador Donald Mahley announces that the US will block any consensus on the proposed changes to the convention. &#8220;The United States has concluded that the current approach to a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention . . . is not, in our view, capable of . . . strengthening confidence in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention,&#8221; he says. &#8220;We will therefore be unable to support the current text, even with changes.&#8221; US opposition to the convention is based on fears that inspections of US facilities might harm the profits of US biotech companies and impede the United States' current &#8220;biodefense&#8221; program. (( Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties )) [[ | Common Dreams, 8/5/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/1/01 ]] [[ | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1/03 ]] [[ | Counterpunch, 10/25/01 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Donald Mahley )) Late July or early August 2001 Late July 2001 US Authorities Look into Theory that Iraq Had Role in 1993 WTC Bombing complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2890 false 1 ------ US authorities re-open the files on Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the WTC bombing in 1993, and begin looking into the theory that Yousef may have actually been an Iraqi agent. Yousef was convicted in 1996 (see [[ a090596ramzi ]]) and has been in custody since 1995 (see [[ a020795ramzi ]]). According to the official version of events, Yousef's real name is Abdul Basit, a 27-year-old Pakistani who until 1989 was a computer student studying in South Wales. In late 2000, the American Enterprise Institute published &#8220;Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America&#8221; arguing in support of the theory that Yousef was actually an Iraqi agent. The book, written by AEI scholar Laurie Mylroie, says that Basit was living with his parents in Kuwait in 1990 when Iraq invaded the country (see [[ us_iraq_80s_2964 ]]). During the occupation, Iraqis presumably murdered him and his family and then altered police files so Iraqi intelligence could use his identity. [[ /timeline/2001/londontimes092201.html | London Times, 9/22/01 ]] [[ /timeline/2001/newrepublic091301.html | New Republic, 9/13/01 ]] ------ Mylroie's theory has been widely discredited among terrorism experts and professional intelligence analysts. [[ | Washington Monthly, 12/03 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> ((- Ramzi Yousef )) ((- Abdul Basit )) August 6, 2001 Perle's Concern About Iraq, North Korea, and Iran Before 9/11 Becomes Axis of Evil Afterward a080601preaxis false 1 ------ Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board and foreign policy adviser to Bush, is asked about new challenges now that the Cold War is over. He cites three: &#8220;We're concerned about Saddam Hussein, We're concerned about the North Koreans, about some future Iranian government that may have the weapon they're now trying so hard to acquire...&#8221; [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corp., 8/6/01 ]] ------ Note that these three nations are the same three named in Bush's famous January 2002 &#8220;axis of evil&#8221; speech. [[ | CNN, 1/29/02 ]] ====== << iraq >> << pre911Plans >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Iran )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((- North Korea )) Fall 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_712 false 1 ------ Joe T., an analyst for the CIA, gives a presentation in Room 6526 of the State Department's Office of Strategic Proliferation on his theory that a confiscated shipment of 7075-T6 aluminum tubes destined for Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) had been intended for use in a gas centrifuge program. Present at the meeting is Greg Thielmann, head of the nuclear proliferation monitoring division at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who is not at all impressed with Joe T.'s argument. &#8220;I found the presentation to be unpersuasive,&#8221; Thielmann later explains to Vanity Fair. &#8220;He seemed far more a man on a mission than an objective analyst. He had something to sell.&#8221; Also in attendance is a scientist from the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory who also disagrees with Joe T.'s conclusions. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 281 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) ((+ Greg Thielmann )) Autumn 2001 and after Senior Official: Bush's Decision on Iraq Influenced by Other People complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_67 false 1 ------ The momentum towards a policy of &#8220;regime change&#8221; in Iraq increases, independent of Bush's own decisions. &#8220;The issue got away from the president,&#8221; a senior official later tells the Washington Post. &#8220;He wasn't controlling the tone or the direction&#8221; and was influenced by people who &#8220;painted him into a corner because Iraq was an albatross around their necks.&#8221; (( Unnamed senior official )) [[ | Washington Post, 1/12/03 ]] ====== << decision >> ((- George W. Bush )) September 4, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_441 false 1 ------ The New York Times reports: &#8220;Over the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the global treaty banning such weapons. ... The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them.&#8221; The US claims that this research is needed to protect Americans from the threat posed by rogue nations or terrorist groups who may be developing such weapons. [[ | New York Times, 9/4/01 ]] ====== << wmd >> September 11, 2001-March 17, 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_13 false 1 ------ In the months leading up to the war with Iraq, Bush administration officials manipulate the intelligence provided to them by analysts in order to drum up support for the invasion. Some analysts complain that they are under pressure to write assessments that support the administration's case for invading Iraq. ------ On March 7, 2002, Knight Ridder reports that various military officials, intelligence employees, and diplomats in the Bush administration have charged &#8220;that the administration squelches dissenting views and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argument that Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States that preemptive military action is necessary.&#8221; (( Jonathan Dean )) (( Simon Crean )) (( Mel Goodman )) (( Joseph Cirincione )) (( John Prados )) (( Ivan Eland )) (( Edward Kennedy )) (( Knight Ridder Newspapers )) (( David Albright )) (( Seymour Hersh )) (( Demetrius Perricos )) (( Scott Ritter )) (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) (( Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) (( Stansfield Turner )) (( Robin Cook )) (( Bob Graham )) (( Vincent Cannistraro )) (( David Albright )) (( Several unnamed US intelligence officials )) (( Menzies Campbell )) (( Patrick G. Eddington )) (( Ray McGovern )) (( Larry C. Johnson )) (( Greg Thielmann )) (( Patrick Lang )) (( Andrew Wilkie )) (( Larry Hanauer )) (( Richard A. Clarke )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/7/02 ]] ====== << deception >> {{ commentary_joseph_c._wilson_3 }} {{ statement_patrick_lang_6 }} {{ statement_david_albright_6 }} {{ commentary_patrick_g._eddington_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_official_4 }} {{ commentary_richard_durbin_2 }} {{ commentary_mel_goodman_2 }} {{ commentary_joseph_c._wilson_4 }} {{ statement_max_cleland_2 }} {{ commentary_kenneth_pollack_2 }} {{ statement_max_cleland_3 }} {{ statement_david_albright_7 }} {{ commentary_karen_kwiatkowski_2 }} {{ statement_kenneth_pollack_5 }} {{ commentary_karen_kwiatkowski_3 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_5 }} {{ statement_melvin_a._goodman_3 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_4 }} {{ commentary_scott_ritter_12 }} {{ commentary_seymour_hersh_2 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_5 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_6 }} {{ commentary_knight_ridder_newspapers_2 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_6 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_23 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_16 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_14 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_12 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_11 }} {{ statement_larry_c._johnson_3 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_4 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_6 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_14 }} {{ statement_demetrius_perricos_2 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_11 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_13 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_14 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_15 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_13 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_13 }} {{ commentary_edward_kennedy_2 }} {{ commentary_us_government_official_2 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_8 }} {{ commentary_david_macmichael_2 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_10 }} {{ statement_ray_mcgovern_7 }} {{ commentary_kenneth_pollack_3 }} {{ statement_ray_mcgovern_3 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_4 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_2 }} {{ commentary_ray_mcgovern_11 }} {{ commentary_bob_filippone_2 }} {{ statement_veteran_intelligence_professionals_for_sanity_3 }} {{ statement_frank_anderson_2 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_12 }} {{ commentary_jonathan_dean_2 }} {{ statement_john_brady_kiesling_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_official_2 }} {{ statement_bob_graham_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_13 }} {{ statement_patrick_lang_2 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_4 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_6 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_4 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_12 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_11 }} {{ statement_unnamed_cia_analysts_and_officials_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_5 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_2 }} {{ commentary_patrick_lang_4 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_3 }} {{ commentary_patrick_lang_3 }} {{ statement_patrick_lang_5 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_6 }} {{ commentary_joseph_cirincione_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_4 }} {{ commentary_menzies_campbell_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_central_intelligence_agency_official_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_high-level_uk_source_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_3 }} {{ statement_david_albright_3 }} {{ statement_john_prados_2 }} {{ statement_david_albright_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_british_intelligence_officer_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_2 }} {{ commentary_ivan_eland_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_9 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_8 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_10 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_army_intelligence_officer_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_8 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_7 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_9 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_10 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_6 }} {{ commentary_vincent_cannistraro_5 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_5 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_military_official_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_7 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_cia_analyst_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_official_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_officials_3 }} {{ commentary_david_albright_4 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_official_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_unnamed_us/british_military_officials,_intelligence_professionals,_and_ diplomats_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_veteran_intelligence_officer_2 }} {{ statement_stansfield_turner_2 }} {{ statement_robin_cook_2 }} {{ commentary_larry_c._johnson_2 }} {{ commentary_bob_kerrey_2 }} September 11, 2001 Rumsfeld's &#8216;Brain Trust&#8217; in Europe When Attacks Occur complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_706 false 1 ------ Seven members of Donald Rumsfeld's so-called neocon &#8220;brain trust,&#8221; including Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and William Luti, head of the Pentagon's Near Eastern and South Asian desk, are &#8220;busy on unrelated missions in Europe and the Middle East.&#8221; They return to Washington the next day (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_705 ]]). (( William Luti )) (( Douglas Feith )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp 234 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ William Luti )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) After September 11, 2001 Propaganda Campaign to Tie 9/11 to Iraq Is Said to Begin complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_63 false 1 ------ Soon after September 11, a concerted effort begins to pin the blame for the attacks on Saddam Hussein. ------ Retired General Wesley Clark will later say on NBC's &#8220;Meet the Press&#8221; in June 2003 and in a letter published by the New York Times that &#8220;immediately after 9/11&#8221; there was a &#8220;concerted effort ... to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein&#8221; and use the attacks as an excuse to go after the Iraqi dictator. When asked by NBC's Tim Russert, who was behind the concerted effort, Clark will respond: &#8220;Well, it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House. It came from all over.&#8221; Clark also says, &#8220;I got a call on 9/11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, &#8216;You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.&#8217; I said, &#8216;But&#8212;I'm willing to say it, but what's your evidence?&#8217; And I never got any evidence.&#8221; He says the phone call came from a Middle Eastern think tank outside of the country. [[ | New York Times, 7/18/03 ]] [[ | MSNBC, 6/15/03 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << decision >> << deception >> << iraq >> ((+ Wesley Clark )) {{ duplicate_wesley_clark_2 }} Shortly after September 11, 2001 Feith Sets Up the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 false 1 ------ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Middle East specialist Harold Rhode recruit David Wurmser, the director of Middle East studies for the American Enterprise Institute, to serve as a Pentagon consultant. Wurmser is a known advocate of regime change in Iraq, having expressed his views in a 1997 op-ed piece published in the Wall Street Journal (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_465 ]]) and having participated in the drafting of a 1996 policy paper for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called &#8220;A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm&#8221; (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_74 ]]). Wurmser works at Feith's office, where he and F. Michael Maloof, a former aide to Richard Perle, head a secret intelligence unit, named the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, or the &#8220;Wurmser-Maloof&#8221; project. Neither Wurmser nor Maloof are intelligence professionals. The four- to five- person unit, a &#8220;B Team&#8221; commissioned by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, uses powerful computers and software to scan and sort already-analyzed documents and reports from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies in an effort to consider possible interpretations and angles of analysis that these agencies may have missed due to deeply ingrained biases and out-of-date worldviews. [[ | New York Times, 10/24/02 ]] [[,1,1827395.story?coll=la-headlines-suncomment | Los Angeles Times, 2/8/04 ]] [[ | Reuters, 2/19/04 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Washington Times, 1/14/02 ]] ------ The Pentagon unit's activities cause tension within the traditional intelligence community. Critics claim that its members manipulate and distort intelligence, &#8220;cherry-picking&#8221; bits of information that fit their preconceived conclusions. &#8220;There is a complete breakdown in the relationship between the Defense Department and the intelligence community, to include its own Defense Intelligence Agency,&#8221; a defense official will tell the New York Times. &#8220;Wolfowitz and company disbelieve any analysis that doesn't support their own preconceived conclusions. The CIA is enemy territory, as far are they're concerned.&#8221; (( Unnamed defense official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/24/02 ]] ------ Defending the project, Paul Wolfowitz will tell the New York Times that the team's purpose is to circumvent the problem &#8220;in intelligence work, that people who are pursuing a certain hypothesis will see certain facts that others won't, and not see other facts that others will.&#8221; He insists that the special Pentagon unit is &#8220;not making independent intelligence assessments.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/24/02 ]] ------ One of the cell's projects includes sorting through existing intelligence to create a map of relationships demonstrating links between militant Islamic groups and state powers. This chart of links, which they name the &#8220;matrix,&#8221; leads the intelligence unit to conclude that Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and other groups with conflicting ideologies and objectives are allowing these differences to fall to the wayside as they discover their shared hatred of the US. The group's research also leads them to believe that al-Qaeda has a presence in such places as Latin American. For weeks, the unit will attempt to uncover evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, a theory advocated by both Feith and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[,1,1827395.story?coll=la-headlines-suncomment | Los Angeles Times, 2/8/04 ]] [[ | Washington Times, 1/14/02 ]] ------ The group is later accused of stovepiping intelligence directly to the White House. Former DIA chief of Mideast operations, Pat Lang, later tells the Washington Times: &#8220;That unit had meetings with senior White House officials without the CIA or the Senate being aware of them. That is not legal. There has to be oversight.&#8221; According to Lang and another US intelligence official, the two men go to the White House several times to brief officials, bypassing CIA analysts whose analyses they disagreed with. They allegedly brief White House staffers Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, and Lewis &#8220;Scooter&#8221; Libby, chief of staff for Vice President Richard Cheney, according to congressional staffers. [[ | Washington Times, 7/29/2004 ]] ------ According to unnamed Pentagon and US intelligence officials, the group is also accused of providing sensitive CIA and Pentagon intercepts to the US-funded Iraqi National Congress, which then passed them on to the government of Iran. [[ | Washington Times, 7/29/2004 ]] ------ David Wurmser will later be relocated to the State Department where he will be the senior advisor to Undersecretary Of State for Arms Control John Bolton.(see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 ]]). [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ====== << deception >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << terroristTies >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Stephen Hadley )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ David Wurmser )) ((+ Harold Rhode )) ((- Richard Perle )) ((+ F. Michael Maloof )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- Paul Wolfowitz )) Before September 11, 2001 or in October 2002 Italian Information Peddler Sells Fake Documents to French Implicating Iraq in the Attempted Purchase of Uranium from Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3173 false 1 ------ Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler reportedly sells a collection of mostly forged documents (though it is not clear precisely what documents these are) to the Direction G�n�rale de la S�curit� Ext�rieure (DGSE), France's intelligence agency, to whom he has been selling documents since 1999 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1608 ]]). The documents suggest Niger agreed to sell uranium to Iraq in 2000. SISMI, Italy's military intelligence service, is reportedly aware of the sale, and may have actually arranged it. French intelligence quickly determines the documents are not authentic. [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/25/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[,,2089-1859301_1,00.html | Sunday Times, 11/6/2005 ]] ------ It is not clear when, precisely, the documents are given to the French. According to the Italian La Repubblica, the transaction takes place before September 11. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] ------ However according to the Sunday Times' sources, DGSE receives the documents in October 2002, long after the documents are reported to have been fabricated (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2977 ]]). [[,,2089-1859301_1,00.html | Sunday Times, 11/6/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ France )) ((+ SISMI )) ((+ Antonio Nucera )) ((+ Rocco Martino )) Shortly after September 11, 2001 Pentagon Forms Secret Office to Influence Foreign Governments and Media Organizations complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1822 false 1 ------ The Pentagon creates a secret office to coordinate military information operations aimed at improving the United States' image abroad. The office, named the Office of Strategic Influence, or OSI, is headed by Brigadier General Simon P. Wordon [[ | New York Times, 2/19/02 ]] ------ , an astrophysicist with experience in space operations and missile defense. [[ | Washington Post, 2/20/02 ]] ------ His assistant is Thomas A. Timmes. [[ | New York Times, 2/19/02 ]] ------ OSI is a small, but well-funded operation and there are reportedly plans to provide it with an annual budget of as much as $100 million. [[ | New York Times, 2/19/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 2/27/02 ]] [[,,13-213439,00.html | London Times, 2/20/02 ]] ------ Soon after the office is formed, a proposal is floated to produce and disseminate disinformation. The New York Times will report: &#8220;[T]he new office has begun circulating classified proposals calling for aggressive campaigns that use not only the foreign media and the Internet, but also covert operations.... One of the office's proposals calls for planting news items with foreign media organizations through outside concerns that might not have obvious ties to the Pentagon.... General Worden envisions a broad mission ranging from &#8216;black&#8217; campaigns that use disinformation and other covert activities to &#8216;white&#8217; public affairs that rely on truthful news releases.... &#8216;It goes from the blackest of black programs to the whitest of white,&#8217; a senior Pentagon official said.... Another proposal involves sending journalists, civic leaders and foreign leaders e-mail messages that promote American views or attack unfriendly governments.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 2/19/02 ]] ------ When OSI's classified proposals are leaked to the press (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2965 ]]), White House officials say they are &#8220;furious&#8221; that the use of disinformation is being considered and then a few days later announce that the office has been shut down (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2966 ]]). [[ | Washington Post, 2/25/02 ]] ====== << propaganda >> << DSM >> ((+ Thomas A. Timmes )) ((+ Simon P. Wordon )) ((+ US Department of Defense )) ((+ Office of Strategic Influence )) Shortly after September 11, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_493 false 1 ------ According to White House counterterrorism advisor, Richard Clarke, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, asks during a meeting, &#8220;Why we are [sic] beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden?&#8221; Clarke responds with an explaination that only al-Qaeda &#8220;poses an immediate and serious threat to the United States.&#8221; Wolfowitz then claims that Iraq poses &#8220;at least as much&#8221; a danger. According to Clarke, FBI and CIA representatives who are present at the meeting agree that there is no evidence to support Wolfowitz's assertion. (( Richard A. Clarke )) [[ | Washington Post, 3/22/04 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) {{ duplicate_richard_a._clarke_7 }} (2:40 p.m.) Rumsfeld Wants to Blame Iraq a240blameiraq false 1 ------ Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is provided information from the CIA indicating that three of the hijackers were suspected al-Qaeda operatives. Notes composed by aides who were with Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on 9/11 are leaked nearly a year later. According to the notes, information shows, &#8220;One guy is [an] associate of [USS] Cole bomber.&#8221; (This is a probable reference to Khalid Almihdhar or Nawaf Alhazmi.) Rumsfeld has also been given information indicating an al-Qaeda operative had advanced details of the 9/11 attack. According to the aide's notes, Rumsfeld wants the &#8220;best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 285 ]] [[ | CBS News, 9/4/02 ]] ====== << dayOf911 >> << donaldRumsfeld >> << iraq >> << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ National Military Command Center )) ((- al-Qaeda )) ((- Nawaf Alhazmi )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((- Khalid Almihdhar )) {{ duplicate_donald_rumsfeld_3 }} {{ commentary_cbs_news_2 }} September 12, 2001 Bush Meeting Raises Iraq Attack Possibility complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_58 false 1 ------ White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke meets with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, President Bush, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Rumsfeld suggests that the US should bomb Iraq in retaliation for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. &#8220;Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq,&#8221; Clarke will later recall in his book, Against All Enemies. &#8220;... We all said, &#8216;But no, no. Al-Qaeda is in Afghanistan,&#8217; and Rumsfeld said, &#8216;There aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq.&#8217; &#8221; (( Richard A. Clarke )) [[;cgi=product&amp;isbn=0743260244 | Clarke, 2004 ]] [[,1280,-3881862,00.html | Associated Press, 3/20/04 ]] [[;storyID=4610418&amp;section=news | Reuters, 3/19/04 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 3/22/2004 ]] ------ Powell agrees with Clarke that the immediate focus should be al-Qaeda. However, Powell also says, &#8220;Public opinion has to be prepared before a move against Iraq is possible.&#8221; Clarke complains to him, &#8220;Having been attacked by al-Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.&#8221; President Bush notes the goal should be replacing the Iraqi government, not just bombing it, but the military warns an invasion would need a large force and many months to assemble. [[;cgi=product&amp;isbn=0743260244 | Clarke, 2004 ]] ------ Rumsfeld's view is said to be closely aligned with that of his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who believes Saddam, not Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda, should be the principal target of the &#8220;war on terrorism.&#8221; [[;cgi=product&amp;isbn=0743204735 | Woodward, 2002, pp 49 ]] ------ Commenting on his feelings after the meeting, Clarke will later write: &#8220;At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting al-Qaeda. I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that (Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 3/28/04 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 3/22/04 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 3/22/04 ]] ------ &#8220;They were talking about Iraq on 9/11. They were talking about it on 9/12.&#8221; (( Richard A. Clarke )) [[,1280,-3881862,00.html | Associated Press, 3/20/04 ]] [[;storyID=4610418&amp;section=news | Reuters, 3/19/04 ]] [[;cgi=product&amp;isbn=0743260244 | Clarke, 2004. ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((- Paul Wolfowitz )) {{ commentary_morton_i._abramowitz_2 }} {{ commentary_bob_graham_4 }} {{ duplicate_richard_a._clarke_5 }} {{ duplicate_richard_a._clarke_3 }} {{ duplicate_richard_a._clarke_2 }} September 12, 2001 Bush to Clarke: &#8216;Look into Iraq&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_492 false 1 ------ US President George Bush speaks privately with White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke in the White House Situation Room. According to Clarke, Bush tells him to investigate the possibility that Iraq was involved in the attacks. &#8220;I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything,&#8221; Bush says. &#8220;See if Saddam did this.&#8221; When Clarke responds, &#8220;But Mr. President, al-Qaeda did this,&#8221; Bush replies, &#8220;I know, I know, but... see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred.&#8221; Clarke insists that the CIA, FBI, and White House already concluded that there were no such links. As he exits the room, Bush &#8220;testily&#8221; says again, &#8220;Look into Iraq, Saddam.&#8221; (( Richard A. Clarke )) [[ | Washington Post, 3/22/2004 ]] ------ During a &#8220;60 Minutes&#8221; interview, Clarke will say that Bush's instructions were made in a way that was &#8220;very intimidating,&#8221; and which hinted that Clarke &#8220;should come back with that answer.&#8221; &#8220;Now he never said, &#8216;Make it up.&#8217; But the entire conversation left me in absolutely no doubt that George Bush wanted me to come back with a report that said Iraq did this.&#8221; [[ | CBS News, 3/20/04 ]] [[;ei=1&amp;en=33db0132fd003259 | New York Times, 3/23/04 ]] ------ Clarke's account is later confirmed by several eyewitnesses. [[,14259,1178658,00.html | Guardian, 3/26/2004 ]] [[ | BBC, 3/23/2004 ]] [[ | CBS News, 3/20/04 ]] ------ After his meeting with Bush, Clarke works with CIA and FBI experts to produce the report requested by the president; but they find no evidence that Iraq had a hand in the attacks. It gets &#8220;bounced by the national-security advisor, or deputy,&#8221; according to Clarke. &#8220; It got bounced and sent back, saying &#8216;Wrong answer .... Do it again.&#8217; &#8221; [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp 238 ]] ====== << deception >> << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ Scott McClellan )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_10 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_9 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_11 }} {{ commentary_morton_i._abramowitz_2 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_12 }} {{ commentary_bob_graham_4 }} September 12, 2001 Rumsfeld's &#8216;Brain Trust&#8217; Returns to States complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_705 false 1 ------ Seven members of Donald Rumsfeld's so-called neocon &#8220;brain trust,&#8221; meet at an airport in Frankfurt, Germany where they are picked up by an Air Force refueling plane which brings them back to Washington. During the flight they discuss the implications of the 911 attacks for US foreign policy. (( William Luti )) (( Douglas Feith )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp 234 ]] ------ &#8220;Right there on the plane, we took out our laptops and sketched out for Secretary Rumsfeld where we thought we had to go, what it meant to get things on a war footing,&#8221; William Luti will tell Vanity Fair magazine. &#8220;Obviously we had Afghanistan on our minds straightaway. That was our immediate concern. But we also thought we had to learn about the terrorist networks, how they connected to he states.&#8221; They arrive at Andrews Air Force base a few minutes after five in the afternoon. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp 234 ]] ====== << decision >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ William Luti )) Shortly after September 11, 2001 September 12, 2001 CIA Station Chief In Rome Asks Italian Intelligence for Any Available Useful Intel complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3142 false 1 ------ In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the CIA station chief in Rome, Jeff Castelli, reportedly asks SISMI to provide the US with any useful intelligence it might have. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Jeff Castelli )) ((+ SISMI )) September 13, 2001 Former CIA Director Suggests Saddam Hussein May Have Been Behind the 9/11 Attacks complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2889 false 1 ------ In an op-ed piece published in the New Republic, former CIA director James Woolsey calls on the Bush administration to re-examine evidence that could potentially tie Iraq to the 1993 bombing of the WTC. He cites a theory (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2890 ]]) that Iraqi intelligence helped bomber Ramzi Yousef steal the identity of a Kuwaiti student studying at a college in Wales. If this theory is correct, he says, &#8220;then it was Iraq that went after the World Trade Center last time. Which makes it much more plausible that Iraq has done so again.&#8221; In light of this, he argues, US authorities should consider the possibility that Saddam Hussein had a hand in the 9/11 attacks. &#8220;[I]ntelligence and law enforcement officials investigating the case would do well to at least consider another possibility: that the attacks&#8212;whether perpetrated by bin Laden and his associates or by others&#8212;were sponsored, supported, and perhaps even ordered by Saddam Hussein,&#8221; he writes. &#8220;As yet, there is no evidence of explicit state sponsorship of the September 11 attacks. But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2001/newrepublic091301.html | New Republic, 9/13/01 ]] ------ A few days later, the US Defense Department will send Woolsey to Britain (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_64 ]]) to investigate the alleged Iraq link to the 1993 bombing. ====== << decision >> ((+ James Woolsey )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Ramzi Yousef )) September 13, 2001 JINSA Calls for Regime Change in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_59 false 1 ------ Two days after the September 11 attacks, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), a neoconservative think tank focused on maintaining and strengthening the US/Israeli military alliance, releases a press statement calling for regime change in Iraq. &#8220;In response to the attack on September 11, 2001 JINSA calls on the United States to: Halt all US purchases of Iraqi oil under the UN Oil for Food Program and to provide all necessary support to the Iraqi National Congress, including direct American military support, to effect a regime change in Iraq,&#8221; the statement reads. [[ | Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), 9/13/01 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs )) {{ duplicate_donald_rumsfeld_3 }} Shortly after September 11, 2001 September 13, 2001 Italian Prime Minister Reportedly Wants to Become Top US Ally complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3141 false 1 ------ Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi reportedly puts pressure on Nicolo Pollari, chief of SISMI, Italy's military intelligence service, to provide US with intelligence in an effort to please the Bush administration and make Italy a top US ally. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Nicolo Pollari )) ((- Bush administration )) ((+ Silvio Berlusconi )) September 14, 2001 Atta-Iraq Spy Meeting Story Begins with Dubious Tip complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_165 false 1 ------ The CIA intelligence liaison in Prague is told by the Czech intelligence agency (BIS) that one of its informants in the local Prague Arab community believes the Hamburg &#8220;student&#8221; he had seen meeting with Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani on April 8, 2001 in a restaurant outside of Prague was 9/11 plotter Mohamed Atta. (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]) Czech intelligence treats the claim skeptically because it comes only after Atta's picture has been broadcast on television and after the Czech press reported that records showed Atta had traveled to Prague. FBI agents go to the Czech Republic and are given full access to Czech intelligence material. This information leads hawks to come up with the so-called &#8220;Prague Connection&#8221; theory, which holds that 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta flew to Prague on April 8, met with al-Ani to discuss the planning and financing of the 9/11 attacks, and returned to the US on either April 9 or 10. The theory will be widely debated but generally discounted by the end of 2004. (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/21/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << terroristTies >> << iraq >> ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) September 15, 2001-April 6, 2002 Bush Shifts Public Focus from bin Laden to Iraq a091501focusshift false 1 ------ On September 15, 2001, President Bush says of bin Laden: &#8220;If he thinks he can hide and run from the United States and our allies, he will be sorely mistaken.&#8221; [[,0,4996976.story | Los Angeles Times, 9/16/01 (B) ]] ------ Two days later, he says, &#8220;I want justice. And there's an old poster out West, I recall, that says, &#8216;Wanted: Dead or Alive.&#8217; &#8221; [[ | ABC News, 9/17/01 ]] ------ On December 28, 2001, even as the US was declaring victory in Afghanistan, Bush says, &#8220;Our objective is more than bin Laden.&#8221; [[;u=/ap_advisory/sept_11_timeline | Associated Press, 8/19/02 (B) ]] ------ Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech describes Iraq as part of an &#8220;axis of evil&#8221; and fails to mention bin Laden at all. On March 8, 2002, Bush still vows: &#8220;We're going to find him.&#8221; [[;node=&amp;contentId=A24191-2002Sep30&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 10/1/02 ]] ------ Yet, only a few days later on March 13, Bush says, &#8220;He's a person who's now been marginalized. ... I just don't spend that much time on him. ... I truly am not that concerned about him.&#8221; Instead, Bush is &#8220;deeply concerned about Iraq.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2002/whitehouse031302.html | White House, 3/13/02 ]] ------ The rhetoric shift is complete when Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers states on April 6, &#8220;The goal has never been to get bin Laden.&#8221; [[ /timeline/2002/dod040602.html | Department of Defense, 4/6/02 ]] ------ In October 2002, the Washington Post notes that since March 2002, Bush has avoided mentioning bin Laden's name, even when asked about him directly. Bush sometimes uses questions about bin Laden to talk about Saddam Hussein instead. In late 2001, nearly two-thirds of Americans say the war on terrorism could not be called a success without bin Laden's death or capture. That number falls to 44 percent in a March 2002 poll, and the question has since been dropped. [[;node=&amp;contentId=A24191-2002Sep30&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 10/1/02 ]] ------ Charles Heyman, editor of Jane's World Armies, later points out: &#8220;There appears to be a real disconnect&#8221; between the US military's conquest of Afghanistan and &#8220;the earlier rhetoric of President Bush, which had focused on getting bin Laden.&#8221; [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/02 (B) ]] ====== << iraq >> << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Richard B. Myers )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) September 15, 2001 State Department Audit of INC Finds Many Problems complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3205 false 1 ------ State Department auditors discover that the Iraqi National Congress' &#8220;information collection&#8221; program has failed to keep its books in order. According to the audit, the INC used a mixture of accounting methods (both cash and accrual); lacked adequate internal controls; lacked written accounting policies and procedures; had bank balances that exceeded FDIC insured amounts; and &#8220;did not comply with applicable regulations and agreements.&#8221; The auditors question the costs of about $2.2 million out of $4.3 million in expenditures between March 2000 and May 2001. &#8220;Of that amount, $113,794 was unallowable under terms and conditions of the agreement, and $2,107,093 was classified as unsupported because of either inadequate or a lack of documentation.&#8221; (( Review of Awards to Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation )) ------ Examples cited by auditors include $2,070 paid for a Washington health center membership and money paid to the Burson-Marsteller public relations firm. [[ | Washington Post, 1/25/2002 ]] ------ Another $101,762 was spent in undocumented expenses related to travel and badge distribution for attendees at a human rights conference. Additionally, the INC made $578,795 in undocumented cash payments. The auditors also draw attention to the INC's shifting of funds &#8220;back and forth among several different banks into several different currencies&#8221; which they note created a potential for &#8220;fraud, waste, and abuse.&#8221; (( Review of Awards to Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation )) ------ In a 200-page response to the audit, the INC acknowledges &#8220;the need to strengthen internal [financial] controls,&#8221; but denies any misuse of federal funds. Entifadh K. Qanbar, the INC's Washington office director, says the US government is using the financial issues as a &#8220;smoke screen&#8221; to divert attention away from its failure to develop its own policy on Iraq. &#8220;There is a sense that the INC will make Saddam very angry if we are allowed to conduct aggressive actions inside the country,&#8221; Qanbar says. &#8220;That will drag the United States into a war. They are not prepared to go to war against Saddam. This is why the review is stalled.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 1/25/2002 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ US Department of State )) ((+ Entifadh Qanbar )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) September 15, 2001 Top Officials Meet at Camp David; Wolfowitz Suggests Striking Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_60 false 1 ------ George W. Bush, CIA Director George Tenet, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, Paul Wolfowitz, and perhaps other officials as well, meet at Camp David to discuss war plans in Afghanistan. The meeting reportedly begins at 9:30 AM with a prayer. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 232 ]] [[;node=&amp;contentId=A64802-2002Jan30&amp;notFound=true | Washington Post, 1/31/02 ]] ------ There is discussion on a paper submitted by the Defense Department depicting Iraq, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda as priority targets. Paul Wolfowitz pushes for regime change in Iraq, claiming that there is a 10 to 50 percent chance that Iraq was involved in the attacks. [[ | Washington Post, 7/23/04 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 232 ]] [[ | Woodward, 2002, pp 83 ]] ------ Wolfowitz will later recall in an interview with Vanity Fair: &#8220;On the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when. There seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement was whether it should be in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about tactics and timing, the president clearly came down on the side of Afghanistan first. To the extent it was a debate about strategy and what the larger goal was, it is at least clear with 20/20 hindsight that the president came down on the side of the larger goal.&#8221; [[ | Defense Department, /29/2005 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ Paul O'Neill )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Robert S. Mueller III )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ statement_bob_woodward_2 }} September 16, 2001 Cheney Says &#8216;Saddam Hussein is Bottled Up&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2962 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney is asked by Tim Russert of NBC's Meet the Press if the US has evidence that Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists. Cheney responds: &#8220;There is&#8212;in the past, there have been some activities related to terrorism by Saddam Hussein. But at this stage, you know, the focus is over here on al-Qaeda and the most recent events in New York. Saddam Hussein's bottled up, at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned.&#8221; [[ | White House, 9/16/2001 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> ((- Osama bin Laden )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) {{ duplicate_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_17 }} September 17, 2001 Bush Signs Afghanistan War Plan, But Also Includes Order to Prepare for Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_61 false 1 ------ President Bush signs a 2 1/2-page &#8220;top secret&#8221; document that outlines the administration's plan to invade Afghanistan and topple its government. According to administration officials interviewed by the Washington Post, the document also instructs the Pentagon to begin planning for an invasion of Iraq. (( senior administration officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 1/12/03 ]] [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] [[ /timeline/2004/atlanticmonthly1004b.html | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ------ The document further orders the military to be ready to occupy Iraq's oil fields if the country acts against US interests. [[ | Washington Post, 7/23/04 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ George W. Bush )) On and around September 18, 2001 September 18, 2001 Wolfowitz and Feith Argue that Iraq Should be Target in War on Terrorism complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2013 false 1 ------ Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith argue in three memos why Iraq should be included as a target in the war on terrorism. One memo, &#8220;Were We Asleep?,&#8221; is dated September 18, and suggests links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. (( senior administration officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 1/12/03 ]] [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) September 18, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_166 false 1 ------ Information about the alleged April 2001 meeting in Prague between 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani is leaked to the Associated Press, which reports, &#8220;A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States has received information from a foreign intelligence service that Mohamed Atta, a hijacker aboard one of the planes that slammed into the World Trade Center, met earlier this year in Europe with an Iraqi intelligence agent.&#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | Associated Press, 9/18/01 ]] [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) September 19, 2001 Rumsfeld Memo Emphasizes Global Nature of Conflict complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2873 false 1 ------ Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld writes a memo to Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisting that initial war plans should emphasize, among other things, the global nature of the conflict. [[ | Washington Post, 8/7/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Hugh Shelton )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) September 19, 2001-September 20, 2001 Defense Policy Board Meets and Discusses Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_62 false 1 ------ The Defense Policy Board (DPB) meets in secrecy in Rumsfeld's Pentagon conference room on September 19 and 20 for nineteen hours to discuss the option of taking military action against Iraq. [[ | New York Times, 10/12/01 ]] ------ They also discuss how they might overcome some of the diplomatic and political pressures that would likely attempt to impede a policy of regime change in Iraq. [[ | New York Times, 10/12/01 ]] ------ Among those attending the meeting are the 18 members of the Defense Policy Board, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Bernard Lewis, Ahmed Chalabi, and Chalabi's aide Francis Brooke. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 236 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/12/01 ]] ------ Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officials in charge of US policy toward Iraq are not invited and are not informed of the meeting. A source will later tell the New York Times that Powell was irritated about not being briefed on the meeting. [[ | New York Times, 10/12/01 ]] ------ During the seminar, two of Richard Perle's invited guests, Princeton professor Bernard Lewis and Ahmed Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress, are given the opportunity to speak. Lewis says that the US must encourage democratic reformers in the Middle East, &#8220;such as my friend here, Ahmed Chalabi.&#8221; Chalabi argues that Iraq is a breeding ground for terrorists and asserts that Saddam's regime has weapons of mass destruction. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 232 ]] ------ He also asserts &#8220;there'd be no resistance, no guerrilla warfare from the Baathists, and [it would be] a quick matter of establishing a government.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ------ Attendees write a letter to President Bush calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein. &#8220;[E]ven if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism,&#8221; the letter reads. The letter is published in the Washington Times on September 20 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2014 ]]) in the name of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a conservative think tank that believes the US needs to shoulder the responsibility for maintaining &#8220;peace&#8221; and &#8220;security&#8221; in the world by strengthening its global hegemony. [[ | Project for a New American Century, 9/20/01 ]] [[ | Manila Times, 7/19/03 ]] ------ Bush reportedly rejects the letter's proposal, as both Cheney and Powell agree that there is no evidence implicating Saddam Hussein in the attacks. (( Unnamed senior administration officials and defense experts )) [[ | New York Times, 10/12/01 ]] ====== << decision >> << chalabi >> << iraq >> ((+ Henry A. Kissinger )) ((+ James Woolsey )) ((+ Adm. David E. Jeremiah )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Bernard Lewis )) ((+ James R. Schlesinger )) ((+ Dan Quayle )) ((+ Harold Brown )) ((+ Newt Gingrich )) ((+ A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm )) ((+ Defense Policy Board )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) {{ duplicate_defense_policy_board_2 }} September 20, 2001 Douglas Feith Suggests Targeting a &#8216;Non-Al-Qaeda Target, Like Iraq&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2872 false 1 ------ Douglas Feith suggests in a draft memo [[ | Washington Post, 8/7/2004 ]] ------ that the US should consider &#8220;hitting terrorists outside the Middle East in the initial offensive, perhaps deliberately selecting a non-al-Qaeda target like Iraq.&#8221; Other regions he proposes attacking include South America and Southeast Asia. He reasons that an initial attack against such targets would &#8220;surprise ... the terrorists&#8221; and catch them off guard. (( 9/11 Commission Report )) [[ | Newsweek, 8/8/2004 ]] ------ According to Newsweek, the content of Feith's memo derives from the work of the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 ]]), a project headed by Michael Maloof and David Wurmser. The group suggested that an attack on the remote Triborder region, where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet and where Iranian-backed Hezbollah is said to have a presence, would have a ripple effect among international Islamic militant groups. [[ | Newsweek, 8/8/2004 ]] ------ Feith later says his memo merely expands upon ideas put forth by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a memo (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2873 ]]) the secretary wrote the day before to Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [[ | Washington Post, 8/7/2004 ]] ------ The logic behind proposing strikes against targets outside of the Middle East, Feith says, was based on the need to &#8220;cast a wide net&#8221; and achieve &#8220;additional objectives,&#8221; such as creating fissures in the enemy network, highlighting &#8220;the global nature of the conflicts,&#8221; showing &#8220;seriousness of US military purpose,&#8221; and demonstrating that the &#8220;war would not be limited geographically to Afghanistan.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 8/7/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> << terroristTies >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ F. Michael Maloof )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ David Wurmser )) September 20, 2001 Bush to Blair: After Afghanistan, &#8216;We Must Come Back to Iraq&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_707 false 1 ------ British Prime Minister Tony Blair meets with President George Bush at the White House. During dinner that night, also attended by Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and British ambassador Sir Christopher Meyer, Blair tells Bush that he wants to concentrate on ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Bush replies, &#8220;I agree with you Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.&#8221; Blair says nothing to disagree. (( Christopher Meyer )) [[,6903,1185407,00.html | Observer, 4/4/04 ]] [[ | BBC, 4/3/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 4/4/04 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 238 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ Christopher Meyer )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Tony Blair )) September 20, 2001 PNAC Think Tank Pushes for Iraq War complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2014 false 1 ------ The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an influential neoconservative think tank, publishes a letter addressed to President Bush, insisting that the war on terrorism include as one of its objectives the removal of Saddam Hussein from power&#8212; &#8220;even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack.&#8221; &#8220;Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.&#8221; PNAC also says the US should demand that Iran and Syria cease all support of Hezbollah, and if they fail to do so, the US should &#8220;retaliate&#8221; against those two countries as well. Israel is praised in the letter as &#8220;America's staunchest ally against international terrorism.&#8221; [[ | Project for the New American Century, 9/20/01 ]] ====== << decision >> << iraq >> ((+ Project for the New American Century )) September 25, 2001 Justice Department Lawyer Asserts There is No Limit to President's Authority to Wage War torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_against_captives_in_iraq,_afghanistan,_and_elsewhere_2150 false 1 ------ In a secret 15-page memo to Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, Justice Department lawyer John Yoo reasons that it is &#8220;beyond question that the president has the plenary constitutional power to take such military actions as he deems necessary and appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks&#8221; of 9/11. Those actions can be extensive. &#8220;Force can be used,&#8221; Yoo writes, &#8220;both to retaliate for those attacks, and to prevent and deter future assaults on the nation. Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.&#8221; This power of the president, Yoo states, rests both on the US Congress' Joint Resolution of September 14 and on the War Powers Resolution of 1973. &#8220;Neither statute, however, can place any limits on the president's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the president alone to make.&#8221; He argues further that the September 14 resolution does not represent the limits to the president's authority. &#8220;It should be noted here that the Joint Resolution is somewhat narrower than the president's constitutional authority,&#8221; as it &#8220;does not reach other terrorist individuals, groups or states which cannot be determined to have links to the September 11 attacks.&#8221; the president's broad power can be used against selected individuals suspected of posing a danger to the US, even though it may be &#8220;difficult to establish, by the standards of criminal law or even lower legal standards, that particular individuals or groups have been or may be implicated in attacks on the United States.&#8221; Yoo concludes: &#8220;[W]e do not think that the difficulty or impossibility of establishing proof to a criminal law standard (or of making evidence public) bars the president from taking such military measures as, in his best judgment, he thinks necessary or appropriate to defend the United States from terrorist attacks. In the exercise of his plenary power to use military force, the president's decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable.&#8221; (( Memo: The President's Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them )) ------ The contents of this memo are not disclosed until mid-December 2004. [[ | Newsweek, 12/27/2004 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 12/18/2004 ]] ====== << keyEvents >> << hr_highlevel >> << hr_internalMemos >> << decision >> ((+ John C. Yoo )) ((+ Timothy E. Flanigan )) (Late September 2001-Early October 2001) Top Italian Officials Provided with Details of Alleged Iraq-Niger Uranium Deal complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3181 false 1 ------ According to author James Bamford, SISMI passes on details of the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal &#8220;to the Executive Committee of the Intelligence and Security Services (CESIS), which in turn passe[s] it on to the Faresine, the Italian Foreign Ministry, and to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at his office in Rome's Palazzo Chigi. Only the Farnesina raise[s] &#8216;strong objection&#8217; and &#8216;reservations&#8217; about the report&#8212;primarily from the African Countries Directorate. They [are] greatly concerned about the reliability of the information.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 303 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Italian Foreign Ministry )) ((+ Committee of the Intelligence and Security Services )) ((+ Silvio Berlusconi )) ((+ SISMI )) After October 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_156 false 1 ------ Rohan Gunaratna, a research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, begins researching for his book, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He examines several tens of thousands of documents acquired from al-Qaeda and Taliban sources. During the course of his investigation, he finds no evidence of an Iraqi-al-Qaeda link. In an op-ed piece printed in the International Herald Tribune on February 19, 2003, he writes: &#8220;In addition to listening to 240 tapes taken from al-Qaeda's central registry, I debriefed several al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees. I could find no evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The documentation and interviews indicated that al-Qaeda regarded Saddam, a secular leader, as an infidel.&#8221; (( Rohan Gunaratna )) [[ | International Herald Tribune, 2/19/03 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Rohan Gunaratna )) October 3, 2001 The Pentagon Hires the Rendon Group to Track and Analyze Foreign Media Reporting complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3236 false 1 ------ The Pentagon secretly awards the Rendon Group a $16.7 million contract to test public opinion and track and analyze foreign news reports in places like Cairo; Istanbul; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Islamabad, Pakistan; and Jakarta, Indonesia. One of Rendon's main targets will be al-Jazeera. The contract specifies that Rendon will track &#8220;the location and use of Al Jazeera news bureaus, reporters and stringers, both regionally and globally. The ... effort will provide a detailed content analysis of the station's daily broadcast. TRG [The Rendon Group] will also chart event-related regional media coverage to identify the biases of specific journalists and potentially obtain an understanding of their allegiances.&#8221; Rendon will land many more contracts from the Pentagon over the next few years including ones that call on the firm to plant television news segments in the foreign media promoting US positions and to &#8220;push&#8221; stories favorable to the US. According to Rendon, in some cases the firm helps &#8220;foreign governments to correct things that are bad or wrong in the news cycle, and amplify those things that are not bad.&#8221; (( The Evolution of Strategic Influence )) [[,1,4083882.story?page=2&amp;cset=true&amp;ctrack=1 | Chicago Tribune , 11/13/2005 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Rendon Group )) ((+ US Department of Defense )) October 4, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_428 false 1 ------ Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control testifies in Congress before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and the South Asia Committee on International Relations that Iraq &#8220;is still committed to developing weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; He states: &#8220;Iraq has become self-sufficient in biological weaponry; it possesses the strains, growth media and infrastructure necessary to build a biological arsenal. Iraq also retains stocks of chemical agent from the period of the Gulf War and is known to have all the elements of a workable nuclear weapon except the fissile material needed to fuel it. Iraq&apos;s authorized program for developing short-range missiles will also enable the building of longer-range missiles, and Iraq is showing an interest in cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, apparently to deliver chemical or biological payloads.&#8221; [[ | US House of Representatives, 10/4/01 ]] [[ | United Press International, 1/17/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Gary Milhollin )) October 8, 2001 Ex-CIA Director's Meeting With Taliban Leader Is Called Off a100801woolsey false 1 ------ Ex-CIA Director James Woolsey, as part of his attempt to gather evidence that could tie Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, contacts the Taliban. He works with Mansour Ijaz, a US businessman of Pakistani origin, who is a lobbyist for Pakistan in the US, an occasional Fox News commentator, and has extensive political ties in the US. Woolsey is also vice-chairman of the board of Ijaz's company. Woolsey and Ijaz work with Khalid Khawaja, a friend of bin Laden and ex-ISI operative. The three plus an unnamed US journalist arrange to meet with Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on October 8. The Taliban agree to tell Woolsey about a meeting between Iraqi and al-Qaeda officials that took place in 1997, and possibly other similar information. Apparently in return they hope to avert the US invasion of Afghanistan. However, the US bombing begins on October 7, and the meeting is called off. [[ /timeline/2002/dawn021502.html | Dawn, 02/15/02 ]] [[ /timeline/2003/financialtimes030603.html | Financial Times, 3/6/03 ]] ------ At least part of this team will later play another behind-the-scenes role. After being given a tip that Mansour Ijaz is connected to leading militant Muslims in Pakistan, reporter Daniel Pearl will connect with Khalid Khawaja, who in turn connects him with militant Muslims who kidnap and eventually kill him. A leading Pakistani newspaper claims that at one point Newsweek is about to accuse Khawaja of involvement in the plot to kidnap Pearl, but Ijaz vouches for Khawaja and convinces Newsweek to pull back their accusations. [[ /timeline/2002/dawn021502.html | Dawn, 02/15/02 ]] [[ /timeline/2002/vanityfair0802.html | Vanity Fair, 8/02 ]] ====== << iraq >> << afghanistan >> << decision >> ((+ James Woolsey )) ((+ Khalid Khawaja )) ((+ Mansour Ijaz )) ((+ Taliban )) ((+ Mullah Omar )) ((- al-Qaeda )) ((- Iraq )) ((- Daniel Pearl )) October 13, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_167 false 1 ------ Czech foreign minister Jan Kavan briefs Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington about the alleged trip 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta took to the Czech Republic in April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). Kavan tells Powell that the BIS, the Czech intelligence service, has reason to believe that Mohamed Atta may have met near Prague with Iraqi Counsel Al-Ani. (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | New York Times, 10/20/01 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Jan Kavan )) ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Colin Powell )) (Mid-October 2001) October 15, 2001 Italian Intel Report Based on Forged Niger Documents Delivered to British Intelligence complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3143 false 1 ------ Following a number of meetings in Rome and London between SISMI, Italy's military intelligence, and the British MI6 [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 303-304 ]] ------ , SISMI provides the British with an intelligence report on Iraq's alleged efforts to obtain uranium from Niger. The report&#8212;delivered by Rocco Martino under the surveillance of SISMI&#8212;is reportedly based on the collection of mostly forged documents put together in Italy (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2977 ]]). The MI6 will include this information in a report it sends to Washington saying only that it was obtained from a &#8220;reliable source.&#8221; Washington treats the report as an independent confirmation of the Italian report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) and French report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3150 ]]). [[ | Independent, 11/6/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/30/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Rocco Martino )) ((+ UK Secret Intelligence Service )) ((+ SISMI )) October 15, 2001 Italian Intelligence Provides CIA with Report Alleging that Niger Agreed to Sell Iraq Uranium complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 false 1 ------ Italy's military intelligence agency, SISMI, reportedly permits a CIA field agent in Rome to review some papers (It is not clear if these papers are the actual forgeries or a summary of the forgeries put together by SISMI) documenting a deal between Iraq and Niger for the purchase of a large quantity of uranium oxide, known as &#8220;yellowcake.&#8221; The agent, who is not permitted to duplicate the papers, writes a report and sends it to Langley. [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 11/4/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 11/11/2005 ]] ------ The report, it is later learned, is based on a collection of mostly forged documents that were put together in Italy (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2977 ]]). (( Robb-Silberman report )) [[ | New York Times, 10/28/2005 ]] --- The allegations --- The report includes four allegations: --- * --- The report states that Iraq first communicated its interest in purchasing uranium from Niger at least as early as 1999. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ------ As blogger &ldquo;Eriposte&rdquo; will conclude through his careful analysis of the scandal at TheLeftCoaster.Org [[ | TheLeftCoaster [.org], 10/31/2005 ]] ------ none of the documents that are later provided to the US as the basis for these allegations provide actual proof of uranium negotiations in 1999. Two of the source documents for this allegation do mention a 1999 visit by Wissam Al-Zahawi to Niger, however no evidence has ever surfaced suggesting that there were any discussions about uranium during that visit (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_94 ]]). The first document (possibly authentic) is a letter, dated February 1, 1999, from the Niger embassy in Rome to Adamou Chekou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Niger, announcing Zahawie's trip. It does not mention uranium. Note that the SISMI report does not mention Al-Zahawi's trip, it only states that uranium negotations between the two countries began by at least 1999. (( Forged Niger documents )) ------ The second document is a letter dated July 30, 1999 from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs to his ambassador in Rome requesting that he contact Zahawie, concerning an agreement signed June 28, 2000 to sell uranium to Iraq. The letter is an obvious forgery because the letter (July 30, 1999) refers to an alleged event that is described as taking place 11 months later (June 28, 2000). (( Forged Niger documents )) --- * --- The SISMI report states that in &#8220;late 2000,&#8221; the State Court of Niger approved an agreement with Iraq whereby Niger would sell Iraq a large quantity of uranium. This allegation appears to be based on a forged document titled &#8220;Annex 1,&#8221; which was possibly an annex to the alleged uranium agreement. It is evident that this document was forged because it says that the state court &#8220;met in the chamber of the council in the palace ... on Wednesday, July 7, 2000.&#8221; But July 7, 2000 was, in fact, a Friday, not a Wednesday. One of SISMI's reports, possibly this one, actually includes this error. (( Forged Niger documents )) [[ | TheLeftCoaster [.org], 10/31/2005 ]] --- * --- According to the report, Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja approved the agreement and communicated this decision to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The source for this is apparently a forged letter from the president of Niger to Saddam Hussein, in which the president refers to his authority under the country's obsolete 1966 constitution. At the time the letter was presumed to have been written, the constitution in effect would have been that of December 26, 1992, which was subsequently revised by national referendum on May 12, 1996 and again by referendum on July 18, 1999. (( Forged Niger documents )) [[ | US Department of State, 9/2005 ]] [[ | Reuters, 3/26/03 ]] --- * --- The report also alleges that in October 2000, Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs Nassirou Sabo informed one of his ambassadors in Europe that Niger had agreed to provide several tons of uranium to Iraq. (( Forged Niger documents )) --- * --- This is seemingly based on a forged letter that accompanied the alleged uranium sales agreement. The letter, dated October 10, 2000, is stamped as being received in Rome on September 28, 2000&#8212;nearly two weeks before the letter was presumably written. Unlike what is reported in the SISMI papers provided to the CIA, the actual letter is signed by Allele Elhadj Habibou, who left office in 1989. This indicates that someone must have corrected this information, replacing the name of Allele Elhadj Habibou with that of Nassirou Sabo (the minister in October 2000) in the SISMI report provided to the CIA. [[ | TheLeftCoaster [.org], 11/2/2005 ]] --- Distribution within US intelligence community --- After recieving the report from its fied agent in Rome, the CIA distributes it to other US intelligence agencies. The SSCI will say in its report: &#8220;CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Department of Energy (DOE) analysts considered the reporting to be &#8216;possible&#8217; while the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) regarded the report as &#8216;highly suspect,&#8217; primarily because INR analysts did not believe that Niger would be likely to engage in such a transaction and did not believe Niger would be able to transfer uranium to Iraq because a French consortium maintained control of the Nigerien uranium industry.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ------ Sources later interviewed by New Yorker's Seymour Hersh portray US intelligence analysts' assessment of the report in slightly harsher terms, saying that they &#8220;dismissed [it] as amateurish and unsubstantiated.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ------ Langley asks for further clarification from Rome [[ | La Repubblica, 11/11/2005 ]] ------ and recieves a response three days later (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3208 ]]). ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) ((- Mamadou Tandja )) ((+ US Department of Energy )) ((- Nassirou Sabo )) ((+ Wissam al-Zahawie )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ SISMI )) ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) October 16, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_452 false 1 ------ Referring to the claim that Atta met with Iraqi Counsel al-Ani on April 8, 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]), Stanislav Gross, the Czech interior minister, states, &#8220;I can only confirm one visit in the summer&#8221; and Petr Necas, chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, says, &#8220;I haven't seen any direct evidence that Mr. Atta met any Iraqi agent.&#8221; Citing a senior Czech Republic official, the New York Times will report on October 20 that &#8220;firm documentary evidence existed only that Mr. Atta had passed through the Prague airport from Germany to take a flight to Newark.&#8221; (( Unnamed senior Czech Republic official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/20/01 ]] ------ The rumors, which had first surfaced shortly after the attacks, were based on information from a Czech intelligence source inside Prague's Middle Eastern community. The source had told the BIS, the Czech Republic's intelligence service, that he had seen Atta meeting al-Ani in a restaurant outside of Prague on April 8 earlier that year.