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Profile: Dan Bartlett

 
  

Positions that Dan Bartlett has held:

  • White House communications director


 

Quotes

 
  

Quote, September 16, 2002

   “We've made it very clear that we are not in the business of negotiating with Saddam Hussein. We are working with the UN Security Council to determine the most effective way to reach our goal.... [Iraq's offer is a tactic to give] false hope to the international community that [President Saddam] means business this time.... Unfortunately, his more than decade of experience shows you can put very little into his words or deeds.” [Independent, 9/17/02]

Associated Events


 

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Dan Bartlett actively participated in the following events:

 
  

September 16, 2002      Complete Iraq timeline

       Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri meets with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Arab League Secretary-General Amir Moussa and gives them a letter expressing Baghdad's willingness to readmit the UN weapons inspectors without conditions. The offer is made after Saddam Hussein convened an emergency meeting in Baghdad with his cabinet and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). [Associated Press, 9/16/02a; Independent, 9/17/02; New York Times, 9/17/02 Sources: Iraq's September 16, 2002 letter accepting the unconditional return of weapons inspectors] Iraq's letter is effectively an agreement to December 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1284. [New York Times, 9/18/02] Kofi Annan tells reporters after the meeting, “I can confirm to you that I have received a letter from the Iraqi authorities conveying its decision to allow the return of the inspectors without conditions to continue their work and has also agreed that they are ready to start immediate discussions on the practical arrangements for the return of the inspectors to resume their work.” Annan credits the Arab League, which he says “played a key role” in influencing Saddam Hussein's decision to accept the inspectors, and suggests that Bush's speech also played a critical part in influencing Baghdad's decision. [UN, 9/16/02] UNMOVIC Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix also meets with Iraqi officials and it is reportedly agreed that weapons inspectors will return to Iraq on October 19. UNMOVIC spokesman Ewen Buchanan tells the BBC, “We are ready to discuss practical measures, such as helicopters, hotels, the installation of monitoring equipment and so on, which need to be put in place.” [BBC, 9/17/02] The Bush administration immediately rejects the offer, calling it “a tactical step by Iraq in hopes of avoiding strong UN Security Council action,” in a statement released by the deputy press secretary. [Associated Press, 9/16/02; White House, 9/16/2002] And Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, tells reporters: “We've made it very clear that we are not in the business of negotiating with Saddam Hussein. We are working with the UN Security Council to determine the most effective way to reach our goal.” He then claims Iraq's offer is a tactic to give “false hope to the international community that [President Saddam] means business this time,” adding, “Unfortunately, his more than decade of experience shows you can put very little into his words or deeds.” Two days later Bush will tell reporters that Saddam's offer is “his latest ploy, his latest attempt not to be held accountable for defying the United Nations,” adding: “He's not going to fool anybody. We've seen him before. . . . We'll remind the world that, by defying resolutions, he's become more and more of a threat to world peace. [The world] must rise up and deal with this threat, and that's what we expect the Security Council to do.” [Independent, 9/17/02; Agence France Presse, 9/19/02] Later that night, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice reportedly hold a conference call with Kofi Annan and accuse him of taking matters into his own hands. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 285] Britain supports the US position and calls for a UN resolution backed with the threat of force. [BBC, 9/17/03] Other nations react differently to the offer. For example, Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, says: “It's important that, through our joint efforts, we have managed to put aside the threat of a war scenario around Iraq and return the process to a political channel ... It is essential in the coming days to resolve the issue of the inspectors' return. For this, no new [Security Council] resolutions are needed.” [Independent, 9/17/02; BBC, 9/17/03]
People and organizations involved: Saddam Hussein, Amir Moussa, Condoleezza Rice, Hans Blix, Dan Bartlett, Kofi Annan, Colin Powell, Naji Sabri, Scott McClellan  Additional Info 
          

A day or two days before January 28      Complete Iraq timeline

       Robert G. Joseph, director for nonproliferation at the National Security Council (NSC), telephones senior CIA official Alan Foley and argues that the Africa-uranium claim should be included in Bush's upcoming State of the Union address. When Foley warns that the allegation has little evidence to support it, Mr. Joseph instead requests that the speech include a remark saying that the British had learned that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa, leaving out the bit about Niger and the exact quantity of uranium that was allegedly sought. [The Washington Post, 7/17/2003; New York Times, 7/17/2003; New York Times, 7/17/2003; The Washington Post, 7/27/2003; Time Magazine, 7/21/2003 Sources: Two unnamed senior administration officials interviewed by Time, Alan Foley] Joseph claims he does not recall the discussion and White House communications director Dan Bartlett calls Foley's version of events a “conspiracy theory.” [The Washington Post, 7/27/03]
People and organizations involved: Alan Foley, Dan Bartlett, Robert G. Joseph
          

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