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Profile: INR's alternative view in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq

 
  

Positions that INR's alternative view in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq has held:


http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/archive/2003/nie_iraq_wmd.pdf


 

Quotes

 
  

Quote, October 1, 2002

   “The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR ) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. AS a result, INT is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.... In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad us reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in Question are intended for use as a centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the US. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds un persuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to concluded that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.” [National Intelligence Estimate, 10/2002]

Associated Events

Quote, October 2003

   “[M]ost” of the US' six intelligence agencies believe there is “compelling evidence that Saddam [Hussein] is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.” [Washington Post, 7/19/03, US Government, 10/02]

Associated Events


 

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INR's alternative view in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq actively participated in the following events:

 
  

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