(see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]) [[ | CNN, 9/19/01 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Petr Necas )) ((+ Stanislav Gross )) (After October 18, 2001) Pollari Advised to Look in &#8216;Other Directions&#8217; in Effort to Tighten Relations with Washington complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3144 false 1 ------ According to Italy's Repubblica, Nicolo Pollari, chief of SISMI, is disappointed with his attempts to communicate with the American intelligence community. (It is not clear from the reporting what exactly Pollari is dissappointed about. It has been widely interpreted to have meant that Pollari is disappointed about US intelligence's refusal to take SISMI's October 15 report seriously) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had reportedly asked Pollari to do what he could to tighten relations with Washington (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3141 ]]). According to La Repubblica, the Prime Minister's diplomatic advisor, Gianni Castellaneta, advises Pollari to look in &#8220;other directions.&#8221; The Italian minister of defense, Antonio Martino, invites Pollari to meet with American neoconservative Michael Ledeen, which he does in December (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 ]]). [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Gianni Castellaneta )) ((+ Antonio Martino )) ((+ Nicolo Pollari )) October 18, 2001 Italian Military Intelligence Chief Verifies to CIA Credibility of Source who Provided Niger Documents complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3208 false 1 ------ Nicolo Pollari, chief of SISMI, Italy's military intelligence service, responds to the CIA's request for clarification regarding intelligence it has suggesting Iraq secured a deal with Niger to purchase a large quantity of uranium. Pollari's page and a half letter explains that &#8220;the information comes form a creditable source, La Signora,&#8221; who has in the past &#8220;given SISMI the cryptographic codes and memorandum ledgers from the Niger Embassy.&#8221; [[ | Il Messagero cited in La Repubblica, 11/11/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Nicolo Pollari )) October 18, 2001 CIA Report Says Allegations about Iraq Contained in Italian Intelligence Report Not Corroborated complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2988 false 1 ------ The CIA issues a senior executive intelligence brief (SEIB) summarizing a recent report from SISMI (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]), Italy's military intelligence service, which suggested that Iraq had struck a deal with Niger to purchase uranium. The CIA report, titled &#8220;Iraq: Nuclear-Related Procurement Efforts,&#8221; notes, &#8220;There is no corroboration from other sources that such an agreement was reached or that uranium was transferred.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ------ As blogger &ldquo;Eriposte&rdquo; of will point out [[ | TheLeftCoaster [.org], 11/4/2005 ]] ------ , there is a discrepancy between this report and the Italian intelligence report it is summarizing. In this report, the CIA states that the uranium purchase deal was approved by the State Court of Niger in &#8220;early 2001,&#8221; whereas the SISMI report had reported that the approval took place in &#8220;late 2000.&#8221; The document, upon which this reporting is presumably based, states that the deal was approved by the court on Wednesday July 7, 2000 (which was actually a Friday). (( Forged Niger documents )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) October 19, 2001 US Ground Attacks Begin in Afghanistan a101901groundattacks false 1 ------ US Special Forces begin ground attacks in Afghanistan. [[ /timeline/2001/msnbc1101.html | MSNBC, 11/01 ]] ------ However, during the Afghanistan war, US ground soldiers are mainly employed as observers, liaisons, and spotters for air power to assist the Northern Alliance&#8212;not as direct combatants. [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/02 (B) ]] ------ White House Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke will suggest in 2004 that the Bush administration did not commit more ground forces to Afghanistan because it wanted to have enough troops available to stage a large offensive against Iraq. &#8220;I can't prove this, but I believe they didn't want to put in a lot of regular infantry because they wanted to hold it in reserve,&#8221; Richard Clarke explains. &#8220;And the issue is the infantry. A rational military planner who was told to stabilize Afghanistan after the Taliban was gone, and who was not told that we might soon be doing Iraq, would probably have put in three times the number of infantry, plus all the logistics support &#8216;tail.&#8217; He would have put in more civil-affairs units, too. Based on everything I heard at the time, I believe I can make a good guess that the plan for Afghanistan was affected by a predisposition to go into Iraq. The result of that is that they didn't have enough people to go in and stabilize the country, nor enough people to make sure these guys didn't get out.&#8221; [[ | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ====== << afghanistan >> << iraq >> << diversionOfResources >> ((- United States )) ((- Northern Alliance )) ((- Bush administration )) ((- Taliban )) ((@ Richard A. Clarke )) October 25, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_140 false 1 ------ Powell, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dismisses bin Laden's claims that al-Qaeda's fight is in solidarity with Iraqis and Palestinians. Powell argues: &#8220;We cannot let Osama bin Laden pretend that he is doing it in the name of helping the Iraqi people or the Palestinian people. He doesn't care one whit about them. He has never given a dollar toward them. He has never spoken out for them.&#8221; [[ | Slate MSNBC, 2/11/03 ]] [[ | US Department of State ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Colin Powell )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_7 }} Shortly before October 26, 2001 Former CIA Director Says US should go after Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3258 false 1 ------ In an interview with the London Daily Telegraph, former CIA Director James Woolsey suggests that the US &#8220;ought to seriously consider removing Saddam's regime if he has been involved in any terror in recent years against us.&#8221; He contends that Saddam Hussein's alleged assassination attempt on President George Herbert Walker Bush in 1993 and Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions are sufficient enough in and of themselves to warrant the use of military force to topple the regime. [[ | Daily Telegraph, 10/26/01 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ James Woolsey )) October 26, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_168 false 1 ------ Czech interior minister Stanislav Gross says during a press conference that 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta had in fact met with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, the consul and second secretary of the Iraqi embassy, in the Czech Republic after arriving in Prague on April 8, 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). &#8220;We can confirm now that during his ... trip to the Czech Republic, he did have a contact with an officer of the Iraqi intelligence,&#8221; he says. He also says that Atta had been in Prague at least twice&#8212;in May 2000 after coming to Prague from Germany on his way to the United States and then again in April when he allegedly met with Ahni. [[ | CNN, 10/27/01 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/27/01 ]] ------ Also, by this time, the FBI claims it has physical evidence of Atta's trip to Prague. The New York Times reports, &#8220;On April 4 he was in Virginia Beach. He flew to the Czech Republic on April 8 and met with the Iraqi intelligence officer ... By April 11, Atta was back in Florida renting a car.&#8221; (( Unnamed US officials )) (( Jan Kavan )) [[ | New York Times, 10/27/01 ]] ------ But this will later be disputed. In late April 2002, Newsweek will report, &#8220;The FBI could find no visa or airline records showing he had left or re-entered the United States that month,&#8221; quoting an unnamed US official who says, &#8220;Neither we nor the Czechs nor anybody else has any information he was coming or going [to Prague] at that time.&#8221; (( Jan Kavan )) (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/02 ]] ------ And in late 2003, Edward Jay Epstein will similarly report in Slate that there &#8220;were no car rental records in Virginia, Florida, or anywhere else in April 2001 for Mohamed Atta, since he had not yet obtained his Florida license ... [n]or were there other records in the hands of the FBI that put Atta in the United States at the time.&#8221; But Epstein will note that Atta would likely have traveled to Prague using false documents anyway. [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Stanislav Gross )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) {{ commentary_james_woolsey_2 }} October 28, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1183 false 1 ------ The White House repeats its warning to the UN that the US will act if the UN fails to pass a stronger resolution. George Bush says: &#8220;Either the UN will do its duty to disarm Saddam Hussein. Or Saddam Hussein will disarm himself. In either case, if they refuse to act ... the US will lead a coalition and disarm Saddam Hussein.&#8221; And Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary says, &#8220;The United Nations has debated this long enough. The time has come for people to raise their hands and cast their vote.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 10/29/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> Early November 2001 USA Today: Decision to Invade Iraq Made at This Time complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_65 false 1 ------ According to a September 2002 USA Today article, the decision to invade Iraq is made at this time. Significantly, the decision is made independent of normal policy-making procedures&#8212;a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq was not requested, members of Congress were not consulted, and the concerns of senior military officers and intelligence analysts were ignored. Explaining why the White House did not request a NIE on Iraq, an unnamed US intelligence official explains it didn't want to detail the uncertainties regarding the threat Iraq allegedly poses to the US. A senior administration official says the White House did not believe an NIE would be helpful. However in September 2002, an NIE will finally be requested as a result of pressure from Congress. The classified version of the document will include many qualified and nuanced statements, but the shorter, unclassified version, which is given to Congress, will not include these uncertainties (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). (( officials at the White House, State Department, Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Congress and elsewhere )) [[ | USA Today, 9/10/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> << DSM >> << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((- US Congress )) Early November 2001 Wayne Downing Drawing up Plans for Invasion complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_66 false 1 ------ Wayne Downing, a retired Army general who is heading counterterrorism in the White House, is drawing up plans for a US invasion of Iraq on his own initiative. (( Unnamed senior administration official )) [[ | Washington Post, 1/12/03 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Wayne Downing )) {{ commentary_usa_today_2 }} November 9, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_169 false 1 ------ Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman tells Colin Powell and CNN that during the alleged April 2001 meeting in Prague between 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, the two men discussed plans to bomb the Radio Free Europe building in Prague, which also housed Radio Free Iraq. The claim is reportedly based on footage from surveillance cameras at the Radio Free Europe building which had shown al-Ani surveying the building in April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_162 ]]). The Prime Minister will later back away from the claim, explaining it was just a hypothesis raised by Czech intelligence. [[ | Washington Post 5/1/02 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/01 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 12/16/01 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/09/01 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Milos Zeman )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) November 14, 2001 Perle Says It Is Only &#8216;a Matter of Time&#8217; Before Iraq Acquires Nuclear Weapons complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2983 false 1 ------ Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says in a speech delivered at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's annual dinner that Saddam Hussein &#8220;is busily at work on a nuclear weapon&#8221; and that &#8220;it's simply a matter of time before he acquires nuclear weapons.&#8221; His assertion is based on information that was provided to him personally by Iraqi defector Kadir Hamza. According to Perle, Hamza said that after the Israeli strikes against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, Iraq built some 400 uranium enrichment facilities all over the country in order to protect its nuclear program from future attacks. &#8220;Some look like farmhouses, some of them look like classrooms, some of them look like warehouses. You'll never find them. They don't turn out much but every day they turn out a little bit of nuclear materials.&#8221; (( Perle, 11/14/2001 )) ====== << nuclearQuotes >> ((+ Richard Perle )) ((- Khidir Hamza )) November 14, 2001 State Department Intelligence Bureau: No Evidence Iraq Has Nuclear Weapons Program complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2978 false 1 ------ The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) says in a report, according to INR official Greg Thielmann, that &#8220;there is no persuasive evidence that the Iraqi nuclear program is being reconstituted.&#8221; (( Greg Thielmann )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) November 19, 2001-December 7, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_440 false 1 ------ The Fifth Review Conference for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention convenes in Geneva, Switzerland. The primary objective of the conference is to complete the negotiation of an enforcement and verification protocol. Member-states, known as the &#8220;Ad Hoc Group,&#8221; had previously attempted to do this during a forum in July, but the efforts had been blocked by the US (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1747 ]]). The proposed change to the Convention would, among other things (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1747 ]]), require mandatory inspections of any plant where biological weapons could be made&#8212;including sites located in the United States. For six years, the US has opposed this proposal. At the very end of the Review Conference, the Bush admininistration proposes to eliminate the Ad Hoc Group and terminate the protocol negotiations completely. The proposal is rejected by other members, but the action effectively blocks consensus on the conference's Final Declaration. To prevent the outright failure of the Review Conference, the chairman suspends negotiations until November 2002. [[ | Common Dreams, 8/5/02 ]] [[ | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1/03 ]] [[ | Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2/2002 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Bush administration )) November 20, 2001 French Mining Consortium Says Niger Could Not Have Diverted Uranium to Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2986 false 1 ------ The US Embassy in Niamey, Niger's capital, disseminates a cable summarizing a recent meeting between the US ambassador and the director general of Niger's French-led mining consortium. The director general reportedly explained that &#8220;there was no possibility&#8221; that the government of Niger could have diverted any of the 3,000 tons of uranium produced by the consortium's two mines. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> November 21, 2001 Bush Wants Iraq Invasion Plan complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_665 false 1 ------ George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld speak in private. Bush asks the Defense Secretary what kind of plan the Pentagon has for invading Iraq. &#8220;What have you got in terms of plans for Iraq? What is the status of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I want you to keep it secret,&#8221; Bush says. When Rumsfeld says its current plan is outdated, Bush instructs him to devise a new one. &#8220;Let's get started on this,&#8221; Bush says. &#8220;And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.&#8221; Bush requests that discussion about Iraq remain low-key. &#8220;I knew what would happen if people thought we were developing a potential war plan for Iraq,&#8221; Bush later explains to journalist Bob Woodward. Bush does not share the details of his conversation with Condoleezza Rice, only telling her that Rumsfeld will be working on Iraq. (( George Bush and other top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Associated Press, 4/16/04 ]] [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in New York Times, 4/17/04 ]] [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Washington Post, 1/18/04 ]] [[ | CBS News, 4/18/04 ]] ------ When General Tommy Franks&#8212;who already has his hands full with the operation in Afghanistan&#8212;learns that the administration is considering plans to invade Iraq, he utters &#8220;a string of obscenities.&#8221; (( Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Associated Press, 4/16/04 ]] ------ General Franks will meet with Bush and brief him on the plan's progress on December 28 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_666 ]]). ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Thomas Franks )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) November 27, 2001 Rumsfeld Tells Franks &#8216;to look at options for Iraq&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2860 false 1 ------ At the request of President Bush (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_665 ]]), Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld telephones Gen. Tommy Franks with instructions to work on war plans for Iraq. &#8220;General Franks, the president wants us to look at options for Iraq,&#8221; the general will later recall being told. In his memoirs, Franks will write: &#8220; &#8216;Son of a bitch,&#8217; I thought. &#8216;No rest for the weary.&#8217; &#8221; Franks will brief Bush on the progress of his work a month later (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_666 ]]). (( Thomas Franks )) [[ | Salon, 5/19/05 ]] [[ | Franks, 2004 ]] ------ Over the next few months, Bush will ask for and receive increasingly detailed briefings from Franks about the forces that would be needed if the US were to move against Iraq. The need to prepare for an invasion of Iraq, according to insiders interviewed by the Atlantic Monthly, hinders the US effort against bin Laden and the Taliban. [[ /timeline/2004/atlanticmonthly1004b.html | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> ((- George W. Bush )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Thomas Franks )) (December 2001) US Diplomat Says There Is No Question About Whether Bush Will Hit Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2861 false 1 ------ An unnamed US envoy in Middle East, possibly W. Robert Pearson, the US ambassador to Turkey [[ | Salon, 5/19/05 ]] ------ , tells Newsweek, &#8220;The question is not if the United States is going to hit Iraq; the question is when.&#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | Newsweek, 1/7/02 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> December 2001 US General Tells Rumsfeld US Attacks in Iraq &#8216;No-Fly&#8217; Zones Should Be Strategic complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2985 false 1 ------ US General Tommy Franks tells Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that US planes patrolling the Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones should begin &#8220;spurts of activity followed by periods of inactivity.&#8221; &#8220;We want the Iraqis to become accustomed to military expansion, and then apparent contraction,&#8221; he later recalls telling the secretary. &#8220;As Phase I is completed, we could flow steadily for the next sixty days, while continuing spikes of activity to lend credence to our deception. During the sixty days we would increase kinetic strikes in the no-fly zones to weaken Iraq's integrated air defenses.&#8221; (( Thomas Franks )) [[ | Franks, 2004, pp 530 ]] [[ | Raw Story, 6/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> ((+ Thomas Franks )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) December 7, 2001 Neoconservative Michael Ledeen Argues in Favor of Perpetual War against the Muslim World complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3163 false 1 ------ Michael Ledeen, an avid admirer of Machiavelli, argues in a piece published by National Review Online that the US must be &#8220;imperious, ruthless, and relentless&#8221; against the Muslim world until there has been &#8220;total surrender.&#8221; Any attempt on the part of the US to be &#8220;reasonable&#8221; or &#8220;evenhanded&#8221; will only empower Islamic militants, he asserts. He writes: &#8220;We will not be sated until we have had the blood of every miserable little tyrant in the Middle East, until every leader of every cell of the terror network is dead or locked securely away, and every last drooling anti-Semitic and anti-American mullah, imam, sheikh, and ayatollah is either singing the praises of the United States of America, or pumping gasoline, for a dime a gallon, on an American military base near the Arctic Circle.&#8221; [[ | National Review Online, 12/7/2001 ]] ------ The piece is republished in the Jewish World Review four days later. [[ | Jewish World Review, 12/11/2001 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Michael Ledeen )) December 9, 2001 Defense Officials Attend Secret Backchannel Meeting with Iranians complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 false 1 ------ The Bush administration sends two defense officials, Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, to meet with Iranians in Rome in response to an Iranian government offer to provide information relevant to the war on terrorism. The offer had been backchanneled by the Iranians to the White House through Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms trader and a central person in the Iran-Contra affair, who contacted another Iran-Contra figure, Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute. Ledeen passed the information on to his friends in the Defense Department who then relayed the offer to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. Hadley expressed no reservations about the proposed meeting and informed George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage. According to officials interviewed by the New York Times, the United States Embassy in Rome was not notified of the planned meeting as required by standard interagency procedures. Neither the US embassy nor CIA station chief in Rome learns of the three-day meeting until after it happens (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2979 ]]). When they do catch wind of the meeting, they notify CIA and State Department headquarters in Washington which complain to the administration about how the meetings were arranged. [[ | Washington Post, 8/9/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/7/03 ]] [[ | Newsday, 8/9/03 ]] ------ In addition to Ghorbanifar, Ledeen, Franklin, and Rhode, the meeting is attended by Nicolo Pollari, head of SISMI, and Antonio Martino, Italy's minister of defense. [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ------ According to the Boston Globe, either at this meeting, a similar one in June (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_81 ]]), or both, Ledeen and Ghorbanifar discuss ways to destabilize the Iranian government, possibly using the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, a US-designated terrorist group, as a US proxy. [[ | Boston Globe, 8/31/2004 ]] ------ Additionally, according to an unnamed SISMI source, Pollari speaks with Ledeen about intelligence his agency has collected (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) suggesting that Iraq made a deal with Niger to purchase several tons of uranium. SISMI already sent a report to Washington on the matter in mid-October (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]). Reportedly, Pollari has also approached CIA Station Chief Jeff Castelli about the report, but Castelli has since indicated he is not interested in the information. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Antonio Martino )) ((+ Harold Rhode )) ((+ Larry Franklin )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Manucher Ghorbanifar )) ((+ Nicolo Pollari )) ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ Harold Rhode )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) December 10, 2001 Congressmen Urge Bush to Use Military Force Against Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_68 false 1 ------ US Congressmen write a letter to President Bush urging him to take military action against Iraq. Among those who sign the letter are Jesse Helms (R), Joseph Lieberman (D), John McCain (D), Henry Hyde (R), and Trent Lott (R). The letter states, &#8220;As we work to clean up Afghanistan, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the threat from Iraq. This December will mark three years since United Nations inspectors last visited Iraq. There is no doubt that since that time, Saddam Hussein has reinvigorated his weapons programs. ... Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf War levels. We believe we must directly confront Saddam, sooner rather than later.&#8221; [[ | US Department of State, 12/5/01 ]] [[ | Scripps Howard News Service, 12/15/01 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Henry Hyde )) ((+ Trent Lott )) ((+ John McCain )) ((+ Joseph Lieberman )) ((+ Jesse Helms )) {{ duplicate_us_senators_john_mccain,_jesse_helms,_richard_shelby,_sam_brownback,_joe_lieberman,_and_trent_lott;_and_us_representatives_henry_hyde,_ben_gilman,_and_harold_ford,_jr._2 }} December 11, 2001 House Committee Drafts Resolution Which Would Give Iraq an Ultimatum complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_69 false 1 ------ The House International Relations Committee drafts House Joint Resolution 75, which states that if Iraq refuses to allow UN inspectors to investigate freely in Iraq, the refusal will constitute an &#8220;act of aggression against the United States.&#8221; The bill is sponsored by Representatives Lindsey Graham (R), Porter Goss (R), and Henry Hyde (R). A different version of this resolution is passed by the House on December 20 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_499 ]]). [[ | H.J Res 75 ]] [[ | World Net Daily, 12/11/01 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Henry Hyde )) ((+ Porter J. Goss )) ((+ Lindsey Graham )) December 12, 2001 Washington Learns About Secret Meeting Involving Iran-Contra Figures complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2979 false 1 ------ The newly-installed US ambassador to Italy, Mel Sembler, learns during the course of a private dinner with Iran-Contra figure Michael Ledeen and Italian defense minister Antonio Martino about a secret backchannel meeting that took place three days before (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 ]]) involving US defense officials, former Iran-Contra figures, and Iranian government officials. After the dinner, Sembler immediately contacts the CIA station chief in Rome to find out if he knows about the meeting. But the station chief says he does not know anything either. &#8220;Soon both Sembler and the Rome station chief were sending anxious queries back to the State Department and CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., respectively, raising alarms on both sides of the Potomac&#8221; since all US government contact with foreign government intelligence agencies is supposed to be overseen by the CIA. (( Unnamed US Government sources )) [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Mel Sembler )) ((+ Antonio Martino )) December 17, 2001 Iraqi National Congress Coaches Iraq Defector ahead of CIA Polygraph complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3235 false 1 ------ After fleeing Iraq, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, 43, defects to the US. Before he is debriefed by the CIA, he spends several days in a Bangkok hotel room being coached by Zaab Sethna, the spokesman of the Iraqi National Congress, on what he should tell his debriefer. On December 17, he meets with a CIA official who questions him. Strapped to a polygraph machine [[;pageregion=mainRegion&amp;rnd=1132263116421&amp;has-player=true&amp;version= | Rolling Stone, 11/17/2005 ]] ------ , al-Haideri proceeds to tell the agent he is a civil engineer who helped hide Iraq's illicit weapons in subterranean wells, private villas, and even beneath the Saddam Hussein Hospital. After reviewing the polygraph, which was requested by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence debriefer concludes that Haideri made the entire story up. [[;pageregion=mainRegion&amp;rnd=1132263116421&amp;has-player=true&amp;version= | Rolling Stone, 11/17/2005 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri )) ((+ Zaab Sethna )) ((- Defense Intelligence Agency )) December 17, 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_170 false 1 ------ Czech Police Chief Jiri Kolar says that there is no evidence that 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta met an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in April (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). He also says&#8212;contradicting earlier reports&#8212;that there is no documentary evidence that Atta traveled to Prague at all in 2001. Additionally, an unnamed Czech intelligence official tells the newspaper Mlada Fronta Dnes, that that the person who had met with al-Ani on April 2001 near Prague was not Atta. Another person with the same name had arrived in Prague in 2001 but he &#8220;didn't have the same identity card number.&#8221; Furthermore, &#8220;There was a great difference in their ages, their nationalities didn't match, basically nothing&#8212;it was someone else,&#8221; the source says. It is also reported that a man named Hassan, described as a businessman and a long-time member of Prague's Arab community, claims to have been a close friend of al-Ani. Hassan says that he believes the Czechs had mistaken another man for Atta, a used car dealer from Nuremberg by the name of Saleh, who often visited Prague to meet al-Ani and and who sold him at least one car. &#8220;I have sat with the two of them at least twice. The double is an Iraqi who has met with the consul. If someone saw a photo of Atta he might easily mistake the two,&#8221; Hassan says. (( Unnamed Czech intelligence officials )) (( Jiri Kolar )) (( Hassan )) (( Unnamed Interior Ministry official )) [[ | Associated Press, 12/16/01 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 12/18/01 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/16/01 ]] ------ Responding to the report, Gabriela Bartikova, spokeswoman for the Czech Minister of Interior, says that the Czech intelligence agency still believes that Mohammed Atta and al-Ani, the consul and second secretary of the Iraqi embassy met in April 2001. She says, &#8220;Minister Gross had the information from BIS (the Czech Republic's Intelligence Agency), and BIS guarantees the information. So we stick by that information.&#8221; At about the same time, US officials tell the Associated Press they also still believe the meeting had transpired. [[ | Associated Press, 12/16/01 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((+ Stanislav Gross )) ((+ Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) December 20, 2001 Iraqi National Congress Arranges Interview between Iraqi Defector and New York Times Reporter complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_430 false 1 ------ Zaab Sethna of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) arranges Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri to be interviewed by Judith Miller of the New York Times. Miller, who has known Chalabi for about eight years (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3227 ]]), immediately flies out to Bangkok for the interview. Her story is published on December 20, just three days after Haideri told his story to a CIA agent who subjected him to a polygraph and determined Haideri's story was a complete fabrication (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3235 ]]). Miller's front-page article, titled &#8220;An Iraqi defector tells of work on at least 20 hidden weapons sites,&#8221; reports: &#8220;An Iraqi defector who described himself as a civil engineer, said he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas and under the Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago.&#8221; If verified, Miller notes, &#8220;his allegations would provide ammunition to officials within the Bush administration who have been arguing that Mr. Hussein should be driven from power partly because of his unwillingness to stop making weapons of mass destruction, despite his pledges to do so.&#8221; Sethna also contacts freelance journalist Paul Moran. Moran is a former employee of the INC and has been employed for years by the Rendon Group, a firm specializing in &#8220;perception management.&#8221; Moran's on-camera interview with Haideri is broadcasted worldwide by the Australian Broadcasting Corp. [[;pageregion=mainRegion&amp;rnd=1132263116421&amp;has-player=true&amp;version= | Rolling Stone, 11/17/2005 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/20/01 ]] [[ | New York Review of Books 2/26/04 ]] [[ | SBS Dateline, 7/23/2003 ]] ====== << wmd >> << trailers >> ((+ Zaab Sethna )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Judith Miller )) ((+ Paul Moran )) ((+ Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri )) December 20, 2001 Bill to Give Iraq Ultimatum Passed in House, But Later Dies in Senate complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_499 false 1 ------ House Joint Resolution 75 is passed by the House and sent to the Senate where it is referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is not as strongly worded as the initial draft (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_69 ]]), which included a provision stating that the refusal to admit inspectors would constitute an &#8220;act of aggression against the United States.&#8221; The final version instead reads: &#8220;Iraq's refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities and documents covered by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions presents a mounting threat to the United States, its friends and allies, and international peace and security.&#8221; The bill is sponsored by Representatives Lindsey Graham (R), Porter Goss (R) and Henry Hyde (R). [[ | H.J Res 75 ]] ------ This bill will die in the Senate. The congressional bill that conditionally authorizes Bush to take military action against Iraq is not passed until October 11, 2002 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_216 ]]). ====== << decision >> ((+ Porter J. Goss )) ((+ Henry Hyde )) ((+ Lindsey Graham )) December 28, 2001 Gen. Franks Briefs Bush on Iraq War Plans complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_666 false 1 ------ General Tommy Franks, the head of US Central Command, visits Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas and briefs him on the progress of his Iraq war plan. Bush requested an updated plan from the Defense Department on November 21 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_665 ]]). (( Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Washington Post 1/18/04 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Thomas Franks )) Late 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1222 false 1 ------ Energy Department analysts publish a classified report disputing the theory that the 7075-T6 aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were intended to be used as rotors in a &#8220;Zippe-type&#8221; gas centrifuge. The report emphasizes that Zippe centrifuges are not suited for the production of nuclear bombs but rather had been designed for use in laboratory experiment. The Energy Department's experts also say that Iraq would need up to 16,000 of such centrifuges working in concert to produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb, which they note would be a challenge for even the most advanced centrifuge plants. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> Late 2001 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_80 false 1 ------ A small group of CIA agents, among them Joe T., flies to Canberra, Australia and meets with Australian intelligence officers from the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA) at ASIO headquarters. The team of CIA officers presents what is later described as a compelling case that the aluminum tubes, which in July had been intercepted by the US in Jordan on their way to Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]), had been intended for use as rotors in a gas centrifuge program. [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> Late 2001-May 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_185 false 1 ------ Jordanian Muslim militant Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi flees Afghanistan and heads to Iran where he continues to run his Islamic militant organization, al-Tawhid, using telephones and a network of couriers to maintain contact with his operatives in Europe. Al Zarqawi's organization establishes another poison and explosive training center camp in northeastern Iraq in an area controlled by Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist group opposed to Saddam Hussein. In May 2002, Zarqawi goes to Baghdad and has an amputation performed on his leg, which had been injured when he was fleeing US forces in Afghanistan. According to the Bush administration, Al Zarqawi stays in Baghdad for two months, during which time some two dozen &#8220;al-Qaeda affiliates&#8221; establish a base of operations in the city. The group presumably &#8220;coordinate[s] the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network.&#8221; Then Zarqawi reportedly travels to the Ansar al-Islam-controlled region in Northern Iraq, before eventually returning to Iran. [[ | Newsweek, 6/25/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 1/28/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] ------ In an effort to justify military action against Iraq, the Bush administration will later claim that Saddam Hussein is aware of Al Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad and therefore is guilty of knowingly harboring a terrorist (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_184 ]]). The administration will also allege&#8212;falsely&#8212;that Al Zarqawi is a senior al-Qaeda agent and that his visit is evidence that Saddam's regime has ties to Osama bin Laden. (( Shadi Abdallah )) [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 6/25/03 ]] ------ But the administration never offers any conclusive evidence to support this allegation. The claim is disputed by intelligence analysts in both Washington and London. [[ | Telegraph, 2/4/03 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << alZarqawi >> ((+ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_officials_5 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_officials_4 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_official_4 }} {{ commentary_jason_burke,_london_observer_2 }} 2002 Senior CIA Operative Instructed by CIA Managers to Falsify His Findings complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3186 false 1 ------ An unnamed senior CIA operative will later allege in a lawsuit that in 2002, his superiors instructed him to falsify his reporting on weapons of mass destruction because it was &#8220;contrary&#8221; to &#8220;official CIA dogma&#8221; and &#8220;the politically mandated conclusion.&#8221; When the operative refuses to change his reporting, the &#8220;management&#8221; of the CIA's Counterproliferation Division orders that he &#8220;remove himself from any further &#8216;handling&#8217;&#8221; of the unnamed asset, who the CIA regards as &#8220;a highly respected human asset.&#8221; The operative will also allege that CIA managers retaliated in response to his refusal to obey their orders. (( US District Court for District of Columbia, 12/6/2004 )) [[ | Washington Post, 12/9/2004, pp A02 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> 2002-March 2003 CIA Analysts Know that Iraq Has no WMD nor Ties to Al-Qaeda; CIA &#8216;Serving the Agenda&#8217; of Bush Administration complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3185 false 1 ------ An unnamed CIA case officer with the agency's Directorate of Operations (DO) later says: &#8220;I was working from the headquarters end in our Iraqi operations. In talking to the specialists, people who had worked on Iraqi issues or Iraq WMD for years, they said to me, &#8216;I always knew we didn't have anything.&#8217; This was before the war. But I mean, it was sort of horrific to me. ... I talked to analysts and I talked to WMD experts, and I said, &#8216;Okay, is there a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq?&#8217; &#8216;No, there's not a link.&#8217; &#8216;Do we have evidence of all this WMD we're talking about?&#8217; &#8216;No, we don't have it.&#8217; And then it was like a snowball, and all of a sudden we were at war. Everybody that I was talking to who did know about the issues were saying we didn't have anything. And of course nobody's speaking up. Who can they speak up to? There's no forum for someone who's involved in operations to talk to anyone and say, &#8216;We don't have any Iraqi assets, we don't have information on WMD, we don't have anything there.&#8217; But yet we all kind of knew it. ... I understand that it [CIA] serves the President and the administration, but my thought is that it should serve the President and the administration in providing intelligence. And what has happened is that it serves the agenda&#8212;or at least for the Bush administration it's serving the agenda of this administration, which is not what the CIA is supposed to do.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 336-337 ]] ====== << wmd >> << terroristTies >> << deception >> (2002) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_711 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney asks that his daily intelligence briefer from the CIA be replaced. An unnamed former CIA official later explains to Vanity Fair magazine: &#8220;One briefer annoyed Cheney and he asked that she be replaced. He asked for a new briefer. That sent a chill through the whole process. It sent out the message to the analysts, &#8216;Be careful with some of this stuff. Be careful what you say.&#8217; &#8221; (( Unnamed former CIA official )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 242-44 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) 2002-early 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_34 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney, sometimes accompanied by his chief of staff, Lewis Libby, visits the offices of US intelligence analysts working at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia &#8220;approximately 10&#8221; times. He drills them on their intelligence work on Iraq. Some analysts later complain that Cheney's visits made them feel pressured to provide the administration with conclusions that supported the case for war. Other analysts will say they did not feel pressured. [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Sydney Morning Herald, 6/5/03 ]] [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 336 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 242 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 6/5/03 ]] ------ According to Ray McGovern, a 27-year veteran CIA analyst, these visits were &#8220;unprecendented.&#8221; [[ | McGovern, 7/23/2003 ]] ------ Newt Gingrich also makes visits to CIA headquarters in Langley. [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] ====== << deception >> << DSM >> ((+ Newt Gingrich )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) {{ commentary_veteran_intelligence_professionals_for_sanity_2 }} {{ commentary_greg_thielmann_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_central_intelligence_agency_official_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_central_intelligence_agency_official_2 }} January 2002 Bush administration requests removal of Jose Bustani from OPCW complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2877 false 1 ------ The US State Department asks the government of Brazil to remove Jose Bustani from his position as director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), because the US is uncomfortable with his &#8220;management style&#8221; and his plan to convince Iraq to join the OPCW (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2886 ]]). Brazil refuses. George Monbiot of the Guardian will note that the request is in violation of the chemical weapons convention, which states: &#8220;The director-general ... shall not seek or receive instructions from any government.&#8221; [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ Bush administration )) (2002-2003) CIA Officer Reportedly Never Sees Evidence of WMD in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3182 false 1 ------ An unnamed CIA case officer with the agency's Directorate of Operations (DO) will later say with regard to Iraq's alleged arsenal of WMD: &#8220;Where I was working, I never saw anything&#8212;no one else there did either.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 333 ]] ====== << wmd >> 2002 and after British Foreign Office Believes US Allegations Are &#8216;Totally Implausible&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2960 false 1 ------ Diplomats working in Britain's Foreign Office are aware that US and British statements concerning Iraq's alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are &#8220;totally implausible.&#8221; Carne Ross, a key Foreign Office diplomat, tells the Guardian in mid-2005: &#8220;I'd read the intelligence on WMD for four and a half years, and there's no way that it could sustain the case that the government was presenting. All of my colleagues knew that, too.&#8221; [[,12956,1510259,00.html | Guardian, 6/20/05 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> ((+ British Foreign Office )) ((@ Carne Ross )) 2002 and after British Foreign Office Believes US Allegations Are &#8216;Totally Implausible&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3255 false 1 ------ Diplomats working in Britain's Foreign Office are aware that US and British statements concerning Iraq's alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are &#8220;totally implausible.&#8221; Carne Ross, a key Foreign Office diplomat, tells the Guardian in mid-2005: &#8220;I'd read the intelligence on WMD for four and a half years, and there's no way that it could sustain the case that the government was presenting. All of my colleagues knew that, too.&#8221; [[,12956,1510259,00.html | Guardian, 6/20/05 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> ((@ Carne Ross )) ((+ British Foreign Office )) January 2002 CIA Report on Global Weapons Proliferation Does Not Mention Nuclear Threat from Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2963 false 1 ------ A CIA report on global weapons technology proliferation fails to mention Iraq as a nuclear threat. The report only says, &#8220;We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&amp;D [research and development] associated with its nuclear program.&#8221; [[ | New Republic, 9/16/2001 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) 2002-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_135 false 1 ------ In the lead-up to the war, top Bush administration officials make strong statements asserting that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. The administration claims that it has incontrovertible evidence, though no such evidence is disclosed to the public&#8212;neither before nor after the invasion. [[ | CBC News, 12/5/02 ]] [[ | AP, 12/5/03 ]] [[ | CNN, 2/5/03 ]] [[ | Newsmax 9/8/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press 9/8/02 ]] [[ | UPI 9/3/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press 9/3/02 ]] [[ | Centcom, 9/3/02 ]] [[,1282,-2302299,00.html | AP, 1/7/03b ]] [[ | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Village Voice, 6/18/03 ]] [[ | Guardian 8/22/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph 8/21/02 ]] [[,2933,60818,00.html | Fox News, 8/20/03 ]] [[ | US President, 3/17/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 1/28/03 ]] [[ | White House, 1/9/03 ]] [[ | White House, 3/21/03 ]] [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 2/5/03 ]] [[ | Sunday Herald, 7/13/03 ]] [[ | Chicago Tribune 2/7/02 ]] [[ | US Vice President 8/26/02 ]] [[ | PBS, 9/12/02 ]] [[ | The Age (Australia), 6/7/03 ]] [[ | White House, 9/12/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_9 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_7 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_8 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_6 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_3 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_5 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_4 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_4 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_3 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_6 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_2 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_5 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_6 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_7 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_2 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_3 }} {{ statement_george_tenet_2 }} {{ commentary_scott_ritter_17 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_4 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_5 }} {{ commentary_scott_ritter_12 }} Early January 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_466 false 1 ------ Harold Rhode, a specialist on Islam who speaks Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi, moves into the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment, &#8220;an in-house Pentagon think tank&#8221; run by Andrew Marshall. Rhode, along with Douglas Feith, whose appointment to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is not approved until July, imposes a new anti-Iraq and anti-Arab orientation on the department. The two men purge the department of career Defense officials whose worldviews are not considered sufficiently compatible with the neoconservative perspective. An intelligence analyst will tell reporter Robert Dreyfuss that Rhode appeared to be &#8220;pulling people out of nooks and crannies of the Defense Intelligence Agency and other places to replace us with.&#8221; The source adds: &#8220;They wanted nothing to do with the professional staff. And they wanted us the f_ck out of there.&#8221; [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << DSM >> ((+ Harold Rhode )) ((- Andrew Marshall )) Early 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_708 false 1 ------ DIA reservist and Penn-State political-science professor Chris Carney takes over the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 ]]). [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 238 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ Chris Carney )) Early 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_491 false 1 ------ Bruce Hardcastle, the Defense Intelligence Agency officer assigned to Bill Luti, provides Luti's office with intelligence briefings. But his reports are not appreciated by Luti or his colleagues, because they do not support neoconservatives' assumptions about Iraq's weapon capabilities and terrorist activities. (( Paul O'Neill )) [[ | Salon, 3/10/04 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << deception >> << DSM >> ((+ William Luti )) ((+ Bruce Hardcastle )) 2002-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_399 false 1 ------ Noted experts, analysts and commentators, as well as current and former US and foreign government officials, say that control over Iraq's oil would benefit the United States. A pro-American government in Iraq would provide the US with stable access to its northern and southern oil fields, provide US oil companies with favorable access to oil production sharing agreements and other oil industry-related contracts, allow the US to undermine OPEC's influence in the oil market, and ensure that Iraq's oil is traded in US dollars. ====== << motivesBehindWar >> {{ statement_international_herald_tribune_2 }} {{ statement_thomas_ferguson_2 }} {{ statement_grant_aldonas_2 }} {{ statement_f.j._chalabi_2 }} {{ statement_mark_flannery_2 }} {{ statement_john_teeling_2 }} {{ statement_f.j._chalabi_3 }} {{ statement_kenneth_derr_2 }} {{ statement_youssef_m._ibrahim_4 }} {{ commentary_youssef_m._ibrahim_3 }} {{ statement_sara_emerson_2 }} {{ statement_sara_emerson_3 }} {{ statement_rob_sobhani_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_25 }} {{ statement_salah_shaikhly_2 }} {{ statement_nikolai_p._tokarev_2 }} {{ statement_nikolai_p._tokarev_3 }} {{ commentary_thomas_walde_2 }} {{ statement_viktor_a._kremenyuk_2 }} {{ statement_ahmed_chalabi_2 }} {{ statement_michael_klare_5 }} {{ statement_michael_klare_3 }} {{ statement_philip_j._carroll_2 }} {{ statement_michael_klare_4 }} {{ statement_michael_klare_2 }} {{ commentary_time_magazine_2 }} {{ statement_reuel_marc_gerecht_2 }} {{ commentary_james_placke_2 }} {{ statement_gerard_butt_2 }} {{ statement_john_brodman_2 }} {{ commentary_research_unit_for_political_economy_3 }} {{ statement_thomas_ferguson_3 }} 2002-2004 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_406 false 1 ------ Critics of the Bush administration's Iraq policy say that its plans for war are motivated by reasons other than those being cited by the White House. ====== << motivesBehindWar >> {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_4 }} {{ statement_boston_globe_2 }} {{ commentary_youssef_m._ibrahim_3 }} {{ statement_ray_mcgovern_9 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_14 }} {{ statement_andrew_wilkie_3 }} {{ statement_scott_ritter_13 }} {{ statement_hubert_g._locke,_a_retired_professor_and_former_dean_of_the_daniel_j._evans_graduate_school_of_public_affairs_at_the_university_of_washington_2 }} 2002-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_353 false 1 ------ The Bush administration develops plans for post-war Iraq. But the process is plagued with infighting between a small, highly secretive group of planners in the Pentagon and experts at the CIA and State Department who are involved with the &#8220;Future of Iraq Project&#8221; (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_349 ]]). The two opposing groups disagree on a wide range of topics, but it is the Pentagon group which exerts the strongest influence on the White House's plans (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_347 ]]) for administering post-Saddam Iraq. One State Department official complains to The Washington Post in October 2002 &#8220;that the Pentagon is seeking to dominate every aspect of Iraq's postwar reconstruction.&#8221; The group of Pentagon planners includes several noted neoconservatives who work in, or in association with, the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 ]]) and the Near East/South Asia bureau. The planners have close ties to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), two think tanks with a shared vision of reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in favor of US and Israeli interests. The Pentagon planning group &#8220;had a visionary strategy that it hoped would transform Iraq into an ally of Israel, remove a potential threat to the Persian Gulf oil trade and encircle Iran with US friends and allies,&#8221; Knight Ridder Newspapers will later observe. The group's objectives put it at odds with planners at the CIA and State Department whose approach and objectives are much more prudent. The Pentagon unit works independently of the CIA and State Department and pays little attention to the work of those two agencies. Critics complain that the group is working in virtual secrecy and evading the scrutiny and oversight of others involved in the post-war planning process by confining their inter-agency communications to discussions with their neoconservative colleagues working in other parts of the government. The Pentagon planners even have a direct line to the office of Dick Cheney where their fellow neoconservative, Lewis Libby, is working. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 4/2/03 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2002/11/12/ixnewstop.html | Associated Press, 11/12/02 ]] ------ In the fall of 2002, the various groups involved in planning for post-war Iraq send their recommendations to the White House&apos;s Executive Steering Committee, which reviews their work and then passes on its own recommendations to the cabinet heads (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_347 ]]). According to a July 2003 report by Knight Ridder Newspapers, the ultimate responsibility for deciding the administration's post-war transition plans lay with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] --- The Office of Special Plans --- --- * --- The civilian planners at the Pentagon believe that the UN should exert no influence over the structure, make-up, or policy of the interim Iraqi post-Saddam government. They seek to limit the UN's role to humanitarian and reconstruction projects, and possibly security. The State Department, however, believes that the US will not be able to do it alone and that UN participation in post-Saddam Iraq will be essential. [[,6903,930591,00.html | Observer, 4/6/03 ]] [[,1,7358865.story?coll=la%2Dhome%2Dheadlines | Los Angeles Times, 4/2/03 ]] --- * --- The Pentagon group wants to install Ahmad Chalabi, the controversial Iraqi exile leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as leader of post-Saddam Iraq. (( Richard Perle )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 5/1/03 ]] ------ ------ The group thinks that the Iraqis will welcome Chalabi, who claims he has a secret network inside and outside the Ba'ath government which will quickly fill in the power vacuum to restore order to the country. Chalabi is a notorious figure who is considered untrustworthy by the State Department and CIA and who has a history of financial misdealings. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ But the Pentagon is said to be enamored with Chalabi &#8220;because he [advocates] normal diplomatic relations with Israel&#8221; which they believe will &#8220;&#8216; [take] off the board&#8217; one of the only remaining major Arab threats to Israeli security.&#8221; Another geopolitical benefit to installing Chalabi is that he can help the US contain &#8220;the influence of Iran's radical Islamic leaders in the region, because he would ... [provide] bases in Iraq for US troops,&#8221; which would &#8220;complete Iran's encirclement by American military forces around the Persian Gulf and US friends in Russia and Central Asia.&#8221; (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ Danielle Pletka, vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, with close ties to the Pentagon's planning group, tells Robert Dreyfuss of American Prospect Magazine that the State Department's perception of Chalabi is wrong. &#8220;The [Defense Department] is running post-Saddam Iraq,&#8221; said Pletka, almost shouting. &#8220;The people at the State Department don't know what they are talking about! Who the hell are they? ... the simple fact is, the president is comfortable with people who are comfortable with the INC.&#8221; [[ | American Prospect, 5/1/03 ]] --- * --- The Pentagon's planning unit believes that the Iraqis will welcome US troops as liberators and that any militant resistance will be short-lived. They do not develop a contingency plan for persistent civil unrest. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ However the State Department's &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; planning project is more prudent, noting that Iraqis will likely be weary of US designs on their country. [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- The Pentagon planners believe that Iraq's oil reserves&#8212;estimated to contain some 112 billion barrels of oil&#8212;should be used to help fund the reconstruction of Iraq. They also advocate a plan that would give the US more control over Iraq's oil. &#8220;[The Pentagon] hawks have long argued that US control of Iraq's oil would help deliver a second objective,&#8221; reports the Observer. &#8220;That is the destruction of OPEC, the oil producers' cartel, which they argue is &#8216;evil&#8217;&#8212;that is, incompatible with American interests.&#8221; The State Department, however, believes such aggressive policies will surely infuriate Iraqis and give credence to suspicions that the invasion is motivated by oil interests. One critic of the plan says &#8220;that only a puppet Iraqi government would acquiesce to US supervision of the oil fields and that one so slavish to US interests risks becoming untenable with Iraqis.&#8221; [[ | Insight, 12/28/02 ]] [[,6903,825103,00.html | Observer, 11/3/02 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << preWarPlanning >> << chalabi >> ((- American Enterprise Institute )) ((- Project for the New American Century )) ((- Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Danielle Pletka )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) {{ commentary_knight_ridder_newspapers_3 }} {{ commentary_robert_dreyfuss,_american_prospect_magazine_2 }} {{ commentary_kenneth_bacon_2 }} Early 2002 Most of Task Force 5 Is Redeployed from Afghanistan to Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2959 false 1 ------ Most of Task Force 5's members are called home from Afghanistan to prepare for operations in Iraq. In early 2002, there were roughly 150 Task Force 5 commandos in Afghanistan. After the massive transfer, Task Force 5's numbers dip to as low as 30 men. Task Force 5 is a top-secret elite group that includes CIA paramilitary units and military &#8220;special mission units,&#8221; or SMUs. One of the SMUs is the former Delta Force. The name of the other unit, which specializes in human and technical intelligence operations, is not known. &#8220;These elite forces, along with the battlefield intelligence technology of Predator and Global Hawk drone aircraft, were the scarcest tools of the hunt for jihadists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,&#8221; the Washington Post notes in June 2004. According to Flynt Leverett, a career CIA analyst assigned to the State Deparmtent, &#8220;There is a direct consequence for us having taken these guys out prematurely. There were people on the staff level raising questions about what that meant for getting al-Qaeda, for creating an Afghan security and intelligence service [to help combat jihadists]. Those questions didn't get above staff level, because clearly there had been a strategic decision taken.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/04 ]] ====== << diversionOfResources >> << decision >> ((@ Flynt Leverett )) 2002 German Intelligence Tells CIA that Reliability of Iraqi Informant Is in Doubt complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_119 false 1 ------ The CIA clandestine service's European division chief meets with a German intelligence officer to discuss intelligence that has been provided by an Iraqi source known as &#8220;Curveball&#8221; Curveball alleges that Iraq previously had mobile biological weapons labs. But according to the German, it is not clear &#8220;whether Curveball was actually telling the truth.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 5/21/2005 ]] ------ Vincent Cannistraro, a former counter-terrorism specialist, will tell the New Yorker in 2004 that the CIA believes the person who set Curveball up with the Germans was Aras Habib, the INC intelligence chief later accused of providing US intelligence to Iran. &#8220;The CIA is positive of it,&#8221; he says. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << wmd >> << trailers >> << powellsSpeech >> ((+ Aras Habib )) January 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_294 false 1 ------ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz orders the CIA to conduct an investigation of Hans Blix, chairman of the new UN weapons inspection team (UNMOVIC) that will go to Iraq if Saddam Hussein agrees to re-admit the weapons inspectors. Wolfowitz feels that past investigations of Saddam's declared nuclear power plants under the authority of Hans Blix were not sufficiently aggressive. The CIA reports back in late January that Blix conducted his past investigations &#8220;fully within the parameters he could operate&#8221; as chief of the agency. There are two opposing accounts of how Wolfowitz responds to the report's conclusion. According to an anonymous former State Department official, Wolfowitz &#8220;hit the ceiling&#8221; upon learning the results because it did not provide a pretext for undermining Blix and UNMOVIC. However an administration official disputes this, claiming that he &#8220;did not angrily respond.&#8221; (( Unnamed administration official )) (( Unnamed former State Department official )) [[ | Independent 5/10/02 ]] [[,4273,4399549,00.html | Guardian 4/23/02 ]] [[ | The Washington Post 4/15/02 ]] ------ The Washington Post notes, &#8220;[T]he request for a CIA investigation underscored the degree of concern by Wolfowitz and his civilian colleagues in the Pentagon that new inspections&#8212;or protracted negotiations over them&#8212;could torpedo their plans for military action to remove Hussein from power&#8221; and ultimately lead to the suspension of sanctions. [[ | The Washington Post 4/15/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((- Hans Blix )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) Early 2002, probably May or later complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_174 false 1 ------ Czech president Vaclav Havel informs Washington that there is no evidence to substantiate claims that 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi diplomat Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). The information is relayed to the White House quietly to avoid embarrassing top Czech officials&#8212;presumably Interior Minister Stanislav Gross -who had publicly stated on more than one occasion that there was no evidence to suggest that the meeting did not take place. The New York Times will report in October 2002: &#8220;Mr. Havel ... moved carefully behind the scenes in the months after the reports of the Prague meeting came to light to try to determine what really happened, officials said. He asked trusted advisers to investigate, and they quietly went through back channels to talk with Czech intelligence officers to get to the bottom of the story. The intelligence officers told them there was no evidence of a meeting.&#8221; The New York Times also reports that analysts in the Czech intelligence service were furious that the Prime Minister stovepiped the information straight to Washington, before they had the opportunity to investigate further. (( Unnamed CIA and FBI officials )) [[ | United Press International, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/21/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << pragueConnection >> ((+ Vaclav Havel )) ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Stanislav Gross )) {{ statement_a_high-ranking_source_close_to_the_bis_2 }} 2002-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_306 false 1 ------ In explaining the Bush administration's policy on Iraq, top US officials waver between &#8220;disarmament&#8221; and &#8220;regime change.&#8221; ====== << legalJustification >> {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_12 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_17 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_8 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_10 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_11 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_29 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_20 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_18 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_19 }} {{ statement_a_clean_break:_a_new_strategy_for_securing_the_realm_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_3 }} {{ statement_paul_wolfowitz_5 }} {{ commentary_jim_mcdermott_3 }} {{ statement_scott_mcclellan_2 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_4 }} Early 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_136 false 1 ------ Unnamed US intelligence officials tell the New York Times that the CIA has no evidence that Saddam Hussein's government has participated in any militant operations against the United States in nearly a decade. The agency also believes that Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda or other militant Islamic organizations. (( Unnamed US Intelligence Officials )) [[ | New York Times, 2/6/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) January 13, 2002 US and British Planes Strike Numerous Targets in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2900 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes strike at least five targets in southern Iraq. The strikes&#8212;described by the Washington Post as the &#8220;heaviest ... in at least a year&#8221; &#8212;target an air defense command site at Tallil, 170 miles southeast of Baghdad, and four repeater stations in southeastern Iraq. According to Iraqi sources, civilian targets in the southern city of Basra are also hit. The Iraqis say that six people are injured as a result of the attacks. [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << decision >> << DSM >> January 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_338 false 1 ------ CIA Director George Tenet informs Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a meeting in Sharm el Sheikh that the Bush administration has already decided to attack Iraq and asks Mubarak not to publicly express Egypt's opposition to the planned invasion. The Egyptian president warns that such an attack could destabilize the entire Middle East. (( Unnamed source interviewed by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Mustaqbal )) [[;contrassID=1&amp;subContrassID=0&amp;sbSubContrassID=0 | Ha'aretz, 2/17/02 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Hosni Mubarak )) ((+ Letter from CIA Director George Tenet to Bob Graham )) January 29, 2002 Bush Sees an Axis of Evil a012902axisofevil false 1 ------ President Bush's State of the Union speech describes an &#8220;axis of evil&#8221; consisting of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. When Bush advisor Richard Perle was asked one month before 9/11 about new challenges the US faced, he replied by naming these exact three countries (see [[ a080601preaxis ]]). Bin Laden is not mentioned in the speech. [[ | CNN, 1/29/02 ]] ------ The speech is followed by a new public focus on Iraq and a downplaying of bin Laden. ====== << otherPost911Events >> << iraq >> << decision >> ((- Iraq )) ((- North Korea )) ((- Iran )) ((+ George W. Bush )) January 30, 2002 CIA Report Suggests Iraq May Be Trying to Reconstitute its Nuclear Weapons Program complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2980 false 1 ------ The CIA sends Congress an unclassified report stating, &#8220;Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> << wmd >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) January 30, 2002 Former Iran-Contra Figure and Pentagon Officials in Douglas Feith's Office Told to Cease Unauthorized Activities complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2981 false 1 ------ Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice's chief deputy on the National Security Council, instructs former Iran-Contra figure Michael Ledeen and officials in Douglas Feith's office to cease their dealings (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 ]]) with Manucher Ghorbanifar. [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Manucher Ghorbanifar )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) February 2002 Ahmed Chalabi Describes Plan to Overthrow Saddam Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3226 false 1 ------ In an interview with the Guardian of London, Ahmed Chalabi describes his plan to overthrow the Iraqi government. &#8220;The United States will help us to train and equip light anti-tank battalions, well-trained, and highly mobile. Those people, once on the ground, will be able to defeat Saddam's forces.&#8221; Just 11 weeks of training would be adequate to train the Iraqi National Congress' forces to defeat Iraq's army of 400,000, he insists. &#8220;Chalabi gave a theoretical example: a rebel incursion across the Kuwaiti border to capture a frontier town. The rebel force would be protected from counter-attack by US air power, and within days the key southern city of Basra would fall as its garrison mutinied.&#8221; According to Chalabi, Saddam would quickly lose his grip on the country. &#8220;Once that happens, our problem will not be finding people&#8212;our problem will be absorbing people,&#8221; Chalabi claims. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) February 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_496 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney prepares for a March trip to the Middle East. According to public statements by the Bush administration, Cheney will be conferring with Arab leaders on US Iraq policy. However, a senior Bush administration official tells the Philadelphia Inquirer: &#8220;He's not going to beg for support. He's going to inform them that the president's decision has been made and will be carried out, and if they want some input into how and when it's carried out, now's the time for them to speak up.&#8221; (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[ | Philadelphia Inquirer, 2/13/02 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) February 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3178 false 1 ------ The Defense Intelligence Agency issues a four-page Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM No. 044-02) stating that it is probable that prisoner Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi intentionally misled debriefers when he claimed Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda in working with illicit weapons. During interviews with al-Libi, the DIA noted the Libyan al-Qaeda operative could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used, or where the alleged training took place. &#8220;It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers,&#8221; the report says. &#8220;Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.