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Profile: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

 
  

Positions that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed has held:

  • Al Qaeda leader


 

Quotes

 
  

No quotes or excerpts for this entity.


 

Relations

 
  

No related entities for this entity.


 

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed actively participated in the following events:

 
  

1993: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Has Ties with ISI      Complete 911 Timeline

       US agents uncover photographs showing Khalid Shaikh Mohammed with close associates of future Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Financial Times later notes that Mohammed and his allies “must have felt confident that their ties to senior Pakistani Islamists, whose power had been cemented within the country's intelligence service [the ISI], would prove invaluable.” [Financial Times, 2/15/03] Also this year, Mohammed is involved in an operation to assassinate Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan (and an opponent of Sharif and the ISI). [Slate, 9/21/01; Guardian, 3/3/03 (B)] The Los Angeles Times later reports that Mohammed “spent most of the 1990s in Pakistan. Pakistani leadership through the 1990s sympathized with Osama bin Laden's fundamentalist rhetoric. This sympathy allowed Mohammed to operate as he pleased in Pakistan.” [Los Angeles Times, 6/24/02]
People and organizations involved: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Osama bin Laden, Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto
          

Early 1994-January 1995: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Receives Financial Support in the Philippines      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a 1998 FBI wanted poster.
9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed lives in the Philippines for a year, planning Operation Bojinka until the plot is exposed in January 1995 and he has to flee (see January 6, 1995). Police later say he lives a very expensive and non-religious lifestyle. He goes to karaoke bars and go-go clubs, dates go-go dancers, stays in four-star hotels, and takes scuba diving lessons. Once he rents a helicopter just to fly it past the window of a girlfriend's office in an attempt to impress her. This appears to be a pattern; for instance, he has a big drinking party in 1998. [Los Angeles Times, 6/24/02] Officials believe his obvious access to large sums of money indicate that some larger network is backing him by this time. [Los Angeles Times, 6/6/02] It has been suggested that Mohammed, a Pakistani, is able “to operate as he please[s] in Pakistan” during the 1990s [Los Angeles Times, 6/24/02] , and he is linked to the Pakistani ISI. His hedonistic time in the Philippines resembles reports of hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi in the Philippines in 1998-2000 . Mohammed returns to the Philippines occasionally, and he is even spotted there after 9/11. [Knight Ridder, 9/9/02] He is almost caught while visiting an old girlfriend there in 1999, and fails in a second plot to kill the Pope when the Pope cancels his visit to the Philippines that year. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; Times of London, 11/10/02]
People and organizations involved: Operation Bojinka, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Marwan Alshehhi
          

January 6, 1995: Pope Assassination and Bojinka Plot to Bomb a Dozen Airplanes Is Foiled      Complete 911 Timeline

      
A 1998 CNN map of likely flights to be hijacked in one version of Operation Bojinka.
Responding to an apartment fire, Philippine investigators uncover an al-Qaeda plot to assassinate the Pope that is scheduled to take place when he visits the Philippines one week later. While investigating that scheme, they also uncover Operation Bojinka, planned by the same people: 1993 WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; Los Angeles Times, 6/24/02; Independent, 6/6/02] The first phase of the plan is to explode 11 or 12 passenger planes over the Pacific Ocean. [Agence France-Presse, 12/8/01] Had this plot been successful, up to 4,000 people would have been killed in planes flying to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, and New York. [Insight, 5/27/02] All the bombs would be planted at about the same time, but some would be timed to go off weeks or even months later. Presumably worldwide air travel could be interrupted for months. [Lance, 2003, pp 260-61] This phase of Operation Bojinka was scheduled to go forward just two weeks later on January 21. [Insight, 5/27/02]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, World Trade Center, al-Qaeda, Operation Bojinka
          

