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Profile: Greg Thielmann


Positions that Greg Thielmann has held:

  • Director of the strategic, proliferation and military issues office in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.




Quote, February 5, 2003

   “... I think my conclusion [about Powell's speech] now is that it's probably one of the low points in his long distinguished service to the nation.” [CBS News, 10/14/03]

Associated Events

Quote, early June 2003

   “Suspicions were presented as fact, contrary arguments ignored. When the administration did talk about specific evidence—it was basically declassified, sensitive information—it did it in a way that was also not entirely honest.” [Associated Press, 6/7/03]

Associated Events

Summary, summer 2003

   There was “a lot of sorrow and anger at the way intelligence was misused.” It seemed as though “the administration didn't think the public would be enthusiastic about the idea of war” if they knew that much of the intelligence on Iraq was uncertain. [Newsweek, 6/9/03, Guardian, 6/2/03]

Associated Events

Quote, August 2, 2003

   “One would think if Cheney was on some sort of noble pursuit of the truth and really wanted to get into details, he would have noticed that INR [State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research] had very loud and lengthy dissents on some critical pieces of Iraq intelligence. ... You'd think he might want to hear from us. It never happened, of course, because Cheney wasn't engaged in an academic search for truth.” [Chicago Tribune, 8/2/03]

Associated Events

Quote, October 2003

   “Bolton seemed to be troubled because INR was not telling him what he wanted to hear. I was intercepted at the door of his office and told, ‘The Under-Secretary doesn't need you to attend this meeting anymore’ ,” he was told by one of Bolton's aides. “The Under-Secretary wants to keep this in the family.” To ensure that Bolton received the intelligence he wanted, explained Thielmann, “He surrounded himself with a hand-chosen group of loyalists, and found a way to get CIA information directly.” [New Yorker, 10/20/03]

Associated Events

Quote, October 27, 2003

   “What was improper and, I thought, very deceptive was implying, as President Bush did when he first mentioned it, that there was no other explanation for the aluminum tube procurements other than the pursuit of nuclear weapons. When he...when he used his language, there was nothing in it that suggested there was enormous controversy inside the intelligence community on what the purpose of these tubes was.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/27/03]

Associated Events

Quote, (Spring 2004)

   “... the American public was seriously misled. The administration twisted, distorted, and simplified intelligence in a way that led Americans to seriously misunderstand the nature of the Iraq threat. I'm not sure I can think of a worse act against the people in a democracy than the president distorting critical classified information.” [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 294]

Associated Events




No related entities for this entity.


Greg Thielmann actively participated in the following events:


Early 2001      Complete Iraq timeline

       Shortly after Bush is inaugurated into office, Greg Thielmann, an analyst for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), is appointed to serve as the intelligence liaison to John Bolton. But Thielmann's intelligence briefings do not support Bolton's assumptions about Iraq, and Thielmann is soon barred from attending the meetings. [New Yorker, 10/20/03 Sources: Greg Thielmann]
People and organizations involved: John R. Bolton, Greg Thielmann  Additional Info 

Fall 2001      Complete Iraq timeline

       Joe T., an analyst for the CIA, gives a presentation in Room 6526 of the State Department's Office of Strategic Proliferation on his theory that a confiscated shipment of 7075-T6 aluminum tubes destined for Iraq (see July 2001) had been intended for use in a gas centrifuge program. Present at the meeting is Greg Theilmann, head of the nuclear proliferation monitoring division at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who is not at all impressed with Joe T.'s argument. “I found the presentation to be unpersuasive,” Thielmann later explains to Vanity Fair. “He seemed far more a man on a mission than an objective analyst. He had something to sell.” Also in attendance is a scientist from the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory who also disagrees with Joe T.'s conclusions. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pg 281]
People and organizations involved: Joe T., Greg Thielmann

After May 2003      Complete Iraq timeline

       US current and former intelligence and other governmental officials who have inside knowledge continue to refute claims made by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein's regime had or was seeking ties with global Islamic terrorist groups. [Boston Globe, 8/3/03; Associated Press, 7/12/03; UPI, 7/25/03; Associated Press, 6/26/03; UPI, 7/23/03]
People and organizations involved: Greg Thielmann, Vince Cannistraro, Mel Goodman  Additional Info 

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