&#8221; Information supplied by al-Libi will be the basis for a claim included in an October 2002 speech (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_36 ]]) by Bush, in which the president states, &#8220;[W]e've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases.&#8221; Intelligence provided by al-Libi will also be included in Colin Powell's February speech (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_442 ]]) to the UN. In that speech, Powell will cite &#8220;the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaeda.&#8221; On the general subject of Iraq's alleged ties to al-Qaeda, the DIA report notes: &#8220;Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control.&#8221; The report also questions the reliability of information provided by high-value al-Qaeda detainees being held in secret CIA facilities or who have been &#8220;rendered&#8221; to foreign countries where they are believed to undergo harsh interrogation tactics. The DIA report is presumably circulated widely within the government, and is available to the CIA, the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and other agencies. [[ | New York Times, 11/6/2005 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 11/6/2005, pp A22 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 11/10/2005 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << poisonsAndGases >> ((- Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi )) ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) February 5, 2002 CIA Issues Second Report on Alleged Iraqi Efforts to Obtain Uranium complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 false 1 ------ The CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) issues a second intelligence report from SISMI, Italy's military intelligence service. This report provides additional details on the alleged agreement described in the October 15 report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2988 ]]), which reported that Iraq had struck a deal with Niger on the purchase of several tons of uranium. A later Senate Intelligence investigation will report that this report from SISMI includes a &#8220;verbatim text&#8221; of the accord, but the Senate Intelligence report does not say precisely which of the orginal documents the &#8220;verbatim text&#8221; is a trascription of. The purported agreement, signed by Iraqi and Niger officials during meetings held July 5-6, 2000, reportedly stated that Niger would sell Iraq 500 tons of uranium per year. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 11/4/2005 ]] ------ The SISMI report also draws attention to a 1999 trip to Niger made by Wissam al-Zahawie (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_94 ]]), Iraq's former ambassador to the Vatican, and alleges that its mission was to discuss the future purchase of uranium. This is the first report from SISMI that names al-Zahawie and refers directly to his 1999 trip. (SISMI's previous report had only stated that negotiations had begun by at least 1999.) This report, as well as the previous report, are likely based on two documents, one of which is definately a forgery (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2988 ]]). (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) (( Unnamed US intelligence sources )) (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | TheLeftCoaster [.org], 11/3/2005 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/2003 ]] ------ Analysts at the CIA and the DIA are more impressed with the detail and substance of this second report, but analysts at the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) remain skeptical of the report's allegations noting that it was unlikely that Niger would sell uranium to Iraq because the Nigeriens would have considered the risk of being caught too great. An INR analyst asks the CIA if the source of the report would submit to a polygraph. A CIA analyst who also asks about the source is told by the DO that the source is &#8220;very credible.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) February 6, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_123 false 1 ------ George Tenet tells the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, &#8220;Our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material, . . . [and] with substantial foreign assistance, [Iraq] could flight-test a longer-range ballistic missile within the next five years.&#8221; [[ | Chicago Tribune 2/7/02 ]] ====== << nuclearQuotes >> ((+ George Tenet )) {{ duplicate_george_tenet_2 }} February 6, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_171 false 1 ------ The New York Times reports, &#8220;[S]enior American intelligence officials have concluded that the meeting between Mr. Atta and the Iraqi officer, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, did take place. But they say they do not believe that the meeting provides enough evidence to tie Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks.&#8221; A month and a half earlier, the same newspaper had reported that sources in the Czech Republic thought that it had been a different &#8220;Mohammed Atta&#8221; who had met al-Ani (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_170 ]]). (( Unnamed Senior US intelligence officials )) [[ | New York Times, 12/16/01 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/09/01 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) February 8, 2002-February 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1847 false 1 ------ In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, 48 percent of the respondents believe that Iraq has &#8220;weapons that threaten US.&#8221; [[ | USA Today, 2/11/02 ]] ====== << publicOpinion >> February 11, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_484 false 1 ------ Former CIA Director James Woolsey telephones Deputy Asistant Defense Secretary Linton Wells to arrange a meeting between Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts and Mohammad Harith, an Iraqi defector being supplied by the Iraqi exile group, the Iraqi National Congress. (( Classified Pentagon report )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ------ After the phone call, Wells issues an &#8220;executive referral,&#8221; requesting that the Iraqi National Congress (INC) introduce Harith to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). (( Classified Pentagon report )) [[;:4032bd96:6f9ede1cc8cbb76f?type=worldNews&amp;locale=en_IN&amp;storyID=4379274 | Reuters, 2/18/04 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ------ Later in the day, two DIA officers meet with Ahmed Chalabi to arrange an interview with Harith. In an email to Knight Ridder Newspapers, Wells will later recall, &#8220;I discussed the issue of an individual with information on Iraq weapons of mass destruction with intelligence community members. They said they would follow up. I never met with any member of the INC.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> << chalabi >> ((+ Linton Wells )) ((+ Mohammad Harith )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ James Woolsey )) Between February 12, 2002 and March 31, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1614 false 1 ------ After several meetings with Mohammad Harith (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_484 ]]) &#8212;an Iraqi defector provided by the Iraqi National Congress&#8212;a Defense Intelligence Agency debriefer determines that the defector's information on Iraq's presumed arsenal of banned weapons seems &#8220;accurate, but much of it [apears] embellished.&#8221; Defense Intelligence Agency analysts also determine that the defected Iraqi has been &#8220;coached by the Iraqi National Congress.&#8221; Harith claimed that he was a major in an Iraqi intelligence unit charged with concealing illicit weapons and that Iraq has developed mobile biological weapons labs. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> << trailers >> ((+ Mohammad Harith )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) February 12, 2002 Bush Official: &#8216;The Debate Is Over&#8217; about Whether or Not to Invade Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_337 false 1 ------ A Bush administration official tells Knight Ridder: &#8220;This is not an argument about whether to get rid of Saddam Hussein. That debate is over. This is ... how you do it.&#8221; (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/13/02 ]] ====== << decision >> February 12, 2002 Powell Says that Regime Change in Iraq Has Been US Policy for &#8216;Several Years&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_710 false 1 ------ Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the Senate Budget Committee: &#8220;With respect to Iraq, it's long been, for several years now, a policy of the United States' government that regime change would be in the best interest of the region, the best interest of the Iraqi people. And we're looking at a variety of options that would bring that about.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 2/13/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Colin Powell )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_29 }} (February 12, 2002) CIA Operative Valerie Plame Suggests that CIA Send her Husband to Niger to Verify Reports that Iraq Attempted to Purchase Uranium from that Country complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3261 false 1 ------ In response to questions from Vice President Dick Cheney (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1810 ]]), CIA operative Valerie Plame and officials from the CIA's DO Counterproliferation Division (CPD) meet to discuss what the agency should do to determine the validity of recent Italian intelligence reports (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) alleging that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from Niger. During the meeting, Plame suggests sending her husband, Joseph Wilson, an Africa expert and former US diplomat, to Niger to investigate the reports. In a memo to the deputy chief of the CPD, Plame says, &#8220;[M]y husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ Counterproliferation Division )) ((+ Valerie Plame )) (February 12, 2002) February 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1810 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney's morning intelligence briefer provides Cheney with a Defense Intelligence Agency report on a recent report sent to Washington by the Italians <ref key="1809"/> suggesting that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. Cheney asks about the implications of the report (( Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) (( Cathie Martin )) (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Time Magazine, 7/21/03 ]] ------ and is reportedly dissatisfied with the initial response. He asks the agency to take another look (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2990 ]]). (( Former high-level CIA official )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) February 12, 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency Issues Report on Recent Italian Intelligence Report; Leaves Out Caveats complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2989 false 1 ------ The Defense Intelligence Agency issues a report summarizing the February 5, 2002 SISMI report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) that suggested that Iraq had struck an agreement with Niger to purchase 500 tons of uranium per year. The report, titled &#8220;Niamey signed an agreement to sell 500 tons of uranium a year to Baghdad,&#8221; concludes that &#8220;Iraq probably is searching abroad for natural uranium to assist in its nuclear weapons program.&#8221; It fails to mention the concerns shared by some US intelligence analysts about the credibility of the source. The report is included in a morning briefing to Vice President Dick Cheney (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1810 ]]). (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) February 13, 2002 CIA Division Requests Approval to Send Joseph Wilson to Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3251 false 1 ------ The CIA's DO Counterproliferation Division (CPD) sends a cable to an unnamed government office or official (the identity of which is redacted in the source document) requesting approval to send former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to investigate Italian intelligence reports that Iraq has attempted to purchase uranium from that country. The cable also requests additional information from Italy regarding the matter. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Counterproliferation Division )) ((- Joseph C. Wilson )) ((- Italy )) Shortly after February 12, 2002 February 13, 2002 CIA Sends Report on Alleged Niger-Iraq Connection Directly to Cheney complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2990 false 1 ------ The Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) completes a &#8220;senior publish when ready&#8221; report, an intelligence assessment with limited distribution, which states, &#8220;[I]nformation on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated.&#8221; The report discusses the details of a recent foreign intelligence report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) issued by the CIA Directorate of Operations and says that &#8220;some of the information in the report contradicts reporting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2986 ]]) from the US Embassy in Niamey, Niger. US diplomats say the French government-led consortium that operates Niger's two uranium mines maintains complete control over uranium mining and yellowcake production.&#8221; The CIA sends a separate version of this assessment to Vice President Dick Cheney. Unlike the official version, the copy sent to Cheney names the foreign intelligence agency, which the New Yorker will later reveal is the Italian SISMI. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ------ Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern describes Cheney's receipt of this document as &#8220;odd.&#8221; &#8220;[I]n more than two years of briefing then-Vice President George H. W. Bush every other morning, not once did he ask a question about a DIA report or even indicate that he had read one,&#8221; McGovern will note. &#8220;That this particular report was given to Cheney almost certainly reflects the widespread practice of &#8216;cherry picking&#8217; intelligence.&#8221; [[ | AfterDowningStreet [.org], 7/25/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Ray McGovern )) ((+ Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control )) Shortly after February 13, 2002 February 14, 2002 CIA Decides to Send Joseph Wilson to Niger; Wilson's Wife Relays the Request to Him complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3249 false 1 ------ Midlevel CIA officials in the agency's Directorate of Operations (DO) Counterproliferation Division (CPD) decide to send former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to investigate allegations that Iraq sought to procure uranium from that country. Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, a CPD officer, relays the request to him explaining that &#8220;there's this crazy report&#8221; asserting that Iraq made a deal with Niger on the sale of a large quantity of uranium. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Counterproliferation Division )) ((+ Valerie Plame )) ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) February 15, 2002 Bush Directs CIA to Conduct Operations in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_667 false 1 ------ Bush signs an intelligence finding, directing the CIA to conduct operations within Iraq as part of an ultimate plan to overthrow Saddam's government. The CIA warns Bush that staging a coup to depose the leader would be impossible. (( Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Washington Post 1/18/04 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ George W. Bush )) February 18, 2002 US Embassy in Niger Recommends Further Investigation of Niger-Uranium Allegation complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3250 false 1 ------ The US embassy in Niger disseminates a cable reporting that the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal &#8220;provides sufficient detail to warrant another hard look at Niger's uranium sales. The names of GON [government of Niger] officials cited in the report track closely with those we know to be in those, or closely-related positions. However, the purported 4,000-ton annual production listed is fully 1,000 tons more than the mining companies claim to have produced in 2001.&#8221; The report says that US ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick met with the Nigerien Foreign Minister to ask for an unequivocal assurance that Niger is not selling uranium to so-called &#8220;rogue states.&#8221; The cable also notes that in September 2001 Nigerien Prime Minister Mamadou Tandja had informed the US embassy that there were buyers like Iraq who had expressed willingness to pay more for Niger's uranium than France, but the Prime Minister assured them at that time that &#8220;of course Niger cannot sell to them.&#8221; However, the cable concludes that &#8220;we should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway to supply Iraq with yellowcake from here.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Mamadou Tandja )) ((+ US Embassy in Niger )) ((- Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick )) February 19, 2002 Gen. Franks: US Is Deploying Resources from Afghanistan to Iraq a0202iraqshift false 1 ------ General Tommy Franks allegedly tells Sen. Bob Graham (D) of Florida, who is on a visit to US Central Command: &#8220;Senator, we have stopped fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan. We are moving military and intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future war in Iraq.&#8221; (( Bob Graham )) [[ | Council on Foreign Relations, 3/26/04 ]] ------ (In his memoirs, Graham quotes Franks as saying that &#8220;military and intelligence personnel are being re-deployed to prepare for an action in Iraq.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/18/2004 ]] [[ | Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp 125 ]] ------ ) Franks denies making the comment. [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/18/2004 ]] ------ The New Yorker magazine also reports on a redeployment of resources to Iraq at this time (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_70 ]]). [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << afghanistan >> << iraq >> << decision >> << diversionOfResources >> ((+ Thomas Franks )) ((+ Bob Graham )) February 19, 2002 New York Times Breaks Story on Office of Strategic Influence complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2965 false 1 ------ The New York Times is the first to report that the Office of Strategic Influence, a secret Pentagon office established shortly after the September 11 attacks (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1822 ]]), is &#8220;developing plans to provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign media organizations as part of a new effort to influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly countries.&#8221; The article reports that many inside the government are opposed to these plans. &#8220;[S]everal senior officials have questioned whether its mission is too broad and possibly even illegal,&#8221; the Times says. &#8220;[T]hey are disturbed that a single office might be authorized to use not only covert operations like computer network attacks, psychological activities, and deception, but also the instruments and staff of the military's globe&#8212;spanning public affairs apparatus.&#8221; Critics are also concerned that &#8220;disinformation planted in foreign media organizations, like Reuters or Agence France-Presse, could end up being published or broadcast by American news organizations.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 2/19/02 ]] ------ The Washington Post similarly reports that discussions on the use of disinformation &#8220;have sparked widespread concern inside the Defense Department among officials who feel that the new office, by seeking to manipulate information and even knowingly dispense false information, could backfire and discredit official Pentagon statements.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 2/25/02 ]] ------ News of the Defense Department's initiative causes an immediate public outcry and the Pentagon denies that it is considering plans to disseminate disinformation. &#8220;The Department of Defense, this secretary and the people that work with me tell the American people and the people of the world the truth,&#8221; Donald Rumsfeld insists. [[ | Washington Post, 2/21/02 ]] ------ Jim Wilkinson, deputy White House communications director and head of the Coalition Information Center (CIC) war room, likewise states, &#8220;The president is a plain-spoken, truthful man and he expects that same high standard from every public affairs spokesperson in the government.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 2/25/02 ]] ------ Rumsfeld, facing mounting criticism, closes the office a few days later (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2966 ]]). ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Office of Strategic Influence )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ James R. Wilkinson )) February 19, 2002 Intelligence Analysts Discuss Merits of Sending Wilson to Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3157 false 1 ------ The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) Counterproliferation Division (CPD) holds a meeting with former ambassador Joseph Wilson, intelligence analysts from both the CIA and State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and several individuals from the DO's Africa and CPD divisions. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the merits of sending Wilson to Niger. An INR analyst's notes indicate that the meeting is &#8220;apparently convened by [Wilson's] wife [Valerie Plame] who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue.&#8221; According to Plame, she leaves the meeting about three minutes after introducing her husband. The INR analyst's meeting notes, as well as e-mails from other participants, indicate that INR expresses skepticism that the alleged uranium contract could have taken place, noting that it would have been very difficult to conceal such a large shipment of yellowcake and because &#8220;the French appear to have control of the uranium mining, milling and transport process, and would seem to have little interest in selling uranium to the Iraqis.&#8221; INR also says that the embassy in Niger has good contacts and is thus in a position to get to the truth on the matter and therefore believes the proposed trip to Niger would be redundant. Others attending the meeting argue that the trip would probably not resolve the matter because the Nigeriens would be unlikely to admit to a uranium sales agreement with Iraq. An e-mail from a WINPAC analyst to CPD following the meeting notes, &#8220;[I]t appears that the results from this source will be suspect at best, and not believable under most scenarios.&#8221; CPD concludes that sending Wilson would be worth a try. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) ((- US Embassy in Niger )) ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ Valerie Plame )) ((+ Counterproliferation Division )) February 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1818 false 1 ------ Senior administration officials say the White House intends to create a permanent office of global diplomacy in order to spread a positive image of the United States around the world and combat anti-Americanism, which the administration believes has been caused by the world's failure to understand America. &#8220;A lot of the world does not like America, and it's going to take years to change their hearts and minds,&#8221; an unnamed senior official tells the New York Times. The office will coordinate the public statements of the State, Defense, and the other departments to ensure that foreign governments, media organizations, and opinion-makers understand US policies. The Times reports that according to one official, &#8220;global diplomacy as envisioned in the new office will inject patriotism into the punishing 24-hour, seven-day news cycle.&#8221; Reports broadcasted by the office would include information about both US foreign and domestic policies and would utilize the State Department's huge communications network of American embassies and media offices. The earlier White House effort to create a more positive image of the United States was handled by the Coalition Information Center, a joint effort between the US and UK that was led by the president's senior advisor, Karen P. Hughes. [[ | New York Times, 2/02/02 ]] ------ The office will be formally created in July and given the name &#8220;The Office of Global Communications&#8221; (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1819 ]]). ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Office of Global Communications )) ((+ Bush administration )) February 20, 2002 CIA Provides Joseph Wilson with Talking Points for His Trip to Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3158 false 1 ------ The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) Counterproliferation Division (CPD) provides former ambassador Joseph Wilson with talking points for his scheduled trip to Niger (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3157 ]]). The points specify that Wilson should ask Nigerien officials if they have been approached, conducted discussions, or entered into any agreements concerning uranium transfers with any &#8220;countries of concern.&#8221; Wilson should also determine how Niger accounts for all of its uranium each year, the points say. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ Counterproliferation Division )) February 21, 2002-March 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_106 false 1 ------ The CIA sends Joseph C. Wilson, a retired US diplomat, to Niger to investigate claims that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from that country. The trip is paid for by the CIA. But the identity of the party who requests the mission is later disputed. While Wilson will claim the trip was requested directly by Dick Cheney's office, other sources will indicate that the CIA had decided (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3157 ]]) that a delegation to Niger was needed in order to investigate questions raised by one of Dick Cheney's aides. (( Unnamed senior officials )) (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) (( Joseph C. Wilson )) [[ | Independent, 6/29/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 7/6/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 5/6/03 ]] ------ Wilson arrives in Niger on February 26, two days after Marine General Carlton W. Fulford Jr.'s meeting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_110 ]]) with Nigerien officials. Wilson meets with US Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick who informs Wilson that she has already concluded that the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq are unfounded. She tells Wilson &#8220;she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington.&#8221; After spending eight days chatting with current government officials, former government officials, and people associated with the country's uranium business, Wilson concludes the rumors are false. He calls the allegations &#8220;bogus and unrealistic.&#8221; (( Joseph C. Wilson )) [[ | The Washington Post, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/13/03 ]] [[ | ABC News, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 6/29/03 ]] [[ | CBS News, 7/11/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 7/6/03 ]] [[ | Novak, 7/14/03 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 282 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick )) {{ statement_joseph_c._wilson_8 }} {{ statement_joseph_c._wilson_7 }} February 24, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_110 false 1 ------ Four-Star Marine General Carlton W. Fulford Jr., deputy commander of the US European Command, arrives in Niger on a scheduled refueling stop. At the request of US Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, Fulford joins the ambassador at a meeting with Niger's President Mamadou Tandja and Foreign Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou. He explains the importance of keeping Niger's ore deposits secure. At the meeting, President Tandja assures the ambassador and General Fulford that Niger is determined to keep its uranium &#8220;in safe hands.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | Voce of America, 7/15/03 ]] [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 282 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 7/15/03 ]] ------ After the meeting, Fulford is of the opinion that Niger's uranium is safely in the hands of a French consortium and that there is little risk that the material will end up in the wrong hands. These findings are passed on to General Joseph Ralston who provides them to General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (( Carlton W. Fulford )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 282 ]] [[ | Voce of America, 7/15/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 7/15/03 ]] ------ The Pentagon will later say that Donald Rumsfeld was not informed about the trip or its conclusions. [[ | Voice of America, 7/15/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick )) ((+ Joseph Ralston )) ((+ Richard B. Myers )) ((+ Aichatou Mindaoudou )) ((+ Mamadou Tandja )) ((+ Carlton W. Fulford )) {{ statement_carlton_w._fulford_2 }} February 26, 2002 Rumsfeld Says Office of Strategic Influence Has Been Closed complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2966 false 1 ------ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announces the closure of the Office of Strategic Influence (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1822 ]]), after news of the Pentagon initiative causes a public stir (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2965 ]]). &#8220;The office has clearly been so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively,&#8221; he tells reporters. &#8220;So it is being closed down.&#8221; Asked if he instructed Rumsfeld to close the office, President Bush says, &#8220;I didn't even need to tell him this. He knows how I feel about this.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 2/27/02 ]] ------ Nine months later, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld says that after the OSI was closed, &#8220;I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to savage this thing fine I'll give you the corpse. There's the name. You can have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 11/18/02 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Office of Strategic Influence )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ James R. Wilkinson )) February 28, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_21 false 1 ------ During a British cabinet meeting, Home Secretary David Blunkett initiates a discussion about Iraq. During the discussion, British Foreign Minister Robin Cook mentions that most of the Arab world considers Ariel Sharon, rather than Saddam Hussein, to be the largest threat to peace in the Middle East. Describing the subsequent reaction to his comments, Cook later writes in his diary: &#8220;Somewhat to my surprise this line provides a round of &#8216;hear, hearing&#8217; from colleagues, which is the nearest I heard to mutiny in the cabinet.&#8221; (( Robin Cook's diary )) [[ | Independent, 10/6/03 ]] [[ | Guardian, 10/6/03 ]] [[ | Sunday Times, 10/5/03 ]] ------ During the meeting, Patricia Hewitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, says &#8220;We are in danger of being seen as close to President Bush, but without any influence over President Bush.&#8221; (( Robin Cook's diary )) [[ | Independent, 10/6/03 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ David Blunkett )) ((+ Robin Cook )) ((+ Patricia Hewitt )) February 28, 2002 Bush Administration Officials Visit Jose Bustani and Demand that He Quit complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2883 false 1 ------ John Bolton and other US officials fly to Europe and meet with Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). They demand that Bustani quietly resign from his position. Bustani refuses. He later explains to the New York Times, &#8220;They said they did not like my management style, but they said they were not prepared to elaborate.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) Late February 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_327 false 1 ------ An unnamed UN official tells The Washington Post that Iraq's level of cooperation is improving. &#8220;[F]or example,&#8221; the Iraqis have been &#8220;frantically digging in an area where it claims biological weapons were destroyed,&#8221; the UN official explains. (( Unnamed UN official )) [[ | The Washington Post, 3/1/03 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> Late February 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_328 false 1 ------ Chief UN Inspector Hans Blix prepares a list of disarmament tasks that Iraq needs to complete in order prove its claim that it has no weapons of mass destruction. According to UN Resolution 1284, the completion of these tasks would make Iraq eligible for the suspension of sanctions. [[ | The Washington Post, 3/01/03 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) March 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1811 false 1 ------ The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) publishes an intelligence assessment, titled &#8220;Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely,&#8221; that disputes recent Italian intelligence reports (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) suggesting that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. The assessment reiterates INR's view that France controls the uranium industry and &#8220;would take action to block a sale of the kind alleged in a CIA report of questionable credibility from a foreign government service.&#8221; It adds that though &#8220;some officials may have conspired for individual gain to arrange a uranium sale,&#8221; Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja's government would have been unlikely to risk relations with the US and other key aid donors. &#8220;A whole lot of things told us that the report was bogus,&#8221; Greg Thielmann, a high-ranking INR official, later explains to Time Magazine. &#8220;This wasn't highly contested. There weren't strong advocates on the other side. It was done, shot down.&#8221; The assessment, drafted in response to interest from the vice president's office (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1810 ]]), is sent to the White House situation room and Secretary of State Colin Powell. (( Greg Thielmann )) (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | Time Magazine, 7/21/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) ((+ Colin Powell )) March 2002 British Foreign Office Issues Legal Advice Concluding That Prewar Aerial Attacks Are Illegal complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2953 false 1 ------ A British Foreign Office memo concludes that a proposal to increase the number of US and British aerial attacks on targets in Iraq's &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone in order to &#8220;put pressure on the regime&#8221; would violate international law. The memo is later distributed to several high officials as an appendix to a July 21 Cabinet Office briefing paper (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2854 ]]) meant to prepare officials ahead of a meeting on July 23 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2855 ]]). The memo also disputes the United States' contention that the bombings are meant to enforce compliance with UN resolutions 688 and 687, which ordered Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. &#8220;This view is not consistent with resolution 687, which does not deal with the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, or with resolution 688, which was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and does not contain any provision for enforcement,&#8221; it says. [[,,2087-1660300,00.html | London Times, 6/19/05 ]] ====== << DSM >> << aerialAttacks >> << legalJustification >> ((+ British Foreign Office )) March 2002 Bush Administration Begins Campaign Aimed at Removing Jose Bustani from Office complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2888 false 1 ------ After Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), refuses to give in to US demands (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2883 ]]) that he resign from his post, the Bush administration mounts a campaign aimed at sacking Bustani. The US sends envoys to the member-states of the OPCW in order to secure votes for his dismissal. The Bush administration accuses Bustani of a number of allegations including &#8220;financial mismanagement,&#8221; &#8220;demoralization of his staff,&#8221; &#8220;bias,&#8221; and &#8220;ill-considered initiatives.&#8221; The US argues that Bustani should resign if he wishes to avoid damage to his reputation. [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ------ But supporters of Bustani say the accusations are baseless. The US allegation of financial mismanagement is contradicted by the fact that the organization's books were recently audited and found to be perfectly sound. The OPCW's only financial problem, in fact, is that the US has restricted the OPCW's budget and is withholding its dues. Regarding the charge of &#8220;demoralization,&#8221; George Monbiot of the Guardian writes that &#8220;staff morale is reportedly higher [at the OPCW] than at any other similar international organization.&#8221; Nor is there much evidence that Bustani is guilty of &#8220;bias.&#8221; According to Monbiot, this charge stems from Bustani's insistence that the OPCW be permitted to examine chemical-industry facilities in the United States with the same rigor it examines facilities in other countries. [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ------ The last claim, that Bustani has embarked on &#8220;ill-considered initiatives,&#8221; is a reference to his effort to convince Saddam Hussein to sign the chemical weapons convention. The US is opposed to OPCW involvement in Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2886 ]]). [[ | New York Times, 7/26/2002 ]] [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ Bush administration )) March 2002 Bush Administration Provides OPCW Members with White Paper Smearing Jose Bustani complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2878 false 1 ------ The office of John Bolton, the undersecretary of state for arms control, issues a &#8220;white paper&#8221; asserting that Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is seeking an &#8220;inappropriate role&#8221; in the United States' confrontation with Iraq. The paper is distributed to the member-states of the OPCW. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ====== << pre911Plans >> << decision >> ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Mickey Herskowitz )) March 2002 Bush Administration Fails to Exact a No Confidence Vote in Jose Bustani from OPCW Members complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2879 false 1 ------ The United States tries to exact a vote of no confidence in Jose Bustani, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), during an OPCW Executive Council meeting. Bustani survives the vote. [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ------ The night before, John Bolton met with Bustani in The Hague personally seeking his resignation. When Bustani refused, &#8220;Bolton said something like, &#8216;Now we'll do it the other way,&#8217; and walked out,&#8221; former Bustani aide Bob Rigg later tells the AP. [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) March 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1613 false 1 ------ Iraqi defector Mohammad Harith (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_484 ]]) appears on CBS's &#8220;60 Minutes&#8221; and claims that while working as an Iraqi intelligence operative he had purchased seven Renault refrigerated trucks for the purpose of converting them into biological weapons laboratories. His identity is not revealed during the program. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Mohammad Harith )) Spring 2002 Focus Shifts from Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda to Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2957 false 1 ------ The Bush administration shifts its attention from Afghanistan and al-Qaeda to Iraq. White House counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke later recalls: &#8220;They took one thing that people on the outside find hard to believe or appreciate. Management time. We're a huge government, and we have hundreds of thousands of people involved in national security. Therefore you would think we could walk and chew gum at the same time. I've never found that to be true. ... It just is not credible that the principals and the deputies paid as much attention to Afghanistan or the war against al-Qaeda as they should have.&#8221; [[ | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ------ Laurence Pope, an ambassador to Chad, similarly recalls in 2004 that the change in focus that spring had a particularly damaging effect on operations in Afghanistan. &#8220;There was a moment of six months or so when we could have put much more pressure on the tribal areas [to get al-Qaeda], and on Pakistan, and done a better job of reconstruction in Afghanistan. In reality, the Beltway can only do one thing at a time, and because of the attention to Iraq, what should have happened in Afghanistan didn't.&#8221; [[ | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ------ US Intelligence agencies are also affected by the shift in priorities. The CIA's limited supply of Arabic-speakers and Middle East specialists are redeployed to help meet the increasing demand for intelligence on Iraq. Michael Scheuer, a career CIA officer who was head of the agency's anti-bin Laden team from the late 1990s until his retirement in 2004, says, &#8220;With a finite number of people who have any kind of pertinent experience there [was] unquestionably a sucking away of resources from Afghanistan and al-Qaeda to Iraq, just because it was a much bigger effort.&#8221; [[ | Atlantic Monthly, 10/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> << diversionOfResources >> ((@ Michael Scheuer )) ((@ Laurence Pope )) ((@ Richard A. Clarke )) ((+ Bush administration )) (Spring 2002) Spy Planes Diverted From Afghanistan Arena and Sent to Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2893 false 1 ------ The US Air Force's only two specially-equipped RC135 U spy planes&#8212;credited with having successfully intercepted the radio transmissions and cellphone calls of al-Qaeda's leaders&#8212;are pulled from Afghanistan to conduct surveillance over Iraq. [[,14259,1178658,00.html | Guardian, 3/26/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << decisionQuotes >> << diversionOfResources >> Early March 2002 Bush Diverts Resources from War on Terror complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_70 false 1 ------ According to a former White House official interviewed by Seymour Hersh during the fall of 2003, Bush makes the decision to invade Iraq at this time and begins diverting resources away from the &#8220;war on terrorism&#8221; to the planned invasion of Iraq. &#8220;The Bush administration took many intelligence operations that had been aimed at al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the world and redirected them to the Persian Gulf. Linguists and special operatives were abruptly reassigned, and several ongoing anti-terrorism intelligence programs were curtailed.&#8221; (( Unnamed Former White House official )) [[ | The New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << iraq >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ commentary_a_clean_break:_a_new_strategy_for_securing_the_realm_2 }} (March 2002) Bush: &#8216;F__k Saddam. We're Taking Him Out&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3248 false 1 ------ During a meeting at the White House attended by Condoleezza Rice and a group of Republican and Democratic senators, President Bush, who is not scheduled to be at the meeting, shows up. At some point, the discussion drifts to Iraq and the president says, &#8220;F__k Saddam. We're taking him out.&#8221; [[,8599,235395,00.html | Time, 5/5/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) March 2002 US Military Pulls Elite Special Operations Group From Afghanistan and Redeploys Them to Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2892 false 1 ------ Fifth Group Special Forces&#8212;an elite group whose members speak Arabic, Pashtun, and Dari&#8212;is pulled from its mission in Afghanistan and sent to Iraq where the group is assigned the task of locating Saddam Hussein. Its mission in Afghanistan is reassigned &#8220;to people who [speak] no Dari, Pashtun or Arabic, and [have] no rapport&#8221; with the Afghans. Members of Fifth Group, who spent six months developing a network of local sources and alliances and who believe they were close to finding Osama bin Laden, are upset with the orders. &#8220;We were going nuts on the ground about that decision,&#8221; one of them will later recall. [[,14259,1178658,00.html | Guardian, 3/26/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << diversionOfResources >> March 2002 Dick Cheney Says The Decision Has Been Made to Invade Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2917 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney drops by a Senate Republican policy lunch and instructs everyone that what he is about to say should not be repeated to anyone. He then explains that the question is no longer if the US will attack Iraq, but when. [[,8599,235395,00.html | Time, 5/5/02 ]] ====== << decision >> << pre911Plans >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) March 5, 2002 Vice President's Office Updated on Niger Issue complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3159 false 1 ------ In response to a request from Vice President Dick Cheney for an update on the Niger uranium issue made a few days earlier, CIA WINPAC analysts provide an analytic update to Cheney's intelligence briefer stating that the government of Niger has said it is making all efforts to ensure that its uranium will be used for only peaceful purposes. The update says the foreign government service (Italian military intelligence agency, SISMI) that provided the original report &#8220;was unable to provide new information, but continues to assess that its source is reliable.&#8221; The update also notes that the CIA would &#8220;be debriefing a source who may have information related to the alleged sale on March 5.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) March 5, 2002 Joseph Wilson Debriefed on Trip to Niger complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3160 false 1 ------ Two CIA officers from the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) debrief former ambassador Joseph Wilson who returned from his trip to Niger the previous day (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_106 ]]). The debriefing takes place in Wilson's home. Based on information provided verbally by the former ambassador, the DO case officer writes a draft intelligence report and sends it to the DO reports officer who adds additional relevant information from his notes. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) March 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_23 false 1 ------ According to British Foreign Minister Robin, Home Secretary David Blunkett asks where Britain had obtained the &#8220;legal authority&#8221; to invade Iraq. (( Robin Cook's diary )) [[ | Guardian, 10/6/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 10/6/03 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ David Blunkett )) March 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_107 false 1 ------ The CIA sends a 1 1/2-page cable to the White House, the FBI, the Justice Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, with news that a CIA source (Joseph Wilson) sent to Niger has failed to find any evidence to back claims that Iraq sought uranium from that country. (( senior CIA official )) (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) [[ | BBC, 7/8/03 ]] [[ | ABC News, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | BBC, 7/8/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/13/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 6/13/03 ]] ------ The report does not name the CIA source or indicate that the person is a former ambassador. Instead it describes the source as &#8220;a contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting record&#8221; and notes that the Nigeriens with whom he spoke &#8220;knew their remarks could reach the US government and may have intended to influence as well as inform.&#8221; A later Senate report on the US' prewar intelligence on Iraq will state: &#8220;The intelligence report indicated that former Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki was unaware of any contracts that had been signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of yellowcake while he was Prime Minister (1997-1999) or Foreign Minister (1996-1997). Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it.&#8221; Mayaki, according to the report, also acknowledged a June 1999 visit (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3260 ]]) by a businessman who arranged a meeting between Mayaki and an Iraqi delegation to discuss &#8220;expanding commercial relations&#8221; between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report says that Mayaki interpreted &#8220;expanding commercial relations&#8221; to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss purchasing uranium. The meeting did take place, but according to the report, &#8220;Mayaki let the matter drop due to UN sanctions on Iraq.&#8221; The intelligence report also says that Niger's former Minister for Energy and Mines, Mai Manga, told Wilson that there have been no sales outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) channels since the mid-1980s. Mai Manga is also reported to have described how the French mining consortium controls Nigerien uranium mining and keeps the uranium very tightly controlled from the time it is mined until the time it is loaded onto ships in Benin for transport overseas. Mai Manga said he believed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to arrange a special clandestine shipment of uranium to a country like Iraq. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ------ Bush administration officials will later say in June 2003 that the cable left out important details of the trip. They will say it did not include the conclusions of the trip. And consequently, the Washington Post will report in June 2003, &#8220;It was not considered unusual or very important and not passed on to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, or other senior White House officials.&#8221; (( senior administration official )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/13/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 6/13/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 6/12/03 ]] ------ But the CIA source who made the journey, Joseph Wilson, will find this explanation hard to believe. &#8220;Though I did not file a written report [he provided an oral briefing (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3160 ]])], there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission,&#8221; he will later explain. &#8220;The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a CIA report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure.&#8221; (( Joseph C. Wilson )) [[ | New York Times, 7/6/03 ]] ------ According to intelligence analysts later interviewed by congressional investigators, the intelligence community does not believe the trip has contributed any significant information to what is already known about the issue, aside from the details of the 1999 Iraqi delegation. (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Mai Manga )) ((- Ibrahim Mayaki )) ((- Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) March 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1223 false 1 ------ Vice President Richard Cheney and other senior administration officials receive two CIA reports which cite the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq as evidence that &#8220;Iraq ... may be trying to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.&#8221; Neither report mentions the fact that leading centrifuge experts at the Energy Department strongly disagree with the CIA's theory. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) March 14, 2002 British Official Tells Rice that Blair Supports Regime Change in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2852 false 1 ------ Sir David Manning, the British prime minister's foreign policy adviser, meets with President George Bush's national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice. In a summary of the meeting written for Tony Blair, Manning says: &#8220;We spent a long time at dinner on Iraq. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a parliament, and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the States. And you would not budge on your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option.&#8221; (( Memo from David Manning to Tony Blair, 3/14/2002 )) [[ | Los Angeles Times, 6/15/2005 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/09/18/ixnewstop.html | Daily Telegraph, 3/21/05 ]] [[,,1308977,00.html | Guardian, 4/21/05 ]] ------ Manning reports that the &#8220;big questions&#8221; have not been thoroughly considered by the US president. Bush, he notes, &#8220;has yet to find the answers ... [about] how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified&#8221; and how to deal with &#8220;what happens on the morning after.&#8221; (( Memo from David Manning to Tony Blair, 3/14/2002 )) [[ | Washington Post, 6/12/2005 ]] ------ With regard to the problem of international opinion, Manning says he suggested to Rice that &#8220;[r]enewed refusal by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument&#8221; in convincing others to support an invasion. [[,,1308977,00.html | Guardian, 4/21/05 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/09/18/ixnewstop.html | Daily Telegraph, 3/21/05 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 6/15/2005 ]] ====== << decision >> << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> << DSM >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Tony Blair )) ((+ David Manning )) March 15, 2002 British Intelligence: Evidence of Iraqi WMD: &#8216;Sporadic and Patchy&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2856 false 1 ------ British Intelligence MI6 says in an intelligence assessment that information on Saddam's alleged arsenal of illicit weapons is &#8220;sporadic and patchy.&#8221; In its conclusion, the report states: &#8220;We believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of chemical warfare agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons. There is no intelligence on any biological agent production facilities.&#8221; [[;sSheet=/news/2004/09/18/ixnewstop.html | Daily Telegraph, 3/21/05 ]] ====== << wmd >> << DSM >> ((+ UK Secret Intelligence Service )) March 17, 2002 British Ambassador to the US Tells Bush Administration that Britain Backs Regime Change in Iraq; But US and Britain Need a Strategy to Build Support complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3247 false 1 ------ British Ambassador to the US Sir Christopher Meyer attends lunch with Paul Wolfowitz and other Bush administration officials in Washington and assures them that the British would support the use of military force against Iraq. Meyer informs Sir David Manning, Tony Blair's foreign policy adviser, in a memo the following day: &#8220;On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs [Security Council Resolutions] and the critical importance of the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] as an integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy.&#8221; (( Memo from Christopher Meyer to David Manning, 3/18/2002 )) [[ | Los Angeles Times, 6/15/2005 ]] [[ | BBC, 4/29/05 ]] [[,,1308977,00.html | Guardian, 4/21/05 ]] ====== << decision >> << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> << DSM >> ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ Christopher Meyer )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ David Manning )) March 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_179 false 1 ------ Testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA Director George Tenet says: &#8220;There is no doubt that there have been (Iraqi) contacts and linkages to the al-Qaeda organization. As to where we are on September 11, the jury is still out. As I said carefully in my statement, it would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of state sponsorship whether Iranian or Iraqi and we'll see where the evidence takes us.... There is nothing new in the last several months that changes our analysis in any way.... There's no doubt there have been contacts or linkages to the al-Qaeda organization.... I want you to think about al-Qaeda as a front company that mixes and matches its capabilities.... The distinction between Sunni and Shia that have traditionally divided terrorists groups are not distinctions we should make any more, because there are common interests against the United States and its allies in this region, and they will seek capabilities wherever they can get it.... Their ties may be limited by divergent ideologies, but the two sides' mutual antipathies toward the United States and the Saudi royal family suggests that tactical cooperation between them is possible.&#8221; [[ | PBS, 3/19/02 ]] [[ | Agence France Press, 3/20/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ George Tenet )) {{ duplicate_george_tenet_3 }} March 22, 2002 British Official Says in Memo that Washington Has Little Evidence To Support Allegations against Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3254 false 1 ------ Peter Ricketts, the British Foreign Office's political director, offers advice to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw who is to provide Tony Blair with a note (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2912 ]]) before he sets off for a planned meeting with Bush in Texas. In the memo, Ricketts recommends that Blair back the Bush policy on regime change, in a broad sense, because it would allow the British to exert some influence on the exact shape of the administration's policy. &#8220;In the process, he can bring home to Bush some of the realities which will be less evident from Washington,&#8221; he says. &#8220;He can help Bush make good decisions by telling him things his own machine probably isn't.&#8221; But he acknowledges that the British, in backing US plans against Iraq, may have a difficult time convincing Parliament and the British public to support the use of military force against Iraq because of scant evidence supporting Washington's allegations against Iraq. &#8220;The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, but our tolerance of them post-11 September.&#8221; He adds that the &#8220;figures&#8221; being used in a dossier on Iraq that Downing Street is drafting needs more work in order for it to be &#8220;consistent with those of the US.&#8221; He explains: &#8220;[E]ven the best survey of Iraq's WMD programs will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile, or chemical weapons/biological weapons fronts: the programs are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.&#8221; He also says the US has little evidence to support its other allegation. &#8220;US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda is so far frankly unconvincing,&#8221; he says. (( Memo from Peter Ricketts to Jack Straw, 3/22/2002 )) [[,,1308977,00.html | Guardian, 4/21/05 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 6/15/2005 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/09/18/ixnewstop.html | Daily Telegraph, 3/21/05 ]] ====== << deception >> << wmd >> << terroristTies >> << DSM >> ((+ Peter Ricketts )) ((- Tony Blair )) ((+ Jack Straw )) March 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3161 false 1 ------ The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) issues a third and final intelligence report from Italy's military intelligence service, SISMI, on the alleged 2000 Niger-Iraq uranium purchase deal. The report does not provide any information about its source. A later Senate investigation will find that of the seven names mentioned by the Italian reports, &#8220;two were not the individuals in the positions described in the reports&#8221; and &#8220;one date, July 7, 2000, is said to be a Wednesday in the report, but was actually a Friday.&#8221; (( Unnamed US Intelligence Officials )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 6/13/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 3/22/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 11/4/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> Late March 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_407 false 1 ------ Philip Gordon of the Brooking Institution tells the Associated Press, &#8220;Removing Saddam will be opening a Pandora's box, and there might not be any easy way to close it back up.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 3/31/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> ((+ Philip Gordon )) Late March 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_339 false 1 ------ After Dick Cheney's 10-day trip across the Middle East, during which he was told by several Middle East leaders that their respective governments would not support an invasion of Iraq, an official tells the Telegraph of London: &#8220;I don't think it will change the administration's thinking. We are quite determined on this account.&#8221; [[ | Telegraph, 3/24/02 ]] ====== << decision >> April 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_349 false 1 ------ The US State Department begins the &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project aimed at developing plans for post-Saddam Iraq. The project eventually evolves into the collaborative effort of some seventeen working groups involving more than 200 exiled Iraqi opposition figures and professionals including jurists, academics, engineers, scientists and technical experts. These groups meet on numerous occasions over the next eight to ten months, preparing plans to address a wide range of issues. The seventeen working groups include: Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Water, Agriculture and the Environment; Public Finance and Accounts; Transitional Justice; Economy and Infrastructure; Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, and Migration Policy; Foreign and National Security Policy; Defense Institutions and Policy; Civil Society Capacity-Building; Public and Media Outreach; Economic and Infrastructure; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Oil and Energy; Education; Free Media; and Democratic Principles. [[ | Washington File, 1/23/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 2/3/03 ]] [[ | Washington File, 2/12/03 ]] [[ | Free Press, 2/10/03 ]] [[ | US State Department, 4/23/03 ]] [[ | US News, 11/25/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] [[ | Washington Times, 6/5/02 ]] [[ | United States Mission to the European Union, 10/4/02 ]] [[ | Washington File, 12/16/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 12/19/02 ]] [[ | Washington File, 12/16/02 ]] [[ | United States Mission to the European Union, 10/11/02 ]] [[ | Assyrian International News Agency, 10/31/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 10/11/02 ]] --- Problems and setbacks --- The project suffers from a serious lack of interest and funds. In July, the Guardian reports, &#8220;Deep in the bowels of the US State Department, not far from the cafeteria, there is a small office identified only by a handwritten sign on the door reading: &#8216;The Future of Iraq Project.&#8217; .... [T]he understaffed and underfunded Future of Iraq Project has been spending more effort struggling with other government departments than plotting Saddam's downfall.&#8221; [[,2763,752591,00.html | Guardian 7/10/02 ]] --- Achievements --- The $5 million project ultimately produces 13 volumes of reports consisting of some 2,000 pages of what is described as varying quality. The New York Times will later report: &#8220;A review of the work shows a wide range of quality and industriousness.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] ------ The newspaper cites several examples: --- * --- &#8220;... the transitional justice working group, made up of Iraqi judges, law professors and legal experts, ... met four times and drafted more than 600 pages of proposed reforms in the Iraqi criminal code, civil code, nationality laws and military procedure.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- &#8220;The group studying defense policy and institutions expected problems if the Iraqi Army was disbanded quickly.... The working group recommended that jobs be found for demobilized troops to avoid having them turn against allied forces ...&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- &#8220;The democratic principles working group wrestled with myriad complicated issues from reinvigorating a dormant political system to forming special tribunals for trying war criminals to laying out principles of a new Iraqi bill of rights.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- &#8220;The transparency and anticorruption working group warned that &#8216;actions regarding anticorruption must start immediately; it cannot wait until the legal, legislative and executive systems are reformed.&#8217;&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- &#8220;The economy and infrastructure working group warned of the deep investments needed to repair Iraq's water, electrical and sewage systems.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- * --- &#8220;The free media working group noted the potential to use Iraq's television and radio capabilities to promote the goals of a post-Hussein Iraq ....&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] --- Impact of the project's work --- After the US and British invasion of Iraq, Knight Ridder will report, &#8220;Virtually none of the &#8216;Future of Iraq&#8217; project's work was used.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ It was &#8220;ignored by Pentagon officials,&#8221; the New York Times will also observe. [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] ------ Iraq expert and former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, who is one of the American experts involved in the &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project, will tell American Prospect magazine in May 2003: &#8220;[The Office of the Secretary of Defense] has no interest in what I do.&#8221; She will also complain about how the Defense Department prevented the State Department from getting involved in the post-war administration of Iraq. &#8220;They've brought in their own stable of people from AEI [American Enterprise Institute], and the people at the State Department who worked with the Iraqi exiles are being kept from Garner,&#8221; she will explain. [[ | American Prospect, 5/1/03 ]] ------ One of those people is Tom Warrick, the &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project director. When retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the first US administrator in Iraq, requests that Warrick join his staff, Pentagon civilians veto the appointment. [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ Other sources will also say that the Pentagon purposefully ignored the work of the &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project. Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who retires from the Pentagon's Near East/South Asia bureau on July 1, will tell Knight Ridder Newspapers that she and her colleagues were instructed by Pentagon officials in the Office of Special Plans to ignore the State Department's concerns and views. &#8220;We almost disemboweled State,&#8221; Kwiatkowski will recall. [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/12/03 ]] ------ After the fall of Saddam Hussein, critics will say that several of the post-war problems encountered could have been avoided had the Pentagon considered the warnings and recommendations of the &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project. [[ | New York Times, 10/19/03 ]] [[ | American Prospect, 5/1/03 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Judith Yaphe )) ((+ Karen Kwiatkowski )) ((+ Jay Garner )) ((+ Tom Warrick )) {{ duplicate_judith_yaphe_2 }} April 2002 Neoconservatives Say War against Iraq Is about Redrawing &#8216;Geopolitical Map of the Middle East&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3179 false 1 ------ According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, the editor-at-large of the Washington Times, he learns in April 2002 from neoconservatives that the planned war against Iraq is not about WMD, but about reshaping the Middle East. In a February 2004 op-ed, he writes: &#8220;WMDs were not the principal reason for going to war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq; they were the pretext. ... When this writer first heard from prominent neoconservatives in April 2002 that war was no longer a question of &#8216;if&#8217; but &#8216;when,&#8217; the casus belli had little to do with WMDs. The Bush administration, they explained, starkly and simply, had decided to redraw the geopolitical map of the Middle East. The Bush Doctrine of preemption had become the vehicle for driving axis-of-evil practitioners out of power.&#8221; [[ | Washington Times, 2/10/2004 ]] ====== << decision >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Arnaud de Borchgrave )) April 1-30, 2002 US and British Planes Drop .3 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2922 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop .3 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> April 6-7, 2002 During Visit to Crawford, Blair Tells Bush Britain Will Support US Military Action against Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2853 false 1 ------ British Prime Minister Tony Blair, on a visit to Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas [[ | Independent, 2/27/05 ]] ------ , tells the president that the UK intends to &#8220;support military action to bring about regime change.&#8221; [[,15803,1474755,00.html | Guardian, 5/2/05 ]] [[;fcategory_desc=Bush%20Administration%20Lies%20and%20Deceit | Daily Telegraph, 5/4/05 ]] ------ But Blair also says that certain conditions will have to be met. He says that efforts will have to be made to &#8220;construct a coalition,&#8221; &#8220;shape public opinion,&#8221; and demonstrate that all options to &#8220;eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors&#8221; have been exhausted. Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis should be quiescent, he says. [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] ------ During a joint press conference with Bush on the first day of their summit at Crawford, Blair is asked by a reporter if Bush has convinced him &#8220;on the need for military action against Iraq&#8221; and whether or not regime change &#8220;is now the policy of the British government.&#8221; Blair does not respond with a direct answer to either of the questions. [[ | Downing Street, 4/6/02 ]] [[ | White House, 4/6/02 ]] ====== << propaganda >> << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Tony Blair )) April 19, 2002 John Bolton Holds Secret Meeting; Tells Staff that OPCW Is a &#8216;Dying Organization&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2880 false 1 ------ John Bolton, US ambassador to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), organizes a meeting with American members of the organization's staff. He arrives late, explaining that he was trying to find a replacement for the organization's director-general, Jose Bustani. He says during the meeting that the US has encountered &#8220;great difficulty finding people of the right caliber&#8221; because no one wants &#8220;to be associated with a dying organization.&#8221; But the staff had previously been told that the removal of Bustani would help revive the OPCW. Bolton then proceeds to explain that if the replacement is &#8220;like Bustani we will say &#8216;screw the organization. We'll dismantle our [chemical] weapons independently and monitor them ourselves.&#8217;&#8221; Bolton, referring to the US promise that the directorship would pass to another Latin American, complains that &#8220;Latin Americans are so characterized by sheer incompetence that they won't be able to make up their minds.&#8221; He tells the staff that &#8220;if any of this gets out of this room, I'll kill the person responsible.&#8221; [[,4273,4399549,00.html | Guardian, 4/23/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((- Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ John R. Bolton )) April 21-22, 2002 Jose Bustani Removed from Position as Head of OPCW complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2884 false 1 ------ Jose Bustani is removed from his position as director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons during an unusual special session that had been called by the US. Bolton and others in the State Department's arms-control bureau have been pressuring Bustani to resign since February (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2879 ]]; [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2883 ]]; [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2877 ]]). They are upset about the OPCW chief's efforts to involve the organization in the evolving dispute between the US and Iraq over the latter's alleged arsenal of illicit weapons ; [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2886 ]]). Only 113 nations of the organization's 145 members are represented at the meeting. Of those, 15 are not eligible to vote because of outstanding membership fees. [[ | New York Times, 7/26/2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ------ Some of the delegates, according to the Guardian, may have been paid by the US to attend. And one of the member-states, Micronesia, gave permission to the US to vote on their behalf. [[,4273,4399549,00.html | Guardian, 4/23/2002 ]] ------ Before the vote, Bustani denounces the Bush administration's allegations and tells the delegates that they must decide whether genuine multilateralism &#8220;will be replaced by unilateralism in a multilateral disguise.&#8221; (( Statement by Jose Bustani, 4/21/2002 )) ------ But the US delegation, intent on seeing that Bustani is removed, threatens to withhold US dues&#8212;22 percent of the organization's $60 million annual budget&#8212;if Bustani remains in office. A US refusal to pay its dues would likely force the organization to close. [[ | BBC, 4/22/2002 ]] [[ | New York Times, 7/26/2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ------ Bustani told a reporter the week before, &#8220;The Europeans are so afraid that the US will abandon the convention that they are prepared to sacrifice my post to keep it on board.&#8221; [[ | Guardian, 4/16/2002 ]] ------ Only forty-eight members&#8212;less than one-third of the total membership&#8212;vote in favor of removing Bustani. But the no-confidence vote is nonetheless successful because 43 of the delegates abstain. Only seven votes are cast in opposition. [[ | US Department of State (Vote Tally), 2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 6/5/2005 ]] ====== << bustani >> << deception >> << wmd >> ((+ Bush administration )) ((+ Jose M. Bustani )) April 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_180 false 1 ------ British Prime Minister Tony Blair's spokesperson states, &#8220;Given what we know about al-Qaeda's interest in the material, we have to have concerns about a possible marriage between those who wish to acquire it and those who have it.&#8221; Immediately after the statement is made, Britain's own senior military officials refute the claim saying that there is no credible evidence to support the claim. A senior source tells the Independent of London, &#8220;We are not aware of evidence, intelligence or otherwise, that the Iraqi government or its agencies are passing on weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda. Nor have we seen any credible evidence linking the Iraqi government to the September 11 attacks.&#8221; (( Unnamed senior British military source )) [[ | Independent, 3/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> {{ duplicate_unnamed_senior_british_military_source_2 }} April 28, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_172 false 1 ------ Newsweek reports that both US and Czech officials no longer believe the alleged April 2001 meeting between Mr. Atta and the Iraqi officer, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, ever took place (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). The magazine reports that FBI and CIA investigations show no record that Atta visited Prague during that time and instead place the 9/11 plotter in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and Florida during that month. (( Unnamed Czech intelligence officials )) (( Unnamed US Intelligence Officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 5/1/02 ]] [[ | BBC, 5/1/02 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/28/01 ]] ------ But Interior Minister Stanislav Gross maintains that the meeting did take place. A few days after the Newsweek report is published, he says, &#8220;Right now I do not have the slightest information that anything is wrong with the details I obtained from BIS counterintelligence. I trust the BIS more than journalists.&#8221; [[ | Prague Post, 5/8/02 ]] [[ | BBC, 5/1/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Stanislav Gross )) {{ statement_unnamed_us_law_enforcement_official_2 }} May 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_473 false 1 ------ Defense Intelligence Agency analysts issue a &#8220;fabricator notice,&#8221; warning the intelligence community that the agency has determined (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1614 ]]) that Iraqi defector Mohammad Harith is of questionable reliability and recommending that agencies disregard any intelligence that he has provided. It also notes that Harith had been &#8220;coached by [the] Iraqi National Congress&#8221; on what to tell US interrogators. (( Unnamed US intelligence official )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 7/16/04 ]] [[;:4032bd96:6f9ede1cc8cbb76f?type=worldNews&amp;locale=en_IN&amp;storyID=4379274 | Reuters, 2/18/04 ]] [[ | New York Times 2/13/04 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 2/16/04 ]] ------ The classified memo is &#8220;widely circulated within intelligence agencies, including the DIA and CIA,&#8221; Newsweek will later report, citing unnamed intelligence officials. (( Linton Wells )) (( Unnamed US Intelligence Officials )) [[ | Newsweek, 2/16/04 ]] ------ Almost a year later, in a presentation to the UN, Secretary of State Colin Powell will make the claim that Iraq has mobile biological weapons labs (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_442 ]]), and cite Harith as one of intelligence's four sources. Explaining how the reference to a dubious source made its way into Powell's speech, the State Department will say that the &#8220;fabricator notice&#8221; had not been properly cross-referenced in intelligence computers. [[ | Newsweek, 2/16/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> << trailers >> ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) (May 2002-February 2003) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_79 false 1 ------ Karen Kwiatkowski escorts about half a dozen Israelis, including some generals, from the first floor reception area of the Pentagon to Douglas Feith's office. &#8220;We just followed them, because they knew exactly where they were going and moving fast,&#8221; she later explains. The Israelis are not required to sign in as is required under special regulations put into effect after the Sept. 11 attacks. Kwiatkowski speculates that Feith's office may have waived this requirement for the Israelis so that there would be no record of the meeting. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> May 1-31, 2002 US Begins &#8216;Spikes of Activity&#8217; To Put Pressure on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2923 false 1 ------ The US military steps up its attacks on targets in Iraq's &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[,,2087-1632566,00.html | London Times, 5/29/05 ]] [[,,2087-1660300,00.html | London Times, 6/19/05 ]] ------ US and British warplanes drop 7.3 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones during this month, compared with just .3 tons the previous month (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2922 ]]). [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ------ Two months later, British Defense Secretary Geoffrey Hoon will say at a British cabinet meeting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2855 ]]) that the US has &#8220;begun &#8216;spikes of activity&#8217; to put pressure on the regime.&#8221; ====== << aerialAttacks >> ((+ United States )) May 2002 Gen. Franks Says There Is No War Plan for Invading Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2920 false 1 ------ When asked at a news conference in Tampa about what kind of military force would be needed to invade Iraq, Gen. Tommy Franks answers, &#8220;That's a great question and one for which I don't have an answer, because my boss has not yet asked me to put together a plan to do that.&#8221; Two years later, Franks will be on the record saying Rumsfeld instructed him to draw war plans up in November 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2860 ]]). [[ | Washington Post, 5/24/2002 ]] [[ | CBS News, 4/18/04 ]] ====== << decision >> << decisionQuotes >> ((+ Thomas Franks )) ((- George W. Bush )) May 5, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_304 false 1 ------ Appearing on ABC's &#8220;This Week,&#8221; Colin Powell says, &#8220;The United States reserves its option to do whatever it believes might be appropriate to see if there can be a regime change.... US policy is that regardless of what the inspectors do, the people of Iraq and the people of the region would be better off with a different regime in Baghdad.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 12/19/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 5/5/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Colin Powell )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_17 }} May 27, 2002 US Air Force Veteran Says War Against Iraq Began Before Official Invasion complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2973 false 1 ------ According to a report published by the website, Truthout, former US Air Force combat veteran Tim Goodrich tells the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI) jury in Istanbul, Turkey: &#8220;We were dropping bombs then, and I saw bombing intensify. All the documents coming out now, the Downing Street Memo and others, confirm what I had witnessed in Iraq. The war had already begun while our leaders were telling us that they were going to try all diplomatic options first.&#8221; [[ | Raw Story, 6/27/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> ((+ Tim Goodrich )) Summer 2002 Bush Advisor: We Say What Reality Is complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2866 false 1 ------ Reporter and author Ron Suskind meets with a unnamed senior adviser to Bush, who complains to Suskind about an article he recently wrote in Esquire magazine about Bush's communications director, Karen Hughes. In spite of his displeasure, the senior advisor says, boastfully: Guys like you are &#8220;in what we call the reality-based community&#8221;&#8212;people who &#8220;believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. That's not the way the world really works anymore. We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality&#8212;judiciously, as you will&#8212;we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.&#8221; [[ | The New York Times Magazine, 10/17/04 ]] ====== << propaganda >> << deception >> ((- Karen Hughes )) ((+ Ron Suskind )) (Early Summer 2002) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_471 false 1 ------ National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice learns that Department of Energy scientists disagree (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_43 ]]) with the CIA's assessment (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_42 ]]) that a shipment of aluminum tubes intercepted on their way to Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) were to be used in a uranium enrichment program. According to the New York Times, &#8220;Months before, her staff had been told that these experts, at the Energy Department, believed the tubes were probably intended for small artillery rockets.&#8221; (( Unnamed Bush administration officials )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) Summer 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_722 false 1 ------ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz secretly meets with Francis Brooke, the Iraqi National Congress' lobbyist, and Khidir Hamza, the former chief of Iraq's nuclear program. Wolfowitz asks Hamza if he thinks the aluminum tubes (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]) could be used in centrifuges. Hamza&#8212;who has never built a centrifuge and who is considered an unreliable source by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_427 ]]) &#8212;looks at the tubes' specifications and concludes that the tubes are adaptable. Wolfowitz disseminates Hamza's assessment to several of his neoconservative colleagues who have posts in the administration. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 281 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Khidir Hamza )) ((+ Francis Brooke )) Summer 2002 British Officials tell Claire Short Decision to Invade Iraq Occurred in Summer 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_72 false 1 ------ Claire Short, the British secretary for international development who later resigns in protest of the impending invasion of Iraq, will say in June 2003 that three senior British Intelligence officials told her before the war that Bush and Blair's decision to attack Iraq had been made sometime during the summer of 2002 and that it would likely begin in mid-February 2003. &#8220;Three extremely senior people in the Whitehall system said to me very clearly and specifically that the target date was mid-February.&#8221; Furthermore, Short will learn, the decision by Blair's government to participate in the US invasion of Iraq bypassed proper government procedures and ignored opposition to the war from Britain's intelligence quarters. (( Claire Short )) [[,12956,979787,00.html | Guardian, 6/18/03 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ Claire Short )) {{ duplicate_condoleezza_rice_2 }} Summer 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_431 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, says that &#8220;informants within the Iraqi intelligence community,&#8221; have revealed &#8220;that Hussein's VX stockpile is far larger than the 3.9 tons Iraq reported&#8212;something UNSCOM inspectors have long suspected,&#8221; reports The Washington Post. &#8220;Chalabi also says that the VX had been converted into a dry salt for long term storage and was positioned in various sites across Iraq for use in the event of a foreign attack. UNSCOM officials said the account seemed credible, given what was learned about Iraq's VX program in the final months of weapons inspections.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 7/31/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> << chalabi >> ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) June 2002-March 2003 US Steps up Aerial Strikes against Targets in Iraq &#8216;No-Fly&#8217; Zones complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2871 false 1 ------ The frequency of US and British aerial attacks against targets in Iraq's &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones increases dramatically as part of Operation Southern Focus. [[,,2087-1632566,00.html | London Times, 5/29/2005 ]] [[ | New York Times, 7/20/2003 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] [[ | Time, 11/27/2002 ]] [[;ID=147 | Independent, 11/24/2002 ]] ------ According to the London Times, US and British planes drop twice as many bombs on Iraq during the second half of 2002 as they did during the entire year of 2001. [[,,2087-1632566,00.html | London Times, 5/29/2005 ]] ------ Between June 2002 and March 19, 2003, US and British planes fly 21,736 sorties over southern Iraq, dropping 606 bombs on 391 carefully selected targets. [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] [[,,2087-1669640,00.html | London Times, 6/27/2005 ]] [[ | New York Times, 7/20/2003 ]] ------ As Timur Eads, a former US special operations officer, notes in January 2003: &#8220;We're bombing practically every day as we patrol the no-fly zones, taking out air defense batteries, and there are all kinds of CIA and Special Forces operations going on. I would call it the beginning of a war.&#8221; [[ | Boston Globe, 1/6/2003 ]] ------ The airstrikes, which occur primarily in the southern no-fly zone, are also becoming more strategic, targeting Iraq's surface-to-air missiles, air defense radars, command centers, communications facilities, and fiber-optic cable repeater stations. [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] [[ | Time, 11/27/2002 ]] [[;ID=147 | Independent, 11/24/2002 ]] ------ The repeater stations are bombed in order to disrupt the network of fiber-optic cables that transmit military communications between Baghdad and Basra and Baghdad and Nasiriya. &#8220;They wanted to neutralize the ability of the Iraqi government to command its forces; to establish control of the airspace over Iraq; to provide air support for Special Operations forces, as well as for the Army and Marine forces that would advance toward Baghdad; and to neutralize Iraq's force of surface-to-surface missiles and suspected caches of biological and chemical weapons,&#8221; the New York Times reports in July 2003. [[ | New York Times, 7/20/2003 ]] ------ &#8220;We're responding differently,&#8221; one Pentagon official explains to Time magazine in November 2002. &#8220;[We're] hitting multiple targets when we're fired upon&#8212;and they're tending to be more important targets.&#8221; [[ | Time, 11/27/2002 ]] ------ Some time after the invasion, a US general reportedly says (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2968 ]]) at a conference at Nevada's Nellis Air Force Base &#8220;that he began taking out assets that could help in resisting an invasion at least six months before war was declared.&#8221; (( Charlie Clements )) [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 6/19/2005 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> << aerialAttacks >> ((+ United States )) ((+ Britain )) June 2002 Defense Official Secretly Attends Secret Meeting in Paris without White House Approval complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_81 false 1 ------ In Paris, an unnamed Pentagon official (either Harold Rhode or Larry Franklin) meets with Manucher Ghorbanifar (Ghorbanifar says he did not attend this meeting [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ------ ), an Iranian arms trader who had been a central figure in the Iran-Contra affair. [[ | Washington Post, 8/9/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/7/03 ]] ------ Though an unnamed senior Defense official claims the meeting resulted from &#8220;an unplanned, unscheduled encounter,&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 8/9/03 ]] ------ Ghorbanifar later tells the Washington Monthly that &#8220;he arranged that meeting after a flurry of faxes between himself and DoD official Harold Rhode.&#8221; According to Ghorbanifar, an Egyptian and an Iraqi are present at the meeting and brief the Pentagon official about the general situation in Iraq and the Middle East, and what would happen in Iraq if the US were to invade. [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ------ But other reports will suggest that Ledeen and Ghorbanifar may have discussed US collaboration with the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, a US-designated terrorist group, as a means to destabilize the Iranian regime. [[ | Boston Globe, 8/31/2004 ]] ------ The meeting, which took place without White House approval, was preceded by a similar meeting involving Pentagon officials and Ghorbanifar that took place seven months earlier (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 ]]). [[ | Washington Post, 8/9/03 ]] ------ When Secretary of State Colin Powell learns of the meeting, he complains directly to Condoleezza Rice and the office of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. [[ | Newsday, 8/9/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/9/03 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ Harold Rhode )) ((+ Larry Franklin )) ((+ Manucher Ghorbanifar )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) June 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1187 false 1 ------ The CIA issues a classified report titled, &#8220;Iraq and al-Qaeda: A Murky Relationship,&#8221; which reportedly expresses doubts that Iraq is involved in international terrorism. [[ | Washington Post, 10/20/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 4/28/04 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 7/11/04 ]] ------ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith informs Donald Rumsfeld that the report should be read &#8220;for content only&#8212;and CIA's interpretation should be ignored.&#8221; [[;sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 7/11/04 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) June 1-30, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 10.4 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2924 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 10.4 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> Summer 2002-2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_361 false 1 ------ Current and former top US military brass dispute White House claims that Iraq poses an immediate threat to the US and that it must be dealt with militarily. In late July 2002, The Washington Post reports that &#8220;top generals and admirals in the military establishment, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff&#8221; believe that Saddam Hussein's regime &#8220;poses no immediate threat and that the United States should continue its policy of containment rather than invade Iraq to force a change of leadership in Baghdad.&#8221; The report says that the military officials' positions are based &#8220;in part on intelligence assessments of the state of Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and his missile delivery capabilities.&#8221; The newspaper says that there are several reasons why these dissident officers disagree with their civilian bosses. They worry that if Saddam Hussein is removed, Iraq could &#8220;split up, ... potentially leading to chaos and the creation of new anti-American regimes and terrorist sanctuaries in the region.&#8221; It is also possible, they say, that an invasion of Iraq could provoke Saddam Hussein into using whatever weapons of mass destruction he may have. And even if the invasion is successful, the aftermath could see &#8220;mass instability, requiring tens of thousands of US troops to maintain peace, prop up a post-Saddam government, and prevent the fragmentation of Iraq,&#8221; the military brass warns. Their position is that the US should continue its policy of containment, specifically sanctions and the enforcement of the US- and British- imposed &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | The Washington Post, 7/28/02 ]] ------ Responding to the dissenting opinions of these military officials, Richard Perle, current chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says that the decision of whether or not to attack Iraq is &#8220;a political judgment that these guys aren't competent to make.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 7/28/02 ]] ------ A few days later, The Washington Post publishes another story along similar lines, reporting, &#8220;Much of the senior uniformed military, with the notable exception of some top Air Force and Marine generals, opposes going to war anytime soon, a stance that is provoking frustration among civilian officials in the Pentagon and in the White House.&#8221; Notably the division has created &#8220;an unusual alliance between the State Department and the uniformed side of the Pentagon, elements of the government that more often seem to oppose each other in foreign policy debates.&#8221; (( Unnamed senior military officials )) [[ | The Washington Post, 8/1/02 ]] ------ The extent of the generals' disagreement is quite significant, reports the Post, which quotes one proponent of invading Iraq expressing his/her concern that the brass' opinion could ultimately dissuade Bush from taking military action. &#8220;You can't force things onto people who don't want to do it, and the three- and four-star Army generals don't want to do it. I think this will go back and forth, and back and forth, until it's time for Bush to run for reelection,&#8221; the source says. (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | The Washington Post, 8/1/02 ]] ------ During the next several months, several former military officials speak out against the Bush administration's military plans, including Wesley Clark, Joseph P. Hoar, John M. Shalikashvili, Tony McPeak, Gen James L Jones, Norman Schwarzkopf, Anthony Zinni, Henry H. Shelton and Thomas G. McInerney. ------ In mid-January 2003, Time magazine reports that according to its sources, &#8220;as many as 1 in 3 senior officers questions the wisdom of a preemptive war with Iraq.&#8221; They complain that &#8220;the US military is already stretched across the globe, the war against Osama bin Laden is unfinished, and ... a long postwar occupation looks inevitable.&#8221; [[ | Time, 1/19/03 ]] ====== << predictions >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Kim Holmes )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ John M. Shalikashvili )) ((+ Tony McPeak )) ((+ James L. Jones )) ((+ Joseph Hoar )) ((+ Wesley Clark )) ((+ Norman Schwarzkopf )) ((+ Anthony Zinni )) ((+ Thomas G. McInerney )) ((+ Henry H. Shelton )) {{ statement_henry_h._shelton_2 }} {{ statement_jim_cornette_2 }} {{ statement_thomas_g._mcinerney_2 }} {{ statement_wesley_clark_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_general_whose_was_involved_in_the_2001_afghanistan_war_2 }} {{ statement_john_m._shalikashvili_3 }} {{ statement_joseph_hoar_3 }} {{ statement_john_m._shalikashvili_2 }} {{ statement_richard_dunn_iii_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_defense_official_2 }} {{ statement_anthony_zinni_4 }} {{ statement_anthony_zinni_3 }} {{ statement_richard_dunn_iii_3 }} {{ statement_anthony_zinni_2 }} {{ statement_james_l._jones_2 }} {{ statement_tony_mcpeak_2 }} {{ statement_norman_schwarzkopf_2 }} June 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_462 false 1 ------ Entifadh Qunbar, a lobbyist for the Iraqi National Congress (INC), sends a memo to the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in which he provides information about a State Department-funded intelligence program, known as the &#8220;information-collection program,&#8221; run by the INC. Qunbar, who says he is the overall manager of the group, states in the memo that under the program, &#8220;defectors, reports and raw intelligence are cultivated and analyzed,&#8221; and &#8220;the results are reported through the INC newspaper (Al Mutamar), the Arabic and Western media and to appropriate governmental, nongovernmental and international agencies.&#8221; Information is also passed on to William Luti, who will later run the Office of Special Plans (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 ]]), and John Hannah, a senior national-security aide on Cheney's staff, who Qunbar describes as the &#8220;principal point of contact.&#8221; (( Memo )) [[ | Newsweek, 12/15/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 2/12/04 ]] ------ The memo provides a description of some of the people involved in the group and their activities. It says that the analytical group includes five analysts with a background in Iraq's military, Iraq's intelligence services and human rights. One person, a consultant, monitors the Iraqi government's alleged efforts to develop banned weapons. The five analysts process information and write reports, which are sent to Al Mutamar, the INC's newspaper, as well as the US government and many mainstream news organizations. Qunbar says that the information-collection program issued 30 reports between August 2001 and June 2002, which were sent to Al Mutamar. According to the memo, the group published 28 private reports in collaboration with the INC's headquarters in London. The memo reveals that between October 2001 and May 2002, information provided by the INC was cited in 108 articles published by a variety of English-language news publications, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, the New Yorker, CNN, Fox News, and several others. (( Memo )) [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | New York Times, 2/12/04 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << deception >> << propaganda >> << DSM >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Entifadh Qanbar )) ((+ Memo )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) June 28, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_405 false 1 ------ The National Review publishes an op-ed piece by Lawrence Kudlow, titled, &#8220;Taking back the market . . . by force,&#8221; in which he claims, &#8220;The shock therapy of decisive war will elevate the stock market by a couple thousand points.&#8221; Kudlow is the CEO of Kudlow &amp; Co. [[ | National Review, 6/26/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Research Unit for Political Economy )) July 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1225 false 1 ------ Australia's intelligence services report in a July 2002 assessment: &#8220;US agencies differ on whether aluminum tubes, a dual-use item sought by Iraq, were meant for gas centrifuges.&#8221; It adds that the tubes evidence is &#8220;patchy and inconclusive.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> Mid-November 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1138 false 1 ------ In an Interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggests, &#8220;If you're looking for a historical analogy, it's probably closer to post-liberation France [after World War II].&#8221; [[ | Philadelphia Inquirer, 11/17/2002 ]] ====== << democracyRhetoricQuotes >> ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) {{ duplicate_paul_wolfowitz_7 }} (Mid-August 2002) Decision Made to Increase Bombing in Iraq &#8216;No-Fly&#8217; Zones During NCS Meeting at White House complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2956 false 1 ------ During a National Security Meeting at the White House, Condoleezza Rice suggests ending the attacks on Iraq's &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. But Gen. Tommy Franks disagrees. In his autobiography, &#8220;American Soldier,&#8221; he says he told Rice he wanted to continue the bombing in order to make Iraq's defenses &#8220;as weak as possible.&#8221; In his book, Franks uses the term &#8220;spikes of activity&#8221; to refer to the increase in bombing raids. [[,,2087-1660300,00.html | London Times, 6/19/05 ]] ====== << DSM >> << aerialAttacks >> << decision >> ((+ Thomas Franks )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) First week of July 2002 Early July 2002 Condoleezza Rice: The Decision Has Been Made complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_71 false 1 ------ Richard Haass, the director of the policy-planning staff at the State Department, meets with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. &#8220;I raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues,&#8221; he later recalls in an interview with the New Yorker. &#8220;And she said, essentially, that that decision's been made, don't waste your breath.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 3/31/2003 ]] [[ | The Mirror, 9/22/03 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Richard Haass )) {{ duplicate_condoleezza_rice_2 }} Mid-March 2002 Deputy CIA Director Tells NSC that CIA is Reducing Number of Operations in Afghanistan complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2958 false 1 ------ Deputy CIA Director John E. McLaughlin informs senior members of the president's national security team that the CIA is cutting back operations in Afghanistan. [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/04 ]] ====== << diversionOfResources >> << decision >> ((+ John E. McLaughlin )) ((+ National Security Council )) ((- Central Intelligence Agency )) July 2002 Michael Ledeen Attempts to Deal with Iranians, Despite Previous White House Instructions Not To complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2982 false 1 ------ Michael Ledeen contacts Mel Sembler, the US ambassador to Italy, and informs him that he will be traveling to Rome again (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_670 ]]) to continue &#8220;his work&#8221; with the Iranians. Sembler passes this on to Washington, and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley sends word to Ledeen reminding him that he is not to deal with the Iranians. [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/2004 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> ((+ Mel Sembler )) ((+ Michael Ledeen )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) Mid-January 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_307 false 1 ------ Referring to the weapons inspectors upcoming January 27 report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_292 ]]), Colin Powell says in an interview with Saturday's Sueddeutsche Zeitung, &#8220;We believe that at the end of the month it will be convincingly proven that Iraq is not cooperating.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 1/18/03 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Colin Powell )) July 2002-March 19, 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_158 false 1 ------ Numerous US and British, current and former, intelligence, military, and other government officials who have inside knowledge refute claims made by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein's regime has or is seeking ties with international militant Islamic groups. [[ | CBC News, 11/1/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post 9/10/02 ]] [[ | Sunday Herald, 10/13/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 2/4/03 ]] [[ | Wall Street Journal, 8/15/02 ]] [[ | Baltimore Sun, 9/26/02 ]] [[ | Radio Free Europe, 10/29/02 ]] [[;ArticleId=75500 | International Herald Tribune, 11/1/02 ]] [[,0,4538810.story | Los Angeles Times, 11/4/02 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 10/7/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 2/3/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/9/03 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Vincent Cannistraro )) ((+ Rohan Gunaratna )) ((+ Tony Blair )) ((+ Igor Ivanov )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Youssef M. Ibrahim )) ((+ Jack Straw )) ((+ Brent Scowcroft )) ((+ Michael Chandler )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Vincent Cannistraro )) ((+ Daniel Benjamin )) ((+ Jean-Louis Brugui←re )) ((+ MIchael O'Hanlon )) ((+ Baltasar Garzon )) ((+ US Department of State, 4/30/2001 )) ((+ Anna Eshoo )) ((+ Richard Durbin )) ((+ Jean Chretien )) {{ statement_unnamed_military_officer_2 }} {{ statement_richard_butler_2 }} {{ commentary_max_cleland_2 }} {{ commentary_rohan_gunaratna_2 }} {{ commentary_turki_bin_faisal_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_official_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_high-ranking_source_in_the_german_intelligence_community_2 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_8 }} {{ statement_jean-louis_brugui←re_3 }} {{ commentary_youssef_m._ibrahim_2 }} {{ commentary_brent_scowcroft_2 }} {{ statement_vincent_cannistraro_10 }} {{ statement_jack_straw_2 }} {{ commentary_michael_o_hanlon_2 }} {{ commentary_baltasar_garzon_2 }} {{ commentary_vincent_cannistraro_11 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_24 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_26 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_27 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_25 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_british_military_source_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_general_whose_was_involved_in_the_2001_afghanistan_war_2 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_22 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_23 }} {{ statement_daniel_benjamin_2 }} {{ statement_jean-louis_brugui←re_2 }} July 1-31, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 9.5 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2925 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 9.5 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> Mid-January 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_312 false 1 ------ By this time, more than 300 different inspections have been conducted in Iraq by the UN weapons inspection teams, which report no instances of Iraqi attempts to impede their access to the alleged weapons sites. [[ | Associated Press, 1/18/03 ]] [[,0,887892.story?coll=bal-nationworld-headlines | Baltimore Sun, 1/20/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 1/20/03 ]] ------ The London Independent quotes one diplomat, who says, &#8220;Realistically, it is not going to be easy to see in the next two months that we will be able to say that Iraq is not cooperating.&#8221; [[ | Independent 1/8/03 ]] ------ Inspectors also say that there are no signs that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction. An Associated Press report cites several specific cases of alleged weapons sites that the inspection teams&#8212;after repeated visits&#8212;have determined are not involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction. &#8220;UN arms monitors have inspected 13 sites identified by US and British intelligence agencies as major &#8216;facilities of concern,&#8217; and reported no signs of revived weapons building.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 1/18/03 ]] [[,0,887892.story?coll=bal-nationworld-headlines | Baltimore Sun, 1/20/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 1/20/03 ]] ------ And International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Weapons Inspector Mohamed ElBaradei tells reporters: &#8220;I think it's difficult for Iraq to hide a complete nuclear-weapons program. They might be hiding some computer studies or R. and D. on one single centrifuge. These are not enough to make weapons&#8221; (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_51 ]]). [[,9171,1101030120-407286,00.html | Time, 1/12/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Mohamed ElBaradei )) {{ duplicate_mohamed_elbaradei_3 }} Mid-January 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_313 false 1 ------ After more than two months and more than 350 inspections, the UN teams have failed to find the arsenal of banned weapons the US and Britain claim Iraq has. Nor are there any signs of programs to build such weapons. The London Observer reports that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors are convinced Iraq does not have a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. &#8220;IAEA officials and intelligence sources admit it is extremely unlikely that Iraq has nuclear weapons squirreled away,&#8221; The Observer reports, explaining that &#8220;... the IAEA [had] revealed that analysis of samples taken by UN nuclear inspectors in Iraq ... showed no evidence of prohibited nuclear activity.&#8221; [[,12239,882739,00.html | Observer, 1/26/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 12/27/03 ]] [[,0,575624.story | Los Angeles Times, 1/26/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> << weaponsInspections >> July 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1137 false 1 ------ President George Bush says in a speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center: &#8220;Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq could create instability and make the situation worse. The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq.&#8221; [[ | White House, 7/10/02 ]] ====== << democracyRhetoricQuotes >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_26 }} July 21, 2002 British Document: UK to Back Military Action against Iraq; Legal Pretext Needed for Invasion; US Post-War Plan Insufficient complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2854 false 1 ------ The British Cabinet Office issues an eight-page briefing note to prepare officials for an upcoming meeting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2855 ]]) on Britain's role in the United States' confrontation with Iraq. The paper, titled &#8220;Conditions for Military Action,&#8221; addresses a number of issues including US invasion and post-war planning, legal justification for the use of military force, and what the US and British hope to achieve through &#8220;regime change.&#8221; (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) [[,,2087-1650822,00.html | London Times, 5/2/05 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 6/15/2005 ]] --- British support for use of military force against Iraq --- The briefing summarizes the main points of Prime Minister Tony Blair's April meeting (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2853 ]]) with President Bush, recalling that Blair pledged British support for &#8220;military action to bring about regime change&#8221; as long as &#8220;certain conditions&#8221; were met. Blair told Bush that the US and Britain would have to first develop a strategy to build a coalition and &#8220;shape public opinion.&#8221; Additionally, Britain would prefer that all &#8220;options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors [are] exhausted&#8221; and that the Israel-Palestine crisis be quiescent before going to war against Iraq. (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) --- US objectives in Iraq --- The briefing paper reports that US military planners see the removal of Saddam Hussein as the primary objective, to be &#8220;followed by [the] elimination of Iraqi WMD [weapons of mass destruction].&#8221; The briefing notes that within the British government there are doubts that &#8220;regime change,&#8221; by itself, would be sufficient to gain control over any WMD present in Iraq. (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) --- Creating conditions necessary for legal justification --- Noting that &#8220;US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community,&#8221; the briefing paper makes it clear that the British government believes &#8220;[r]egime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law.&#8221; Because Blair told Bush in April that the British would support military action against Iraq, it will be necessary develop a realistic political strategy that would involve, among other things, working with the US to create &#8220;the conditions necessary to justify government military action.&#8221; It is suggested in the briefing note that an Iraqi refusal to cooperate with weapons inspections could help create such conditions. Saddam Hussein would &#8220;likely&#8221; agree to admit inspectors and allow them to operate freely during the first six months of inspections when UNMOVIC is in the process of establishing a monitoring and verification system. After this point, the briefing notes, Hussein would probably begin limiting cooperating with inspectors. This would likely not occur until January 2003. Another alternative&#8212;one that would provide a legal basis for &#8220;regime change&#8221; much sooner&#8212;is that &#8220;an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject ... and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community.&#8221; (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] [[;fcategory_desc=Bush%20Administration%20Lies%20and%20Deceit | Daily Telegraph, 5/4/05 ]] [[,15803,1474755,00.html | Guardian, 5/2/05 ]] [[,,2087-1650822,00.html | London Times, 5/2/05 ]] --- US invasion plan --- According to the briefing paper, US military planners seem to favor an invasion plan that would provide a &#8220;running start&#8221; to the ground invasion. It would consist of &#8220;[a]ir strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq [that] would lead initially to small-scale land operations.&#8221; It would likely begin around November 2002 &#8220;with no overt military build-up,&#8221; followed by the ground invasion that could commence as early as January 2003. The other option under consideration is the &#8220;generated start&#8221; plan, which would involve a longer build-up. (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) [[,,2087-1650822,00.html | London Times, 5/2/05 ]] --- US post-war plan --- The briefing paper notes that US &#8220;military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace&#8221; &#8212;but with &#8220;little thought&#8221; to issues such as &#8220;the aftermath and how to shape it.&#8221; It predicts that a &#8220;post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise.&#8221; The Pentagon's plans &#8220;are virtually silent on this point,&#8221; the document notes, warning of the possibility that &#8220;Washington could look to [the British] to share a disproportionate share of the burden.&#8221; (( Downing Street Briefing, 7/19/2002 )) [[ | Washington Post, 6/12/2005 ]] ====== << propaganda >> << decision >> << legalJustification >> << preWarPlanning >> << DSM >> << predictions >> ((- Tony Blair )) ((- George W. Bush )) July 23, 2002 British Intelligence Chief Says Bush Has Decided on War; &#8216;Facts ... Being Fixed around the Policy&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2855 false 1 ------ Top British officials attend a meeting to discuss the UK's potential role in the Bush administration's confrontation with Iraq. According to the minutes of the meeting, transcribed by Matthew Rycroft, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of the British intelligence service, MI6, says that during his last visit to Washington he noticed a &#8220;perceptible shift in attitude. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy.&#8221; Furthermore, he states, Bush's National Security Council indicated it &#8220;had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record.&#8221; He also noted that there &#8220;was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.&#8221; (( Downing Street Memo, 7/23/2002 )) [[ | Salon (op-ed), 5/6/05 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] ------ Foreign Minister Jack Straw appears to agree with Dearlove's assessment, saying that it seems clear that President Bush has already decided on using military force to depose Saddam Hussein. But Straw notes that the Bush administration's case against Saddam was &#8220;thin.&#8221; The Iraqi leader &#8220;was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran,&#8221; the minutes say, summarizing his remarks. [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] [[,15803,1474755,00.html | Guardian, 5/2/05 ]] ------ There is no indication in the minutes that anyone present at the meeting disputed Dearlove's or Straw's observations. (( Downing Street Memo, 7/23/2002 )) ------ Furthermore, the account provided by the intelligence official and Straw are corroborated by a former senior US official who is later interviewed by Knight Ridder. It is &#8220;an absolutely accurate description of what transpired,&#8221; the official will say. [[ | Knight Ridder, 5/2/05 ]] ------ Straw proposes that the next step would be to &#8220;work up an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,&#8221; which &#8220;would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.&#8221; [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] [[,15803,1474755,00.html | Guardian, 5/2/05 ]] ------ Britain's attorney general, Lord Peter Goldsmith, warns that &#8220;the desire for regime change [is] not a legal base for military action,&#8221; the minutes say. But Blair says that &#8220;it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors.&#8221; [[ | Los Angeles Times, 5/12/05 ]] ------ Finally, the officials agree that the British government &#8220;should continue to work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action&#8221; but &#8220;not ignore the legal issues.&#8221; [[,15803,1474755,00.html | Guardian, 5/2/05 ]] ------ The minutes do not provide any indication that officials discussed how war might be avoided. [[ | Salon, 6/10/2005 ]] ------ The minutes of this meetings will be revealed by the British Sunday Times three years later (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2910 ]]). Commonly referred to as the &#8220;Downing Street Memo,&#8221; the minutes will re-spark the controversy over politicized intelligence. ====== << propaganda >> << decision >> << legalJustification >> << DSM >> << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Michael Boyce )) ((+ Jonathan Powell )) ((+ Sally Morgan )) ((+ Richard Wilson )) ((+ John Scarlett )) ((+ Francis Richards )) ((+ Alastair Campbell )) ((+ Peter Goldsmith )) ((+ Richard Dearlove )) ((+ Geoff Hoon )) ((+ Jack Straw )) ((+ Tony Blair )) {{ commentary_san_francisco_chronicle_2 }} {{ commentary_andrew_bacevich_2 }} July 26, 2002 Rogelio Pfirter Chosen to Head OPCW complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3263 false 1 ------ The 145-member Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) chooses Argentinean Rogelio Pfirter, 53, to replace Jose M. Bustani, the Brazilian diplomat who was outed from his position as director-general of the organization on April 22 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2885 ]]) under pressure from the US. The Bush administration had levied numerous charges against Bustani, chief among them that he was meddling in the United Nations' efforts to persuade Baghdad to admit international weapons inspectors. Pfirter, a lawyer and Argentina's former undersecretary for foreign policy, says he will not interfere in the ordeal. While all nations should join, he says in an interview with the New York Times, &#8220;we should be very aware that there are United Nations resolutions in effect&#8221; and that new members to the OCPW should not be sought &#8220;at the expense&#8221; of pledges to other international organizations. [[ | New York Times, 7/26/2002 ]] ====== << bustani >> ((- Jose M. Bustani )) ((+ Rogelio Pfirter )) July 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_427 false 1 ------ Khidir Hamza, &#8220;who played a leading role in Iraq's nuclear weapon program before defecting in 1994,&#8221; tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that according to German intelligence, Iraq has &#8220;more than 10 tons of uranium and one ton of slightly enriched uranium ... in its possession&#8221; which would be &#8220;enough to generate the needed bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.&#8221; He says that Iraq is &#8220;using corporations in India and other countries to import the needed equipment for its program and channel it through countries like Malaysia for shipment to Iraq.&#8221; He also claims that Iraq is &#8220;gearing up to extend the range of its missiles to easily reach Israel.&#8221; The testimony is widely reported in the media. [[ | CNN, 8/1/02 ]] [[,2763,767235,00.html | Guardian, 8/1/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 8/1/02 ]] ------ Hamza, however, is considered by many to be an unreliable source. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security where Hamza worked as an analyst from 1997 to 1999, says that after Hamza defected &#8220;he went off the edge&#8221; and &#8220;started saying irresponsible things.&#8221; [[ | New York Review of Books, 2/26/04 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] ------ And General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law who was in charge of the dictator's former weapons program but who defected in 1995, told UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors at the time of his defection, as well as US and British intelligence, that Khidhir Hamza was not a reliable source (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_424 ]]). (( UNSCOM Interview with Hussein Kamel, August 22, 1995 )) [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] ------ The IAEA will say in 2004 that before the US invasion of Iraq, it had warned journalists reporting on Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program that Hamza was not a credible source. &#8220;Hamza had no credibility at all. Journalists who called us and asked for an assessment of these people&#8212;we'd certainly tell them.&#8221; (( Unnamed IAEA staff member )) [[ | New York Review of Books, 2/26/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Hussein Kamel )) ((+ Khidir Hamza )) ((+ David Albright )) July 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1819 false 1 ------ The White House formally announces plans to create a public diplomacy agency, to be called the Office of Global Communications, that will be charged with projecting a more positive image of the US abroad. [[,3604,765924,00.html | Guardian, 7/31/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 7/30/02 ]] [[ | CBS News, 7/30/02 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 1/5/03 ]] ------ It will help the world understand &#8220;what America is all about and why America does what it does,&#8221; says White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. ------ The task formerly belonged to the State Department, but Bush's advisors didn't think it was &#8220;doing a good enough job, so they're going to take it on,&#8221; a former Coalition Information Center (CIC) official tells the Guardian. &#8220;Nobody [was] that impressed with Charlotte Beers [of the State Department] and what she's done. She listens to people. She's done a lot of listening, but you need to go further than that.&#8221; [[,3604,765924,00.html | Guardian, 7/31/02 ]] ------ This new public diplomacy office, said to the brainchild of Bush's senior advisor, Karen Hughes, has actually &#8220;existed for months, quietly working with foreign news media outlets to get the American message out about the war on terrorism,&#8221; according to CBS News. [[ | CBS News, 7/30/02 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ George Herbert Walker Bush )) ((+ Hill and Knowlton )) July 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1821 false 1 ------ The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) publishes a report, entitled, &#8220;Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform,&#8221; concluding that, &#8220;There is little doubt that stereotypes of the United States as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive, and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue are pervasive and deeply rooted.&#8221; As a solution, the report recommends developing &#8220;a coherent strategic and coordinating framework, including a presidential directive on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by the president's personal designee.&#8221; The short term public diplomacy objective would be to &#8220;influence opinions and mobilize publics in ways that support specific US interests and policies.&#8221; However, the long term goal would be to promote &#8220;dialogue in ways that are politically, culturally, and socially,&#8221; the report says. (( Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform )) [[ | Miami Herald, 8/13/02 ]] [[,3604,765924,00.html | Guardian, 7/31/02 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Council on Foreign Relations )) July 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_181 false 1 ------ Richard Butler, a former UN inspector from Australia, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, &#8220;I have seen no evidence of Iraq providing weapons of mass destruction to non-Iraqi terrorist groups.&#8221; [[,5936,4817425^401,00.html | Associated Press, 8/1/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Richard Butler )) {{ duplicate_richard_butler_2 }} Late July 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_178 false 1 ------ A Congressional panel investigating the September 11 attacks concludes that there is no evidence that Mohammad Atta&#8212;under any of his known aliases&#8212;visited Prague in April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). [[ | Boston Globe, 8/3/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << terroristTies >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) {{ commentary_former_intelligence_official__2 }} Late July -September 2002 As Much as $700 Million Diverted from Afghanistan to Prepare for Invasion of Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2919 false 1 ------ President Bush allegedly approves a request from the Pentagon for $700 million to help fund military preparations underway in the Gulf for war against Iraq. The charge is made by Bob Woodward in his book, Plan of Attack, released in the spring of 2004. [[ | Woodward, 2004 ]] [[ | CBS News, 4/18/04 ]] ------ The White House and Pentagon will deny the charge claiming that Bush only approved the spending of $178.4 million out of a requested total of $750 million. According to the Pentagon, $178.4 million is spent on 21 projects in Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. At least 11 of them are in Kuwait, which becomes the major staging ground for operations in Iraq. In that country alone, $24 million is spent constructing an ammunition storage and supply system for an Army brigade, and $15 million worth of communications equipment is installed at the Arifjan Base Camp. The military also builds a $3 million detention facility and a $6.5 million inland petroleum-distribution system. In Qatar, $36.4 million goes toward the construction of a forward headquarters facility for Central Command. [[ /timeline/2004/wallstreetjournal042204.html | Wall Street Journal, 4/22/2004, pp A4 ]] ------ The money for these projects is taken from a supplemental appropriation for the Afghan War without congressional approval. [[ | CBS News, 4/18/04 ]] ====== << decision >> << diversionOfResources >> ((+ George W. Bush )) July 31, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_362 false 1 ------ Joseph P. Hoar, a retired Marine Corps general who commanded American forces in the Persian Gulf after the 1991 war, warns the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the proposed invasion is both &#8220;risky&#8221; and possibly unnecessary. [[ | New York Times, 8/1/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Joseph Hoar )) August 2002 Funding for Iraqi National Congress Taken up by Defense Department complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3206 false 1 ------ After the State Department decides it will no longer provide the Iraqi National Congress (INC) with monthly payments, funding for the INC's &#8220;information collection&#8221; program and other covert operations is picked up by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which begins providing Chalabi's group with a monthly stipend of $340,000. Under the DIA's rules, the INC is forbidden from publicly releasing any info about its intelligence program without written permission from the Pentagon. Under the State Department, the INC had been feeding stories to the media. The Defense Department tasks the INC with collecting intelligence on Iraq's alleged ties to al-Qaeda, its presumed arsenal of WMD, and the whereabouts of Michael Scott Speicher, a US Navy pilot missing since being shot down during the first gulf war. Not withstanding its divorce with the INC, the State Department will continue supporting other INC initiatives, providing it with $8 million for its newspaper, anti-Hussein television broadcasts into Iraq, and regional offices and humanitarian relief programs. [[ | New Yorker, 6/7/2004 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 4/5/2004 ]] [[ | Houston Chronicle, 3/11/2004 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 8/16/2002 ]] ====== << chalabi >> ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) ((+ US Department of State )) ((+ Iraqi National Congress )) (Early August 2002) Bush and Blair Discuss Plans to Depose Hussein complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_715 false 1 ------ British Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George Bush discuss over the phone their intention to topple Saddam Hussein's government. An unnamed White House official who later reads the transcripts of the 15-minute phone call will explain to Vanity Fair that it was clear from their conversation that the decision to invade Iraq had already been made. The magazine reports in April 2004: &#8220;Before the call, the official says, he had the impression that the probability of invasion was high, but still below 100 percent, Afterward, he says, &#8216;it was a done deal.&#8217; &#8221; (( Unnamed White House official )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pp 284 ]] ====== << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Tony Blair )) August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_432 false 1 ------ US satellite photos reportedly show increased activity near the Taji factory in Iraq, which US intelligence suspects may be involved in the production of anthrax. The facility is located 10 miles outside of Baghdad. [[ | World Tribune, 8/14/02 ]] ------ But on August 20, a week after news of the satellite photos are reported, the Iraqi government allows 15 journalists, mostly Iraqis representing foreign presses, to tour the alleged weapons site. Reporters who tour the facility find &#8220;piles of 110-pound sacks of sugar and rice and boxes of milk covered the floor. Writing on the sacks [indicates] ... they were imported under the oil-for-food program that allows Iraq to sell unlimited quantities of oil provided the proceeds go for food, medicine and other supplies,&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 8/20/02 ]] ------ including powdered milk imported from Yemen, Vietnam, Tunisia and Indonesia and sacks of sugar imported from Egypt and India. [[ | Saleh, 8/20/02 ]] ------ Iraq's trade minister, Mohammed Mehdi Saleh, explains that the trucks captured by the satellite photos had been distributing foodstuffs from al-Taji to warehouses in the various provinces of Iraq. He states: &#8220;They [Americans] are checking every movement in Iraq, but a satellite cannot tell real information. This is rubbish information, actually rubbish information to convert baby milk and baby food and sugar to weapons of mass destruction.... We started to move food from this warehouse to supply stores in provinces early this month, and more specifically on August 4 as we started to distribute food rations every two months.... We have transported 2,500 tons of powdered milk in 187 trucks and not 60 trucks as the Americans said and we will continue (to do so).... If they enlarge the satellite photographs they can compare boxes of the baby milk moved from this site as they were not covered and boxes here.&#8221; [[ | Saleh, 8/20/02 ]] ------ An enlargement of the pictures would have revealed the words, &#8220;Al-moudhish,&#8221; written on the packages&#8212;the brand name of the milk that had been imported from Oman. [[ | Associated Press, 8/20/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Mohammed Mehdi Saleh )) August 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_409 false 1 ------ A panel of experts on Iraq warns the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that administering Iraq after the toppling of Saddam's government will be expensive and difficult. The panel says that &#8220;there are no obvious successors to Saddam Hussein and that the Bush administration should be prepared to help install and protect a pro-American government if it decides to topple him&#8212;a proposition, they added, that would be long and expensive,&#8221; the New York Times reports. &#8220;Nearly all the experts argued that setting up a stable, pro-Western government in Baghdad would require a huge infusion of aid and a long term commitment of American troops to maintain peace.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/2/02 ]] ------ Phebe Marr, a professor from the National Defense University who has written prolifically on Iraq, tells the panel, &#8220;If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants on the cheap.&#8221; Scott Feil, a retired Army colonel who studies postwar reconstruction programs, says that 75,000 troops will be needed in Iraq to stabilize the country after Saddam is removed from power. He estimates that such a deployment will cost in excess of $16 billion per year. After the first 12 months, the colonel says that the force could be reduced in number, possibly to as low as 5,000, though this military presence would have to be maintained for at least another five years. In contrast, Caspar W. Weinberger, the secretary of defense under President Ronald Reagan argues that the United States will not need to undertake a major effort in rebuilding Iraq. [[ | New York Times, 8/2/02 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> << predictions >> ((+ Phebe Marr )) ((+ Caspar Weinberger )) ((+ Scott Feil )) August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_481 false 1 ------ The Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, also know as the &#8220;Wurmser-Maloof&#8221; project, which had been formed shortly after the September 11 attacks (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 ]]), is disbanded. [[ | Reuters, 2/19/04 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_709 false 1 ------ Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] reservist and Penn-State political-science professor Chris Carney and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith give two presentations on Iraq's alleged ties to al-Qaeda to the CIA at the agency's Langley headquarters. CIA analysts are not impressed, having seen much of the information before and having already determined that it was not credible. Some of the information will nevertheless be included in speeches by Bush and in testimony by Tenet to Congress. The information is also put into a classified memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee by Feith, which is later leaked to the Weekly Standard, a neoconservative magazine. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 238 ]] ====== << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << terroristTies >> ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Chris Carney )) ((- US Congress )) August 2002 Top Bush Officials Form Group To Sell Iraq War to the Public, Congress, and Allies complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3153 false 1 ------ White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. forms the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, which aims to &#8220;educate the public&#8221; about the alleged threat from Iraq. A senior official involved with the group later describes it as &#8220;an internal working group, like many formed for priority issues, to make sure each part of the White House was fulfilling its responsibilities.&#8221; Members of the group include Karl Rove, Karen Hughes, Mary Matalin, James R. Wilkinson, Nicholas E. Calio, and policy advisers led by Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, and I. Lewis Libby. They meet weekly in the White House Situation Room. A &#8220;strategic communications&#8221; task force under the WHIG is charged with planning speeches and writing white papers. [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/2003 ]] ------ According to an intelligence source interviewed by the New York Daily News in October 2005, the group, on &#8220;a number of occasions,&#8221; will attempt &#8220;to push the envelope on things,&#8221;&#8212;&#8220;The [CIA] would say, &#8216;We just don't have the intelligence to substantiate that.&#8217;&#8221; [[ | New York Daily News, 10/19/2005 ]] ------ An important part of the WHIG strategy is to feed their messages to friendly reporters such as New York Times reporter Judith Miller. James Bamford, in his book A Pretext for War, writes: &#8220;First OSP [Office of Special Plans] supplies false or exaggerated intelligence; then members of the WHIG leak it to friendly reporters, complete with prepackaged vivid imagery; finally, when the story breaks, senior officials point to it as proof and parrot the unnamed quotes they or their colleagues previously supplied.&#8221; [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 325 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Karen Hughes )) ((+ Mary Matalin )) ((+ James R. Wilkinson )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Karl Rove )) ((+ Andrew Card )) ((+ White House Iraq Group )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Mel Sembler )) (August 2002) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1188 false 1 ------ Pentagon officials working in the Office of Special Plans visit George Tenet at CIA headquarters under the direction of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith to voice their objections to the final draft of a CIA assessment on Iraq's supposed links to militant Islamic groups. The officials disputed the report's conclusion that intelligence suggesting an alleged April 2001 Prague meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_162 ]]) was not credible. As a result of Pentagon officials' objections, the CIA's assessment is postponed until September 18. Tenet will later say he &#8220;didn't think much of&#8221; the briefing. [[ | Newsweek, 7/19/04 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 7/11/04 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << pragueConnection >> ((+ George Tenet )) August 1-31, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 14.1 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2926 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 14.1 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_369 false 1 ------ Retired Army General Henry H. Shelton, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tells The Washington Post, &#8220;If we get drawn into something in Iraq, then our focus will go very heavily there, and it will be hard to sustain the momentum in the war on terrorism. That's the biggest danger that I see.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 9/1/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Henry H. Shelton )) {{ duplicate_henry_h._shelton_2 }} Early August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_173 false 1 ------ Several Pentagon officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, meet with the FBI's assistant director for counterterrorism, Pat D'Amuro, to discuss the latest intelligence concerning the alleged April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]) meeting between 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. Wolfowitz pressures the FBI briefers to confirm that the Prague meeting had in fact happened. The FBI concedes that the occurrence of the meeting, though not proven, was at least possible. [[ | Time, 9/2/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << deception >> << terroristTies >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) ((+ Pasquale D'Amuro )) August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_366 false 1 ------ General James L. Jones, the four-star commander of the Marine Corps who will be taking over as NATO's supreme allied commander, tells The Washington Times that toppling Iraq's government and defeating its army will be much more difficult than it was to remove the Taliban. &#8220;Afghanistan was Afghanistan; Iraq is Iraq,&#8221; he explains. &#8220;It would be foolish, if you were ever committed to going into Iraq, to think that the principles that were successful in Afghanistan would necessarily be successful in Iraq. In my opinion, they would not.&#8221; The general suggests that a large force will be needed to successfully invade the country. [[ | Telegraph, 8/23/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ James L. Jones )) {{ duplicate_james_l._jones_2 }} August 3, 2002 US Official Asserts US Will Have International Support When Time Comes for Regime Change in Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2894 false 1 ------ US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton tells John Humphries of the BBC: &#8220;Let there be no mistake... our policy... insists on regime change in Baghdad and that policy will not be altered whether the inspectors go in or not... we are content that at the appropriate moment we will have the requisite degree of international support.&#8221; When Humphries asks, &#8220;But if you don't have it, and all the indications are that at the moment you won't, then what?&#8221; Bolton responds, bluntly: &#8220;We will have it Mr. Humphries.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 4/29/2005 ]] ====== << decision >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ John R. Bolton )) August 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_381 false 1 ------ Appearing on CBS's &#8220;Face the Nation,&#8221; Brent Scowcroft warns that a unilateral invasion of Iraq could destabilize the Middle East and undermine efforts to defeat international anti-American militant groups. Scowcroft says: &#8220;It's a matter of setting your priorities. There's no question that Saddam is a problem. He has already launched two wars and spent all the resources he can working on his military. But the president has announced that terrorism is our number one focus. Saddam is a problem, but he's not a problem because of terrorism. I think we could have an explosion in the Middle East. It could turn the whole region into a cauldron and destroy the War on Terror.&#8221; [[ | Times, 8/5/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Brent Scowcroft )) {{ commentary_michael_ledeen_2 }} August 5, 2002 US Decides To Begin Offensive Against Iraq with Air Raids complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2870 false 1 ------ US military planners decide that the operation to depose Saddam Hussein will begin with an air offensive&#8212;under the guise of enforcing the so-called &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone &#8212;and Special Forces operations aimed at weakening Iraqi air defenses. This will begin without any formal declaration or authorization from the UN. Meanwhile the US and British will build up forces in Kuwait in preparation for a full-scale ground invasion. [[,,2087-1632566,00.html | London Times, 5/29/2005 ]] ------ The tonnage of ordnance dropped on targets in Iraq's &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones will increase dramatically over the next few months (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2926 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2927 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2928 ]]). ====== << legalJustification >> << decision >> << DSM >> << aerialAttacks >> (8:00 p.m.) August 5, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_716 false 1 ------ After dinner at the White House, Colin Powell speaks privately with George Bush and convinces him that international backing would be crucial for an invasion of Iraq and the inevitable occupation that would follow. Powell cites polls which indicate that a majority of Americans favor seeking a UN resolution. Bush reluctantly agrees. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 284 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ George W. Bush )) August 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_371 false 1 ------ Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco, Cheney states, &#8220;Many of us, I think, are skeptical that simply returning the inspectors will solve the problem. A debate with [Mr Hussein] over inspectors simply, I think, would be an effort by him to obfuscate, delay and avoid having to live up to the accords that he signed up to at the end of the Gulf war.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/7/02 ]] [[ | Observer, 8/11/02 ]] ------ In the speech, he also tells his audience that Saddam &#8220;sits on top of 10 per cent of the world's oil reserves. He has enormous wealth being generated by that,&#8221; ------ adding, &#8220;And left to his own devices, it's the judgment of many of us that in the not too distant future he will acquire nuclear weapons.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/7/02 ]] [[ | Observer, 8/11/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << nuclearQuotes >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) August 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_379 false 1 ------ Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes an op-ed piece which is published in the paper edition of The Washington Post. In it, Kissinger argues against a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq without first creating a new international security framework that allows for nations to conduct preemptive strikes only under specific limited conditions. Otherwise, Kissinger argues, such an action would set a dangerous precedent that other nations might attempt to use in justifying their own policies. [[ | New York Times, 8/16/02 ]] [[,2933,60626,00.html | Fox News, 8/16/02 ]] [[ | Times of London, 8/13/02 ]] [[ | Independent, 8/17/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ John Larson )) {{ excerpt_henry_a._kissinger_3 }} {{ excerpt_henry_a._kissinger_2 }} {{ excerpt_henry_a._kissinger_5 }} {{ excerpt_henry_a._kissinger_4 }} August 13, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_382 false 1 ------ Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger joins Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and his advisors for a meeting. Describing the meeting, the New York Times reports three days later that they &#8220;have decided that they should focus international discussion on how Iraq would be governed after Mr. Hussein&#8212;not only in an effort to assure a democracy but as a way to outflank administration hawks and slow the rush to war, which many in the department oppose.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/15/02 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Henry A. Kissinger )) August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_438 false 1 ------ USA Today reports: &#8220;US intelligence cannot say conclusively that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, an information gap that is complicating White House efforts to build support for an attack on Saddam's Iraqi regime. The CIA has advised top administration officials to assume that Iraq has some weapons of mass destruction. But the agency has not given President Bush a &#8216;smoking gun,&#8217; according to US intelligence and administration officials. The most recent unclassified CIA report on the subject goes no further than saying it is &#8216;likely&#8217; that Iraq has used the four years since United Nations inspectors left the country to rebuild chemical and biological weapons programs.&#8221; (( Unnamed US intelligence and administration officials )) [[ | USA Today, 8/15/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_385 false 1 ------ Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger says on ABC News that unless Mr. Hussein &#8220;has his hand on a trigger that is for a weapon of mass destruction, and our intelligence is clear, I don't know why we have to do it now, when all our allies are opposed to it.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/15/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Lawrence Eagleburger )) August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_386 false 1 ------ Kenneth Adelman, a former Reagan official with close ties to senior Bush aides, &#8220;It'll be a piece of cake to get public support. The American people will be 90 percent for it. Almost nobody in Congress will object, and the allies will pipe down.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 8/18/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((- US Congress )) ((+ Kenneth Adelman )) August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_387 false 1 ------ The Washington Post syndicated columnist Charles Krauthhammer, speaking on &#8220;Inside Washington&#8221; in a discussion with fellow Post columnist Charlie King and Post military reporter Thomas Ricks, argues in favor of the Bush administration's policy on Iraq. At one point, moderator Gordan Petersons asks what the US should do after deposing Saddam. Krauthhammer responds: &#8220;We don't speak about exit strategies; this is not Bosnia, or Haiti, or the Balkans. This is very important, everybody understands it, we are not going to run away. We are going to get there, and we are going to stay. We are going to try to make a reasonably civil society, reasonably pro-American, a good influence on the neighbors, and disarmed. That's a large undertaking, and I think we are absolutely [unintelligible] everybody who is supporting the war or the invasion is in favor of staying and doing the job.&#8221; When Thomas Ricks notes that Krauthhammer's proposal would involve nine of the US Army's ten active-duty divisions, he counters, &#8220;That assumption is entirely unwarranted. I think we will be accepted as liberators, as we were in Afghanistan.&#8221; He also shoots down a comment from Peterson referring to the cost of invading Iraq. &#8220;If we win the war, we are in control of Iraq, it is the single largest source of oil in the world, it's got huge reserves, which have been suppressed because of Iraq's actions, and Saddam's. We will have a bonanza, a financial one, at the other end, if the war is successful,&#8221; Krauthhammer explains. [[ | WUSATV, 8/3/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Charles Krauthhammer )) August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_370 false 1 ------ In an interview broadcast by BBC Radio 4's Today Program, Condoleezza Rice says: &#8220;This is an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own population, his neighbors and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, on all of us. There is a very powerful moral case for regime change. We certainly do not have the luxury of doing nothing.... Clearly, if Saddam Hussein is left in power doing the things that he is doing now, this is a threat that will emerge, and emerge in a very big way.... The case for regime change is very strong. This is a regime that we know has twice tried and come closer than we thought at the time to acquiring nuclear weapons. He has used chemical weapons against his own people and against his neighbors, he has invaded his neighbors, he has killed thousands of his own people. He shoots at our planes, our airplanes, in the no-fly zones where we are trying to enforce UN security resolutions.... History is littered with cases of inaction that led to very grave consequences for the world. We just have to look back and ask how many dictators who ended up being a tremendous global threat and killing thousands and, indeed, millions of people, should we have stopped in their tracks.&#8221; [[ | Telegraph, 8/16/02 ]] [[ | Times, 8/16/02 ]] [[,2763,775110,00.html | Guardian, 8/15/02 ]] [[ | Reuters, 8/15/02 ]] ------ Interestingly, Rice does not say Iraq has chemical, biological or nuclear arms. Instead, she speaks of the danger Saddam would pose, &#8220;if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.&#8221; [[ | USA Today, 8/15/02 ]] ====== << imminentThreatQuotes >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) {{ commentary_tony_lloyd_2 }} August 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_380 false 1 ------ Brent Scowcroft is the source of major embarrassment for the administration when he authors an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing against the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. He says that the toppling of Saddam's regime would destabilize the Middle East and thus &#8220;turn the whole region into a cauldron and destroy the War on Terror.&#8221; Noting that &#8220;there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks,&#8221; he calls on Bush to abandon his designs on Saddam Hussein and instead refocus his foreign policy on the war on terrorism. [[ | Wall Street Journal ]] ------ It is suggested that Scowcroft's criticisms probably reflect the feelings of the president's father. The Los Angeles Times reports: &#8220;Several former officials close to Scowcroft said they doubted he would have gone public with that posture without clearing the move first with the senior Bush, heightening questions about the latter's view on confronting Iraq. The former president has not commented publicly, which has only fed speculation.&#8221; [[ | Los Angeles Times, 8/17/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> << terroristTies >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Brent Scowcroft )) ((+ George Herbert Walker Bush )) {{ commentary_richard_perle_3 }} {{ commentary_unnamed_administration_official_4 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_3 }} {{ commentary_lawrence_eagleburger_2 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_4 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_8 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_7 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_6 }} {{ excerpt_brent_scowcroft_5 }} {{ commentary_james_baker_6 }} {{ commentary_james_baker_4 }} {{ commentary_james_baker_5 }} {{ commentary_james_baker_3 }} {{ commentary_james_baker_2 }} August 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_391 false 1 ------ After a spate of criticism of his administration's Iraq policy from several prominent Republican former US government officials, President George Bush says from his ranch in Mount Crawford, Texas: &#8220;I am aware that some very intelligent people are expressing their opinions about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. I listen very carefully to what they have to say. I'll continue to consult.... I will use all the latest intelligence to make informed decisions about how best to keep the world at peace, how best to defend freedom for the long run.... Listen, it's a healthy debate for people to express their opinion. People should be allowed to express their opinion. But America needs to know, I'll be making up my mind based upon the latest intelligence and how best to protect our own country plus our friends and allies.&#8221; But he also adds, &#8220;There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that this man is thumbing his nose at the world, that he has gassed his own people, that he is trouble in his neighborhood, that he desires weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/17/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 8/16/02 ]] [[,2933,60626,00.html | Fox News, 8/16/02 ]] ====== << wmdQuotesGeneral >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ excerpt_hamid_sohrabpour_2 }} August 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_384 false 1 ------ In a Washington Post op-ed piece, Zbigniew Brzezinski reprimands the Bush administration for its reckless foreign policy, saying that &#8220;war is too serious a business and too unpredictable in its dynamic consequences&#8212;especially in a highly flammable region&#8212;to be undertaken because of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual assertions.&#8221; He adds that &#8220;[i]f it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes US global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more responsible system of international security.&#8221; He then makes several recommendations for improving US foreign policy, including a summary of &#8220;a wrong way for America to initiate a war.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 8/18/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Zbigniew Brzezinski )) {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_5 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_4 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_6 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_7 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_3 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_2 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_8 }} {{ excerpt_zbigniew_brzezinski_9 }} August 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_365 false 1 ------ Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded allied forces during the Gulf War, warns against invading Iraq without the support of allies. He explains: &#8220;In the Gulf War we had an international force and troops from many nations. We would be lacking if we went it alone at this time.... It is not going to be an easy battle but it would be much more effective if we didn't have to do it alone.&#8221; [[ | Times, 8/19/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Norman Schwarzkopf )) {{ duplicate_norman_schwarzkopf_2 }} August 19-21, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1839 false 1 ------ 86 percent of those polled in a CNN/USA Today Gallup poll say they believe that Saddam Hussein supports groups &#8220;that have plans to attack the United States&#8221; and 53 percent think Saddam was &#8220;personally involved in the September 11 attacks.&#8221; The results are based on telephone interviews with 801 adults and the margin of error is estimated at 4 percent. [[ | Gallup, 08/23/02 ]] ====== << publicOpinion >> August 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_124 false 1 ------ During an interview with Fox News, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld mocks calls from Washington, Europe and the Arab world demanding that the Bush administration show them evidence to substantiate the hawk's claim that Saddam Hussein is a threat to the US and its allies. &#8220;Think of the prelude to World War Two,&#8221; the Defense Secretary says. &#8220;Think of all the countries that said, well, we don't have enough evidence. I mean, Mein Kampf had been written. Hitler had indicated what he intended to do. Maybe he won't attack us. Maybe he won't do this or that. Well, there were millions of people dead because of the miscalculations. The people who argued for waiting for more evidence have to ask themselves how they are going to feel at that point where another event occurs.&#8221; [[ | Telegraph 8/21/02 ]] [[ | Guardian 8/22/02 ]] [[,2933,60818,00.html | Fox News, 8/20/03 ]] ------ Rumsfeld also says during a news conference that according to &#8220;intelligence reports,&#8221; Saddam's government is &#8220;hosting, supporting or sponsoring&#8221; an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. Responding to a question about whether he has any evidence to support the claim that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq, Rumsfeld states, &#8220;There are Al-Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq.... The suggestion that ... [Iraqi government officials] who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren't aware of where these folks [al-Qaeda] are or what they're doing is ludicrous in a vicious, repressive dictatorship.... [I]t's very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what's taking place in the country.&#8221; [[ | New York Times 8/20/02 ]] ------ Shortly after Rumsfeld's remarks, a senior US intelligence official tells The Guardian that there is no evidence to back the defense secretary's claims. &#8220;They are not the official guests of the Government,&#8221; a second official says, adding that any al-Qaeda in the region are still &#8220;on the run.&#8221; [[ | Guardian 8/22/02 ]] ====== << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> << imminentThreatQuotes >> << terroristTiesQuotes >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) {{ duplicate_donald_rumsfeld_5 }} August 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_182 false 1 ------ Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, citing various &#8220;intelligence reports,&#8221; claims that the Iraqi government is &#8220;hosting, supporting or sponsoring&#8221; an al-Qaeda presence in Iraq. When asked if he has evidence to support this claim Rumsfeld responds: &#8220;There are al-Qaeda in a number of locations in Iraq.... The suggestion that ... [Iraqi government officials] who are so attentive in denying human rights to their population aren't aware of where these folks [al-Qaeda] are or what they're doing is ludicrous in a vicious, repressive dictatorship.&#8221; He also says, &#8220;It's very hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what's taking place in the country.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 8/20/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 8/20/02 ]] ------ Shortly after the defense secretary's allegations, an unnamed intelligence official tells the Guardian, &#8220;They are not the official guests of the government,&#8221; adding that any al-Qaeda in the region are still &#8220;on the run.&#8221; A month later, Knight Ridder reports that according to an anonymous US official, Rumsfeld's charge is based on information from Kurdish opposition groups which are feeding information to the Pentagon. (( Unnamed US official )) (( Unnamed US intelligence official )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 9/25/02 ]] [[ | Guardian, 8/22/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) August 21, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_378 false 1 ------ Following a trip to several Middle Eastern countries, which included meetings with several diplomats and foreign dignitaries, US Representative John Larson warns that &#8220;the innocent slaughter of Muslims will create, in essence, what Osama bin Laden was unable to do, a united Islamic jihad against us.&#8221; [[;BRD=1641&amp;PAG=461&amp;dept_id=10110&amp;rfi=6 | New Britain Herald, 8/22/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> ((+ John Larson )) August 23, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_367 false 1 ------ In a speech to the Economic Club of Florida in Tallahassee, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who recently served as the president's special envoy to the Middle East, argues that there are more pressing issues than Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Specifically, he points to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instability in Afghanistan, the continuing existence of the al-Qaeda network, and the theocracy in Iran. He adds that the proposed war with Iraq would be expensive and would put considerable strain on the military's resources, which already are &#8220;stretched too tight all over the world.&#8221; Furthermore, notes the general, invading Iraq would further antagonize America's allies in the Middle East. &#8220;We need to quit making enemies that we don't need to make enemies out of,&#8221; he says. He also notes, &#8220;It's pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way and all the others who have never fired a shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.&#8221; [[ | Tampa Tribune, 8/24/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ James L. Jones )) {{ duplicate_anthony_zinni_2 }} August 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_383 false 1 ------ The New York Times publishes an opinion article by James Baker, a former secretary of state and a close friend of the Bush family. In his piece, Baker writes that the US must raise a coalition and secure a broad base of support before attempting to remove Saddam Hussein by force. Although it may be possible to successfully invade the country and depose its regime, he argues, America's image would suffer irreparable damage as a consequence. Therefore, according to Baker, a unilateral preemptive strike in the midst of massive opposition from US allies in Europe and the Middle East would be detrimental to American strategic interests. [[ | New York Times, 8/25/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ James Baker )) August 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_121 false 1 ------ In a speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Vice President Richard Cheney says Saddam Hussein will &#8220;seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.&#8221; He also states unequivocally that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. &#8220;Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction,&#8221; he says. &#8220;There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and against us ... What he wants is time, and more time to husband his resources to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons program, and to gain possession of nuclear weapons.&#8221; Therefore he argues, the answer is not weapons inspections. &#8220;Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of shoot and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 8/26/02 ]] ------ Cheney's speech marks the first major statement from the White House regarding the Bush administration's Iraq policy following a flood of criticisms from former officials. Significantly, the speech was not cleared by the CIA or the State Department. (( Unnamed sources interviewed by Newsweek )) [[ | Newsweek, 9/9/02 ]] ------ Furthermore, Cheney's comments dismissing the need for the return of inspectors, were not cleared by President Bush. (( Andrew Card )) [[ | Newsweek, 9/9/02 ]] ------ Three days after the speech, a State Department source tells CNN that Powell's view clashes with that which was presented in Cheney's speech, explaining that the secretary of state is opposed to any military action in which the US would &#8220;go it alone ... as if it doesn't give a damn&#8221; what other nations think. The source also says that Powell and &#8220;others in the State Department were &#8216;blindsided&#8217; by Cheney's &#8216;time is running out&#8217; speech ... and were just as surprised as everyone else,&#8221; CNN reports. (( Unnamed source interviewed by CNN )) [[ | CNN, 8/30/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> << nuclearQuotes >> << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) {{ duplicate_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_2 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_7 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_13 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_10 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_11 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_9 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_8 }} {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_12 }} August 27, 2002 Ari Fleischer Says Bush Has Made No Decision on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2858 false 1 ------ After a meeting between President Bush and Saudi ambassador Bandar bin Sultan, Ari Fleischer tells the press, &#8220;The president stressed that he has made no decisions, that he will continue to engage in consultations with Saudi Arabia and other nations about steps in the Middle East, steps in Iraq.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 8/27/02 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((- Bandar bin Sultan )) August 27, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_498 false 1 ------ Speaking to US Marines of the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton in California, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says: &#8220;Leadership in the right direction finds followers and supporters.... It's less important to have unanimity than it is making the right decision and doing the right thing, even though at the outset it may seem lonesome.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 8/27/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 8/28/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) Late August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_389 false 1 ------ Gideon Ezra, Israel's deputy interior minister, says, &#8220;The more aggressive the attack is, the more it will help Israel against the Palestinians. The understanding would be that what is good to do in Iraq, is also good for here.&#8221; He also says that a US invasion of Iraq would &#8220;undoubtedly deal a psychological blow&#8221; to the Palestinians. [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/30/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Gideon Ezra )) Late August 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_390 false 1 ------ Yuval Steinitz, a Likud party member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, suggests that the imposition of a pro-American regime in Baghdad would ease Israel's discomfort with Syria, which it views as a threat. Steinitz says, &#8220;After Iraq is taken by US troops and we see a new regime installed as in Afghanistan, and Iraqi bases become American bases, it will be very easy to pressure Syria to stop supporting terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, to allow the Lebanese army to dismantle Hezbollah, and maybe to put an end to the Syrian occupation in Lebanon. If this happens we will really see a new Middle East.&#8221; [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 8/30/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Yuval Steinitz )) Before September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_113 false 1 ------ According to a senior intelligence official interviewed by the Associated Press in June of 2003, the CIA shares with Britain the results of Joseph Wilson's trip to Niger (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_106 ]]), advising British intelligence that claims that Iraq attempted to procure uranium from Niger are unsubstantiated. But another report, by the Guardian in London the following month, contradicts this AP report. It cites a series of letters to the British Foreign Affairs Committee which show that the US had asked Britain not to use the Africa-uranium claim, but did not provide details about Wilson's mission to Niger. [[ | Associated Press, 6/12/03 ]] [[,6903,997243,00.html | Observer, 7/13/03 ]] [[ | Time Magazine, 7/21/03 ]] ------ In spite of this warning, Britain publishes a dossier in September which includes the claim.(see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_46 ]]) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Joseph C. Wilson )) September 2002 CIA Analyst Advises National Security Council Member to Remove Africa-Uranium Claim from Upcoming Speech complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3174 false 1 ------ A member of the National Security Council staff speaks with a CIA analyst about the allegation that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. The CIA analyst reportedly tells the NSC staff member that the claim should be removed from an upcoming speech (It is not known which speech this concerns). The CIA analyst later tells a Senate investigative committee that the NSC staff member said removing the allegation would leave the British &#8220;flapping in the wind.&#8221; (( Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ France )) September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_33 false 1 ------ Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Energy Department's intelligence agency meet to discuss the draft of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which will be published the following month (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). ------ Representing the DOE's intelligence service is Thomas Ryder, who is temporarily filling in as the office's acting director. Significantly, Ryder is a &#8220;human resources guy&#8221; with no intelligence background. &#8220;Ryder is not an intelligence guy by any stretch of the imagination,&#8221; a DOE source will later explain to World Net Daily. &#8220;He [has] ... no intel background whatsoever. He [works] on all the personnel stuff&#8212;paperwork for promotions, hiring contractors, stuff like that.&#8221; At the meeting, Ryder is supposed to represent the position of the DOE's scientists and intelligence officers, who believe that Iraq has not reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Scientists in the Energy Department as well as officers in the department's intelligence office want to join the INR in its dissenting vote. One official will later explain to World Net Daily, &#8220;Senior folks in the office wanted to join INR on the footnote, and even wanted to write it with them, so the footnote would have read, &#8216;Energy and INR.&#8217; &#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] ------ Instead Ryder will side with the other intelligence agencies who claim that Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. An official later tells World Net Daily that when Ryder and his staff were arguing over Iraq's alleged program during a pre-brief, Ryder told them to &#8220;shut up and sit down.&#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] ------ When the voting takes place, Ryder does not sign his department onto the State Department's dissenting opinion. As a result, the final vote is a near unanimous 5-1. &#8220;Time comes for the Iraq NIE, and instead of being hard-charging and proactive and pulling everybody together, he just didn't know what to do,&#8221; one source later says. &#8220;He wasn't a strong advocate. He just didn't have the background. He didn't have the gravitas.&#8221; The Department of Energy's position on the issue is considered very important. &#8220;Energy's vote on the nuclear allegation was critical, because the department is viewed as the final arbiter of technical disputes regarding nuclear-proliferation issues,&#8221; World Net Daily will note. (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] ------ While serving in the temporary DOE position, Ryder, who is said to be close to Secretary Spencer Abraham, receives bonuses totaling $20,500. Energy insiders will say they cannot remember a previous instance where an intelligence chief had been provided with such a large bonus. &#8220;That's a hell of a lot of money for an intelligence director who had no experience or background in intelligence, and who'd only been running the office for nine months,&#8221; one official says. &#8220;Something's fishy.&#8221; [[ | World Net Daily, 8/12/03 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ Thomas S. Ryder )) ((+ Spencer Abraham )) ((- Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) {{ commentary_david_albright_5 }} September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1 false 1 ------ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issues an 80-plus-page classified report titled, &#8220;Iraq: Key Weapons Facilities&#8212;An Operational Support Study,&#8221; concluding that there is &#8220;no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons.&#8221; (( Iraq: Key Weapons Facilities&mdash;An Operational Support Study )) [[;sid=anFlpqtus8H8&amp;refer=home# | Bloomberg News, 6/6/03 ]] [[ | Reuters, 6/6/03 ]] [[ | US News and World Report, 6/9/03 ]] ------ When this is reported in the press in June 2003, Michael Anton, a spokesman with the National Security Council, immediately denies that the report suggested the administration had misrepresented intelligence. &#8220;The entire report paints a different picture than the selective quotes would lead you to believe. The entire report is consistent with [sic] the president was saying at the time,&#8221; he claims. [[,2933,88767,00.html | Fox News, 6/6/03 ]] ------ But two Pentagon officials confirm to Fox News that according to the report, the Defense Intelligence Agency indeed had no hard evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons. [[,2933,88767,00.html | Fox News, 6/6/03 ]] ====== << deception >> << wmd >> ((+ Defense Intelligence Agency )) {{ excerpt_iraq:_key_weapons_facilities&mdash;an_operational_support_study_2 }} {{ excerpt_iraq:_key_weapons_facilities&mdash;an_operational_support_study_6 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_officials_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_department_of_defense_official_2 }} {{ excerpt_iraq:_key_weapons_facilities&mdash;an_operational_support_study_5 }} {{ excerpt_iraq:_key_weapons_facilities&mdash;an_operational_support_study_4 }} {{ statement_lowell_e._jacoby_2 }} {{ statement_joe_mcmillan_2 }} {{ excerpt_iraq:_key_weapons_facilities&mdash;an_operational_support_study_3 }} Before September 2002 Rumsfeld Orders Commanders To Focus Aerial Strikes in Iraq on Military Communications Infrastructure complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2895 false 1 ------ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld orders commanders to focus US and British aerial strikes in Iraq on the country's air defense communications centers, command buildings, and fiber-optic links, in order to degrade Iraq's air defense network. [[ | Washington Post, 12/12/2002 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << decision >> << DSM >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) (Autumn 2002) British &#8216;Shocked&#8217; that Pentagon in Charge of Post-War Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2913 false 1 ------ The British government is &#8220;shocked&#8221; when it learns &#8220;that in the postwar period, the Defense Department would still be running the show.&#8221; (( Unnamed British official )) [[ | Washington Post, 6/12/2005 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> Fall 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_347 false 1 ------ The Bush White House establishes a &#8220;high-level, interagency task force&#8221; charged with the task of &#8220;coordinating all Iraq war planning efforts and postwar initiatives.&#8221; The task force is headed by the Deputies Committee, which is made up of the &#8220;No. 2 officials at the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, CIA, National Security Council, and vice president's office.&#8221; The committee&apos;s job is to review the work of other groups who have been involved in the planning of post-war Iraq, and provide recommendations to Bush&apos;s top advisors. The committee presumably draws on the work of the Pentagon&apos;s Office of Special Plans (OSP) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_353 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 ]]), Elliot Abrams&apos; group (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_350 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_351 ]]) and the State Department&apos;s &#8220;Future of Iraq&#8221; project (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_349 ]]). Later accounts make clear that Abrams&apos; and the OSP&apos;s recommendations have much more influence. The Deputies Committee usually meets in the White House situation room. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice keeps President Bush updated on the progress of the task force&apos;s work. In November, US News reports that a consensus is forming &#8220;at the highest levels of the Bush administration over how to run the country after Saddam and his regime are history.&#8221; (( Unnamed US government officials )) [[ | Financial Times, 11/4/02 ]] [[ | US News, 11/25/03 ]] [[ | Reuters, 11/25/03 ]] --- Some Conclusions of the Deputies Committee, as reported by US News and World Report --- --- * --- The US should not create a provisional government or a government in exile. &#8220;We are not going to be in the business of choosing&#8221; who should lead Iraq, a senior official tells US News and World Report. (( Unnamed senior official )) [[ | US News 11/25/03 ]] --- * --- The invasion of Iraq will likely be followed by a lengthy occupation. This conclusion is passed on to Bush. &#8220;I have been with the president when he has been briefed about the need to have US forces there for an extended period of time,&#8221; a senior administration official will later tell US News and World Report. (( Unnamed senior administration official )) [[ | US News 11/25/03 ]] --- * --- During the first phase of the occupation, Iraq will be ruled by the military, probably a US general. The primary objective during this phase will be maintaining security and preventing the emergence of hostilities between the Shiites and Sunnis. Pentagon officials involved in planning this stage are reported to have reviewed the archived plans for the occupation of Germany and Japan. The second phase of the occupation will involve some sort of international civilian administration, with a diminished US military presence, and Iraqis will be given a larger role in the government. In the last phase, a constitution will be drafted, transferring power to a representative, multiethnic Iraqi government that commits to being free of weapons of mass destruction. [[ | US News 11/25/03 ]] --- * --- Revenue generated from the sale of Iraq's oil will be used for the cost of reconstruction and for conducting humanitarian operations. Hardliners however want the funds to pay for the military costs of the invasion as well. [[ | US News 11/25/03 ]] --- * --- No firm decisions are made about the what role, if any, Iraqi exiles affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) will play in post-Saddam Iraq. Pentagon hardliners and some top officials in the White House favor giving them a prominent role, while the CIA and State Department adamantly oppose their inclusion, arguing that the exiles cannot be trusted. [[ | US News 11/25/03 ]] --- * --- Iraqis will not necessarily treat the invading American soldiers as &#8220;liberators.&#8221; Many Iraqis harbor a deep resentment against the US for the decades-long sanction policy. [[ | US News, 11/25/03 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ George W. Bush )) September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_151 false 1 ------ A US official with inside knowledge of the interrogations of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, tells USA Today that the administration's recent assertions that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members are based on uncorroborated information from a single detainee. The source also notes that the detainees may be lying to US authorities to encourage a US invasion of Iraq in order to add support to the al-Qaeda argument &#8220;that the United States is the mortal enemy of Muslim countries.&#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[ | USA Today, 9/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_148 false 1 ------ Senior intelligence officials tell the Washington Post that the CIA has yet to find solid evidence that Saddam Hussein has ties to international militant Islamic groups despite substantial efforts including analysis of surveillance photos and communications intercepts. (( Unnamed senior intelligence officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((- Saddam Hussein )) Fall 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3257 false 1 ------ The Bush administration picks Philip Carroll, a former CEO of Royal Dutch/Shell's US division, to advise post-Saddam Iraq's oil ministry. [[,6903,825103,00.html | Harpers Magazine, 4/05, pp 74-76 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Philip J. Carroll )) September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_78 false 1 ------ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, adamant hawks, rename the Northern Gulf Affairs Office on the Pentagon's fourth floor (in the seventh corridor of D Ring) the &#8220;Office of Special Plans&#8221; (OSP) and increase its four-person staff to sixteen. (( Unnamed administration official )) (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) (( Greg Thielmann )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Tom Paine [.com], 8/27/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 11/24/02 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 8/16/02 ]] ------ William Luti, a former navy officer and ex-aide to Vice President Cheney, is put in charge of the day-to-day operations. [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ------ The Office of Special Plans is staffed with a tight group of like-minded neoconservative ideologues, who are known advocates of regime change in Iraq. Notably, the staffers have little background in intelligence or Iraqi history and culture. (( A Pentagon adviser )) (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) (( Greg Thielmann )) [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ------ Some of the people associated with this office were earlier involved with the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, also known as the &#8220;Wurmser-Maloof&#8221; project (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 ]]). ------ They hire &#8220;scores of temporary &#8216;consultants&#8217; ... including like-minded lawyers, congressional staffers, and policy wonks from the numerous rightwing think-tanks in the US capital.&#8221; Neoconservative ideologues, like Richard Perle and Newt Gingrich, are afforded direct input into the Office of Special Plans. [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ------ The office works alongside the Near East and South Asia (NESA) bureau, also under the authority of Douglas Feith (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ------ The official business of Special Plans is to help plan for post-Saddam Iraq. The office's staff members presumably &#8220;develop defense policies aimed at building an international coalition, prepare the secretary of defense and his top deputies for interagency meetings, coordinate troop-deployment orders, craft policies for dealing with prisoners of war and illegal combatants, postwar assistance and reconstruction policy planning, postwar governance, Iraqi oil infrastructure policy, postwar Iraqi property disputes, war crimes and atrocities, war-plan review and, in their spare time, prepare congressional testimony for their principals.&#8221; [[ | Insight, 12/2/03 ]] ------ But according to numerous well-placed sources, the office becomes a source for many of the administration's prewar allegations against Iraq. It is accused of exaggerating, politicizing, and misrepresenting intelligence, which is &#8220;stovepiped&#8221; to top administration officials who use the intelligence in their policy decisions on Iraq. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) (( Greg Thielmann )) (( Unnamed administration official )) [[;sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 7/11/04 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | CNN, 7/11/04 ]] [[ | Tom Paine [.com], 8/27/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 8/16/02 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 11/24/02 ]] [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] ------ There are very few news reports in the American mainstream media that report on the office. In fact, the office is reportedly Top Secret. [[ | Bamford, 2004, pp 308 ]] ------ &#8220;We were instructed at a staff meeting that this office was not to be discussed or explained,&#8221; OSP staffer Karen Kwiatkowski will later say, &#8220;and if people in the Joint Staff, among others, asked, we were to offer no comment.&#8221; [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] ------ Colin Powell is said to have felt that Cheney and the neoconservatives in this &#8220;Gestapo&#8221; office had established what was essentially a separate government. (( Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Washington Post 1/18/04 ]] ------ Among the claims critics find most troubling about the office are: --- * --- The office relies heavily on accounts from Iraqi exiles and defectors associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC), long considered suspect by other US intelligence agencies. (( Unnamed administration official )) (( Greg Thielmann )) [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/30/03 ]] ------ One defector in particular, code-named &#8220;Curveball,&#8221; provides as much as 98 percent of the intelligence on Iraq's alleged arsenal of biological weapons. [[ | CNN, 7/11/04 ]] ------ Much of the information provided by the INC's sources consists of &#8220;misleading and often faked intelligence reports,&#8221; which often flow to Special Plans and NESA directly, &#8220;sometimes through Defense Intelligence Agency debriefings of Iraqi defectors via the Defense Human Intelligence Service and sometimes through the INC's own US-funded Intelligence Collection Program, which was overseen by the Pentagon.&#8221; [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] ------ According to Karen Kwiatkowski, the movement of intelligence from the INC to the Office of Special Plans is facilitated by Colonel Bruner, a former military aide to Gingrich. (( Memo )) (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Salon, 3/10/04 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 12/15/03 ]] ------ Bruner &#8220;was Chalabi's handler,&#8221; Kwiatkowski will tell Mother Jones. &#8220;He would arrange meetings with Chalabi and Chalabi's folks.&#8221; (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] --- * --- The Office of Special Plans purposefully ignores intelligence that undermines the case for war while exaggerating any leads that support it. &#8220;It wasn't intelligence,&#8212;it was propaganda,&#8221; Karen Kwiatkowski, who worked at the NESA desk, will later explain. &#8220;They'd take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, often by juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don't belong together.&#8221; (( Ellen Tauscher )) (( Greg Thielmann )) (( Unnamed former intelligence official )) [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/24/02 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/30/03 ]] --- * --- The OSP bypasses established oversight procedures by sending its intelligence assessments directly to the White House and National Security Council without having them first vetted by a review process involving other US intelligence agencies. (( Unnamed senior officer who left the Pentagon during the planning of the Iraq war )) (( David Obey )) (( Greg Thielmann )) [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[ | Mother Jones, 1/04 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] ------ The people at Special Plans are so successful at bypassing conventional procedures, in part, because their neoconservative colleagues hold key positions in several other agencies and offices. Their contacts in other agencies include: John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International; Bolton's advisor, David Wurmser, a former research fellow on the Middle East at the American Enterprise Institute, who was just recently working in a secret Pentagon planning unit at Douglas Feith's office (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_82 ]]); Elizabeth Cheney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs; Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser; Elliott Abrams, The National Security Council's top Middle East aide; and Richard Perle, Newt Gingrich, James Woolsey and Kenneth Adelman of the Defense Policy Board. The office provides very little information about its work to other US intelligence offices. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) (( Unnamed An unnamed senior officer who left the Pentagon during the planning of the Iraq war )) (( Greg Thielmann )) (( David Obey )) [[ | Salon, 7/16/03 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] [[,2763,999737,00.html | Guardian, 7/17/03 ]] --- * --- Lastly, the people involved in Special Plans openly exhibit strong pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias. The problem, note critics, is that the analysis of intelligence is supposed to be apolitical and untainted by ideological viewpoints. (( Karen Kwiatkowski )) [[ | American Conservative, 12/1/03 ]] ------ According to a CIA intelligence official and four members of the Senate's Intelligence Committee, Special Plans is the group responsible for the claim Bush will make in his 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from an African country (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_92 ]]). [[ | Information Clearing House, 7/16/03 ]] [[;s=dreyfuss | The Nation, 6/19/03 ]] ------ After the existence of the Office of Special Plans is revealed to the public, the Pentagon will deny that it served as a direct conduit to the White House for misleading intelligence, instead claiming that its activities had been limited to postwar plans for Iraq. [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] ------ And a December 2003 opinion piece published in Insight magazine will call the allegations surrounding the Office of Special Plans the work of conspiracy theorists. [[ | Insight, 12/2/03 ]] ====== << deception >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << chalabi >> ((+ Colonel Bruner )) ((+ James Woolsey )) ((+ Newt Gingrich )) ((+ Kenneth Adelman )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ Elliott Abrams )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) ((+ Karen Kwiatkowski )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Abram Shulsky )) ((+ David Wurmser )) ((+ Elizabeth Cheney )) {{ commentary_patrick_lang_9 }} {{ statement_richard_a._clarke_8 }} {{ statement_melvin_a._goodman_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_16 }} {{ commentary_steve_aftergood_2 }} {{ commentary_ellen_tauscher_2 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_9 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_10 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_official_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_former_intelligence_official_2 }} {{ statement_david_obey_2 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_15 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_14 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_6 }} {{ commentary_seymour_hersh_5 }} {{ commentary_vincent_cannistraro_5 }} {{ commentary_greg_thielmann_13 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_8 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_officer_who_left_the_pentagon_during_the_planning_of_ the_iraq_war_2 }} {{ statement_karen_kwiatkowski_7 }} Fall 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_395 false 1 ------ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells Fortune magazine, &#8220;If you [worry about just] the cost, the money, Iraq is a very different situation from Afghanistan ... Iraq has oil. They have financial resources.&#8221; [[ | Financial Times, 1/16/04 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_343 false 1 ------ James Woolsey tells the Washington Post: &#8220;It's pretty straightforward. France and Russia have oil companies and interests in Iraq. They should be told that if they are of assistance in moving Iraq toward decent government, we'll do the best we can to ensure that the new government and American companies work closely with them..... If they throw in their lot with Saddam, it will be difficult to the point of impossible to persuade the new Iraqi government to work with them.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 9/15/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ James Woolsey )) {{ statement_curt_weldon_2 }} September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_150 false 1 ------ An unnamed Pentagon official tells USA Today that the hawks' recent assertions regarding Iraq-al Qaeda ties are &#8220;exaggeration[s].&#8221; (( Unnamed Pentagon official )) [[ | USA Today, 9/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1213 false 1 ------ The CIA completes a highly classified report on &#8220;Iraqi Ties to Terrorism,&#8221; summarizing claims that Iraq has provided &#8220;training in poisons and gases&#8221; to members of al-Qaeda. The report warns that evidence for the claim comes from &#8220;sources of varying reliability&#8221; and has not yet been substanitated. The main source behind this allegation, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who once operated bin Laden's Khalden training camp in Afghanistan and who is being held in custody by the CIA, will later recant the claim (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1214 ]]). [[ | Newsweek, 7/5/2004 ]] [[ | The New York Times, 7/31/2004 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << poisonsAndGases >> ((- Abu Hammad )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) September 1-30, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 54.6 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2927 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 54.6 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones&#8212;nearly a four-fold increase over what was dropped in August (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2926 ]]). [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> September 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_372 false 1 ------ In an interview with the BBC, Powell states that he favors the return of UN inspectors as a necessary &#8220;first step&#8221; in dealing with Iraq. He says: &#8220;Iraq has been in violation of these many UN resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. So as a first step, let's see what the inspectors find, send them back in, why are they being kept out.&#8221; Regarding the decision of whether or not the use of military action would be required, he says: &#8220;The world has to be presented with the information, with the intelligence that is available. A debate is needed within the international community so that everybody can make a judgment about this.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 9/2/03 ]] ------ His comments directly contradict statements made by Vice President Dick Cheney in a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on August 7 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_371 ]]), and another speech to the Nashville convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_121 ]]). Interestingly, it also comes one day after Scott McClellan, the White House deputy press secretary, told reporters, &#8220;The view of the administration is united and one in the same. We are singing from the same songbook.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 8/30/02 ]] ------ But commentators are concluding otherwise, which spurs another statement from Washington, this one from White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, who the next day tells reporters as they accompany him on Air Force One: &#8220;There is no difference in position between Cheney, Powell, and President Bush. It's much ado about no difference.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 9/03/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Scott McClellan )) ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((+ Colin Powell )) September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_363 false 1 ------ Retired General Wesley Clark writes a piece in the Washington Monthly, titled, &#8220;An Army of One: In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They're the key to it,&#8221; in which he argues that it is a &#8220;fundamental misjudgment&#8221; to continue the war on terrorism in the absence of NATO support. He refers to NATO's war in Kosovo repeatedly in his essay using it as an example of how he thinks a just and effective war should be fought. He also says that cooperation with its European allies is crucial if the Bush administration wants to prevent future attacks, noting that most of the planning and preparations for the 9-11 attacks took place in cells in Europe. [[ | Washington Monthly, 9/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Wesley Clark )) {{ statement_wesley_clark_6 }} {{ statement_wesley_clark_5 }} {{ statement_wesley_clark_4 }} Fall 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_397 false 1 ------ US officials, advisors, and foreign policy experts suggest that a portion of the cost of the US military operation in Iraq, as well as the post-war reconstruction, could be funded with Iraq's oil wealth. [[ | St. Petersburg Times, 4/2/03 ]] [[ | Financial Times, 1/16/04 ]] [[ | Congressional Office of Jan Schakowsky, n.d. ]] [[ | White House, 2/18/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> {{ statement_paul_wolfowitz_6 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_official_5 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_9 }} {{ statement_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_6 }} {{ statement_richard_armitage_2 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_15 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_14 }} September 3, 2002 Bush Attempts to Solicit Support from Skeptical Congressional Leaders for Confronting Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3155 false 1 ------ President Bush invites a group of skeptical Congressional leaders to the White House to solicit their support for action against Iraq. [[ | New York Times, 9/7/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) September 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_125 false 1 ------ During a Defense Department news briefing, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says: &#8220;We know that they were a lot closer than any of the experts had estimated they would be with respect to [developing] a nuclear weapon. To the extent that they have kept their nuclear scientists together and working on these efforts, one has to assume they've not been playing tiddlywinks.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press 9/3/02 ]] [[ | UPI 9/3/02 ]] [[ | Centcom, 9/3/02 ]] ====== << nuclearQuotes >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) {{ duplicate_donald_rumsfeld_6 }} September 4, 2002 Iraq Sued for Conspiring with al-Qaeda in 9/11 Attacks complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2015 false 1 ------ Over 1,400 relatives of 9/11 attack victims sue Iraq for more than $1 trillion, claiming there is evidence Iraq conspired with al-Qaeda on the 9/11 attacks. [[ | CBS News, 9/5/02 ]] ------ One of the key pieces of evidence cited is an article in a small town Iraqi newspaper written by Naeem Abd Muhalhal on July 21, 2001. He describes bin Laden thinking &#8220;seriously, with the seriousness of the Bedouin of the desert, about the way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House.&#8221; He adds that bin Laden is &#8220;insisting very convincingly that he will strike America on the arm that is already hurting,&#8221; which has been interpreted as a possible reference to the 1993 bombing of the WTC. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein apparently praised this writer on September 1, 2001. The lawsuit is based largely on the idea that &#8220;Iraqi officials were aware of plans to attack American landmarks,&#8221; yet did not warn their archenemy, the US. [[ | Associated Press, 9/4/02 ]] ------ Former CIA agent and terrorism consultant Robert Baer is hired by the prosecuting legal team to find evidence of a meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi agents on April 8, 2001, but despite the help of the CIA, he is unable find any evidence of such a meeting. [[ | CBS News, 9/5/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << iraq >> ((+ Robert Baer )) September 4, 2002 Neoconservative Michael Ledeen Advocates Overthrow of Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian Governments complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3164 false 1 ------ Neoconservative Michael Ledeen argues in a piece published by the Wall Street Journal that the US must not limit the next military strike to Iraq alone. Rather, according to Ledeen, the US &#8220;should instead be talking about using all our political, moral, and military genius to support a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the Middle East from tyranny.&#8221; In addition to Iraq, he says, the governments of Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia must also be overthrown. &#8220;Stability is an unworthy American mission, and a misleading concept to boot. We do not want stability in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even Saudi Arabia; we want things to change. The real issue is not whether, but how to destabilize.&#8221; [[,pubID.14216/pub_detail.asp | Wall Street Journal, 9/4/2002 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Michael Ledeen )) {{ duplicate_michael_ledeen_4 }} September 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_388 false 1 ------ The Washington Post publishes an op-ed piece by James Webb, a former assistant secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy, warning that the neoconservatives' plan to invade Iraq would commit the US to a long term occupation of Iraq. &#8220;The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay. This reality was the genesis of a rift that goes back to the Gulf War itself, when neoconservatives were vocal in their calls for &#8216;a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad.&#8217; Their expectation is that the United States would not only change Iraq's regime but also remain as a long term occupation force in an attempt to reconstruct Iraqi society itself.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 9/4/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> << maintreamDissent >> ((+ James Webb )) September 4, 2002 or September 5, 2002 9:00 a.m. September 4, 2002 Top Administration Officials Discuss Iraqi Policy with Senators complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3156 false 1 ------ The Bush administration invites two dozen senators from both parties to the Pentagon to discuss Iraqi policy with Vice President Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and George J. Tenet. [[ | New York Times, 9/7/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ George W. Bush )) September 4, 2002 or September 5, 2002 5:00 p.m. September 4, 2002 Cheney and Tenet Discuss &#8216;Sensitive&#8217; Iraq Information with Top Four Senators complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3252 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney and CIA Director George Tenet meet with senators Trent Lott (R-Miss), Tom Daschle (S-SD), Dennis Hastert (R-Ill), and Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) and, in the words of Cheney, &#8220;share the most sensitive information [on Iraq's alleged WMDs] with them.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 9/7/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Trent Lott )) ((+ Richard Gephardt )) ((+ Dennis Hastert )) ((+ Tom Daschle )) ((+ George Tenet )) September 5, 2002 US and British Air Force Conduct Major Assault on Iraqi Defenses complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2921 false 1 ------ One hundred American and British warplanes attack Iraq's H-3 airfield, a major air defense installation in western Iraq located far away from the Shia-populated areas that the US and Britain patrols are supposedly protecting. The attacks mark the first time jets have striked against a target in western Iraq while patrolling the southern &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone. According to US central command, the operation&#8212;described by one newspaper as &#8220;the biggest single operation over the country [in] four years&#8221; &#8212;was launched in &#8220;response to recent Iraqi hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern no-fly zone.&#8221; The US asserts that &#8220;coalition strikes in the no-fly zones are executed as a self defense measure in response to Iraqi hostile threats and acts against coalition forces and their aircraft.&#8221; The London Telegraph, however, reports that the operation &#8220;seemed designed to destroy air defenses to allow easy access for special forces helicopters to fly into Iraq via Jordan or Saudi Arabia to hunt down Scud missiles before a possible war within the next few months.&#8221; [[ | Daily Telegraph, 9/6/2002 ]] [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << decision >> September 6, 2002 White House Officials Describe How They Plan to Sell Iraq War to Public, Congress, and US Allies complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3154 false 1 ------ White House officials, in interviews with the New York Times, describe the administration's strategy to convince the public, Congress, and US allies of the need to confront Iraq. They say the centerpiece of the strategy will be Bush's September 11 speech at Ellis Island in New York Harbor which they have been planning since at least June (The speech will not actually make a case for confronting Iraq. Bush first will first make his case to the nation in his October 7 speech (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_118 ]])). Explaining why the White House did not launch this effort in August when the administration's plans came under intense criticism from a number of different quarters, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. tells the New York Times, &#8220;From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August.&#8221; Card is the founding member of the White House Iraq Group (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3153 ]]), which was formed to &#8220;educate the public&#8221; on the alleged threat from Iraq. The officials also tell the Times that one of the administration's goals is for Congress to pass a resolution approving the use of force in Iraq within the next four to five weeks. &#8220;In the end it will be difficult for someone to vote against it,&#8221; one administration official tells the Times. [[ | New York Times, 9/7/2002 ]] ====== << propaganda >> ((+ Andrew Card )) September 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_28 false 1 ------ During a joint press conference with US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the two leaders make 2 false and misleading statements, which are quickly contested by experts. --- * --- Tony Blair states, &#8220;We only need to look at the report from the International Atomic Agency [IAEA] this morning showing what has been going on at the former nuclear weapons sites to realize that&#8221; Saddam is a real threat. [[ | White House, 9/7/02 ]] ------ But no such report exists. [[ | Washington Times, 9/27/02 ]] ------ What Blair is actually referring to is a set of commercial satellite photographs showing signs of new construction at a site the US had bombed in 1998. [[ | Associated Press, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | MSNBC 9/7/02 ]] [[,11209,798175,00.html | Guardian 9/9/02 ]] ------ That same day, Mark Gwozdecky, a spokesman for the UN agency, says the agency had drawn no conclusion from those photographs. [[ | MSNBC 9/7/02 ]] ------ On September 9, the Guardian of London will report that according to &#8220;a well-placed source&#8221; the photographs do not support Blair's statement. &#8220;You cannot draw any conclusions,&#8221; the source explains. &#8220;The satellites were only looking at the top of a roof. You cannot tell without inspectors on the ground.&#8221; [[,2763,788469,00.html | Guardian, 9/9/02 ]] ------ [[,2763,788469,00.html | Guardian, 9/9/02 ]] ------ The following day, Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, will similarly tell reporters: &#8220;... satellites don't see through roofs. So we are not drawing conclusions from them. But it would be an important element in where, maybe, we want to go to inspect and monitor.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | The Globe and Mail, 9/11/02 ]] --- * --- Bush asserts, &#8220;I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied&#8212;finally denied access [in 1998], a report came out of the Atomic&#8212;the IAEA that they were six months away from developing a weapon,&#8221; adding, &#8220;I don't know what more evidence we need.&#8221; [[ | Washington Times, 9/27/02 ]] [[ | White House, 9/7/02 ]] ------ But Bush's statement is quickly refuted by an MSNBC news report published later that day, which includes an excerpt from the summary of the 1998 IAEA report Bush cited. The summary reads, &#8220;[B]ased on all credible information available to date ... the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical capability for the production of weapon-useable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material.&#8221; [[ | MSNBC 9/7/02 ]] ------ The text of the actual report, authored by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, reads: &#8220;There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.&#8221; [[ | Washington Times, 9/27/02 ]] ------ When confronted by MSNBC reporters on this point, an unnamed senior White House official states, &#8220;What happened was, we formed our own conclusions based on the report.&#8221; [[ | MSNBC 9/7/02 ]] ------ Later, when The Washington Times presses Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan for an explanation, he says, &#8220;[Bush is] referring to 1991 there. In '91, there was a report saying that after the war they found out they were about six months away.&#8221; But this too is challenged by Mr. Gwozdecky, spokesman for the UN agency, who says that no such report was ever published by the IAEA in 1991. Apparently the President's accusations are based on two news articles that were published more than a decade ago&#8212; &#8220;a July 16 [2001] story in the London Times by Michael Evans and a July 18 [2001] story in the New York Times by Paul Lewis.&#8221; But as The Washington Times notes, &#8220;Neither article cites an IAEA report on Iraq's nuclear-weapons program or states that Saddam was only six months away from &#8216;developing a weapon&#8217; &#8212;as claimed by Mr. Bush.&#8221; Instead the two news articles reported that at that time, UN inspectors had concluded that Iraq was only six months away from the large-scale production of enriched uranium. But as the 1998 report shows, both 1991 news stories are outdated. [[ | Washington Times, 9/27/02 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ Tony Blair )) ((+ Mark Gwozdecky )) ((+ Mohamed ElBaradei )) ((+ Scott McClellan )) ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_unknown_2 }} {{ duplicate_unknown_2 }} {{ duplicate_tony_blair_2 }} {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_2 }} September 8, 2002 Cheney Says No Decision Has Been Made To Use Military Force Against Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2857 false 1 ------ When asked on NBC's &#8220;Meet the Press&#8221; how long US troops would be in Iraq after the expected US invasion, how much it would cost, and whether or not the military operation would be a cakewalk, Vice President Dick Cheney insists that &#8220;first of all, no decision's been made yet to launch a military operation.&#8221; Addressing host Tim Russert's question, he explains, &#8220;We clearly would have to stay for a long time,&#8221; and admits that it &#8220;could be very costly.&#8221; [[ | NBC (transcripts), 9/8/02 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2004/09/18/ixnewstop.html | Daily Telegraph, 3/21/05 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) (1:00am) September 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_470 false 1 ------ The New York Times publishes a front page story reporting that Iraq has attempted to obtain aluminum tubes which, US intelligence believes, were intended for use in a nuclear weapons program. The article&#8212;written by Times reporters Judith Miller and Michael Gordon&#8212;cites unnamed intelligence officials as its sources. &#8220;In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which American officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium,&#8221; reports the newspaper. &#8220;The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq's nuclear program ....&#8221; The article does not say that experts at the Department of Energy do not believe the tubes were intended for use in a gas centrifuge. [[ | New York Times, 9/8/02 ]] ------ Houston G. Wood III, a retired Oak Ridge physicist who had filed a report with the US government more than a year before (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_43 ]]) concluding that the tubes were not meant for centrifuges, is shocked by the report. In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation more than a year later, he will recount his initial reaction: &#8220;My first thought was, &#8216;This must be some new tubes&#8217; , you know. And then...and then when I realized that these were the tubes that I had been looking at a year before, I was just ... I was ... I was just shocked. I couldn't believe that, you know, here we were, saying that these tubes were, you know, the same tubes that I'd come to the conclusion a year before were not valid for centrifuges, and here they're saying they are. So, er ... that was a real surprise.&#8221; [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/27/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Houston G. Wood III )) ((+ Michael Gordon )) ((+ Judith Miller )) 9:00 a.m. September 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_472 false 1 ------ Vice President Dick Cheney is interviewed on NBC's &#8220;Meet the Press&#8221; to discuss the Bush administration's position on Iraq and the alleged threat Iraq poses to the world. &#8220;[B]ased on intelligence that's becoming available&#8212;some of it has been made public [referring to the recent New York Times story (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_470 ]])]&#8212; ... he has indeed stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver biological weapons, ... he has reconstituted his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon, ... there are efforts under way inside Iraq to significantly expand his capability. ... [H]e now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs. ... There's a story in The New York Times this morning ... [I]t's now public that, in fact, he has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge. And the centrifuge is required to take low-grade uranium and enhance it into highly enriched uranium, which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb. This is a technology he was working on back, say, before the Gulf War. And one of the reasons it's of concern, ... is ... [that] we know about a particular shipment. We've intercepted that. We don't know what else&#8212;what other avenues he may be taking out there, what he may have already acquired. We do know he's had four years without any inspections at all in Iraq to develop that capability. ... [W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he [Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment [aluminum tubes] he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.&#8221; Cheney says the US intends to work with the international community, but hints that the US is willing to confront Saddam without international support. &#8220;We are trying very hard not be unilateralist,&#8221; he says. &#8220;We are working to build support with the American people, with the Congress, as many have suggested we should. And we are also as many of us suggested we should, going to the United Nations, and the president will address this issue. ... We would like to do it with the sanction of the international community. But the point in Iraq is this problem has to be dealt with one way or the other.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/27/2003 ]] [[ | Washington File, 9/9/2002 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 2/7/2003 ]] [[ | NBC News Meet the Press, 9/8/2002 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> << nuclearQuotes >> << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> << propaganda >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ White House Iraq Group )) {{ duplicate_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_14 }} 9:00 a.m. September 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_129 false 1 ------ Secretary of State Colin Powell appears on &#8220;Fox News Sunday,&#8221; and asserts that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons stocks and that Saddam Hussein is intent on building a nuclear weapon. He cites a recent article in the New York Times by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_470 ]]) as evidence of Hussein's nuclear ambitions. &#8220;There's no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there's no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. With respect to biological weapons, we are confident that he has some stocks of those weapons, and he's probably continuing to try to develop more. And biological weapons are very dangerous because they can be produced just about in any kind of pharmaceutical facility. With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that he continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon. Whether he could do it in one, five, six or seven, eight years is something that people can debate about, but what nobody can debate about is the fact that he still has the incentive, he still intends to develop those kinds of weapons. And as we saw in reporting just this morning, he is still trying to acquire, for example, some of the specialized aluminum tubing one needs to develop centrifuges that would give you an enrichment capability. So there's no question that he has these weapons, but even more importantly, he is striving to do even more, to get even more.&#8221; Tony Snow, the program's host, asks Secretary of State Colin Powell to respond to comments by former UN Chief Weapons Inspector Scott Ritter in a speech he recently made to Iraq's parliament, in which the former weapons inspector stated: &#8220;The rhetoric of fear that is disseminated by my government and others has not to date been backed up by hard facts that substantiate any allegations that Iraq is today in possession of weapons of mass destruction or has links to terror groups responsible for attacking the United States. Void of such facts, all we have is speculation.&#8221; Powell responds: &#8220;We have facts, not speculation. Scott is certainly entitled to his opinion but I'm afraid that I would not place the security of my nation and the security of our friends in the region on that kind of an assertion by somebody who's not in the intelligence chain any longer... If Scott is right, then why are they keeping the inspectors out? If Scott is right, why don't they say, &#8216;Anytime, any place, anywhere, bring'em in, everybody come in&#8212;we are clean?&#8217; The reason is they are not clean. And we have to find out what they have and what we're going to do about it. And that's why it's been the policy of this government to insist that Iraq be disarmed in accordance with the terms of the relevant UN resolutions.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 9/8/2002 ]] [[ | Newsmax, 9/8/2002 ]] [[,2933,62291,00.html | Fox News, 9/8/2002 ]] ====== << wmdQuotesGeneral >> << nuclearQuotes >> << aluminumTubes >> << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> << propaganda >> ((+ White House Iraq Group )) ((+ Colin Powell )) {{ duplicate_colin_powell_4 }} {{ duplicate_colin_powell_3 }} {{ duplicate_colin_powell_5 }} 10:30 a.m. September 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1126 false 1 ------ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appears on CBS' &#8220;Face the Nation&#8221; and talks about Iraq. He tells host Bob Schieffer, &#8220;[President Bush] has decided to go to the Congress and to the United Nations later this week and make the case of what Iraq has done for 11 years. It has invaded its neighbors; it's violated almost every single UN resolution that relates to Iraq. And against the agreement they had to disarm, they proceeded to develop weapons of mass destruction&#8212;chemical, biological and nuclear.&#8221; When asked if the government has &#8220;smoking gun&#8221; evidence that Iraq is developing nuclear weapons, Rumsfeld responds: &#8220;The smoking gun is an interesting phrase. It implies that what we're doing here is law enforcement, that what we're looking for is a case that we can take into a court of law and prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem with that is, the way one gains absolutely certainty as to whether a dictator like Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon is if he uses it, and that's a little late. It's not late if you're interested in protecting rights of the defendant in a court of law, but it's a quite different thing if one thinks about it.&#8221; Schieffer then asks the defense secretary whether or not the administration has information that has not yet been shared with the public. Rumsfeld says: &#8220;The problem we have, of course, is a real one. Intelligence, we spend billions of dollars gathering intelligence. And to do it, you have to have methods of doing it and sources from whom you get this information. And to the extent you take that intelligence and spread it out in the public record, what you do is you put people's lives at risk, the sources of that information, because people can connect the dots there and say, well, who knew that, and then they go out and they stop people from helping us learn that type of information, or if it's a source, a satellite or some other thing. To the extent that we reveal the information and show our capability, we then lose that capability because they find ways to deceive and deny us from gaining access to it. So there's a very good reason for not taking all the information.&#8221; [[ | CBS Face the Nation, 9/8/2002 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> << nuclearQuotes >> << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> << imminentThreatQuotes >> << propaganda >> ((+ White House Iraq Group )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) (12:00 p.m.) September 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1124 false 1 ------ Condoleezza Rice appears on CNN's Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer to discuss the alleged threat posed to the US by Saddam Hussein. She insists that Iraq is intent on developing a nuclear weapon. &#8220;We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance&#8212;into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to&#8212;high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. And we know that when the inspectors assessed this after the Gulf War, he was far, far closer to a crude nuclear device than anybody thought, maybe six months from a crude nuclear device. The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't what the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 7/20/03 ]] [[ | Iraq on the Record database, 3/16/04 ]] [[ | CNN Late Night with Wolf Blitzer, 9/8/02 ]] ====== << nuclearQuotes >> << aluminumTubes >> << propaganda >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ White House Iraq Group )) {{ duplicate_condoleezza_rice_21 }} September 9, 2002 Italian Intelligence Chief Meets with US Officials in Washington complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3145 false 1 ------ Nicolo Pollari, chief of SISMI, Italy's military intelligence service, meets briefly with US National Security Council officials. [[ | Il Fogglio, 10/28/2005 ]] ------ Present at the meeting are National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; her deputy, Stephen Hadley; and other US and Italian officials. (( Unnamed high-ranking Italian SISMI source )) (( Unnamed Bush administration official )) [[;page=0&amp;id=agionline-eng.italyonline | AGI online, 10/29/2005 ]] [[;name=ViewWeb&amp;articleId=10506 | American Prospect, 10/25/2005 ]] [[,1,4276297.story?coll=la-headlines-nation&amp;ctrack=1&amp;cset=true | Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/26/2005 ]] ------ This meeting is not reported until 2005, when Italy's La Repubblica reports that a meeting&#8212;arranged through a backchannel by Gianni Castellaneta, the Italian prime minister's diplomatic advisor&#8212;took place between Pollari and Hadley on this date. The report is refuted by Italy which insists it was actually a short meeting between Pollari and Rice. Hadley, Italy says, was present but not really part of the meeting. [[;page=0&amp;id=agionline-eng.italyonline | AGI online, 10/29/2005 ]] ------ The Bush administration also insists the meeting was of little importance. Frederick Jones, a National Security Council spokesman, describes the meeting as a courtesy call of 15 minutes or less. He also says, &#8220;No one present at that meeting has any recollection of yellowcake [Uranium oxide] being discussed or documents being provided.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/28/2005 ]] ------ It is not clear from the reporting, however, if the meeting acknowledged by Italy and Washington, is in fact the same meeting reported by La Repubblica. ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) ((+ Nicolo Pollari )) ((+ Gianni Castellaneta )) September 9-11, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1229 false 1 ------ In early September, Democratic members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence begin pressing for a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. They want it completed before they vote on a resolution that would authorize the use of force against Iraq. [[ | Independent, 11/3/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] ------ But the White House does not want a National Intelligence Estimate, because, according to one senior intelligence official, it knows &#8220;there [are] disagreements over details in almost every aspect of the administration's case against Iraq.&#8221; The president's advisers, according to the official, do not want &#8220;a lot of footnotes and disclaimers.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/2003, pp A01 ]] ------ On September 9, Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) writes about his &#8220;concern that the views of the US intelligence community are not receiving adequate attention by policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch.&#8221; Finally, two days later when Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.) insists on a new NIE in a classified letter, Tenet gives in. [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/2003, pp A01 ]] ------ Though NIEs usually take months to prepare, US intelligence services will finish the report by the beginning of the following month (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). The last NIE on Iraq was done in 2000. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] [[ | Independent, 11/3/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ Joe T. )) September 9, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_429 false 1 ------ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London concludes in a report that &#8220;Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons&#8221; and that &#8220;it would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material production facilities.&#8221; [[ | International Institute for Strategic Studies, 9/9/02 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] [[ | Guardian, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | BBC, 9/9/02 ]] [[ | Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ International Institute for Strategic Studies )) September 9, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_149 false 1 ------ Canadian Primer Minister Jean Chretien and US President George Bush meet in Detroit to discuss policy towards Iraq as well as security measures along the US-Canadian border initiated after September 11. Chretien later tells reporters that Bush said that Saddam Hussein's alleged ties to militant Islamic groups was &#8220;not the angle they're exploring now. The angle they're exploring is the production of weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; (( Jean Chretien )) [[ | Washington Post, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 9/10/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Jean Chretien )) {{ duplicate_jean_chretien_2 }} September 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_360 false 1 ------ In an appearance on Good Morning America with Charlie Gibson, Rumsfeld dismisses the notion that the administration needs to disclose evidence about Iraq's banned weapons to the public before going to war. Gibson asks: &#8220;One of the sentinel moments of my life was when John Kennedy went on television and showed satellite photos of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil. Isn't it going to take and do you have that kind of direct evidence?&#8221;In response, Rumsfeld states: &#8220;You know, the idea of direct evidence is not like a court of law under Article 3 of our Constitution where your goal is to punish somebody for doing something wrong. That really isn't the case here. This is self defense, and the United States task is to see that we don't allow an event to happen that then one has to punish someone.&#8221; Gibson then follows with another question: &#8220;But you can't go to war without American public support and I'm asking don't you need that kind of direct evidence? Or do you have it, to get the American public support or to get a coalition?&#8221; Rumsfeld replies: &#8220;The evidence is certainly there. The President has to decide what precisely he believes is the best approach. And one thing he'd say is, the one course of action that's not acceptable is doing nothing.&#8221; [[;c=StoryFT&amp;cid=1031119181922&amp;p=1012571727102 | Financial Times, 9/11/02 ]] [[ | US Department of Defense, 9/11/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) September 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_376 false 1 ------ Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet give a classified briefing to some members of Congress. After the briefing, several Democrats say they are unconvinced that Saddam Hussein poses an imminent threat to the US. Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi from California, the ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee, tells The Washington Post, &#8220;I did not hear anything today that was different about [Saddam Hussein's] capabilities,&#8221; save a few &#8220;embellishments.&#8221; Democratic Senator Richard J. Durbin from Illinois tells the newspaper: &#8220;It would be a severe mistake for us to vote on Iraq with as little information as we have. This would be a rash and hasty decision&#8221; adding that he has heard &#8220;no groundbreaking news&#8221; on Iraq's capabilities. Democrat Robert Menendez, a representative from New Jersey, says he also didn't hear any new evidence. &#8220;What was described as new is not new. It was not compelling enough,&#8221; he says. &#8220;Did I see a clear and present danger to the United States? No.&#8221; And an unnamed House Republican leader also seems to believe the case Tenet and Rice presented is weak. He says, &#8220;Daschle will want to delay this and he can make a credible case for delay.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 9/10/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 9/10/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Richard Durbin )) ((+ Robert Menendez )) ((+ Nancy Pelosi )) ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) September 12-16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1840 false 1 ------ A CBS news poll concludes that 51 percent of Americans think that Saddam Hussein &#8220;was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks&#8221; and &#8220;70 percent believe that members of al-Qaeda are currently in Iraq.&#8221; [[ | CBS News, 9/24/02 ]] ====== << publicOpinion >> September 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_45 false 1 ------ In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, George Bush says: &#8220;Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons . . . Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.&#8221; [[ | The Age (Australia), 6/7/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> << aluminumTubes >> September 12, 2002 Italian Magazine Reports Iraq Obtained Uranium from Nigeria complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3146 false 1 ------ Panorama, an Italian weekly owned by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, reports that Iraq's intelligence agency, the Mukhabarat, obtained 500 tons of uranium from Nigeria [not Niger, as other reports at this time are alleging] through a Jordanian intermediary. [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Panorama )) September 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_117 false 1 ------ President George Bush tells the UN General Assembly, &#8220;Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.&#8221; [[ | White House, 9/12/02 ]] [[ | PBS, 9/12/02 ]] [[ | The Age (Australia), 6/7/03 ]] ====== << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_4 }} September 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_138 false 1 ------ The White House publishes a 26-page government white paper titled, &#8220;A Decade of Deception and Defiance,&#8221; which seeks to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein represents a serious and imminent threat to the United States and its people. Section 5 of the report deals with &#8220;Saddam Hussein's support for international terrorism,&#8221; though it makes no attempt to tie the Iraqi leader to al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. It includes a brief list of six points implicating Saddam Hussein in terrorist activities, some dating as far back as the '70s. One of the points criticizes Iraq for its ties to the Mujahadeen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an obscure militant Iranian dissident group whose main office is in Baghdad. The report says: &#8220;Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several US military personnel and US civilians.&#8221; The paper notes that the US State Department classified MKO as a &#8220;foreign terrorist organization&#8221; in 1997, &#8220;accusing the Baghdad-based group of a long series of bombings, guerilla cross-border raids and targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.&#8221; (( Richard Durbin )) [[ | Newsweek, 9/26/02 ]] [[ | White House, 9/12/02 ]] ------ The administration is quickly ridiculed for making the claim when, two weeks later, Newsweek reports that MKO's front organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has a small office in the National Press Building in Washington D.C. It is also reported that only two years beforehand this very group had been supported by then-Senator John Ashcroft and more than 200 other members of Congress. On several issues the senator and his colleagues had expressed solidarity with MKO at the behest of their Iranian-American constituencies. [[ | Newsweek, 9/26/02 ]] ------ Another allegation included in the paper states that Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, a civil engineer, &#8220;had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.&#8221; According to the White House dossier, Haideri &#8220;supported his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications.&#8221; Ten months earlier, the CIA had debriefed Haideri in Bangkok and concluded from the results of a polygraph that Haideri account was a complete fabrication (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3235 ]]). [[ | White House, 9/12/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << wmd >> ((- John Ashcroft )) ((- US Congress )) ((- Osama bin Laden )) ((- Saddam Hussein )) ((- Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri )) September 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_725 false 1 ------ In an address to the UN General Assembly, US President George Bush announces that the US &#8220;will work with the UN Security Council.&#8221; [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 285 ]] [[ | White House, 9/12/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ George W. Bush )) September 13, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1226 false 1 ------ The New York Times publishes a second article reporting that the Bush administration believes a shipment of aluminum tubes destined for Iraq, intercepted in Jordan by US authorities in July (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]), was intended for use in a gas centrifuge. Unlike The Times' previous report, this article mentions that there is a debate over the tubes between the Energy Department and CIA. It says that according to an unnamed official &#8220;[T]here have been debates among intelligence experts about Iraq's intentions in trying to buy such tubes.&#8221; The article says that the official claims &#8220;the dominant view in the administration was that the tubes were intended for use in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.&#8221; Another official interviewed by the newspaper claims that Energy's alternative view &#8220;is a footnote, not a split.&#8221; One administration official is even quoted by the paper asserting &#8220;that the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the CIA assessment.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 9/13/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ------ After the article is published, the Energy Department releases a directive forbidding employees from discussing the issue with reporters. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << wmd >> << aluminumTubes >> ((+ US Department of Energy )) September 13, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_377 false 1 ------ Dennis Kucinich, a Democratic representative from Ohio and outspoken critic of the administration's plan to invade Iraq, says: &#8220;There is no imminent threat by Iraq against the United States. Iraq does not have nuclear capabilities that anyone has been able to specifically determine, nor does it have the ability to deliver such a weapon, nor does it have the intent to do so. It could be said by Iraq that they are facing the imminent threat.... Oil is a factor. How much [of a factor] is anybody's guess, but to discount it as a factor is, I think, to be misleading.... It's not a conspiracy theory to bring it in because, after all, it is the second largest oil supply in the world.&#8221; [[ | CNS News, 9/16/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Dennis Kucinich )) September 15-20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_147 false 1 ------ In closed sessions, administration officials are asked several times whether they have evidence of an imminent threat from Iraq against US citizens. US Representative Anna Eshoo, later tells the San Francisco Chronicle that the officials acknowledged they had no such evidence. &#8220;They said &#8216;no,&#8217; &#8221; she says, &#8220;Not &#8216;no, but&#8217; or &#8216;maybe,&#8217; but &#8216;no.&#8217; I was stunned. Not shocked. Not surprised. Stunned.&#8221; (( Anna Eshoo )) [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 9/20/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Anna Eshoo )) September 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_628 false 1 ------ In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Lawrence Lindsey says he believes the Bush administration's planned invasion of Iraq could cost between $100 and $200 billion. But he dismisses that such spending would significantly increase interest rates, add much to the federal debt, or cause a recession. Mitch Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently disputes the figure, saying it is &#8220;very, very high.&#8221; He suggests the total costs would run between $50-$60 billion. [[ | Wall Street Journal, 9/16/02 ]] [[ | Reuters, 9/18/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> ((+ Lawrence Lindsey )) ((+ Mitch Daniels )) September 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1132 false 1 ------ In response to Tony Snow's probing on Fox News Sunday as to whether or not President Bush was convinced there were links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the National Security Advisor is circumspect until she's pressed. &#8220; He clearly has links to terrorism ... &#8212;Links to terrorism [that] would include al-Qaeda....&#8221; [[ | CNN, 9/26/02 ]] [[ | Islam OnLine, 9/15/02 ]] [[ | Iraq on the Record database, 3/16/04 ]] [[,2933,63125,00.html | Fox News, 9/15/02 ]] ====== << terroristTiesQuotes >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) {{ duplicate_condoleezza_rice_27 }} September 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_192 false 1 ------ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that President Bush has not decided to go to war. [[;Story=20020916/259w9255.xml | Associated Press, 9/16/02 ]] ====== << decision >> << decisionQuotes >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- George W. Bush )) September 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_191 false 1 ------ Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri meets with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Arab League Secretary-General Amir Moussa and gives them a letter expressing Baghdad's willingness to readmit the UN weapons inspectors without conditions. The offer is made after Saddam Hussein convened an emergency meeting in Baghdad with his cabinet and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). (( Iraq's September 16, 2002 letter accepting the unconditional return of weapons inspectors )) [[;Story=20020916/259w9255.xml | Associated Press, 9/16/02a ]] [[ | Independent, 9/17/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 9/17/02 ]] ------ Iraq's letter is effectively an agreement to December 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1284. [[ | New York Times, 9/18/02 ]] ------ Kofi Annan tells reporters after the meeting, &#8220;I can confirm to you that I have received a letter from the Iraqi authorities conveying its decision to allow the return of the inspectors without conditions to continue their work and has also agreed that they are ready to start immediate discussions on the practical arrangements for the return of the inspectors to resume their work.&#8221; Annan credits the Arab League, which he says &#8220;played a key role&#8221; in influencing Saddam Hussein's decision to accept the inspectors, and suggests that Bush's speech also played a critical part in influencing Baghdad's decision. [[;sID=7 | UN, 9/16/02 ]] ------ UNMOVIC Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix also meets with Iraqi officials and it is reportedly agreed that weapons inspectors will return to Iraq on October 19. UNMOVIC spokesman Ewen Buchanan tells the BBC, &#8220;We are ready to discuss practical measures, such as helicopters, hotels, the installation of monitoring equipment and so on, which need to be put in place.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 9/17/02 ]] ------ The Bush administration immediately rejects the offer, calling it &#8220;a tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action,&#8221; in a statement released by the deputy press secretary. [[ | White House, 9/16/2002 ]] [[;Story=20020916/259w9255.xml | Associated Press, 9/16/02 ]] ------ And Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, tells reporters: &#8220;We've made it very clear that we are not in the business of negotiating with Saddam Hussein. We are working with the UN Security Council to determine the most effective way to reach our goal.&#8221; He then claims Iraq's offer is a tactic to give &#8220;false hope to the international community that [President Saddam] means business this time,&#8221; adding, &#8220;Unfortunately, his more than decade of experience shows you can put very little into his words or deeds.&#8221; Two days later Bush will tell reporters that Saddam's offer is &#8220;his latest ploy, his latest attempt not to be held accountable for defying the United Nations,&#8221; adding: &#8220;He's not going to fool anybody. We've seen him before. . . . We'll remind the world that, by defying resolutions, he's become more and more of a threat to world peace. [The world] must rise up and deal with this threat, and that's what we expect the Security Council to do.&#8221; [[ | Agence France Presse, 9/19/02 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/17/02 ]] ------ Later that night, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice reportedly hold a conference call with Kofi Annan and accuse him of taking matters into his own hands. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 285 ]] ------ Britain supports the US position and calls for a UN resolution backed with the threat of force. [[ | BBC, 9/17/03 ]] ------ Other nations react differently to the offer. For example, Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, says: &#8220;It's important that, through our joint efforts, we have managed to put aside the threat of a war scenario around Iraq and return the process to a political channel ... It is essential in the coming days to resolve the issue of the inspectors' return. For this, no new [Security Council] resolutions are needed.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 9/17/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/17/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Hans Blix )) ((+ Saddam Hussein )) ((+ Amir Moussa )) ((+ Scott McClellan )) ((+ Kofi Annan )) ((+ Naji Sabri )) ((+ Dan Bartlett )) {{ commentary_matthew_engel,_guardian_newspaper_2 }} {{ commentary_david_north,_world_socialist_web_site_2 }} {{ commentary_michael_o?hanlon_3 }} {{ commentary_ivo_daalder_2 }} {{ commentary_judith_kipper_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_us_state_department_official_2 }} {{ statement_gerhard_schroeder_2 }} {{ statement_jack_straw_3 }} {{ statement_scott_mcclellan_2 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_10 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_official_4 }} {{ statement_dan_bartlett_2 }} September 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1189 false 1 ------ Two days before the CIA is to issue an assessment (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1188 ]]) on Iraq's supposed links to militant Islamic groups, Pentagon officials working in the Office of Special Plans give a briefing directly to the White House; Vice-President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis Libby; and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley. The briefing says that there were &#8220;fundamental problems&#8221; with CIA intelligence-gathering methods and includes a detailed breakdown of the alleged April 2001 Prague meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi diplomat Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. [[;sSheet=/news/2004/07/11/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 7/11/04 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 7/19/04 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << officeOfSpecialPlans >> << pragueConnection >> ((+ Lewis ("Scooter") Libby )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) September 17, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_193 false 1 ------ The White House releases a detailed timeline depicting past Iraqi attempts to obstruct United Nations efforts, including Saddam's repeated refusals to provide inspectors access to sites they wanted to visit. [[ | New York Times, 9/18/02 ]] [[ | White House, 9/17/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> {{ commentary_kenneth_pollack_4 }} September 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_210 false 1 ------ Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warns the House Armed Services Committee of the serious and imminent threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the West. He says: &#8220;No terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people and the stability of the world than the regime of Saddam Hussein.&#8221; He adds: &#8220;What has not changed is Iraq's drive to acquire those weapons of mass destruction, and the fact that every approach that the United Nations has taken to stop Iraq's drive has failed. This is a critical moment for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test unfortunately the world's free nations have failed before in recent history with unfortunate consequences.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 9/18/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 9/19/02 ]] [[ | Agence France Presse, 9/19/02 ]] ------ The Secretary of Defense also says that Congress must authorize the president to use military force against Iraq before the Security Council votes on the issue. &#8220;Delaying a vote in the Congress would send a message that the US may be unprepared to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand and as we are cautioning the Iraqi regime to consider its options,&#8221; argues Rumsfeld, adding, &#8220;Our job today&#8212;the president's, the Congress' and the United Nations'&#8212;is to ... anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happen and to make the right decision as to whether or not it's appropriate for this country to take action.... The goal is not inspections, the goal is disarmament.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 9/18/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 9/19/02 ]] ------ He also tries to discredit Iraq's September 16 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_191 ]]) offer to admit UN inspectors without conditions. He says: &#8220;There's no doubt in my mind but that the inspection program that currently is on the books wouldn't work because it's so much weaker than the earlier one. The more inspectors that are in there, the less likely something is going to happen. The longer nothing happens, the more advanced their weapons programs go along.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 9/18/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << weaponsInspections >> << imminentThreatQuotes >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- US Congress )) September 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_209 false 1 ------ Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri tells the UN: &#8220;I hereby declare before you that Iraq is totally clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Our country is ready to receive any scientific experts, accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any one of your countries, to tell us which places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 9/20/02 ]] ------ The Iraq minister also states that in pursuing its aggressive policy towards Iraq, the US is &#8220;acting on behalf of Zionism which has been killing the heroic people of Palestine, destroying their property, murdering their children,&#8221; adding that Washington intends to &#8220;control Middle East oil.&#8221; His words draw the applause of several UN diplomats. [[ | Independent, 9/20/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Naji Sabri )) September 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_196 false 1 ------ A group of nineteen House Democrats form a coalition against war in Iraq and draft a resolution advocating multilateral diplomacy. [[ | Washington Times, 9/20/02 ]] ------ Representative Barbara Lee of California sponsors a resolution advocating that &#8220;the United States ... work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.&#8221; The resolution has twenty-six co-sponsors. [[ | H. Con. Res 473 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Iraq's September 16, 2002 letter accepting the unconditional return of weapons inspectors )) {{ statement_barbara_lee_2 }} {{ statement_marcy_kaptur_2 }} {{ statement_jim_mcdermott_3 }} {{ statement_dennis_kucinich_2 }} September 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_195 false 1 ------ UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix tells the Security Council that he intends to position an advance weapons inspection team in Iraq by October 15. He explains: &#8220;We will select some sites that we think are interesting to go to in the early phases, so it's not like it takes two months before we can send any guys out there in the field. It will be much earlier than that.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 9/20/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) September 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_194 false 1 ------ The White House delivers a draft of a strongly worded resolution to Congress authorizing the president to use &#8220;all appropriate means&#8221; against Iraq. The 20-paragraph draft includes provisions that would allow Bush to ignore the UN and &#8220;use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce&#8221; the UN's Security Council resolutions, &#8220;defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.&#8221; According to the Associated Press, &#8220;Three senior White House aides familiar with the draft said it would give Bush maximum flexibility to confront the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, including an explicit OK to use military force.&#8221; Although numerous congresspersons complain that the proposed wording of the resolution would provide Bush with a blank check to use military force anywhere in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, several senators&#8212;Democrats and Republicans alike&#8212;say that an amended version of the resolution would likely pass. (( Proposed Resolution to give Bush authority to use military force against Iraq )) [[ | Associated Press, 9/19/02b ]] [[ | Independent, 9/19/02 ]] [[,,3-420322,00.html | Times, 9/19/02 ]] --- * --- The draft lists several allegations against Iraq, depicting the country as an imminent threat against the US and its citizens. It states that Iraq continues to &#8220;possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security.&#8221; It also claims that Iraq &#8220;continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations,&#8221; including members of al-Qaeda. (( Proposed Resolution to give Bush authority to use military force against Iraq )) --- * --- The proposed resolution asserts that the use of military force against Iraq would constitute self-defense. It reads, &#8220;Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself.&#8221; (( Proposed Resolution to give Bush authority to use military force against Iraq )) --- * --- The draft calls on Congress to authorize the president to use military force against Iraq. &#8220;The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.&#8221; (( Proposed Resolution to give Bush authority to use military force against Iraq )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Bush administration )) {{ commentary_bruce_ackerman_2 }} {{ commentary_jim_mcdermott_2 }} {{ commentary_scott_l._silliman_2 }} {{ commentary_trent_lott_2 }} {{ commentary_carl_levin_2 }} {{ commentary_lloyd_doggett_2 }} {{ commentary_russell_d._feingold_2 }} {{ commentary_tom_daschle_2 }} {{ commentary_robert_c._byrd_2 }} {{ commentary_lloyd_doggett_3 }} September 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1831 false 1 ------ The White House submits its &#8220;National Security Strategy&#8221; to Congress. The 33-page document makes it clear that the ultimate objective of its national security policy is to &#8220;dissuade future military competition.&#8221; The US must therefore &#8220;build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge,&#8221; it says. &#8220;Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.&#8221; The use of military force will not be reserved solely for defense. There may be situations where the US should take preemptive action, it asserts. &#8220;To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.&#8221; [[ | London Times, 9/21/02 ]] ------ The NSS also states, &#8220;We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.&#8221; (( National Security Strategy of the United States of America )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Bush administration )) {{ duplicate_abraham_lincoln_2 }} September 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_211 false 1 ------ The Bush administration makes it clear that it will prevent the UN inspectors from going to Iraq under the terms of the current UN resolution. Powell tells the House International Relations Committee, &#8220;If somebody tried to move the team in now [before a UN resolution authorizing the use of force is passed], we would find ways to thwart that.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 9/20/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 9/21/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 9/29/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Colin Powell )) September 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_197 false 1 ------ White House and Pentagon officials publicly disclose that the Department of Defense has finished a highly detailed plan for attacking Iraq that was delivered to President Bush's desk in early September by Gen. Tommy R. Franks. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, &#8220;The president has options now, and he has not made any decisions.&#8221; The New York Times interviews senior officials who explain that the plan includes specific details, including the &#8220;number of ground troops, combat aircraft and aircraft carrier battle groups that would be needed,&#8221; and the &#8220;detailed sequencing for the use of air, land, naval and Special Operations forces to attack thousands of Iraqi targets, from air-defense sites to command-and-control headquarters to fielded forces.&#8221; Officials also tell the Times that any attack would begin &#8220;with a lengthy air campaign led by B-2 bombers armed with 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs to knock out Iraqi command and control headquarters and air defenses.&#8221; The principal goal of the air attacks, they say, &#8220;would be to sever most communications from Baghdad and isolate Saddam Hussein from his commanders in the rest of the country.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 9/21/02 ]] ------ The disclosure of this information notably comes only a few days after Iraq has offered to unconditionally admit weapons inspectors (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_191 ]]). ====== << decision >> ((- Thomas Franks )) ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((- George W. Bush )) September 21, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_198 false 1 ------ Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri reads the full text of a statement by Saddam Hussein before the UN secretariat-general. The statement condemns the Bush administration's attempts to provoke a war with Iraq and accuses the administration of working hand in hand with the hardline Zionists in the Israeli government [[ | Text of Letter ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> September 23, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_47 false 1 ------ David Albright, a physicist who had investigated Iraq's nuclear weapons program following the 1991 Persian Gulf War as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection team, concludes in a study that Iraq's attempt to import the tubes was not &#8220;evidence that Iraq [was] in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons&#8221; or that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant. His assessment is based on several factors, including the fact that the tubes are made of an aluminum alloy that is ill-suited for welding. He notes that Iraq had used maraging steel and carbon fiber in its earlier attempts to make centrifuges (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1216 ]]). Albright also challenges the CIA's contention the tubes' anodized coating is an indication that they are meant to be used as rotors in a gas centrifuge. The nuclear physicist notes that the fact that the tubes are anodized actually supports the theory that they were meant to be used in rockets, not a centrifuge. He cites another expert who contended that an &#8220;anodized layer on the inside of the tube ... can result in hampering the operation of the centrifuge.&#8221; (( David Albright )) [[ | Institute for Science and International Security, 9/23/02 ]] ------ Though Albright is critical of the charges being made by the Bush administration against Iraq, concerning nuclear weapons, he is no Saddam sympathizer. He believes that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction and advocates a tough stance towards his regime. [[ | New York Review of Books, 2/26/04 ]] ------ His report is widely dispersed and is reported in detail by The Washington Post on September 19, 2002. Several other newspapers also cover Albright's report. [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/19/02 ]] ------ It is later revealed that scientists at the Energy Department secretly worked with Albright on the report. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> ((+ David Albright )) September 23, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_22 false 1 ------ British education secretary Estelle Morris asks during a cabinet meeting what specifically has changed over the last few years&#8212;other than President George Bush's coming to office&#8212;that makes military action against Iraq necessary. [[ | Sunday Times, 10/5/03 ]] [[,12956,1056762,00.html | Guardian, 10/6/03 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ Estelle Morris )) September 23, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_199 false 1 ------ Three retired four-star generals testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee and warn Congress that a unilateral strike against Iraq without UN approval might limit aid from allies, create more recruits for al-Qaeda and subvert long term US diplomatic and economic interests. A fourth general urges the committee to support the use of military force against Iraq. [[ | New York Times, 9/24/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> ((+ Kofi Annan )) ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Amir Moussa )) ((+ Wesley Clark )) ((+ Naji Sabri )) {{ statement_joseph_hoar_2 }} {{ statement_joseph_hoar_3 }} {{ statement_john_m._shalikashvili_2 }} {{ statement_wesley_clark_3 }} {{ statement_john_m._shalikashvili_3 }} {{ statement_thomas_g._mcinerney_2 }} September 24, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_46 false 1 ------ The British government releases its now-infamous white paper on Iraq's unconventional weapons capabilities. In the section discussing Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program, the document notes: &#8220;[T]here is no definitive intelligence evidence that [the specialized aluminum] is destined for a nuclear program.&#8221; The dossier, however, insists that Iraq has attempted to purchase large quantities of uranium from Africa. &#8220;But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa,&#8221; it states. &#8220;Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants, and therefore has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.&#8221; [[ | British Government, 9/24/02 ]] ------ After it is revealed early the following year that US intelligence had relied on forged documents provided to it by a foreign intelligence agency (Italy's military intelligence agency, SISMI), the British will insist the allegations in the September dossier are still valid. Reports will suggest that the British allegations are based on a 1999 visit to Niger by Iraqi diplomat Wissam al-Zahawie (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_94 ]]). But according to US intelligence officials, this claim is universally regarded within intelligence circles as unsubstantiated. In fact, prior to the dossier's release, US intelligence warned the British against making this allegation (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_113 ]]). In early February 2003, the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency will report that there is no evidence that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_93 ]]). Defending Britain's decision to include the claim in the September dossier, a British Foreign official will explain to the Independent in August 2003: &#8220;Niger has two main exports&#8212;uranium and chickens. The Iraqi delegation did not go to Niger for chickens.&#8221; But Al-Zahawie disputes this. &#8220;My only mission was to meet the president of Niger and invite him to visit Iraq,&#8221; he tells the Independent. &#8220;The invitation and the situation in Iraq resulting from the genocidal UN sanctions were all we talked about. I had no other instructions, and certainly none concerning the purchase of uranium.... I have been cleared by everyone else, including the US and the United Nations. I am surprised to hear there are still question marks over me in Britain. I am willing to cooperate with anyone who wants to see me and find out more.&#8221; (( Unnamed US intelligence sources )) (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) [[ | Independent, 8/10/03a ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ------ Later reporting will reveal that the source for the dossier is in fact an Italian intelligence report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3143 ]]) that was based on the set of forged documents (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3143 ]]). [[ | La Repubblica, 10/24/2005 ]] [[ | La Repubblica, 10/25/2005 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> << africaUraniumClaim >> September 24, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_86 false 1 ------ George Tenet briefs the Senate Intelligence Committee on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). In his summary of the document, he includes the allegation that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. He mentions that there are some doubts about the reliability of the evidence, but he does not say that the CIA had sent former diplomat Joseph C. Wilson as an envoy to Niger in February (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_106 ]]) and that the former ambassador's conclusion had been that the claims were &#8220;bogus.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 6/12/03 ]] [[ | ABC News, 6/16/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> << deception >> << africaUraniumClaim >> ((- Joseph C. Wilson )) ((+ George Tenet )) (September 24, 2002) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_109 false 1 ------ Joe Wilson, who had been sent to Niger by the CIA in February 2002 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_106 ]]) and who had determined that the allegations that Iraq had sought to obtain uranium from Niger were false, contacts the CIA and advises the agency to inform the British about the intelligence that had been acquired during his mission to Niger. The London Independent later reports, &#8220;When he saw ... claims [that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from an African country] in Britain's dossier on Iraq last September, he even went as far as telling CIA officials that they needed to alert their British counterparts to his investigation.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 6/29/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) September 24, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_433 false 1 ------ Within &#8220;two hours and ten minutes&#8221; of the British dossier's publication, Iraqi government officials invite British journalists on a tour of the sites named in the document as suspected weapon sites. The journalists are permitted to choose which facilities, of those mentioned in the dossier, they want to visit. --- Al-Qa'qa complex --- The first site they visit is the al-Qa'qa complex, located 30 miles south of Baghdad, which according to the British government's paper has &#8220;been repaired&#8221; and is now &#8220;operational.&#8221; &#8220;Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant,&#8221; states the dossier, which makes two claims. The first is that the substance, phosgene, is being produced at the facility and can be used &#8220;as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.&#8221; The second claim is that the facility's phosgene production plants had been &#8220;dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt.&#8221; [[ | British Government, 9/24/2002, pg. 20 ]] [[ | Independent 9/25/02 ]] ------ But both claims are wrong. Director-General Sinan Rasim Said concedes that the plants produce phosgene as a byproduct of centralit, a stabilizer for gunpowder (which is not illegal), but denies that it can be used &#8220;as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent,&#8221; as alleged in the British document. He explains to reporters that phosgene can &#8220;not be extracted from the manufacturing equipment, let alone be used for making nerve agents.&#8221; To support his claims, he says that during the Gulf War, the US had never attempted to destroy the phosgene plants &#8220;because they knew we can't make use of it.&#8221; Instead they had bombed the boiler room and the storage area, he says. Said also disputes the claim that UNSCOM had attempted to dismantle the facility's phosgene production plants. There was no reason to, he explains, because the plant was not in violation of any laws. He tells reporters that if the British had simply requested the relevant documents from the UN they would have seen that they were wrong. [[ | Independent, 9/25/02 ]] [[ | Independent, 9/25/02 ]] ------ Amir al Sa'adi, a senior Iraqi weapons expert, offers his own opinion as to why the facility was referred to in the dossier. He suggests that Blair singled out the plant &#8220;because it could produce propellant powder for weapons from pistols to artillery guns for Iraqi air defenses.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 9/25/02 ]] ------ UNMOVIC weapons inspectors will visit the site in February 2003 and find nothing. [[,2763,895722,00.html | Guardian, 2/14/03b ]] [[;c=StoryFT&amp;cid=1042491948440 | Financial Times, 2/14/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 2/14/03 ]] [[ | CNN, 2/3/03 ]] --- Amariyah Sera --- The second site they visit is Amariyah Sera, a facility which the British say UNSCOM inspectors had concluded &#8220;was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War.&#8221; [[ | British Government 9/24/2002, pg. 20 ]] [[ | Independent 9/25/02 ]] ------ It is also claimed by Downing Street that the facility &#8220;has now expanded its storage capacity,&#8221; implying that the expansion is related to biological weapons. [[ | Independent 9/25/02 ]] [[ | British Government 9/24/2002, pg. 20 ]] ------ But the facility's director, Karim Obeid, disputes the dossier's claim that UNSCOM had earlier determined the plant was used for genetic research and storing biological agents. He tells the Independent of London: &#8220;They were coming here ever since the Gulf War until they left, and they have never accused us of any of those things in that time. All our work was done with their supervision.&#8221; He says the facility is being used &#8220;for testing typhoid fever.&#8221; Moreover, he adds that he is morally opposed to biological warfare &#8220;both as a scientist and a human being.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 9/25/02 ]] ------ Obeid also explains that the storage capacity of the facility has been increased, as the dossier states, but that the additional rooms are not being used in a way that violates international law. A reporter from the Independent, who visits the additional rooms, reports that one of the added areas is &#8220;a large mostly empty room&#8221; which the director says is being used &#8220;to store solutions for blood tests, imported from the Melat pharmaceutical company in France,&#8221; while a second area is &#8220;stacked with empty bottles of various brands of vaccine.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 9/25/02 ]] ------ Weapons inspectors will visit the site on December 15, 16, and 22 and find no evidence of biological weapons. [[,2763,895722,00.html | Guardian, 2/14/03b ]] [[;c=StoryFT&amp;cid=1042491948440 | Financial Times, 2/14/03 ]] [[;sID=8 | UNMOVIC, 12/15/02 ]] [[;sID=8;sID=8 | UNMOVIC, 12/16/02 ]] [[;sID=8 | UNMOVIC, 12/22/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 2/14/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Amir Hammudi al-Saadi )) ((+ Sinan Rasim Said )) ((+ Karim Obeid )) September 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_201 false 1 ------ US Congressmen David Bonior and Jim McDermott head for Baghdad with the intention of convincing Iraq to admit the weapons inspectors unfettered access. The day before, Bonior explained: &#8220;We want to avoid war, and we will make our case as strong as we can to not only the Iraqi leadership, but the leadership here in this country&#8212;that this war is not necessary. [War] will destabilize, we believe, many parts of the world. It will result in much loss of life, and to the extent that we can raise our concerns and have them heard, we're anxious to do so.&#8221; CNN reported, &#8220;While in Iraq, the congressmen will also visit hospitals, food distribution sites and other similar locations to assess the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi citizens.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 9/25/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Jim McDermott )) ((+ Lloyd Doggett )) September 25, 2002 Bush Says that bin Laden and Saddam are Indistinguishable complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_200 false 1 ------ During a White House meeting with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, George Bush makes the claim that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden work together. &#8220;The danger is, is that they work in concert,&#8221; he says in response to a question from a Reuters reporter. &#8220;The danger is, is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world.&#8221; He continues: &#8220;I can't distinguish between the two, because they're both equally as bad, and equally as evil and equally as destructive.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 9/25/2002 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/26/2002 ]] [[ | White House, 9/25/03a ]] ------ Later in the day, Bush's comments are downplayed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, who says that Bush did not mean Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are working together, but rather that there is the danger that they could work together. He explains, &#8220;Clearly, al-Qaeda is operating inside Iraq. In the shadowy world of terrorism, sometimes there is no precise way to have definitive information until it is too late.&#8221; [[ | White House, 9/25/03b ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/26/2002 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << iraq >> {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_9 }} September 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_356 false 1 ------ In a paper titled, &#8220;The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq,&#8221; which is a part of the study, A Future of a Post-Saddam Iraq: A Blueprint for American Involvement, Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O'Driscoll, argue for the implementation of neoliberal reforms including the privatization of Iraq's major industries. The document says that poverty in Iraq is a result of Saddam Hussein's mismanagement, namely Saddam's decision to nationalize certain industries; Iraq's war with Iran; the invasion of Kuwait; and Saddam's refusal to comply with the requirements for the suspension of UN sanctions. The paper's proposal for jumpstarting Iraq's economy focuses on privatization of Iraq's industries and several other neoliberal reforms. To complement this, the authors recommend using the &#8220;media and the educational system to explain the benefits of privatization and the changes to come in order to ensure broad public support.&#8221; The costs of reconstruction, they suggest, could be paid for with funds generated from the sale of Iraq's oil. &#8220;Iraq's vast oil reserves are more than ample to provide the funds needed to rebuild and boost economic growth,&#8221; the report says. (( The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq. Backgrounder #1594 )) [[,6903,825103,00.html | Observer, 11/3/02 ]] ------ But in order to generate this amount, the Cohen and Driscoll write, the post-Saddam government would probably have to reconsider its membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) . &#8220;Following the demise of Saddam Hussein, it is unlikely that the Saudi kingdom would transfer a fraction of its production quota under the [OPEC] regime to Iraq to compensate for those lost profits and facilitate its rebuilding,&#8221; the authors note. &#8220;Iraq will need to ensure cash flow for reconstruction regardless of OPEC supply limitations. Combined with the potential privatization of the oil industry, such measures could provide incentive for Iraq to leave the OPEC cartel down the road, which would have long term, positive implications for global oil supply. ... An Iraq outside of OPEC would find available from its oil trade an ample cash flow for the country's rehabilitation.&#8221; (( The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq. Backgrounder #1594 )) ------ Cohen will later admit in an interview after the invasion of Iraq that his interest in Iraq withdrawing from OPEC was to destabilize Saudi Arabia (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2345 ]]). ====== << preWarPlanning >> << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Gerald P. O'Driscoll )) ((+ Ariel Cohen )) {{ excerpt_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_2 }} {{ excerpt_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_3 }} {{ excerpt_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_4 }} {{ excerpt_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_5 }} {{ excerpt_the_road_to_economic_prosperity_for_a_post-saddam_iraq._backgrounder_#1594_6 }} September 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq-93 false 1 ------ During the daily press &#8220;gaggle,&#8221; Ari Fleischer acknowledges there is no evidence that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks. [[ | White House, 9/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) September 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_184 false 1 ------ Rumsfeld claims the US government has &#8220;bulletproof&#8221; confirmation of ties between Baghdad and al-Qaeda members, including &#8220;solid evidence&#8221; that al Qaeda maintains a presence in Iraq. The allegation refers to Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who is the founder of al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_185 ]]). No evidence ever surfaces to suggest that the group works with al-Qaeda. Rumsfeld's statement is based on intercepted telephone calls in which Al Zarqawi was overheard calling friends or relatives. But Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that according to US intelligence officials, &#8220;The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.&#8221; (( Unnamed US Intelligence Officials )) [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 10/7/02 ]] ====== << alZarqawi >> << terroristTies >> ((- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) {{ statement_unnamed_us_intelligence_officials_4 }} {{ statement_unnamed_us_official_4 }} September 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_137 false 1 ------ Powell tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, &#8220;The world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is and it will continue to be our overriding concern for some years to come.&#8221; [[ | US Department of State, 9/26/02 ]] ------ But Paul Anderson, spokesman for Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, tells reporters that Graham, who has access to highly classified reports, has seen no evidence that Iraq has ties to al-Qaeda. (( Paul Anderson )) [[ | USA Today, 9/26/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Colin Powell )) ((- Bob Graham )) ((+ Paul Anderson )) September 28, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_202 false 1 ------ The US and Britain present a jointly drafted UN resolution to Russia, China, and France that goes &#8220;far beyond anything previously agreed to by America's partners on the UN Security Council.&#8221; The draft resolution seeks to authorize the use of military action against Iraq in the event that Saddam's regime fails to comply with the new demands outlined in the draft resolution. The draft, which is not immediately made public, is reportedly three and a half single-space typed pages. [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 9/29/02 ]] --- * --- In its opening paragraph, the draft resolution summarizes how Iraq is in violation of numerous past United Nations resolutions. (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] --- * --- The draft resolution proposes giving Iraq seven days &#8220;to accept the resolution and declare all of its programs of weapons of mass destruction, and a further 23 days to open up the sites concerned and provide all documents to support the declaration.&#8221; (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] --- * --- Weapons inspectors would operate out of bases inside Iraq, where they would be under the protection of UN troops. UN military forces or those of a &#8220;member state&#8221; (presumably the US or Britain), would enforce &#8220;no-fly&#8221; and &#8220;no-drive&#8221; zones along the roads on the way to and around alleged weapons sites to be visited by the inspectors. This would discourage Iraqis from removing anything before inspections. &#8220;Diplomats at the UN said there was no doubt that US troops would play a leading role in any such enforcement, allowing the Pentagon to deploy forces inside Iraq even before hostilities got under way,&#8221; reports The Guardian. (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) (( Unnamed UN Diplomats )) [[ | New York Times, 10/2/02 ]] [[,2763,803471,00.html | Guardian, 10/3/02 ]] --- * --- The US-British draft resolution includes provisions that would demand that Iraq permit the free and unrestricted landing of aircraft, including unmanned spy planes. (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[,2763,803471,00.html | Guardian, 10/3/02 ]] --- * --- The UN inspections teams would be authorized to remove anyone it wishes to a location outside out of Iraq, along with his or her family, for interrogation. The stated reason for this would be to remove the person's fear of possible Iraqi government reprisals. (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[,2763,803471,00.html | Guardian, 10/3/02 ]] --- * --- The draft resolution would override the provisions of UN Resolution 1154, requiring inspectors to notify Iraqi authorities prior to inspecting presidential sites and to perform the inspections in the presence of Iraqi diplomats. That provision applies to eight such sites in Iraq, spanning about 11.5 square miles. (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 9/30/02 ]] --- * --- The document stipulates that errors in a &#8220;currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects&#8221; of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction or &#8220;failure by Iraq at any time to comply and cooperate fully&#8221; would constitute &#8220;a further material breach ... that authorizes member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area,&#8221; which the New York Times notes is &#8220;a diplomatic euphemism for American and British military action to remove Mr. Hussein from power.&#8221; As one US official explains to the Times, &#8220;If we find anything in what they give us that is not true, that is the trigger. If they delay, obstruct or lie about anything they disclosed, then this will trigger action.&#8221; (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[ | New York Times, 10/2/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] ------ The BBC reports that Russia, China, and France suspect &#8220;that the ultimatum is really designed to be turned down, leaving the way open for military operations during the December to February period.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 9/30/02 ]] --- * --- The draft resolution would also allow the permanent members of the UN Security Council to place their own nationals on the inspection teams. This is significant because the current inspections team, UNMOVIC, currently does not have any US officials in high positions. The reason for this is because the last UN inspections team, UNSCOM, had been sabotaged by US spies (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_297 ]]). (( US and British Draft UN Resolution )) [[ | Times, 9/18/02 ]] [[ | BBC, 10/1/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/2/02 ]] --- Reaction --- Iraq is infuriated by the draft resolution and calls it &#8220;unacceptable.&#8221; Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan states, &#8220;The position on the inspectors has been decided and any new measure intended to harm Iraq is unacceptable.&#8221; French President Jacques Chirac immediately expresses his opposition to the US-proposed draft resolution and seeks to form a coalition to prevent its passing. He explains that France favors the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq absent of any ultimatums because of &#8220;the seriousness of the decisions to be taken and the consequences.&#8221; He meets with Chinese premier Zhu Rongji and calls Russian President Vladimir V. Putin. Russia is also upset with the proposed draft resolution. &#8220;In its current form, this resolution cannot be implemented by its very nature,&#8221; a source tells Reuters. [[ | Telegraph, 9/29/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 9/28/02 ]] [[ | Sydney Morning Herald, 9/30/02 ]] [[ | Reuters, 9/29/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << weaponsInspections >> {{ commentary_unnamed_european_diplomat_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_russian_source_2 }} {{ commentary_john_pike_2 }} {{ statement_zhu_rongji_2 }} {{ statement_dominique_de_villepin_2 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_5 }} (September 28, 2002-November 8, 2002) complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_717 false 1 ------ During negotiations with the French over the wording of UN Resolution 1441, the US reportedly attempts to deceive the French with amateurish tricks. Vanity Fair magazine reports in April 2004: &#8220;According to a French diplomat, the US attempted various amateurish maneuvers. For example, they would have the French look at certain paragraphs that spoke to the issue of an automatic trigger; the French would insist on deletions, which the US would appear to accept; then the deletion would pop-up elsewhere in the text. &#8216;We didn't like it in paragraph four,&#8217; a French diplomat says, recalling the mind numbing dialogue. &#8216;We don't like it in paragraph two, either.&#8217; &#8221; (( Unnamed French diplomat )) [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 286-88 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> September 29, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_203 false 1 ------ Jane's Foreign Report reveals that Israeli forces have been operating within Iraq. Citing Israeli sources, it reports that the elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit was dispatched into Iraqi sovereign territory &#8220;to find and identify places used by, or likely to be used by, Iraqi Scud missile launchers.&#8221; The newsletter explains, &#8220;Our information is that neither Israel nor the United States have a clue about what, if anything, Saddam Hussein is hiding,&#8221; and that &#8220;It was this ignorance that persuaded the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, to assign the Sayeret Matkal to a job that is sensitive and dangerous.&#8221; [[;contrassID=1&amp;subContrassID=0&amp;sbSubContrassID=0 | Ha'aretz 9/29/02 ]] [[ | Jerusalem Post, 9/29/02 ]] [[ | USA Today, 11/3/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> Late September 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1227 false 1 ------ The CIA distributes a classified report on the case of the aluminum tubes to policymakers. The report, the agency's most detailed to date, acknowledges for the first time that &#8220;some in the intelligence community&#8221; have argued that the tubes were likely intended to be used in the production of conventional rockets, not gas centrifuges. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/04 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> September 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_204 false 1 ------ Iraqi and UN officials meet together with weapons inspectors to begin a two-day discussion on the resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq. &#8220;The Iraqis are being positive and businesslike and they are coming with a desire to reach an agreement,&#8221; says Muhammad ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. ElBaradei co-hosts the discussion with Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector. This effort to reach an agreement is independent to, and in conflict with, the US and British plan to introduce a tougher UN resolution that would allow for the inspections to be backed by the threat of military force. Notes the Times of London, &#8220;Such an agreement could be bad news for the United States and Britain by further complicating their efforts to win UN approval for a tough new resolution explicitly threatening military action if Iraq does impede the inspectors.&#8221; [[,,3-432251,00.html | Times, 10/1/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Mohamed ElBaradei )) ((+ Hans Blix )) September 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_411 false 1 ------ The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that a &#8220;heavy ground war&#8221; with three months of fighting, followed by a five-year occupation force could cost more than $272 billion. [[ | Associated Press, 10/1/02 ]] [[ | CNBC, 10/21/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> October 2002 State Department Restarts Propaganda Activities a1002disinfo false 1 ------ The State Department's propaganda office, closed in 1996, is reopened. Called the Counter-Disinformation/Misinformation Team, this office supposedly only aims its propaganda overseas to counter propaganda from other countries. [[ | Associated Press, 3/10/03 ]] ====== << otherPost911Events >> << propaganda >> ((+ Counter-Disinformation/Misinformation Team )) ((+ US Department of State )) October 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_206 false 1 ------ After a two-day meeting, UN and Iraqi officials agree to resume weapons inspections according to the terms that have been outlined in previous UN resolutions. &#8220;Iraq and the United Nations agreed today that inspectors would be given unfettered access to a range of sites, including sensitive areas like the Defense Ministry and the headquarters of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard,&#8221; reports the New York Times. Iraq agrees to &#8220;technical details covering transport, communications, security and accommodation for UN inspectors, except for flights by UN aircraft into the no-fly zones&#8221; and agree &#8220;to allow UN inspectors to open regional offices in Basra, the southern capital, and Mosul in the north,&#8221; reports the Times of London. UN Resolution 1154, which requires inspectors to warn Iraq before inspecting presidential sites and to conduct such inspections in the company of Iraqi diplomats, is not revoked as the Bush administration has insisted. The Iraqis also provide the UN with monitoring reports for suspect sites and items, covering the period between June 1998 and July 2002, as has been requested. Amir Al Sadi, the head of the Iraqi negotiation team, tells reporters, &#8220;We expect the advance party to arrive in Baghdad in about two weeks.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 10/1/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/1/02 ]] [[ | Times, 10/2/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/02/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> {{ statement_george_w._bush_11 }} {{ statement_unnamed_state_department_official_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_11 }} {{ statement_saddam_hussein_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_10 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_9 }} {{ statement_hans_blix_7 }} October 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 false 1 ------ The National Intelligence Council, a board of senior analysts who prepare reports on crucial national security issues, completes a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. The purpose of an NIE is to provide policy-makers with an intelligence assessment that includes all available information on a specific issue so that they can make sound policy decisions. The formal document is supposed to be the result of a collaborative effort of the entire intelligence community and is supposed to be untainted by political interests. The decision to produce the assessment on Iraq followed criticisms that the administration had already decided to invade Iraq without having received&#8212;or even called for&#8212;an assessment from its multi-billion dollar intelligence apparatus on the supposed threat posed by Iraq. Congress wanted the NIE completed prior to voting on a bill authorizing the President to use force against Iraq and was formally requested by Senator Bob Graham. ------ NIEs such as this usually take months to prepare, however this document took a mere three weeks. The person in charge of preparing the document was weapons expert Robert Walpole. According to the Independent of London, Walpole has a track record of tailoring his work to support the preconceived conclusions of his superiors. &#8220;In 1998, he had come up with an estimate of the missile capabilities of various rogue states that managed to sound considerably more alarming than a previous CIA estimate issued three years earlier,&#8221; the newspaper will report. &#8220;On that occasion, he was acting at the behest of a congressional commission anxious to make the case for a missile defense system; the commission chairman was none other than Donald Rumsfeld ....&#8221; [[ | Independent, 11/3/03 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] --- Summary of NIE Conclusions --- After the document is completed, two different versions will be released. An abridged declassified version is posted on the CIA's website for the public, while the classified version is disseminated within the administration and to Congress (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_713 ]]). The two versions portray the threat posed by Saddam Hussein very differently. The classified version of the NIE on Iraq provides a far less alarmist view of the threat allegedly posed by Iraq than that which is presented in the public version of the document. According to US intelligence and congressional sources who read the classified document, the intelligence estimate contains &#8220;cautionary language about Iraq's connections with al-Qaeda and warnings about the reliability of conflicting reports by Iraqi defectors and captured al-Qaeda members about the ties.&#8221; And notably, the second paragraph of the &#8220;key judgment&#8221; section states that the estimate lacks &#8220;specific information&#8221; on Iraq's alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Though the document does say that Iraq probably has chemical and biological weapons, it also says that US intelligence analysts believe that Saddam Hussein would only launch an attack against the US if he felt a US invasion was inevitable. The intelligence estimate also concludes that Saddam would only provide terrorists with chemical or biological agents for use against the United States as a last resort in order to &#8220;exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.&#8221; A senior intelligence official will later tell the Washington Post in June 2003: &#8220;There has always been an internal argument within the intelligence community about the connections between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. The NIE had alternative views.&#8221; The NIE also concludes that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons. The public version of the report&#8212;which is presented to Congress before it votes on a resolution conditionally authorizing Bush to use military force against Iraq&#8212;contains language that is far less qualified and nuanced than the classified version. (( Stuart Cohen )) (( US intelligence and congressional sources )) (( INR's alternative view in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq )) [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/03 ]] [[ | Agence France Presse, 11/30/03 ]] --- Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium from Africa --- The document makes a reference to the allegation that Iraq has sought to procure uranium from Africa. &#8220;A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of &#8216;pure uranium&#8217; (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement. Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.&#8221; But the alternative view&#8212;endorsed by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)&#8212;says that it is doubtful Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa. &#8220;(T)he claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious,&#8221; it reads. (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 7/19/03 ]] [[ | US Government, 10/02 ]] --- Iraqi attempts to obtain aluminum tubes --- The document provides a very misleading assessment of the tubes case. For instance, it includes a chart which compares the dimensions of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq with those that would be needed for a &#8220;Zippe-type&#8221; centrifuge. The comparison makes the two tubes appear similar. However, the chart fails to note that the aluminum tubes are an exact match to those used in Iraq's 81-millimeter rocket. The estimate also claims that the tubes are not suitable for rockets. The assertion ignores the fact that similar tubes are used in rockets from several countries, including the United States. [[ | New York Times, 10/3/2004 ]] ------ In addition to the assessment's misleading statements about the tubes, there are interesting differences between the classified and declassified versions of the NIE with regard to the tubes. The declassified, public version of the NIE states: &#8220;Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs. Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year.&#8221; However the classified version of the document presents a more nuanced assessment. In the main text of the document, it says that the Energy Department &#8220;agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.&#8221; At the bottom of the page, in a lengthy footnote by the State Department's INR, the alternative view states that the agency agrees with the DOE's assessment that the tubes are not meant for use in a gas centrifuge. The footnote reads: &#8220;In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the US Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.&#8221; (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 7/19/03 ]] [[ | US Government, 10/02 ]] [[ | USA Today, 7/31/03 ]] --- Reconstituted nuclear weapons programs --- The intelligence estimate says that &#8220;most&#8221; of the US' six intelligence agencies believe there is &#8220;compelling evidence that Saddam [Hussein] is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.&#8221; The classified version of the document includes the dissenting position of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) which states: &#8220;The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs, INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening.&#8221; It is later learned that nuclear scientists in the Department of Energy's in-house intelligence office were also opposed to the NIE's conclusion and had wanted to endorse the State's alternative view. However, the person representing the DOE, Thomas Ryder, silenced the views of those within his department and inexplicably voted to support the position that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_33 ]]). The DOE's vote was seen as critical, since the department's assessment was supposed to represent the views of the government's nuclear experts. (( Wissam al-Zahawie )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/10/04 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/10/04 ]] [[ | US Government, 10/02 ]] [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 7/19/03 ]] --- Chemical and Biological Weapons --- The classified version of the estimate uses cautionary language to conclude that Iraq probably does have chemical and biological weapons. It states: &#8220;We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.&#8221; But the document also highlights the belief that it is unlikely that Iraq has any intention to use these against the US. &#8220;... Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [Chemical/Biological Weapons] against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war.&#8221; Iraq would probably only use such weapons against the United States if it &#8220;feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.&#8221; (( 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq )) ------ The last two observations are conspicuously absent from the declassified, public version of the estimate, which reads only, &#8220;Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 2/7/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/10/04 ]] --- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles --- The NIE claims that Iraq has unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which can be used to deploy biological and chemical weapons. &#8220;Baghdad's UAVs&#8212;especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents&#8212;could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.&#8221; (( 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq )) ------ But this view is not held unanimously among the various intelligence agencies. Significantly, the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center disagrees with this assessment. The Center, which controls most of the American military's UAV fleet, says in a dissenting opinion that there is little evidence that Iraq's drones are related to the country's suspected biological weapons program. Current intelligence suggests that the drones are not capable of carrying much more than a camera and a video recorder. The Air Force believes that Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are for reconnaissance, like its counterparts in the US. The dissenting opinion reads: &#8220;... The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.&#8221; (( US Government officials and scientists )) [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 9/26/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 8/24/03 ]] [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/10/04 ]] ------ This important statement is not included in the public version of the document. (( 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq )) [[ | Knight Ridder, 2/10/04 ]] ------ Bob Boyd, director of the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency, will tell reporters in August 2003 that his department thought the allegation in the NIE &#8220;was a little odd,&#8221; noting that Air Force assessments &#8220;all along&#8221; had said that reconnaissance, not weapons delivery, was the purpose of Iraq's drones. &#8220;Everything we discovered strengthened our conviction that the UAVs were to be used for reconnaissance,&#8221; he will explain. &#8220;What we were thinking was: Why would you purposefully design a vehicle to be an inefficient delivery means? Wouldn't it make more sense that they were purposefully designing it to be a decent reconnaissance UAV?&#8221; (( Bob Boyd )) [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 9/26/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 8/24/03 ]] ------ The NIE's conclusion is apparently also based on accounts from defectors and exiles as well as information suggesting that Iraq is attempting to obtain &#8220;commercially available route-planning software,&#8221; containing topographic data of the United States. According to the NIE, this data &#8220;could facilitate targeting of US sites.&#8221; But Air Force analysts were not convinced by the argument, noting that this sort of information could easily be retrieved from the Internet and other highly accessible sources. &#8220;We saw nothing sinister about the inclusion of the US maps in route-planning software,&#8221; Boyd will tell reporters. (( Bob Boyd )) [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 9/26/03 ]] ------ Analysts at the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency are said to back the Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center's position. (( US Government officials and scientists )) [[ | Associated Press, 8/24/03 ]] --- Aftermath --- After the completion of the National Intelligence Estimate, the Bush administration will continue to make allegations concerning Iraq's weapons capabilities and ties to militant Islamic groups, but will include none of the qualifications and nuances that are present in the classified version of the assessment. After excerpts from the classified version of the NIE are published in the press in July of 2003 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_476 ]]) and the public learns that the document's conclusions had actually been much less alarmist than the public version, administration officials will claim that neither Bush, Rice, nor other top officials were informed about the alternative views expressed by the DOE, INR, and the Air Force intelligence agency. They will also assert that the dissenting views did not significantly undermine the overall conclusion of the NIE that Iraq was continuing its banned weapons program despite UN resolutions. [[ | New York Times, 7/19/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 7/27/03 ]] [[;fcategory_desc=Under%20Reported | Washington Post, 7/19/03 ]] ------ But this claim is later disputed in an article by The Washington Post, which reports: &#8220;One person who has worked with Rice describes as &#8216;inconceivable&#8217; the claims that she was not more actively involved. Indeed, subsequent to the July 18 briefing, another senior administration official said Rice had been briefed immediately on the NIE&#8212;including the doubts about Iraq's nuclear program&#8212;and had &#8216;skimmed&#8217; the document. The official said that within a couple of weeks, Rice &#8216;read it all.&#8217; &#8221; (( two unnamed administration officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 7/27/03 ]] ------ The official's account, will in fact be confirmed by Rice herself, who reportedly tells Gwen Ifill at the National Association of Black Journalists Convention in Dallas on August 7, 2003: &#8220;I did read everything that the CIA produced for the president on weapons of mass destruction. I read the National Intelligence Estimate cover to cover a couple of times. I read the reports; I was briefed on the reports. This is&#8212;after 20 years, as somebody who has read a lot of intelligence reports&#8212;this is one of the strongest cases about weapons of mass destruction that I had ever read..&#8221; [[ | Gwenn Ifill, 8/7/2003 cited in Daily Howler, 8/11/2003 ]] ------ Additionally, senior CIA analyst Stuart Cohen, the acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council at this time, who helped write the document, will tell the Agence France Presse, &#8220;Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said, &#8216;we lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD program.&#8217; &#8221; (( Michael Hayden )) [[ | Agence France Presse, 11/30/03 ]] ------ A Senate Intelligence Committee investigation will determine in July 2004 that &#8220;Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.&#8221; (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) ====== << wmdQuotesGeneral >> << africaUraniumClaim >> << wmd >> << terroristTies >> << aluminumTubes >> << deception >> << drones >> ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) ((- US Congress )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Bob Graham )) ((+ Stuart Cohen )) ((+ Bob Boyd )) {{ excerpt_inr_s_alternative_view_in_the_2002_national_intelligence_estimate_on_iraq_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_official_described_as_&#8220;close&#8221;_to_condoleezza_rice_2 }} {{ duplicate_inr_s_alternative_view_in_the_2002_national_intelligence_estimate_on_iraq_5 }} {{ duplicate_inr_s_alternative_view_in_the_2002_national_intelligence_estimate_on_iraq_4 }} {{ duplicate_inr_s_alternative_view_in_the_2002_national_intelligence_estimate_on_iraq_6 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_administration_official_4 }} {{ statement_michael_o?hanlon_2 }} {{ statement_entity_snippet_1 }} {{ duplicate_inr_s_alternative_view_in_the_2002_national_intelligence_estimate_on_iraq_3 }} {{ statement_greg_thielmann_21 }} Early October 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_96 false 1 ------ Elisabetta Burba, a reporter for the Italian current affairs weekly Panorama, receives a phone call from Rocco Martino, an Italian information peddler and former SISMI agent. He tells her that he has some documents <ref key="1611"/> that might interest her. Burba has obtained information from Martino before and she considers him to be a reliable source. (( Elisabetta Burba )) [[ | Financial Times, 8/2/04 ]] [[ | Corriere della Sera, 7/17/03, cited in Talking Points Memo, 10/31/03 ]] ------ They meet at a bar in Rome and he gives her copies of the documents, totaling some 22 pages, mostly in French, and offers to give her the originals for a sum of ten thousand dollars. Burba tells her source that she needs to verify the authenticity of the documents before her employer will agree to purchase the documents. (( Elisabetta Burba )) [[ | Corriere della Sera, date unknown, cited in Talking Points Memo, 10/31/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Agence France Presse, 7/19/03 ]] [[;cd=2003-07-19 | Reuters, 7/19/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Elisabetta Burba )) October 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_205 false 1 ------ Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden circulate an alternative to Bush's draft congressional resolution, which the two senators explain, &#8220;helps the president attract strong bipartisan support in Congress.&#8221; Their proposed resolution focuses on the use of force against Iraq as opposed to the entire region and specifies that the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction would be the reason for using military force. Bush rejects the suggested alternative outright, complaining, &#8220;I don't want to get a resolution which ties my hands,&#8221; instead insisting that Congress pass a resolution that &#8220;sends a clear signal that this country is determined to disarm Iraq and thereby bring peace to the world.&#8221; Bush says, &#8220;My question is, what's changed [since the Congressional resolution passed in 1998]? Why would Congress want to weaken a resolution?&#8221; [[,12271,802818,00.html | Guardian, 10/2/2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/1/2002 ]] [[ | White House, 10/1/02 ]] ------ Saddam, he continues, is &#8220;more of a threat four years later&#8221; and &#8220;[a]ll of us recognize that the military option is not the first choice, but disarming this man is, because he represents a true threat to the United States.&#8221; [[,12271,802818,00.html | Guardian, 10/2/2002 ]] [[ | White House, 10/1/02 ]] ====== << imminentThreatQuotes >> << legalJustification >> ((+ Richard Lugar )) ((+ Joseph Biden )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((- US Congress )) October 1, 2002 Bush Denies Having Made Decision To Go to War with Iraq; Says US Economy Strong Enough to Deal with Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2897 false 1 ------ President Bush is asked whether he thinks the US economy is strong enough to withstand a war with Iraq. He responds, &#8220;Of course, I haven't made up my mind we're going to war with Iraq,&#8221; and then adds, &#8220;I think the US economy is strong .... we're strong enough to handle the challenges ahead.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/1/2002 ]] ====== << decisionQuotes >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_39 }} October 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_55 false 1 ------ Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC) meets with the executives of &#8220;three US oil multinationals to negotiate the carve-up of Iraq's massive oil reserves post-Saddam.&#8221; Also in attendance are &#8220;leading oilmen, exiled Iraqis, and lawyers.&#8221; The meeting, titled &#8220;Invading Iraq: dangers and opportunities for the energy sector,&#8221; meets &#8220;behind the closed doors of the Royal Institute of International Affairs&#8221; in London. Several weeks after the meeting one delegate will tell the Guardian that the whole day could have been summarized with: &#8220;Who gets the oil?&#8221; The meeting is confirmed by INC spokesman Zaab Sethna. [[,6903,825103,00.html | Observer, 11/3/02 ]] [[,2763,845167,00.html | Guardian, 11/22/02 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> << motivesBehindWar >> << chalabi >> ((+ Ahmed Chalabi )) October 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1838 false 1 ------ Deutsche Bank publishes a report, titled, Baghdad Bazaar Big Oil in Iraq, which analyses the large stakes that certain countries and oil companies have in the United State's conflict with Iraq. It notes that the removal of Saddam Hussein would benefit US and British companies, while Russian, French, and Chinese companies would benefit from a peaceful outcome. Either way, companies from many different countries are positioning themselves for a role in Iraq's post-conflict oil industry, the report says. [[ | New York Times, 10/26/02 ]] [[ | Friends of the Earth, 1/26/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Deutsche Bank )) Early October 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_400 false 1 ------ Grant Aldonas, American undersecretary of commerce, tells a business forum that a war in Iraq &#8220;would open up this spigot on Iraqi oil, which certainly would have a profound effect in terms of the performance of the world economy for those countries that are manufacturers and oil consumers.&#8221; [[ | MSNBC, 11/7/02 ]] [[ | Christian Science Monitor, 10/16/02 ]] [[,12239,882517,00.html | Guardian, 1/26/03 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Grant Aldonas )) October 2002 Cannistraro Says CIA Analysts Are Upset About Use of Cooked Intelligence complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2023 false 1 ------ Vincent Cannistraro, the CIA's former head of counterintelligence, says, &#8220;Basically, cooked information is working its way into high-level pronouncements and there's a lot of unhappiness about it in intelligence, especially among analysts at the CIA.&#8221; [[ | Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << iraq >> ((+ Vincent Cannistraro )) {{ duplicate_vincent_cannistraro_13 }} October 1-31, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 17.7 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2928 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 17.7 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> (8:00pm) October 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_713 false 1 ------ The CIA delivers the classified version of its 90-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]) to Congress. It is available for viewing by Congresspersons under tight security in the offices of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. Congress asks the CIA for a declassified version so that the members have something they can refer to during their debates on the Iraq war resolution. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 281 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/2003 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) October 2, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_207 false 1 ------ The House and Senate draft a joint resolution authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq. The House bill is sponsored by Democrat Richard Gephardt, who meets with the president in the morning to discuss the compromise bill. Bush concedes on a few of Gephardt's requests. The resulting joint resolutions&#8212;HJ Res. 114 in the House and SJ Res. 46, in the Senate&#8212;give substantially more to President Bush than the other proposals that are under consideration such as the Biden-Lugar initiative and Barbara Lee's HR 473. Gephardt's resolution angers many fellow democrats. (( S.J. Res. 46 )) [[ | New York Times, 10/3/02 ]] --- * --- The document alleges, among other things, that Iraq is harboring al-Qaeda operatives, is actively seeking and preparing to use weapons of mass destruction, had gassed its own people, had attempted to assassinate the president's father, and was in violation of past UN resolutions. (( S.J. Res. 46 )) --- * --- The document authorizes the president to use military force to &#8220;defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.&#8221; (( S.J. Res. 46 )) --- * --- The document requires that the president, within 48 hours of exercising the use of military force, provide Congress with an explanation as to why diplomacy was insufficient to protect the United States or enforce United Nations resolutions. The resolution also requires the president to report to Congress every 60 days during the entire duration of the conflict. (( S.J. Res. 46 )) ====== << terroristTies >> << legalJustification >> ((+ US Congress )) October 2, 2002 CIA Deputy Director Tells Congress Agency Doubts British Africa-Uranium Claim complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3147 false 1 ------ Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin testifies before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. When asked by Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) whether he has read the British white paper (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_46 ]]) on Iraq and whether he disagrees with any of its conclusions he responds: &#8220;[T]he one thing where I think they stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations. We've looked at those reports and we don't think they are very credible...&#8221; (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Jon Kyl )) ((+ John E. McLaughlin )) October 2, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_146 false 1 ------ In a congressional closed-door hearing, Senator Carl Levin asks a senior intelligence witness: &#8220;If (Saddam) didn't feel threatened, did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?&#8221; The intelligence witness responds that under those circumstances &#8220;the likelihood ... would be low.&#8221; But the probability of Saddam using such weapons would increase, the witness explains, if the US initiates an attack. (( Letter from CIA Director George Tenet to Bob Graham )) [[ | Congressional Record, 10/7/02, Page S10154 ]] [[ | CBC News 11/1/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Carl Levin )) {{ excerpt_letter_from_cia_director_george_tenet_to_bob_graham_2 }} October 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_212 false 1 ------ Senator Robert Byrd speaks strongly against the Bush administration's drive towards war with Iraq during a debate over Senate Joint Resolution 46. [[ | Byrd, 10/3/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Robert C. Byrd )) October 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_208 false 1 ------ The US and Britain continue to demand that weapons inspectors not return to Iraq until after a stronger resolution&#8212;one that authorizes the use of force&#8212;is agreed upon by the National Security Council. Bush threatens to lead a coalition against Iraq if the UN Security Council fails to back him. During an address in Washington to Hispanic leaders, Bush says: &#8220;My intent, of course, is for the United Nations to do its job. I think it'll make it easier for us to keep the peace.... My intent is to put together a vast coalition of countries who understand the threat of Saddam Hussein. The military option is my last choice, not my first. It's my last choice.... The choice is up to the United Nations to show its resolve. The choice is up to Saddam Hussein to fulfill its word&#8212;his word. And if neither of them acts, the United States, in deliberate fashion, will lead a coalition to take away the world's worst weapons from one of the world's worst leaders.&#8221; [[ | Reuters, 10/3/2002b ]] [[ | White House, 10/3/02 ]] ------ But Russia, France, and China maintain their opposition to the US-British draft resolution which would pave the way for using military force against Iraq. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov strongly disagrees that a tougher resolution is needed. And France remains insistent that any further resolutions against Iraq should be broken into two parts&#8212;one defining the terms of inspections, and a second outlining the consequences if Iraq does not comply. [[ | Reuters, 10/3/2002b ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Richard Gephardt )) ((+ Alexander Saltanov )) ((+ Robert C. Byrd )) ((+ George W. Bush )) October 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_714 false 1 ------ The CIA releases a 25-page declassified version of its October 1 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and posts it on the agency's website for public viewing. [[ | Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 281 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/2003 ]] ------ But the public version presents a very different assessment of the threat posed by Iraq than the original document (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). ====== << deception >> October 4, 2002 National Intelligence Officer Tells Congress He Doubts British Africa-Uranium Claim complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3148 false 1 ------ Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, testifies before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In response to a question from Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) regarding his assessment of Britain's recent white paper (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_46 ]]) on Iraq, he says that the British &#8220;put more emphasis on the uranium acquisition in Africa than we would.&#8221; He added: &#8220;There is some information on attempts and, as we said, maybe not to this committee, but in the last couple of weeks, there's a question about some of those attempts because of the control of the material in those countries. In one case the mine is completely flooded and how would they get the material...&#8221; (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Fred Thompson )) ((+ Robert Walpole )) October 5, 2002 CIA Warns White House Not to Include Africa-Uranium Allegation in Cincinnati Speech complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_101 false 1 ------ The CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence [ADDI] sends a four-page memo to Bush administration officials, including Bush's deputy national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, and the chief speechwriter, Michael Gerson, expressing doubt over claims that Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger. On page 3 of the memo, the ADDI advises removing the allegation from the draft of Bush's upcoming speech in Cincinnati. &#8220;[R]emove the sentence because the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it can be acquired from the source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue. Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 7/23/03 ]] ------ Despite the warning, draft seven of the speech, completed later in the day, contains the passage: &#8220;[T]he regime has been caught attempting to purchase substantial amounts of uranium oxide from sources in Africa.&#8221; (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) ------ Stephen Hadley will later claim in July 2003 that he did not brief Condoleezza Rice on the memo. [[ | The Washington Post, 7/27/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Stephen Hadley )) ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Michael Gerson )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) October 6, 2002 CIA Again Warns White House Not to Include Africa-Uranium Allegation in Cincinnati Speech complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_102 false 1 ------ The CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence [ADDI] receives draft seven of Bush's upcoming speech in Cincinnati and sees that the speech writers have failed to remove the passage on Iraq's alleged attempt to purchase uranium from Niger, as the CIA had advised the day before (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_101 ]]). He informs Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet who personally calls White House officials, including Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, with the CIA's concerns. The ADDI reportedly tells Tenet that the &#8220;president should not be a fact witness on this issue&#8221; because the agency's analysts consider the reporting &#8220;weak&#8221; and say it is based solely on one source. The allegation is finally removed from the speech. Later in the day, to press its point even further, the CIA faxes another memo, summarizing its position on the Africa-uranium claim. The memo states: &#8220;[M]ore on why we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points (1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British.&#8221; (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) [[ | The Washington Post, 7/13/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 7/23/03 ]] ------ The memo's recipients include National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley. [[ | The Washington Post, 7/23/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Condoleezza Rice )) ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ Stephen Hadley )) October 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_213 false 1 ------ British Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, Solicitor-General Harriet Harman and the Financial Times warn British Prime Minister Tony Blair that if his government pursues &#8220;a war against Iraq, Britain could be hauled before the International Court of Justice.&#8221; [[ | IC Coventry, 10/7/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Tony Blair )) ((+ Peter Goldsmith )) ((+ Harriet Harman )) Before October 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_187 false 1 ------ During the trial of Jordanian-born Shadi Abdallah, it is learned that Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, a Jordanian Muslim militant accused by the Bush administration of having ties to Osama bin Laden, is actually the founder of another Islamist group, al-Tawhid, which works &#8220;in opposition&#8221; to al-Qaeda (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_186 ]]). The aim of the group is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan. Abdallah recounts one instance where Zarqawi vetoed a proposal to share charity funds collected in Germany with al-Qaeda. According to Abdallah, Al Zarqawi's organization had also &#8220;competed&#8221; with al-Qaeda for new recruits. [[ | Newsweek, 6/25/03 ]] [[ | Independent, 2/6/03 ]] ------ Details of the trial are passed on to US intelligence. Nonetheless, Bush will claim in a televised speech on October 7, 2002 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_36 ]]) that a &#8220;very senior al-Qaeda leader ... received medical treatment in Baghdad this year,&#8221; a reference to Al Zarqawi. And Colin Powell will similarly state on February 5, 2003 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_442 ]]) that &#8220;Iraq is harboring the network of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants.&#8221; Both statements are made even though &#8220;US intelligence already had concluded that Zarqawi was not an al-Qaeda member ....&#8221; (( Unnamed US intelligence sources )) [[ | BBC, 2/5/03 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/03 ]] [[ | US Department of State, 2/5/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << alZarqawi >> << terroristTies >> ((+ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) ((+ Shadi Abdallah )) {{ statement_unnamed_washington_terrorism_expert_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_intelligence_analyst__2 }} October 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_145 false 1 ------ In a response letter to Senator Bob Graham of the Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA Director George Tenet says that US Intelligence's &#8220;understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al- Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information ... received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.&#8221; (( Letter from CIA Director George Tenet to Bob Graham )) [[ | CBC News 11/1/02 ]] [[ | Congressional Record, 10/7/02, Page S10154 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ George Tenet )) ((- Bob Graham )) October 7, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_36 false 1 ------ In a televised speech, Bush presents the administration's case that Saddam Hussein's regime is a threat to the security of the nation. The speech is widely criticized for including false and exaggerated statements. --- Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons --- Bush claims that a shipment of 3,000 aluminum tubes to Iraq, which were intercepted in Jordan by US authorities in July of 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_41 ]]), had been destined for use in a uranium enrichment program. But by this time numerous experts and government scientists have already warned the administration against making this allegation. [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] ------ Three weeks before Bush's speech, The Washington Post ran a story on the aluminum tubes. The article summarized a study by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), disputing the administration's claim that the tubes were to be used for gas centrifuges. The report was authored by the institute's president and founder, David Albright, a respected nuclear physicist, who had investigated Iraq's nuclear weapons program after the First Gulf War as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection team and who has spoken before Congress on numerous occasions. In his study, he concluded that Iraq's attempts to import the tubes &#8220;are not evidence that Iraq is in possession of, or close to possessing, nuclear weapons&#8221; and &#8220;do not provide evidence that Iraq has an operating centrifuge plant or when such a plant could be operational.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 9/19/02 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | Institute for Science and International Security, 10/9/03 ]] ------ Soon after the speech, David Albright tells The Guardian newspaper that there is still no evidence to substantiate that interpretation. As one unnamed specialist at the US Department of Energy explains to the newspaper, &#8220;I would just say there is not much support for that [nuclear] theory around here.&#8221; [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian 10/9/02 ]] ------ The Washington Post article also reported that government experts on nuclear technology who disagreed with the White House view had told Mr. Albright that the administration expected them to remain silent. [[,12271,807286,00.html | Washington Post 9/19/02 ]] [[ | Independent 9/22/02 ]] ------ Houston G. Wood III, a retired Oak Ridge physicist considered to be &#8220;among the most eminent living experts&#8221; on gas centrifuges reviewed the tube question in August 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_44 ]]) and concluded at that time that it was very unlikely that the tubes had been imported to be used for centrifuges in a uranium enrichment program. He later tells The Washington Post in mid-2003 that &#8220;it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges,&#8221; adding that it stretched &#8220;the imagination to come up with a way.&#8221; He also says that other centrifuge experts whom he knew shared his assessment of the tubes. (( Houston G. Wood III )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ------ In addition to the several outside experts who criticized the tubes allegation, analysts within the US intelligence community also doubted the claim. Less than a week before Bush's speech, the Energy Department and the State Department's intelligence branch, the INR, had appended a statement to a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq disputing the theory (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). (( David Albright )) [[ | National Intelligence Estimate, 10/2002 ]] --- Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue in 1998 --- Bush says that US intelligence has information that Saddam Hussein ordered his nuclear program to continue after inspectors left in 1998. &#8220;Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the (UN) International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium enrichment sites,&#8221; Bush charges. &#8220;That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] ------ But Bush's &#8220;high-ranking&#8221; source turns out to be Khidir Hamza, who is considered by many to be an unreliable source. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security where Hamza worked as an analyst from 1997 to 1999, says that after Hamza defected &#8220;he went off the edge&#8221; and &#8220;started saying irresponsible things.&#8221; [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] ------ And General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law who was in charge of the dictator's former weapons program but who defected in 1995, told UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors, as well as US and British intelligence, that Khidhir Hamza was &#8220;a professional liar.&#8221; &#8220;He worked with us, but he was useless and always looking for promotions,&#8221; Kamel had explained. &#8220;He consulted with me but could not deliver anything. . . . He was even interrogated by a team before he left and was allowed to go.&#8221; (( UNSCOM report, S/1998/332, April 16, 1998 )) [[ | New Yorker, 5/5/03 ]] --- Iraq is developing drones that could deploy chemical and biological weapons --- The President claims that Iraq is developing drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which &#8220;could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.&#8221; He goes so far as to say, &#8220;We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] ------ But this claim comes shortly after US intelligence agencies completed a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, in which Air Force intelligence had disputed the drone allegation (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). ------ Bush's drone allegation is quickly derided by experts and other sources. The Guardian of London reports two days later that according to US military experts, &#8220;Iraq had been converting eastern European trainer jets, known as L-29s, into drones, but ... that with a maximum range of a few hundred miles they were no threat to targets in the US.&#8221; (( Unnamed military experts )) [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] ------ And the San Francisco Chronicle will cite experts who say that &#8220;slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles would likely be shot down as soon as they crossed Iraq's borders&#8221; because &#8220;Iraqi airspace is closely monitored by US and British planes and radar systems&#8221; . The report will also note, &#8220;It's also unclear how the vehicles would reach the US mainland&#8212;the nearest point is Maine, almost 5, 500 miles away&#8212;without being intercepted.&#8221; (( Unnamed experts )) [[ | San Francisco Chronicle 10/12/02 ]] ------ Anthony Cordesman, a security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will say he believes the drone allegation is unrealistic. In an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, he says, &#8220;As a guesstimate, Iraq's present holdings of delivery systems and chemical and biological weapons seem most likely to be so limited in technology and operational lethality that they do not constrain US freedom of action or do much to intimidate Iraq's neighbors.&#8221; (( Anthony Cordesman )) [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] ------ These criticisms of Bush's claim are validated after the US invasion of Iraq. Two US government scientists involved in the post-invasion hunt for weapons of mass destruction will tell the Associated Press in August 2003 that they inspected the drones and concluded that they were never a threat to the US. &#8220;We just looked at the UAVs and said, &#8216;There's nothing here. There's no room to put anything in here,&#8217; &#8221; one of the scientists will say. &#8220;The US scientists, weapons experts who spoke on condition of anonymity, reached their conclusions after studying the small aircraft and interviewing Iraqi missile experts, system designers and Gen. Ibrahim Hussein Ismail, the Iraqi head of the military facility where the UAVs were designed,&#8221; the Associated Press will explain in its report. (( Unnamed US government scientists )) [[ | Associated Press, 8/24/03 ]] --- Saddam Hussein could give terrorists weapons of mass destruction --- Bush asserts, &#8220;Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] ------ But not only have numerous experts and inside sources disputed this theory (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_158 ]]), US intelligence's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq&#8212;completed just one week before&#8212;concluded that this is an unlikely scenario (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_7 ]]). &#8220;Baghdad, for now, appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States,&#8221; the document clearly stated. &#8220;Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions.&#8221; [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 9/12/03 ]] --- Iraq rebuilding facilities associated with production of biological and chemical weapons --- Bush claims that surveillance photos indicate that Iraq &#8220;is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] ------ On the following day, photos are published on the White House website showing that Iraq had repaired three sites damaged by US bombs&#8212;the Al Furat Manufacturing Facility, the Nassr Engineering Establishment Manufacturing Facility, and Fallujah II. [[ | White House, 10/8/02 ]] ------ But no evidence is provided by the White House demonstrating that these sites have resumed activities related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi authorities will give reporters a tour of the facilities on October 10 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_214 ]]). --- Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases --- Bush alleges that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda operatives &#8220;in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] ------ The claim is based on a September 2002 CIA document which had warned that its sources were of &#8220;varying reliability&#8221; and that the claim had not yet been substantiated (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1213 ]]). The report's main source, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda operative who offered the information to CIA interrogators while in custody, later recounts the claim (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1214 ]]). A Defense Intelligence Agency report in February 2002 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3178 ]]) had also expressed doubt in the claim, going so far as to suggest that al-Libi was &#8220;intentionally misleading [his] debriefers.&#8221; (( Unnamed administration official )) [[ | CNN, 9/26/02 ]] [[ | Newsweek, 7/5/2004 ]] [[ | The New York Times, 7/31/2004 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/6/2005 ]] ------ And earlier in the month, US intelligence services had concluded in their National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that this allegation could not be confirmed. [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] [[ | Newsday, 10/10/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 6/22/03 ]] [[ | CNN, 9/26/02 ]] --- A very senior al-Qaeda leader received medical treatment in Baghdad --- Bush claims: &#8220;Some al-Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al-Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.&#8221; The allegation refers to Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who is the founder of al-Tawhid, an organization whose aim is to kill Jews and install an Islamic regime in Jordan. No evidence ever surfaces to suggest that the group works with al-Qaeda. The allegation is partly based on intercepted telephone calls in which Al Zarqawi was overheard calling friends or relatives (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_185 ]]). But Knight Ridder Newspapers reports that according to US intelligence officials, &#8220;The intercepts provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist operation while he was in Iraq.&#8221; (( Umnamed US intelligence officials )) [[ | Knight Ridder Newspapers, 10/7/02 ]] [[ | White House, 10/7/02 ]] ====== << alZarqawi >> << terroristTiesQuotes >> << ChemicalBiologicalQuotes >> << nuclearQuotes >> << terroristTies >> << wmd >> << aluminumTubes >> << deception >> << poisonsAndGases >> << drones >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Houston G. Wood III )) ((+ David Albright )) ((- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi )) {{ commentary_greg_thielmann_22 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_5 }} October 8-9, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_97 false 1 ------ One day after receiving the Niger documents (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_96 ]]), Elisabetta Burba meets with her editors and expresses her concern that the documents might be fakes. She notes that the amount of uranium specified in the documents&#8212;500 tons&#8212;is very large. Moreover, the letters do not include details on how the uranium would be delivered. She proposes that she travel to Niger to determine the document's authenticity. (( Elisabetta Burba )) [[ | Corriere della Sera, 7/19/03, cited in Talking Points Memo, 10/31/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 7/20/03 ]] ------ But Burba is instructed by the magazine's editor-in-chief, Carolo Rossella, who is &#8220;known for his ties to the Berlusconi government,&#8221; to hand them over to the American embassy in Rome for verification. (( Elisabetta Burba )) [[ | The Washington Post, 7/20/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | Corriere della Sera, 7/19/03, cited in Talking Points Memo, 10/31/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Carlo Rossella )) ((+ Elisabetta Burba )) October 8 and 11, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_216 false 1 ------ Chief UN inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, send a letter to the Iraqi government which lists conclusions they had drawn from the October 1 meeting with Iraqi arms officials (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_206 ]]). The letter asks that Iraqi officials respond with a letter confirming these conclusions. But the inspectors' letter actually includes additional conditions not discussed during the October 1 meeting, &#8220;among them were the right of inspectors to conduct interviews and choose &#8216;the mode and location&#8217; for them as well as the possibility of flying U-2 spy planes over Iraq.&#8221; [[ | Reuters, 10/12/02 ]] ------ Iraqi officials respond to the request on October 11 with a letter signed by Amir Hammudi al-Saadi, an adviser to Saddam Hussein. The letter agrees only to the conditions that were agreed upon during the October 1 meeting. (( Iraqi letter to UN, Oct. 10, 2002 )) [[ | Reuters, 10/12/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/12/2002 ]] ------ The Bush administration seizes on the Iraqi response, calling it another example of Iraq evasion. &#8220;We are not surprised that once again the Iraqis want to delay and deceive. ... We've had 16 resolutions and 11 years of playing this game, and it's time the Security Council takes action,&#8221; says Richard Grenell, spokesman for US Ambassador John Negroponte. [[ | New York Times, 10/12/2002 ]] [[ | Reuters, 10/12/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Mohamed ElBaradei )) ((+ Amir Hammudi al-Saadi )) ((+ Hans Blix )) October 9-16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_84 false 1 ------ Italian Panorama journalist Elisabetta Burba goes to the US Embassy in Rome and gives US officials copies of the Niger documents <ref key="1611"/> that she had obtained two days before (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_96 ]]). [[ | Agence France Presse, 7/19/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 7/20/03 ]] [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 7/20/03 ]] ------ The documents are then sent to Washington and distributed to the various intelligence agencies. The precise details are unclear, however, due to contradicting accounts. --- In Rome --- According to a senior US State Department official interviewed by the Agence France-Presse in July 2003, the documents are first vetted by &#8220;all the relevant agencies&#8221; in Rome before being sent to Washington. &#8220;[T]hey were immediately shared with all the appropriate agencies,&#8221; the sources will explain. &#8220;The embassy shared them with all the relevant agencies at post, and they were then shared again when they got back to Washington.&#8221; (( Unnamed US State Department official )) [[ | Agence France Presse, 9/19/03 ]] [[,5936,6771366%255E25777,00.html | Mercury, 9/19/03 ]] ------ But an unnamed former CIA official will tell Seymour Hersh that the papers were not looked at in Rome. &#8220;The Embassy was alerted that the papers were coming and it passed them directly to Washington without even vetting them inside the Embassy.&#8221; (( Unnamed former CIA official )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] --- In Washington --- After the documents arrive in Washington, they are reviewed by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and within days its analysts conclude that the papers might be fakes. On October 16, the INR distributes the documents to the CIA and several other US intelligence agencies with the caveat that the documents are of &#8220;dubious authenticity.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 7/20/03 ]] ------ Vince Cannistraro, former chief of counter-terrorism operations and analysis, will tell Seymour Hersh that the CIA did not immediately recognize that the documents were forged. (( Vincent Cannistraro )) [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] ------ However, other sources will claim that like the INR, the CIA quickly saw that the documents were not authentic. A senior Central Intelligence Agency official will tell Knut Royce of Newsday that the CIA &#8220;had serious questions about [the claims] from day one.&#8221; The agency &#8220;had accounts [(see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_95 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2987 ]]) (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3161 ]])] of them [the letters] and that was close enough. We didn't take it that seriously to begin with. ... We didn't put a lot of stock in these reports from Niger. We didn't rush around to get the actual documents.&#8221; (( Unnamed Senior CIA official )) [[;FMT=ABS&amp;FMTS=FT | Newsday, 7/11/03 ]] ------ Likewise, a US intelligence official will tell the New York Times that CIA officials were always suspicious of the Niger documents. [[ | New York Times 3/23/03 ]] ------ And Hersh&apos;s anonymous CIA source also says the papers were quickly assessed as fakes. &#8220;Everybody knew at every step of the way that they were false&#8212;until they got to the Pentagon, where they were believed.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 7/20/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Central Intelligence Agency )) ((+ Bureau of Intelligence and Research )) ((+ Vincent Cannistraro )) ((+ Elisabetta Burba )) {{ statement_elisabetta_burba_2 }} After October 9, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_478 false 1 ------ Elisabetta Burba travels to Niger to investigate the documents <ref key="1611"/> she received a few day earlier (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_96 ]]). In Niger, she quickly becomes convinced that the documents are not authentic. Seymour Hersh will later report: &#8220;She visited mines and the ports that any exports would pass through, spoke to European businessmen and officials informed about Niger's uranium industry, and found no trace of a sale. She also learned that the transport company and the bank mentioned in the papers were too small and too ill-equipped to handle such a transaction.&#8221; With all evidence indicating that the papers are bogus, Burba abandons the story. [[ | New Yorker, 10/20/03 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 7/20/03 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 7/20/03 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ Elisabetta Burba )) October 9, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_402 false 1 ------ During his daily press briefing, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer denies that oil is a motivating factor behind the drive for war with Iraq. He says, &#8220;It is not a factor. This is about preserving the peace and saving the lives of Americans.&#8221; [[ | New York Daily News, 10/10/02 ]] [[ | White House, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | MSNBC, 11/7/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) October 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_214 false 1 ------ Iraqi Minister Abdul Tawab Mullah Hawaish, who is in charge of Iraq's weapons programs, invites reporters and members of the Bush administration to visit two of the alleged WMD sites, Furat and Nasser al-Azim, to which Bush had referred in his October 7 speech (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_36 ]]). Hawaish says, &#8220;The American administration are invited to inspect these sites. As I am responsible for the Iraqi weapons programs, I confirm here that we have no weapons of mass destruction and we have no intention to produce them.... I am saying here and now that we do not have weapons of mass destruction and we do not have programs to develop them.&#8221; [[ | Reuters, 10/10/02 ]] [[ | BBC, 10/10/02 ]] ------ But the White House rejects the offer. Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, &#8220;This is not up to Iraq, this is up to the UN.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 10/10/2002 ]] ------ Reporters, however, accept the offer and tour the Nasser State Establishment, a facility that Iraq claims produces goods for civilian use as well as components for conventional weapons. [[;ARTICLE_ID=405081 | Reuters, 10/10/2002 ]] ====== << wmd >> ((+ Abdul Tawab Mullah Hawaish )) Before October 10, 2002 Bush Refuses To Discuss Iraq with Senators complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2867 false 1 ------ As a group of Democratic and Republican members of Congress are discussing the proposed bill to authorize the use of force against Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_207 ]]), President Bush walks in and says: &#8220;Look, I want your vote. I'm not going to debate it with you.&#8221; When a senator attempts to ask him a question, Bush snaps back, &#8220;Look, I'm not going to debate it with you.&#8221; [[,23657,995011,00.html | Time Magazine, 9/6/2004 ]] [[ | The New York Times Magazine, 10/17/2004 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) October 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_486 false 1 ------ The House votes 296 to 133 in favor of HR Res. 114 authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq, in spite of significant opposition from their constituencies. Commenting on the passing of the resolution, The Washington Post reports: &#8220;Yesterday's debate often lacked the passion and unpredictability of the 1991 affair, when members sat late into the night listening attentively to a war of words. By contrast, the House chamber was largely empty most of yesterday: the arguments familiar, the outcome certain, the conclusion anticlimactic.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 10/11/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ US Congress )) October 10, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_368 false 1 ------ In a speech during Middle East Institute's annual conference, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, presents an extensive argument against the Bush administration's plans for invading Iraq. He makes several points. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- In order for the planned military operation against Iraq to be successful it must have international support. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- In order to ensure a quick war, the US must use overwhelming force. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- Civilian casualties, collateral damage, and destruction of the infrastructure must be kept to a minimum. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- Israeli involvement would create massive instability. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- The invasion must not provoke a reaction from the Arab Street. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- The transition to a post-Saddam Iraq will not be easy. He explains: &#8220;If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, then we don't understand history, the nature of the country, the divisions, or the underneath-suppressed passions that could rise up. God help us if we think this transition will occur easily.&#8221; [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- The burden of the war and post-war reconstruction must be shared. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- It will not be possible to simply impose a democracy on Iraq. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- Anti-American militant groups cannot be defeated by military means alone. He asks several questions that are rarely asked in public: &#8220;Why are young people flocking to these causes? Could the issues be political, economic and social? Could disenfranchisement or oppression be what drives them rather than the religious fanaticism that may be the core element to only a few? How do we cooperate to fix these problems? How do we help a part of the world that's trying to come to grips with modernity?&#8221; [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- He questions whether an invasion is even necessary, instead suggesting that there are numerous other issues to deal with of higher priority. [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] --- * --- Finally, he says that violence and war are not the solution. &#8220;Like those generals who were far greater than I am, I don't think that violence and war is the solution. There are times when you reluctantly, as a last resort, have to go to war. But as a general that has seen war, ... I will tell you that in my time, I never saw anything come out of fighting that was worth the fight.&#8221; [[ | Middle East Institute, 10/10/02 ]] ====== << maintreamDissent >> ((+ Anthony Zinni )) {{ duplicate_anthony_zinni_3 }} {{ duplicate_anthony_zinni_4 }} October 11, 2002 French and British Deny Link Between Iraq and al-Qaeda complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2024 false 1 ------ French and British officials deny that there is any link between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The British specifically deny any meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi agents in the Czech Republic. They state that Iraq has purposely distanced itself from al-Qaeda, not embraced it. [[ | Financial Times, 10/4/02 ]] [[,12469,808905,00.html | Guardian, 10/10/02 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << terroristTies >> << iraq >> October 11, 2002 Pentagon and CIA at Odds Over Alleged Iraq-al-Qaeda Ties complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2025 false 1 ------ The Los Angeles Times reports that there is an escalating &#8220;war&#8221; between the Pentagon and the CIA over tying Iraq to al-Qaeda. [[ | Los Angeles Times, 10/11/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> << iraq >> 1:15 a.m. October 11, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_215 false 1 ------ Senators vote 77 to 23 in favor of SJ Res. 46 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_207 ]]) authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq, despite significant opposition from their constituencies. (( S.J. Res. 46 )) [[ | Washington Post, 10/11/02 ]] ------ Dissident Democrats Senators Carl Levin, Richard Durbin, Barbara Boxer, Robert Byrd, and Mark Dayton attempt to come up with an alternative, SJ Res. 45, but discussion on it is postponed indefinitely by a 75 to 25 vote. (( S.J. Res. 45 )) --- Sen. Carl Levin. SJ Res. 45 with amendments 4858-62 (rejected) --- &#8220;To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes.&#8221; (( S.J. Res. 45 with amendments 4858-62 )) --- Sen. Richard Durbin. SJ Res. 45 with amendments 4865 (rejected) --- To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq. --- Sen. Barbara Boxer. SJ Res. 45 with amendments 4866-67 (not voted on) --- &#8220;In families with minor children where both parents serve on active duty in the Armed Forces or where both parents are members of the National Guard or Reserves, the Secretary of Defense shall make every effort to ensure that not more than one of the parents is deployed in combat.&#8221; --- Sen. Robert Byrd. SJ Res. 45 with amendments 4868 (rejected) --- To provide statutory construction that constitutional authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of authority is made to the president not directly related to the existing threat posed by Iraq. (( S.J. Res. 45 with amendments 4868-69 )) --- Sen. Robert Byrd. SJ Res. 45 with amendments 4869 (rejected) --- To provide a termination date for the authorization of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the extension. (( S.J. Res. 45 with amendments 4868-69 )) --- Sen. Mark Dayton. S.J. Res. 45 with amendments 4870 (rejected) --- Allows the president to prepare for the deployment&#8212;not use&#8212;of the US Armed Forces. If he determines that the use of force is necessary to protect the US from an imminent threat posed by Iraq, he may request a declaration of war to be voted upon by Congress. (( S.J. Res. 45 with amendments 4870 )) ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Carl Levin )) ((+ Barbara Boxer )) ((+ US Congress )) ((+ Richard Durbin )) ((+ Mark Dayton )) ((+ Robert C. Byrd )) October 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_217 false 1 ------ Hans Blix announces that he will wait for a decision on the proposed new UN resolution being pushed by the US and Britain prior to leading the inspection team to Iraq. The New York Times reports, &#8220;The chief of the United Nations weapons inspectors appealed to Iraq today to agree to arrangements for new inspections but said his weapons teams would only return to Iraq after the Security Council adopts a resolution giving them a new mandate.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/16/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) October 16, 2002 Bush Signs Congressional Resolution Authorizing Use of Force Against Iraq; Says War is a &#8216;Last Resort&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3253 false 1 ------ President Bush signs the congressional resolution (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_207 ]]) authorizing him to use military force against Iraq. &#8220;I have not ordered the use of force. I hope the use of force will not become necessary,&#8221; he says shortly before signing the document. &#8220;Hopefully this can be done peacefully. Hopefully we can do this without any military action.&#8221; He says he has &#8220;carefully weighed the human cost of every option before us&#8221; and that he will only send troops &#8220;as a last resort.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/16/02 ]] ====== << decision >> << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) October 17, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_218 false 1 ------ Opposition in the UN Security Council against the US-British-proposed draft remains strong in spite of US arm-twisting. France, China and Russia&#8212;who are all permanent members of the UN Security Council and who have veto power&#8212;remain steadfast in their opposition to the wording of the US-British draft resolution. [[ | BBC, 10/17/2002 ]] [[ | BBC, 10/16/2002 ]] ------ Additionally, a debate held among members of the UN General Assembly reveals significant resentment over the US and British position. [[ | BBC, 10/17/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> October 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_219 false 1 ------ The US and Britain announce that they will act without UN approval if the UN fails to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw warns that the US and Britain will take military action against Iraq with or without UN approval. He says, &#8220;We reserve the right to act within international law in respect of the use of force which may or may not be covered by a new resolution. It is entirely appropriate for America, as for us, to reserve their position if the United Nations does not meet its responsibilities.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 10/18/02a ]] [[;categoryid=2 | BBC, 10/18/2002b ]] ------ Additionally, the State Department announces that President Bush has the authority to use military force against Iraq in order to disarm it, even if the United Nations fails to back such an action. [[ | Associated Press, 10/19/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> Before October 19, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_48 false 1 ------ Nuclear scientists working for the government who disagree with the administration's claim that the tubes were meant for a centrifuge program are instructed &#8220;to remain silent.&#8221; (( David Albright )) [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 10/12/02 ]] [[,12271,807286,00.html | Guardian, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 9/19/02 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> October 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_495 false 1 ------ While in Prague to attend to a Trilateral Commission meeting, Richard Perle is told &#8220;in person ... that the BIS now doubts that any such meeting between Atta and al-Ani in fact took place.&#8221; And an unnamed source with ties to the BIS tells UPI: &#8220;Quite simply, we think the source for this story may have invented the meeting that he reported. We can find no corroborative evidence for the meeting and the source has real credibility problems.&#8221; (( Unnamed source close to the BIS )) [[ | United Press International, 10/20/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> << terroristTies >> ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) October 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_220 false 1 ------ Iraq releases a statement saying that the weapons inspectors' failure to show up in Iraq on October 19 was &#8220;a breach of the agreement reached between Iraq and the United Nations secretary general on September 16.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 10/20/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> October 21, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_175 false 1 ------ Two articles by reporter James Risen on the &#8220;Prague Connection&#8221; are published in the New York Times. One article reveals that early in 2002 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_174 ]]), Czech president Vaclav Havel had informed Washington that there was no evidence to substantiate claims that 9/11 plotter Mohammed Atta had met with Iraqi diplomat Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_163 ]]). The article also reveals that analysts in the Czech intelligence service had been furious with the Prime Minister for stovepiping unsubstantiated reports straight to Washington, before they had had the opportunity to investigate further. [[ | New York Times, 10/21/02 ]] ------ Risen's other article explains how rivalry within the BIS and problematic relations with Britain's MI6 had resulted in reporters receiving misinformation from sources with grievances and conflicting agendas. [[ | New York Times, 10/21/02 ]] ------ His two articles seemingly put to rest the &#8220;Prague Connection&#8221; theory, though a November 2003 article in Slate by Edward Jay Epstein will note that many questions remain unanswered. [[ | Slate, 11/19/03 ]] ====== << pragueConnection >> ((- Vaclav Havel )) ((- Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani )) ((- Mohamed Atta )) October 21, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_221 false 1 ------ US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte provides the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with a revision of the UN draft resolution. (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] ------ The Bush administration makes it clear that it expects the UN Security Council to vote on this draft of the resolution soon and signals that US officials are losing their patience with other member states. At the daily White House press briefing, Secretary Ari Fleischer says, &#8220;It's coming down to the end. The United Nations does not have forever.&#8221; Similarly, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, states, &#8220;We're also making clear it is time to wrap this up.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02 ]] ------ George Bush will say the following day: &#8220;The UN can't make its mind up. If Saddam won't disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him for the sake of peace. [The United Nations] must resolve itself to be something more than the League of Nations, must resolve itself to be more than a debating society, must resolve itself to keep international peace.&#8221; Summing up US feelings, an unnamed official tells the New York Times that the administration's message to the other permanent members is, &#8220;You're either with us or against us.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 10/22/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 10/23/02 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] --- * --- The revision drops the words &#8220;all necessary means,&#8221; stipulating in its place that Iraq's failure to abide by the new resolution would result in &#8220;serious consequences.&#8221; (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] [[ | Washington Post, 10/22/02 ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] --- * --- The revision does not require that UN inspectors be accompanied by armed guards, a requirement in the earlier draft which many current and former UN inspectors opposed. (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02 ]] --- * --- A provision in the previous draft requiring that member states help the UN enforce &#8220;no-fly&#8221; and &#8220;no-drive&#8221; zones around the inspection sites remains in the draft resolution, but in brackets, suggesting that the US and Britain are willing to negotiate on this point. (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] [[ | Economist, 10/23/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] --- * --- The revision does not require that the five permanent members of the Security Council be permitted to appoint their own officials to the inspection teams. (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] --- * --- The revision stipulates that Iraq must declare its weapons of mass destruction within 30 days of the resolution's passing, after which the weapons inspectors would have another 45 days to commence its work on disarmament. If Iraq does not meet the deadline, its failure to do so will be considered a &#8220;material breach&#8221; of the resolution. (( John Negroponte )) [[ | ABC News, 10/23/02 ]] [[ | Economist, 10/23/02 ]] --- * --- The revised draft still contains phrases that set a hair trigger for the implementation of &#8220;serious consequences.&#8221; The revision stipulates that further &#8220;false statements and omissions&#8221; by Iraq would amount to &#8220;a further material breach.&#8221; (( Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) [[ | Economist, 10/23/02 ]] --- Reactions --- In spite of the revision, the oppositional stances of France, Russia, Mexico, and China remain unchanged. Bulgaria, Colombia, Norway, Singapore show some support for the revision. [[;sSheet=/news/2002/10/22/ixnewstop.html | Telegraph, 10/22/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 10/21/02b ]] [[ | Times, 10/28/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> ((+ Revised Draft of a US-British UN Resolution on Iraq )) ((+ Richard A. Boucher )) ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ statement_dominique_de_villepin_4 }} {{ statement_dominique_de_villepin_3 }} {{ statement_igor_ivanov_2 }} {{ statement_igor_ivanov_3 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_kremlin_official_2 }} {{ statement_sergei_lavrov_2 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_12 }} October 22, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_222 false 1 ------ Russia formally rejects the revised draft. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov states, &#8220;The American draft resolution ... does not answer the criteria which the Russian side laid out earlier and which it confirms today.&#8221; (( Igor Ivanov )) [[ | Reuters, 10/22/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Igor Ivanov )) October 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_223 false 1 ------ Russia offers an alternative draft resolution to the US-British version, which drops Washington's toughest inspection terms and threat of &#8220;consequences&#8221; if Iraq refuses to comply. Russia's deputy UN ambassador, Gennadi M. Gatilov, criticizes the US-favored resolution, calling it &#8220;anti-Iraqi and aimed at possible military action against Iraq in case of any omissions or misunderstandings.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 10/25/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Gennadi M. Gatilov )) October 26, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_224 false 1 ------ France circulates an alternative draft resolution to the US-British version that drops the assertion that Iraq is &#8220;in material breach&#8221; of Resolution 687 and changes the order of some paragraphs to provide a different emphasis. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin tells reporters: &#8220;There is still work to be done, progress to be made and we have said so to our American friends for weeks.... If there is no breakthrough, we shall obviously officially submit our own document.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 10/25/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Dominique de Villepin )) October 27, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_225 false 1 ------ President Bush attends a summit conference in Mexico and fails to secure a pledge of support from Mexican President Vicente Fox for the US-British draft resolution. President Vicente Fox says, &#8220;What we need to accomplish is a resolution that is satisfactory to all the parties there in the United Nations. We are listening and talking and we want to search for and do everything possible for a strong resolution.&#8221; [[ | Times, 10/28/02 ]] ------ Mexican officials reportedly make &#8220;it clear that Mexico is siding with France in the debate at the United Nations.&#8221; Mexico's foreign minister, Jorge G. Casteneda, says, &#8220;What we want is a resolution that is approved by all 15 or 14 members of the Security Council. We think that's more important for the United States' cause.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 10/28/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Jorge G. Casteneda )) ((+ Vicente Fox )) October 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_144 false 1 ------ When asked about claims that Iraq has ties to al-Qaeda, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw responds: &#8220;It could well be the case that there were links, active links, between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime before Sept. 11. What I'm asked is if I've seen any evidence of that. And the answer is: I haven't.&#8221; [[,0,4538810.story | Los Angeles Times, 11/4/02 ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Jack Straw )) {{ duplicate_jack_straw_2 }} October 30, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_403 false 1 ------ White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer denies that the US intends to control Iraq's oil reserves. He claims, &#8220;The only interest the United States has in the region is furthering the cause of peace and stability ... not his country's ability to generate oil.&#8221; Asked if the US would take over Iraq's oil fields in the event of a US invasion of Iraq, Fleischer explains, &#8220;No. The purpose of any plan the United States has is to make certain that Saddam Hussein complies with all UN resolutions.&#8221; Asked if the US would administer Iraq's oil fields after an invasion he said, &#8220;I think that it's impossible for anybody to speculate about anything and everything that could possibly happen under any military scenario. And I wouldn't even try to start guessing what the military may or may not do.&#8221; [[ | White House, 10/9/02 ]] [[ | MSNBC, 11/7/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) October 31, 2002 General Frank's Full US Battle Plan Is Completed complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3246 false 1 ------ General Tommy Frank's full US battle plan, codenamed 1003V, is completed. [[ | Independent, 9/29/04 ]] ====== << decision >> ((+ Thomas Franks )) November 2002-December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_350 false 1 ------ Elliot Abrams leads one of a dozen administration working groups charged with drafting post-invasion plans. Involved in his group are adamant neoconservatives Joe Collins, a deputy assistant secretary at the Pentagon, and Robin Cleveland, a former aide to Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. His working group is supposed to draft plans for rapid humanitarian planning. But critics in the State Department complain that it involves itself in the issue of post-Saddam politics and economic reconstruction. Abrams' group is backed by Paul Wolfowitz and the vice president's office. An ally of Secretary of State Colin Powell tells Inter Press Service, &#8220;This is a case of stealthy micromanagement by the Wolfowitz hawks&#8212;they use what bureaucratic vehicles are available to make their imprint on policy.&#8221; Additionally the group is very secretive. It refuses &#8220;to brief not only top State Department officials but also aides of Gen. Tommy Franks, the commanding officer of the US Central Command [CENTCOM], about what it is doing.&#8221; Instead it &#8220;stovepipes&#8221; its work to its contacts in the White House. Sources in the State Department and CIA believe that one of the group's apparent aims is reducing the influence of the State Department, CIA and the United Nations in post-Saddam Iraq. These critics also question &#8220;why a convicted felon [Abrams], pardoned or not, is being allowed to help shape policy.&#8221; Within the Pentagon, there is also resentment of Abrams' group. An unnamed Pentagon source says General Tommy Franks is being &#8220;left out of the loop.&#8221; A Defense official says, &#8220;CENTCOM is for the most part unaware of what Abrams is doing, but friction is developing and the military end of the equation feels that they are being mislead.&#8221; (( Unnamed US State Department Officials )) [[ | Insight, 11/26/02 ]] [[ | Insight, 12/9/02 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Elliott Abrams )) ((- Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ Joe Collins )) ((- American Enterprise Institute )) November 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_408 false 1 ------ Former US Diplomat Joseph Wilson warns in an interview with Knight Ridder that a post-Saddam occupation could turn into &#8220;a very, very nasty affair.&#8221; He explains: &#8220;There will be vengeful killings against the Sunnis, against the Tikritites [Hussein's clan], against the Ba'aths. There will be Shi'ia grabs in the south and probably Baghdad. There will be Kurdish grabs for power.... And in the middle of that will be an American occupation force.... This war is not going to be over when we get to Baghdad. In fact, the war will have just essentially begun.&#8221; [[ | Knight Ridder, 11/4/02 ]] ====== << predictions >> ((+ Joseph C. Wilson )) November 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1835 false 1 ------ The US Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that in 2025, 51 percent of world oil production will come from OPEC. And two-thirds of OPEC's production will be coming from the Persian Gulf. According to EIA, OPEC production now accounts for 38 percent of global oil production. [[ | New York Times, 12/26/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> November 1, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_227 false 1 ------ The US announces that Ireland and Mauritius will vote in favor of the revised version of the US-British draft resolution, thus giving the US and Britain the required majority to pass their resolution. &#8220;We're done,&#8221; announces one US official. &#8220;We are confident that we have a majority, and we are looking to end the diplomatic process next week.&#8221; France and Russia, meanwhile standby their criticisms of the resolution. [[ | Baltimore Sun, 11/2/2002 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_24 false 1 ------ The Bush administration fails to cooperate with the UN inspection regime in Iraq. Inspectors complain that Washington is refusing to provide them with the intelligence they need to do their work. What intelligence they do offer the inspectors, is usually of extremely poor quality. Administration officials deny they are refusing to provide the inspectors with needed intelligence. ------ CBS reports on January 18, 2003: &#8220;UN arms inspectors are privately complaining about the quality of US intelligence and accusing the United States of sending them on wild-goose chases.... The inspectors have become so frustrated trying to chase down unspecific or ambiguous US leads that they've begun to express that anger privately in no uncertain terms.... UN sources have told CBS News that American tips have lead to one dead end after another.&#8221; And whatever intelligence has been provided, reports CBS, has turned out to be &#8220;circumstantial, outdated or just plain wrong.&#8221; [[ | CBS News, 2/20/03 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> {{ statement_hans_blix_4 }} {{ statement_joern_siljeholm_2 }} {{ statement_hans_blix_5 }} {{ statement_mohamed_elbaradei_2 }} {{ statement_hans_blix_2 }} {{ statement_hans_blix_3 }} {{ statement_donald_rumsfeld_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_senior_administration_official_2 }} {{ statement_source_interviewed_by_cbs_news_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_un_weapons_inspector_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_intelligence_official_2 }} November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_298 false 1 ------ The Bush administration and the United Nations disagree over how intrusive the inspections should be. The US wants the inspectors to be as aggressive as possible by visiting sensitive sites and demanding interviews with Iraqi scientists without the presence of minders. Hans Blix, on the other hand, advocates a more measured approach to achieving disarmament. He says that inspection team recruits should be &#8220;firm&#8221; with their Iraqi counterparts but never &#8220;angry and aggressive.&#8221; One of his aides tells The Washington Post in late November 2002: &#8220;We're not going to do in-your-face inspections. He [Blix] wants effective inspections. It's not our job to provoke, harm or humiliate.&#8221; The inspectors argue that it makes no sense&#8212;nor is logistically feasible&#8212;to begin the inspections process with intrusive inspections of Iraq's most sensitive sites. One UN official explains to The Washington Post, &#8220;If you only have 11 people, you cannot go to a big new site, but you can go check on a known monitoring site.&#8221; The Independent reports that inspectors &#8220;believe it would not only be counterproductive, but could damage the prospect of ascertaining whether President Saddam does indeed possess an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; (( US and UN officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 11/17/02 ]] ------ In December, Washington calls for an increase in the UN inspectors' staff so that the UN's two agencies can conduct multiple simultaneous inspections each day. On December 4, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, &#8220;We want to make certain that they [the inspections] are aggressive enough to be able to ascertain the facts in the face of an adversary who in the past did everything in his power to hide the facts.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 12/4/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((+ Hans Blix )) November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_299 false 1 ------ The Bush administration disagrees with the United Nations and other member states over what precisely should qualify as a &#8220;material breach&#8221; of UN Resolution 1441. The UN and other nations believe that only serious violations should count. The US, however, takes the position that any violation, no matter how small, should be considered a material breach and thus sufficient cause for using military force against Iraq. The difference in opinion is acknowledged by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who says, &#8220;The US does seem ... to have a lower threshold than others may have&#8221; to justify the use of military force. He also says, &#8220;I think the discussion in the council made it clear we should be looking for something serious and meaningful, and not for excuses to do something.&#8221; President Bush, reflecting the stance of his hawkish advisors, says the Security Council should have &#8220;zero tolerance,&#8221; implying that even minor infractions could be considered a &#8220;material breach.&#8221; (( US and UN officials )) [[ | Washington Post, 11/17/02 ]] ------ Colin Powell and Vice President Cheney contend that the delay of, or omissions and inaccuracies in, Iraq's early December declaration would constitute a breach. And Iraq is warned to this effect. During a dinner meeting on November 18, Hans Blix reminds a close aide to Saddam Hussein that a failure to meet the deadline would be considered by the United States to be a &#8220;material breach.&#8221; [[ | Independent, 11/20/02 ]] [[,12239,856166,00.html | Observer, 12/8/02 ]] [[ | US Department of State 11/21/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Kofi Annan )) November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_300 false 1 ------ Top US officials and policy advisors make repeated statements warning that the US is ready to unilaterally invade Iraq if the UN fails to back the use of military force. ====== << legalJustification >> {{ statement_andrew_card_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_16 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_12 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_14 }} {{ statement_john_negroponte_2 }} {{ statement_richard_perle_2 }} November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_296 false 1 ------ The Bush administration disagrees with UN inspectors and the governments of other Security Council member states on how much time inspectors will need to complete their work. The Bush administration, eager to begin its planned invasion of Iraq before the end of March, opposes suggestions by inspectors that the process will require a year or more. Military planners are concerned that beginning an invasion after March could cause some of the heaviest fighting to occur during Iraq's blistering hot summer. The Washington Times reports: &#8220;US military planners are facing the prospect that weapons inspections in Iraq will drag on for months, pushing the Pentagon's timetable for action from the ideal weather of February to the blistering days of midsummer.... War designers see February as the best time to fight and have considered troop deployments around that date. A February campaign would capitalize on optimum weather in the desert region. A February date also would allow three months for the administration to complete a final war plan, line up support from allies, and deploy and alert the necessary combat units.&#8221; [[ | The Washington Times, 11/29/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> {{ statement_mohamed_elbaradei_8 }} {{ statement_mohamed_elbaradei_7 }} {{ statement_mohamed_elbaradei_6 }} {{ statement_rolf_ekeus_3 }} {{ statement_hans_blix_8 }} {{ commentary_john_rothrock_2 }} {{ statement_richard_a._boucher_3 }} {{ commentary_independent_2 }} November 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_305 false 1 ------ Bush administration officials claim that the conclusion that needs to be drawn from reports by the UN weapons inspectors is whether or not Iraq is cooperating. ====== << legalJustification >> << weaponsInspections >> {{ statement_unnamed_bush_administration_official_6 }} {{ statement_unnamed_bush_administration_official_5 }} {{ statement_unnamed_bush_administration_official_4 }} November 1-30, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 33.6 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2929 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 33.6 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> November 6, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_229 false 1 ------ The Bush administration presents the UN Security Council with a third draft for a tougher UN resolution aimed at &#8220;disarming&#8221; Saddam Hussein's regime. In one section the word &#8220;or&#8221; is replaced with &#8220;and,&#8221; and in another the phrase &#8220;restore international peace and security&#8221; is changed to &#8220;secure international peace and security.&#8221; France will agree to the new draft on November 7 and the resolution will be passed by the council unanimously on November 8 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_228 ]]) with only slight modifications. [[ | CNN, 11/8/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> November 7, 2002 Bush Says War Is His Last Choice complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2898 false 1 ------ A reporter asks President Bush if he thinks a war against Iraq might be a bad idea given widespread concerns that it could &#8220;generate a tremendous amount of anger and hatred at the United States ... [thus] creating many new terrorists who would want to kill Americans.&#8221; Bush responds that the US should not avoid taking action out of fear that it might &#8220;irritate somebody [who] would create a danger to Americans.&#8221; He also adds that no decision has been made with regard to using force against Iraq. &#8220;Hopefully, we can do this peacefully,&#8221; he says. &#8220;And if the world were to collectively come together to do so, and to put pressure on Saddam Hussein and convince him to disarm, there's a chance he may decide to do that. And war is not my first choice ... it's my last choice. But nevertheless, it is ... an option in order to make the world a more peaceful place.&#8221; [[ | White House, 11/7/02 ]] ====== << decisionQuotes >> << decision >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_40 }} November 8, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_228 false 1 ------ The UN Security Council unanimously votes 15-0 in favor of UN Resolution 1441, which stipulates that Iraq is required to readmit UN weapons inspectors under tougher terms than required by previous UN resolutions. The resolution does not give the US authority to use force against Iraq. The resolution makes it very clear that only the UN Security Council has the right to take punitive action against Iraq in the event of noncompliance. (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[ | United Nations, 11/8/02 ]] [[ | Zunes, 11/14/02 ]] ------ After the resolution is passed, top Bush administration officials make public statements threatening to use military force against Iraq if Saddam's regime does not comply with the resolution. George Bush, Colin Powell, John Negroponte, Andrew Card, and Ari Fleischer make statements asserting that the resolution does not prevent the US from using force. --- * --- A provision that would have authorized UN member states to use &#8220;all necessary means&#8221; to disarm Iraq is relocated to the preamble of the resolution where it presumably has no practical significance. [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] --- * --- A provision requiring that security guards accompany the inspectors is removed. [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] --- * --- The resolution requires Iraq to provide the UN with the names of all its weapons experts. (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[,,4281-474550,00.html | Times, 11/9/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] --- * --- The resolution states that weapons inspectors will be authorized to remove Iraqi scientists, as well as their families, from Iraq in order to interview them. An official later tells The Washington Post that the power to interview Iraqi scientists was &#8220;the most significant authority contained in the resolution&#8221; and &#8220;the one thing that is most likely to produce overt Iraqi opposition.&#8221; (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[ | The Washington Post, 12/12/02 ]] [[,2763,835091,00.html | Guardian, 11/7/02 ]] [[,,4281-474550,00.html | Times, 11/9/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] --- * --- The resolution overturns provisions of the previous Resolution 1154 that required UN inspectors to notify Baghdad before inspecting Saddam Hussein's presidential sites. Resolution 1154 had also required that inspections of those sensitive sites occur in the presence of diplomats. The new resolution demands that Iraq allow the inspectors &#8220;immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access&#8221; to any sites chosen by the inspectors. [[,,4281-474550,00.html | Times, 11/9/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] [[,2763,835091,00.html | Guardian, 11/7/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/8/02 ]] ------ Unnamed diplomats and US officials tell USA Today that the US may attempt to claim that Iraq is engaged in a pattern of defiance and deceit if it hinders the inspectors in any way. (( Unnamed diplomats and US officials )) [[ | USA Today 12/19/02 ]] --- * --- The resolution include a provision calling for &#8220;no-fly&#8221; and &#8220;no-drive&#8221; zones in the areas surrounding suspected weapons sites to prevent the Iraqis from removing evidence prior to or during inspections. (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[,,4281-474550,00.html | Times, 11/9/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] [[,2763,835091,00.html | Guardian, 11/7/02 ]] --- * --- The final resolution includes statements stipulating that an Iraqi failure to comply with the terms of the resolution, including &#8220;false statements or omissions&#8221; in the weapons declaration it is required to submit, will &#8220;constitute a further material breach&#8221; of its obligations. Additional wording included in the same provision explains that any breach of the resolution will &#8220;be reported to the Council for assessment.&#8221; Also, towards the end of the resolution, it states that the chief weapons inspector should &#8220;report immediately to the Council any interference&#8221; by Iraq so that the Council can &#8220;convene immediately to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all the relevant council resolutions in order to restore international peace and security.&#8221; (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[ | New York Times, 11/6/02 ]] [[,,4281-474550,00.html | Times, 11/9/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/8/02 ]] --- * --- Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 states that Iraq &#8220;shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution.&#8221; The US contends that this applies to the US- and British- patrolling of the &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones that the two countries imposed shortly after the Gulf War. The &#8220;patrolling,&#8221; which has never been officially sanctioned by the UN and which is not recognized by Iraq, often includes aerial attacks on Iraqi sovereign territory. Iraq consistently fires on the attacking jets in self-defense. Other UN Security Council members explicitly oppose this interpretation of the resolution before its passage. (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[ | Associated Press, 11/15/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/12/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/16/02 ]] [[ | United Press International ]] [[ | Reuters, 11/15/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 11/16/02 ]] --- * --- The resolution gives Iraq seven days to announce whether or not it will comply with the resolution, and 30 days (December 8) to declare its chemical, biological, and nuclear-related capabilities&#8212;even those that are unrelated to weapons programs. 10 days after Iraq's acceptance of the terms, inspectors will send an advanced team to Baghdad, but will have a total of 45 days to begin the actual work. The inspection team will be required to provide the UN Security Council with a report 60 days (January 27) after the commencement of its work. (( UN Resolution 1441 )) [[,2763,835091,00.html | Guardian, 11/7/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/8/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/16/02 ]] ------ Diplomats and US officials speaking off the record tell USA Today that the declaration due on December 8 represents a hidden trigger, explaining that any omissions will be considered a material breach and sufficient justification for war. (( Unnamed diplomats and US officials )) [[ | USA Today 12/19/02 ]] --- * --- Syria requested that the resolution include a provision stating that Iraq's compliance with the terms would result in the lifting of sanctions. This provision was not included. [[ | CNN, 11/8/02 ]] --- * --- Syria requested that the resolution declare the entire Middle East a &#8220;nuclear-free and weapons of mass destruction-free zone.&#8221; This provision was not included. [[ | CNN, 11/8/02 ]] --- * --- France did not want the resolution to include any wording that might authorize the use of force. Instead it argued that the resolution should include only terms for tougher inspections. In the event of Iraqi noncompliance with the terms, France argued, a separate resolution should be agreed upon to decide what further action would be necessary. France lost its argument, and the new resolution includes a warning to Iraq &#8220;that it will face serious consequences&#8221; in the event of its failure to comply with the terms of the resolution. [[,2763,835091,00.html | Guardian, 11/7/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((+ Andrew Card )) ((+ John Negroponte )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ statement_sergei_lavrov_3 }} {{ statement_kofi_annan_2 }} {{ statement_zhang_yishan_2 }} {{ statement_jean-david_levitt_2 }} {{ statement_jeremy_greenstock_2 }} {{ statement_andrew_card_2 }} {{ statement_condoleezza_rice_6 }} {{ statement_turki_bin_faisal_3 }} {{ statement_naji_sabri_2 }} {{ commentary_majorie_cohn_2 }} {{ commentary_guardian_of_london_2 }} {{ commentary_times_of_london_2 }} {{ statement_colin_powell_12 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_15 }} {{ statement_john_negroponte_2 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_14 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_13 }} November 12, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_230 false 1 ------ The Iraqi parliament votes unanimously to reject UN Resolution 1441. But since the parliament has no real authority, the final decision is left to Saddam Hussein, who has another three days to respond to the UN. [[ | BBC, 11/12/2002 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/12/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> November 13, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_232 false 1 ------ Bush reiterates the White Houses' interpretation of UN Resolution 1441: &#8220;I have told the United Nations we'll be glad to consult with them, but the resolution does not prevent us from doing what needs to be done, which is to hold Saddam Hussein into account. We hope that he disarms, we hope that he will listen to the world.&#8221; [[ | White House, 11/13/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/13/02b ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) November 13, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_231 false 1 ------ Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Al-Douri delivers a 9-page letter from Baghdad to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's office agreeing to comply with UN Resolution 1441&#8212;without conditions. According to the ambassador, &#8220;The letter says that Iraq accepts the resolution, and accepts the return of inspectors. There are no conditions, no reservations. We explained in the letter the whole Iraqi position saying that Iraq ... has not and will not have any mass destruction weapons, so we are not worried about the inspectors when they will be back.&#8221; [[ | Associated Press, 11/13/02b ]] [[,,3-480037,00.html | Times, 11/14/2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/13/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Mohammed Al-Douri )) November 14, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_310 false 1 ------ Colin Powell hints that the US might view Iraqi attempts to shoot down coalition aircraft in the so-called &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone as a breach of UN Resolution 1441 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_228 ]]). &#8220;If they [Iraqis] were to take hostile acts against the United States or United Kingdom aircraft patrolling in the northern and (southern) no-fly zone, then I think we would have to look at that with great seriousness if they continue to do that,&#8221; he says after a meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham in Ottawa. [[ | Associated Press, 11/14/02 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 11/17/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Colin Powell )) November 15, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_233 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes attack a radar installation in southern Iraq near Al Najaf about 85 miles southeast of Baghdad at around 2:50 EST after Iraqi air defenses fired on &#8220;coalition&#8221; aircraft that were patrolling the southern &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone. This is the first such incident to have occurred after the passing of UN resolution 1441. The US- and British- imposed &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones have never been recognized by the UN and the two countries' jurisdiction over the zones has no legal basis. Iraq has consistently regarded this &#8220;patrolling&#8221; as a violation of its airspace and as a threat to its security. US and British warplanes have attacked Iraqi targets more than forty times during the 2002. After the attacks, the Bush administration claims that Iraq's action was a violation of UN Resolution 1441. [[ | Associated Press, 11/15/02 ]] [[ | United Press International, 11/15/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/16/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 11/16/02 ]] [[ | Washington Post, 11/17/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> November 16, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_295 false 1 ------ Hans Blix says he cannot guarantee that there will be no spies on his team. &#8220;People have asked me, &#8216;Can you be absolutely sure we will have no spies in any of the member states?&#8217; and I said, &#8216;No, I don't think either the KGB or the CIA can give that absolute assurance.&#8217; &#8221; He adds that if he discovers any spies, he will dismiss them from the team. [[;TagID=2 | Independent, 11/17/02 ]] ------ The concern stems from the fact that the previous inspection regime, UNSCOM, had been infiltrated by US and British spies. While much of the intelligence obtained was used to increase the effectiveness of the inspections, some of it was used to serve other interests. For example, some of the intelligence was &#8220;used to help identify and target Hussein's suspected hide-outs when US and British bombers launched the Desert Fox airstrikes in December 1998.&#8221; And some intelligence was even sent to Israel. (( Scott Ritter )) (( Rolf Ekeus )) (( Ake Sellstrom )) [[ | Los Angeles Times, 6/19/02 ]] [[ | The Times of London, 9/18/02 ]] [[,0,4477844.story | Los Angeles Times, 10/23/02 ]] [[ | Reuters, 10/3/02 ]] [[ | Financial Times, 7/29/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) {{ statement_rolf_ekeus_2 }} {{ statement_ake_sellstrom_2 }} November 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_235 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes attack sites northeast of Mosul after Iraqi defense forces fire anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft patrolling the so-called &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. In a separate incident, warplanes attack two Iraqi air defense communications facilities and one air defense radar site in southern Iraq in Wassit and Dhi Oar after &#8220;Iraqi air defenses fired multiple surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft.&#8221; [[ flyZoneViolation.htm | Reuters, 11/19/02 ]] [[,4057,5524262%255E1702,00.html | Associated Press, 11/20/02 ]] [[ | Scotsman, 11/19/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/19/2002 ]] ------ According to Iraqi authorities, four Iraqi civilians were wounded as a result of the attacks in southern Iraq. [[,4057,5524262%255E1702,00.html | Associated Press, 11/20/02 ]] ------ White House spokesperson Scott McClellan says in a press briefing, &#8220;The United States believes that firing upon our aircraft in the no-fly zone, or British aircraft, is a violation&#8212;it is a material breach.&#8221; [[ | White House, 11/18/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/19/02 ]] ------ And Donald Rumsfeld, who is in Chile, says: &#8220;I do find it unacceptable that Iraq fires. It is for the president of the United States and the UN Security Council to make judgments about their view of Iraq's behavior over a period of time.&#8221; [[ | CNN, 11/23/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 11/19/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/19/02 ]] ------ This is the second time the US has bombed Iraq since the passing of UN resolution 1441. The US will conduct at least 22 more aerial attacks on Iraq before the March 19, 2003 invasion. [[ | Colorado Campaign for Middle East Peace ]] ------ UN officials disagree with Washington's assessment. Secretary-General Kofi Annan states, &#8220;Let me say that I don't think that the council will say this is in contravention of the resolution of the Security Council.&#8221; [[ | Reuters, 11/19/02 ]] [[ | Reuters, 11/19/02 ]] [[ | Peoples Weekly World News, 11/23/02 ]] [[ | Independent, 11/20/02 ]] [[,4057,5524262%255E1702,00.html | Associated Press, 11/20/02 ]] ------ Responding to Annan's remarks, Rumsfeld argues, &#8220;I don't know that he (Annan) necessarily reflects the UN, the center of gravity of the Security Council, on any particular issue at any particular time.... Whenever resolutions are passed, they tend to be compromises, and there tend to be calculated ambiguities written into them to gain votes. So it does not come as a surprise to me.... The United Nations sat there for years with 16 resolutions being violated. So, just as we've seen a pattern of behavior on the part of Saddam Hussein, we've seen a pattern of behavior on the part of the United Nations.&#8221; [[ | US Department of Defense, 11/19/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/19/02 ]] ------ No comments supporting the US position are made by the British. [[ | Telegraph, 11/19/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Scott McClellan )) ((+ Kofi Annan )) {{ statement_russian_foreign_ministry_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_british_foreign_office_source_2 }} {{ statement_unnamed_un_security_council_source_2 }} November 18, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_234 false 1 ------ A team of 26 UN inspectors arrive in Baghdad. On the tarmac of Saddam Hussein International Airport, UNMOVIC Weapons Inspection Chief Hans Blix tells reporters, &#8220;We have come here for one single reason and that is because the world wants to have assurances that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The situation is tense at the moment, but there is a new opportunity and we are here to provide inspection which is credible... We hope we can all take that opportunity together.... There is a new opportunity and we hope that opportunity will be well-utilized so that we can get out of sanctions. And in the long term, we will have a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.&#8221; Hans Blix and Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei then head to Baghdad where they meet with Iraqi Gen. Amir al-Saadi and Hussam Mohammed Amin, the head of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate. [[ | New York Times, 11/19/2002 ]] [[ | CNN, 11/19/02 ]] [[,2763,842962,00.html | Guardian, 11/29/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Amir Hammudi al-Saadi )) ((+ Mohamed ElBaradei )) ((+ Hans Blix )) ((+ Hussam Mohammad Amin )) November 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_308 false 1 ------ On the eve of a 2-day NATO summit in Prague, Czech Republic, President Bush says in an address to the Prague Atlantic Student Summit: &#8220;Saddam Hussein has been given a very short time to declare completely and truthfully his arsenal of terror. Should he again deny that this arsenal exists, he will have entered his final stage with a lie. And deception this time will not be tolerated. Delay and defiance will invite the severest of consequences. America's goal, the world's goal, is more than the return of inspectors to Iraq. Our goal is to secure the peace through the comprehensive and verified disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Voluntary or by force, that goal will be achieved.&#8221; [[ | White House, 11/20/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/21/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_17 }} November 20, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_309 false 1 ------ Richard Perle, a member of the Defense Policy Board, attends a meeting on global security with members of the British Parliament. At one point he argues that the weapons inspection team might be unable to find Saddam's arsenal of banned weapons because they are so well hidden. According to the London Mirror, he then states that the US would &#8220;attack Iraq even if UN inspectors fail to find weapons.&#8221; [[ | Mirror, 11/21/02 ]] ------ Peter Kilfoyle, a former defense minister and Labour backbencher, tells the Mirror: &#8220;America is duping the world into believing it supports these inspections. President Bush intends to go to war even if inspectors find nothing. This make a mockery of the whole process and exposes America's real determination to bomb Iraq.&#8221; [[ | Mirror, 11/21/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> ((+ Peter Kilfoyle )) ((+ Richard Perle )) November 21-22,2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_236 false 1 ------ A NATO summit is convened in Prague to welcome the Eastern European states of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, who will become members of the alliance in 2004. These seven countries, along with Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, release a statement, which says, &#8220;NATO allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UN [Resolution] 1441.&#8221; The statement also says, &#8220;[W]e are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.&#8221; Bruce Jackson, a former US Defense Department official who heads a Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, helps draft the statement. France also releases a statement, which is a bit less confrontational. A French official explains to the London Telegraph that the Eastern states' statement was &#8220;his [Bush's] own interpretation [of UN Resolution 1441] and we do not share it. On December 8, we will take note of what Iraq says it has ... and we will see if its behavior is consistent with its statement.&#8221; Germany remains opposed to the use of military force. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer tells reporters, &#8220;We are against military action. We don't support military action. We want the possibility not to become the reality.&#8221; [[ | Agence France Press, 11/20/02 ]] [[ | Telegraph, 11/22/2002 ]] [[ | New York Times, 11/22/2002 ]] ------ On the night of November 21, in an interview with Dan Rather of CBS news, Powell also makes the US position clear. He says, &#8220;If the [December 8] declaration is patently false and everybody can see it. If he does not let the inspectors do their job, then the president is fully ready to take the necessary step, which is military force.&#8221; [[ | US Department of State, 11/21/02 ]] ------ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is also in town for the summit. Before he leaves Prague to meet with Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia, he says he will not believe Iraq if its declaration claims Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. [[ | Associated Press, 11/22/02 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> ((+ Bruce Jackson )) ((+ Colin Powell )) ((+ Joschka Fischer )) November 22, 2002 France Informs US State Deparment that Iraq Attempted to Purchase Uranium from Africa complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3150 false 1 ------ The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation informs US State Department officials that France is in possession of intelligence suggesting that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. He says that France has determined that the attempt was not successful. (( Senate Intelligence Report on Iraq, 7/2004 )) ------ The assessment is based on intelligence France obtained 1999, not the forged documents&#8212;which French intelligence know are fakes (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3173 ]]). [[,,2089-1859301_1,00.html | Sunday Times, 11/6/2005 ]] ====== << africaUraniumClaim >> ((+ France )) ((+ US Department of State )) November 22, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_237 false 1 ------ British Foreign Minister Jack Straw says that another UN resolution will be needed before taking military action against Iraq. Straw tells the BBC, &#8220;The most likely course of action, if military action is required&#8212;which it is not at the moment&#8212;is that we go to the security council, which is where there would be discussion. Our preference has always been for a further resolution for the Security Council, and that would then be put to the House of Commons for further endorsement, just as this original 1441 resolution is being put before the House for endorsement on Monday [Nov. 25].&#8221; [[ | BBC, 11/22/02 ]] [[ | The International News, 11/23/02 ]] ====== << alZarqawi >> ((+ Jack Straw )) November 23, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_238 false 1 ------ Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri complains in a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan that the US intends to use UN Resolution 1441 as a pretext to use military force against Iraq. In the letter, he analyzes several paragraphs in the UN resolution, demonstrating how they are based on assumptions and how the US plans to use some of the key provisions as a pretext for invading Iraq. (( November 23, 2002 Iraqi letter to UN )) [[ | CTV News, 11/25/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Naji Sabri )) November 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_240 false 1 ------ Iraq informs the Council that it might not be able to provide the UN with a complete declaration of its past and present civilian and military chemical, biological and nuclear programs as required by UN Resolution 1441 by the December 8 deadline. Hans Blix is sympathetic and the Russian UN ambassador suggests that the deadline should be extended. Iraqi officials also indicate they are not sure what exactly they are expected to include. According to The Washington Post, &#8220;Iraqi officials told Blix that they were uncertain whether the Security Council's terms required that they declare every single item produced in its commercial chemical industry, citing plastic slippers as an example.&#8221; Hans Blix indicates that he is also unsure. John D. Negroponte, the US ambassador to the United Nations, argues that no extension should be granted. [[ | Washington Post, 11/26/2002 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) ((+ John Negroponte )) ((+ Sergei Lavrov )) November 25, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_239 false 1 ------ 18 international arms monitors, including 12 inspectors from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and 8 from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, arrive in Baghdad with their cargo of high-tech sensors, computers and other gear. [[ | New York Times, 11/25/2002 ]] [[ | Independent, 11/24/2002 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 11/25/2002 ]] --- Make-up of Inspection Team --- ------ The complete roster of UN inspectors expected to participate in the inspections includes some 300 chemists, biologists, missile and ordnance experts and other specialists of UNMOVIC, as well as a few dozen engineers and physicists from the IAEA. Hans Blix of UNMOVIC will head the effort to search for chemical and biological weapons and Jacques Baute of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency will lead the team seeking to determine if Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. [[ | Associated Press, 11/25/2002 ]] --- Purpose of Inspections --- ------ The stated purpose of the inspections, according to the UN resolution, is to bring &#8220;to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council.&#8221; (( UN Resolution 1441 )) ------ However, since the passing of the resolution the Bush administration has maintained that the purpose of inspections is much broader. For instance, US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld will claim in January that inspectors are not to act as &#8220;discoverers&#8221; trying to locate things. Rather the purpose of the inspections, according to Rumsfeld, is to determine whether Iraq is cooperating. [[ | BBC, 1/22/03 ]] --- Methods --- The inspectors will &#8220;revisit the previously monitored sites to check if the equipment installed [by the previous weapons inspectors] is still functional,&#8221; explains a UN spokesperson. &#8220;It will take some time to do that work. We can't rule out other activities, but it's quite likely we will start with that.&#8221; Inspectors also says that they will not immediately conduct &#8220;intrusive&#8221; inspections into Iraq's more sensitive areas. As an aide to Hans Blix explains to The Washington Post, &#8220;We're not going to do in-your-face inspections. He [Blix] wants effective inspections. It's not our job to provoke, harm or humiliate.&#8221; The inspections teams will also investigate new sites that the US and Britain allege are involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Inspectors will have the option to interview Iraqi scientists without the presence of Iraqi officials. The interviews may be conducted outside of Iraq. [[ | The Washington Post, 11/23/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Jacques Bautes )) ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) ((+ Hans Blix )) December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_49 false 1 ------ Experts from US national laboratories inform the US Department of Energy that Iraq is producing tubes identical to the Italian-made Medusa 81 rockets, which are of the same dimensions and which are made of the same alloy as the tubes that were intercepted in Jordan in July 2001. (( Unnamed US intelligence, US administration, and/or UN inspectors )) [[ | Washington Post, 8/10/03 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_351 false 1 ------ Elliott Abrams drafts a proposal, in which he argues that the United States should take de facto control of Iraqi oil fields. The proposal is not well-received by moderates in the Bush administration who question the legality of the proposal, and who argue &#8220;that only a puppet Iraqi government would acquiesce to US supervision of the oil fields and that one so slavish to US interests risks becoming untenable with Iraqis,&#8221; reports Insight Magazine. Such a move would also lend credence to suspicions that the invasion is motivated by oil interests, the critics add. (( Unnamed Bush administration officials )) [[ | Insight, 12/28/02 ]] ------ A similar recommendation was made in a paper published by the Heritage Foundation in late September (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_356 ]]). (( The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq. Backgrounder #1594 )) [[,6903,825103,00.html | Observer, 11/3/02 ]] [[ | Heritage Foundation, 9/25/02 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Elliott Abrams )) December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_348 false 1 ------ Elliott Abrams, a special assistant to President George W. Bush on the National Security Council [NSC] is appointed to senior director for Near East and North African affairs within the NSC. Neoconservatives working at the Pentagon's Near East South Asia (NESA) desk worked hard to get Abrams appointed. &#8220;The day he got (the appointment), they were whooping and hollering, &#8216;We got him in, we got him in,&#8217;&#8221; Karen Kwiatkowski, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, tells Inter Press Service. Abrams, a controversial figure with close ties to Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, had been convicted of withholding information from Congress during the Iran-Contra scandal, though he was later pardoned by George W. Bush's father. [[ | Insight, 12/9/02 ]] [[ | Inter Press Service, 8/7/03 ]] ====== << preWarPlanning >> ((+ Karen Kwiatkowski )) ((+ Richard Perle )) ((+ Douglas Feith )) ((+ Elliott Abrams )) December 2002 Unnamed Source Comments on Rumsfeld's Influence Over the Defense Intelligence Agency complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2026 false 1 ------ A former senior official tells investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, &#8220;If it became known that [Rumsfeld] wanted [the Defense Intelligence Agency] to link the government of Tonga to 9/11, within a few months they would come up with sources who'd do it.&#8221; [[ | New Yorker, 12/16/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << iraq >> December 2002 US Admits Using Iraqi Attack on Planes in Northern Iraq as Justification for Attacks against Targets in South complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2899 false 1 ------ US military officials admit that they recently used an incident of Iraqi fire on jets in the northern &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zone to justify an attack against targets in southern Iraq. [[ | Washington Post, 1/15/2003 ]] ====== << legalJustification >> << decision >> << DSM >> December 2002 Bush Questions Intelligence on Iraq; George Tenet Insists &#8216;It's a Slam Dunk Case&#8217; complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_723 false 1 ------ CIA Director George Tenet and his deputy John McLaughlin meet in the White House with President George Bush and Bush's top advisors for a &#8220;dress rehearsal&#8221; ahead of a public presentation that will accuse Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction. According to Bob Woodward's book, Plan of Attack, Bush is disappointed with Tenet and McLauglin's presentation, which is based on communications intercepts, satellite photos, diagrams, and other intelligence. &#8220;Nice try,&#8221; Woodward's source will later recall Bush saying. &#8220;I don't think this quite&#8212;it's not something that Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from.&#8221; Bush reportedly says to Tenet. &#8220;I've been told all this intelligence about having WMD, and this is the best we've got?&#8221; Tenet responds, &#8220;It's a slam dunk case.&#8221; Woodward's book will say that Bush then asked, &#8220;George, how confident are you?&#8221; To which the intelligence head responded, &#8220;Don't worry, it's a slam dunk.&#8221; (( Top officials interviewed by Washington Post editor Bob Woodward )) [[ | Woodward, 2004 cited in Washington Post 4/17/04 ]] ====== << deception >> ((+ George Tenet )) ((+ George W. Bush )) ((+ John E. McLaughlin )) December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1836 false 1 ------ John Brodman, the deputy assistant secretary of energy for international energy policy, tells the New York Times: &#8220;Our dependency on the Persian Gulf could take a slight dip before it goes up. But the basic geological fact of life is that 70 percent of the proven oil reserves are in the Middle East.&#8221; [[ | New York Times, 12/26/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ John Brodman )) December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_404 false 1 ------ RUPE publishes a special issue in their journal, Aspects of India's Economy, analyzing the true motives behind the United States&apos; plan to invade Iraq. The purpose for this special publication, according to RUPE, is that India (like Pakistan) has been placed within the US geo-strategic agenda for the Asian region. This has been done, among other things, by declaring India to be an important military ally, and by working for a US-India political/military axis against China. RUPE argues that this will heighten the military tension in a region occupied by nuclear powers. Therefore it is necessary to understand the true motives behind the US geo-political agenda, exemplified in the current move against Iraq, before uncritically exposing one's country to such risks. The report concludes that protecting the security of the US dollar is a primary motive behind the US's planned invasion of Iraq. [[ | Research Unit for Political Economy,11/02 ]] ====== << motivesBehindWar >> ((+ Research Unit for Political Economy )) {{ commentary_research_unit_for_political_economy_2 }} {{ commentary_research_unit_for_political_economy_3 }} Early December, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_242 false 1 ------ The Bush administration attempts to delay a vote for the second time in nine days on a UN resolution extending Iraq's authority to sell oil for the next six months. John D. Negroponte, the US ambassador to the United Nations, argues that the resolution should add approximately 40 additional items to a list of items requiring UN approval prior to import. [[ | Washington Post, 12/4/02a ]] [[ | BBC 12/4/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> Early December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_248 false 1 ------ The White House orders the CIA, the department of defense, and the State Department to develop an aggressive plan for UN weapons inspectors that would require Iraqi scientists to appear for questioning. &#8220;An intense argument is under way ... on almost all of the details of a protection program,&#8221; reports the New York Times. &#8220;Some American officials want the United Nations team to be aggressive in identifying scientists and demanding that they leave the country, perhaps without the scientists' permission.&#8221; The UN would either issue subpoenas to the scientists or the UN would &#8220;lure&#8221; the scientists with offers of asylum in another country. If it is decided that subpoenas are to be used, Iraqi scientists would be required to &#8220;appear on a certain date and time at a place outside of Iraq ... [and] Baghdad would be held responsible for seeing that they appear,&#8221; reports The Washington Post. Officials leak to the press that the Bush administration views the plan as the most likely way to provoke resistance from Baghdad. One official tells The Washington Post that if Iraqis &#8220;don't produce those people, I would say that's a demonstration of noncompliance and noncooperation.&#8221; The Washington Post reports that the inspections agencies, some allied governments, and UN officials are not pleased with the idea. They warn &#8220;that attempts to short-circuit the inspection process with a quickly conceived operation that could involve hundreds of Iraqis and their families could endanger lives while undermining both the inspections themselves and ongoing US intelligence operations in Iraq.&#8221; (( Unnamed US officials )) [[ | The Washington Post, 12/12/02 ]] [[ language=printer | Washington Post 12/13/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/6/02 ]] ------ Hans Blix, who strongly disapproves of the recommendation, argues that the United Nations cannot abduct people against their will. &#8220;Do you really think any Iraqis are going to go for it?&#8221; he asks. &#8220;I mean how big is a family, do you take just the wife and children and parents? What about the extended family&#8212;the cousins? Do you leave them behind? And what if we're stopped on the way to the airport?&#8221; [[,2763,855665,00.html | Guardian, 12/7/02 ]] ------ The next day he reaffirms his position, saying, &#8220;We are in nobody's pocket. ... We are not going to abduct anybody and we are not serving as a defection agency.&#8221; [[ | United Press International, 12/6/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/7/02 ]] [[,,3-505652,00.html | The Times of London, 12/7/02 ]] ------ His view is &#8220;backed by most of the United Nations hierarchy and the State Department in Washington,&#8221; reports the New York Times. The Times quotes one US official, who disagrees with the idea. &#8220;Taking someone against their will is contrary to the whole United Nations concept,&#8221; the source says. &#8220;You'd fracture the UN consensus.&#8221; (( Unnamed US official )) [[,2763,855665,00.html | Guardian, 12/7/02 ]] [[ | New York Times, 12/6/02 ]] [[ | The Washington Post, 12/12/02 ]] ------ Iraqi General Amir Saadi argues that the proposal is problematic under international law and expresses concern that Hans Blix would be pressured into providing a copy of Iraq's list of scientists to US intelligence. &#8220;This is a confidential list,&#8221; he says. &#8220;Will he make it public? Will he give it to other countries?&#8221; [[ | The Washington Post, 12/20/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) ((+ Amir Hammudi al-Saadi )) December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2 false 1 ------ Two months after the September 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency report (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_1 ]])&#8212;which found there was no conclusive evidence Iraq has chemical weapons&#8212;another secret document titled, &#8220;Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon and Missile Program: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities,&#8221; is completed. It also says in very clear terms that there is no solid proof that Iraq has chemical weapons. ------ One passage from the report says, &#8220;No reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where the country has or will establish its chemical agent production facility.&#8221; (( Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon and Missile Program: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities )) [[ | US News and World Report, 6/13/03 ]] ====== << wmd >> {{ duplicate_iraq_s_nuclear,_biological_and_chemical_weapon_and_missile_program:_progress,_prospects,_ and_potential_vulnerabilities_2 }} December 1-31, 2002 US and British Planes Drop 53.2 Tons of Ordnance on Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2930 false 1 ------ US and British warplanes drop 53.2 tons of ordnance on targets in Iraq &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones. [[ | Statesman, 5/30/2005 ]] ====== << aerialAttacks >> December 2002-March 2003 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_311 false 1 ------ Critics argue that the Bush administration is attempting to use the inspections as a means of provoking resistance from Iraq so that Washington can claim it is in &#8220;further material breach.&#8221; The US would then cite this breach as justification for taking military action against Iraq. Critics also say that the administration's agenda conflicts with the aims of the inspectors and that the US is undermining the inspectors' work. ====== << weaponsInspections >> << legalJustification >> {{ commentary_peter_kilfoyle_2 }} {{ commentary_milan_rai_2 }} {{ commentary_jeremy_brecher,_historian_2 }} End of December 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_267 false 1 ------ After examining more than 200 sites, UN weapons inspectors say that despite unfettered access to all Iraqi facilities, they have found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction or any programs aimed at developing such weapons. Several of the suspected weapons sites have been visited multiple times. Inspectors say that they have exhausted the leads provided by US intelligence and complain that Washington resists requests to provide them with more information. The San Francisco Chronicle reports: &#8220;UN spokesmen in Baghdad admit they have largely exhausted their list of possible weapons sites and must make repeat visits to stay busy. They have asked the United States to provide intelligence to help identify new sites. Although the Bush administration recently said it would share some secrets with the United Nations, it appears to have turned over little so far.&#8221; [[,3604,867158,00.html | Guardian, 1/3/02 ]] [[;thesection=news&amp;thesubsection=world | New Zealand Herald, 1/1/03 ]] [[;dir=508&amp;host=3 | Independent, 1/1/03 ]] [[ | BBC, 12/31/01 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 12/31/01 ]] [[ | Agence France Presse, 12/30/02 ]] [[ | San Francisco Chronicle, 12/30/02 ]] ------ And an unnamed weapons inspector tells the Los Angeles Times: &#8220;We haven't found an iota of concealed material yet. Even private facilities which are not part of their state-run military industrial complex open up for us&#8212;like magic. ... We can't look for something which we don't know about. If the United States wants us to find something, they should open their intelligence file and share it with us so that we know where to go for it. .... By being silent, we may create the false illusion that we did uncover something. ... But I must say that if we were to publish a report now, we would have zilch to put in it.&#8221; [[,3604,867158,00.html | Guardian, 1/3/02 ]] [[ | Los Angeles Times, 12/31/01 ]] [[ | BBC, 12/31/01 ]] [[;dir=508&amp;host=3 | Independent, 1/1/03 ]] [[;thesection=news&amp;thesubsection=world | New Zealand Herald, 1/1/03 ]] ------ The London Observer will report in early January, &#8220;Some of the inspectors are understood to be convinced that their mission has become a &#8216;set-up job&#8217; and America will attack Iraq regardless of what they find.&#8221; [[,6903,868839,00.html | Observer, 1/5/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << wmd >> << weaponsInspections >> December 2, 2002 Ari Fleischer Insists Iraq Intended To Use Imported Aluminum Tubes For Nuclear Program complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_3271 false 1 ------ White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says at a press briefing: &#8220;I will say this is something that the president has said publicly, that Iraq did, in fact, seek to buy these tubes for the purpose of producing, not as Iraq now claims conventional forces, but for the purpose of trying to produce nuclear weapons. And so it's, on the one hand, mildly encouraging that Iraq would now admit to what it's been doing. But on the other hand, a lie is still a lie, because these&#8212;they sought to produce these for the purpose of production of nuclear weapons, not conventional.&#8221; [[ | White House, 12/2/2002 ]] ====== << aluminumTubes >> << nuclearQuotes >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((- George W. Bush )) December 2, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_244 false 1 ------ In a speech to the Air National Guard Senior Leadership Conference in Denver, Vice President Dick Cheney calls Saddam's government an &#8220;outlaw regime&#8221; and accuses the leader of &#8220;harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror,&#8221; asserting that his government &#8220;has had high-level contacts with al-Qaeda going back a decade and has provided training to al-Qaeda terrorists.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 12/3/02 ]] [[ | White House, 12/2/02c ]] ====== << terroristTies >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) {{ duplicate_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_4 }} December 2, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_243 false 1 ------ Bush administration officials launch what appears to be a concerted effort to discredit the inspections after press reports indicate that inspections are going well and that Iraq is cooperating. The Washington Post reports, &#8220;In speeches in London, Washington and Denver, Bush, Vice President Cheney and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz sought to increase pressure on Hussein in advance of a Sunday deadline for the Iraqi leader to declare his inventory of weapons and missiles.&#8221; The paper adds, &#8220;The coordinated speeches ... seemed designed to preempt any positive sign from the UN inspection teams about Iraqi compliance and to set the stage for an early confrontation with Hussein.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 12/3/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Richard ("Dick") Cheney )) ((+ Paul Wolfowitz )) ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ statement_richard_(_dick_)_cheney_5 }} {{ statement_paul_wolfowitz_5 }} {{ statement_ari_fleischer_6 }} {{ statement_george_w._bush_16 }} December 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_241 false 1 ------ Iraq reiterates its claim that it has no weapons of mass destruction in the country, foreshadowing the content of its formal declaration, which is due in five days. Responding to the statement, US Secretary of Defense says, &#8220;Any country on the face of the earth with an active intelligence program knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.&#8221; And Bush says, &#8220;He [Saddam Hussein] says he won't have weapons of mass destruction; he's got them.&#8221; [[ | BBC, 12/4/02 ]] ====== << wmd >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Donald Rumsfeld )) {{ duplicate_donald_rumsfeld_11 }} December 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_302 false 1 ------ In a news briefing, Donald Rumsfeld says, &#8220;You can't expect people to go into a country that is just enormous, with all that real estate and all that underground facilities and all of these people monitoring everything&#8212;everything anyone is doing&#8212;and expect them to engage in a discovery process and turn up something somebody is determined for them not to turn up. If you go back and look at the history of inspections in Iraq, the reality is that things have been found not by discovery, but through defectors ... and you get the kind of information that means the game is up.&#8221; [[ | Washington Times, 12/4/02 ]] [[ | US Department of Defense, 12/3/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> December 3, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_245 false 1 ------ One day after Bush asserts that signs of Iraqi cooperation are so far &#8220;not encouraging,&#8221; UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix tells the Associated Press, &#8220;I think we have started in the manner we expected and we have not had any impediments in the visits of plants.&#8221; By this date, notes the Associated Press, &#8220;UN inspectors have reported unimpeded access and Iraqi cooperation&#8221; in &#8220;more than a dozen field missions.&#8221; [[ | Guardian, 12/11/02 ]] [[ | AP, 12/3/02 ]] [[ | Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12/3/02 ]] [[,2933,72011,00.html | Fox News, 12/3/02 ]] ------ Similarly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan says, &#8220;It's only been a week and obviously the cooperation seems to be good, but this is not a one-week wonder. They have to sustain the cooperation and the effort and perform.&#8221; [[ | Washington Post, 12/4/02 ]] [[ | Associated Press, 12/3/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Hans Blix )) ((+ Kofi Annan )) December 4, 2002 Bush Insists It Is Up to Saddam Whether or Not US Invades Iraq complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2901 false 1 ------ During a question and answer period following President Bush's signing of the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, the president is asked about the weapon inspectors' progress in Iraq and if he believes &#8220;the signs are not encouraging that they're doing their job.&#8221; Bush responds: &#8220;This isn't about inspectors. The issue is whether Saddam Hussein will disarm. Will he disarm in the name of peace.&#8221; He also condemns Iraq's shooting of US and British planes that have been patrolling the so-called &#8220;no-fly&#8221; zones over northern and southern Iraq (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_2871 ]]) and contends that these actions demonstrate that Saddam does not intend to comply with UN Resolution 1441 (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_228 ]]). Bush also implies that no decision has been made to use military force against Iraq. &#8220;The best way for peace is for Mr. Saddam Hussein to disarm,&#8221; he insists. &#8220;It's up to him to make his decision.&#8221; [[ | White House, 12/4/02 ]] ====== << decisionQuotes >> << decision >> << legalJustification >> ((+ George W. Bush )) {{ duplicate_george_w._bush_41 }} December 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_246 false 1 ------ The White House calls for more aggressive inspections. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, &#8220;We want to make certain that they [the inspections] are aggressive enough to be able to ascertain the facts in the face of an adversary who in the past did everything in his power to hide the facts.&#8221; The White House recommends increasing the UN inspectors' staff so that the two agencies can conduct multiple simultaneous inspections each day. [[ | BBC, 12/4/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Ari Fleischer )) December 4, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_253 false 1 ------ During the bill signing of the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Bush says of Saddam Hussein: &#8220;One of my concerns is that in the past he has shot at our airplanes. Anybody who shoots at US airplanes or British airplanes is not somebody who looks like he's interested in complying with disarmament.&#8221; He also chastises Saddam's questioning US motives (see [[ complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_238 ]]). &#8220;He wrote letters, stinging rebukes, to what the UN did. He was very critical of the US and Britain. It didn't appear to be somebody that was that anxious to comply, but we've just started the process.&#8221; [[ | White House, 12/4/02 ]] [[ | CNN, 12/4/02 ]] ====== << weaponsInspections >> ((+ George W. Bush )) December 5, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_131 false 1 ------ White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says: &#8220;The president of the United States and the secretary of Defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it.&#8221; When pressed for details, he adds: &#8220;President Bush has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Tony Blair has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Donald Rumsfeld has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler has said they do. The United Nations has said they do. The experts have said they do. Iraq says they don't. You can choose who you want to believe.&#8221; [[ | AP, 12/5/03 ]] [[ | CBC News, 12/5/02 ]] ====== << wmdQuotesGeneral >> ((- Tony Blair )) ((- Donald Rumsfeld )) ((- George W. Bush )) ((+ Ari Fleischer )) ((- Richard Butler )) {{ duplicate_ari_fleischer_2 }} December 5, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_247 false 1 ------ Demetrius Perricos, the Greek head of the team searching Iraq for chemical and biological weapons, criticizes Washington's efforts to influence the inspections. He says: &#8220;The people who sent us here are the international community, the United Nations. We're not serving the US. We're not serving the UK. We're not serving any individual nation.&#8221; He also questions why the Bush administration is refusing to share its intelligence with the inspectors. He explains: &#8220;What we're getting and what President Bush may be getting is very different, to put it mildly.&#8221; [[,,3-504631,00.html | Times of London, 12/6/02 ]] ====== << deception >> << weaponsInspections >> ((+ Demetrius Perricos )) December 5, 2002 complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of