February 1995: Bojinka Second Wave Fully Revealed to Philippines Investigators; Information Given to US      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza.
As Colonel Mendoza, the Philippines investigator, continues to interrogate Operation Bojinka plotter Abdul Hakim Murad, details of a post-Bojinka “second wave” emerge. Author Peter Lance calls this phase “a virtual blueprint of the 9/11 attacks.” Murad reveals a plan to hijack commercial airliners at some point after the effect of Bojinka dies down. Murad himself had been training in the US for this plot. He names the buildings that would be targeted for attack: CIA headquarters, the Pentagon, an unidentified nuclear power plant, the Transamerica Tower in San Francisco, the Sears Tower, and the World Trade Center. Murad continues to reveal more information about this plot until he is handed over to the FBI in April. [Lance, 2003, pp 278-80] He identifies approximately ten other men who met him at the flight schools or were getting similar training. They came from Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Apparently none of these pilots match the names of any of the 9/11 hijackers. However, he also gives information pointing to the al-Qaeda operative Hambali through a front company named Konsonjaya. Hambali later hosts an important al-Qaeda meeting attended by two of the 9/11 hijackers. [Associated Press, 3/5/02 (B)] Colonel Mendoza even makes a flow chart connecting many key players together, including bin Laden, bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Ramzi Yousef, and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (named as Salem Ali a.k.a. Mohmad). Philippine authorities later claim that they provide all of this information to US authorities, but the US fails to follow up on any of it. [Lance, 2003, pp 303-4] Khalifa is in US custody and released even after the Philippine authorities provide this information about him.
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Ramzi Yousef, World Trade Center, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Operation Bojinka, Sears Tower, Rodolfo Mendoza, Abdul Hakim Murad, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pentagon, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa
          

February 7, 1995: Yousef Is Arrested and Talks, but Hides Operation Bojinka Second Wave and bin Laden Ties      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Ramzi Yousef.
Ramzi Yousef is arrested in Pakistan. At the time, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is staying in the same building, and brazenly gives an interview to Time magazine as “Khalid Sheikh,” describing Yousef's capture. [Lance, 2003, pp 328] Yousef had recruited Istaique Parker to implement a limited version of Operation Bojinka. Parker was to place bombs on board two flights bound from Bangkok to the US, but got cold feet and instead turned in Yousef. [Lance, 2003, pp 284-85] The next day, as Yousef is flying over New York City on his way to a prison cell, an FBI agent says to him, “You see the Trade Centers down there, they're still standing, aren't they?” Yousef responds, “They wouldn't be if I had enough money and enough explosives.” [MSNBC, 9/23/01; Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp 135] Yousef also soon admits to ties with Wali Khan Shah, who fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan, and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of bin Laden's brothers-in-law, who is being held by the US at the time. Despite Yousef's confession, Khalifa is released later in the year. Although Yousef talks freely, he makes no direct mention of bin Laden, or the planned second wave of Operation Bojinka that closely parallels the later 9/11 plot. [Lance, 2003, pp 297-98]
People and organizations involved: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Operation Bojinka
          

May 11, 1995: FBI Memo Fails to Mention Operation Bojinka Second Wave      Complete 911 Timeline

       FBI agents, having held Operation Bojinka plotter Abdul Hakim Murad for about a month, write a memo containing what they have learned from interrogating him. The memo contains many interesting revelations, including that Ramzi Yousef, a mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, “wanted to return to the United States in the future to bomb the World Trade Center a second time.” However, this memo does not contain a word about the second wave of Operation Bojinka— to fly about 12 hijacked airplanes into prominent US buildings—even though Murad had recently fully confessed this plot to Philippines investigators, who claim they turned over tapes, transcripts, and reports with Murad's confessions of the plot to the US when they handed over Murad. It has not been explained why this plot is not mentioned in the FBI's summary of Murad's interrogation. [Lance, 2003, pp 280-82] After 9/11, a Philippine investigator will refer to this third plot when he says of the 9/11 attacks, “It's Bojinka. We told the Americans everything about Bojinka. Why didn't they pay attention?” [Washington Post, 9/23/01] In an interview after 9/11, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will claim that the 9/11 attacks were a refinement and resurrection of this plot. [Australian, 9/9/02]
People and organizations involved: Operation Bojinka, Abdul Hakim Murad, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ramzi Yousef, World Trade Center
          

January-May 1996: US Fails to Capture Mohammed Living Openly in Qatar      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Abdallah al-Thani.
Since Operation Bojinka was uncovered in the Philippines (see January 6, 1995), nearly all of the plot's major planners, including Ramzi Yousef, are found and arrested. The one exception is 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He flees to Qatar in the Persian Gulf, where he lives openly using his real name, enjoying the patronage of Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Qatar's Interior Minister and a member of the royal family. [ABC News, 2/7/03] In January 1996, he is indicted in the US for his role in the 1993 WTC bombing, and in the same month, the US determines his location in Qatar. FBI Director Louis Freeh sends a letter to the Qatari government asking for permission to send a team after him. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/02] One of Freeh's diplomatic notes states that Mohammed was involved in a conspiracy to “bomb US airliners” and is believed to be “in the process of manufacturing an explosive device.” [New Yorker, 5/27/02] Qatar confirms that Mohammed is there and is making explosives, but they delay handing him over. After waiting several months, a high-level meeting takes place in Washington to consider a commando raid to seize him. However, the raid is deemed too risky, and another letter is sent to the Qatari government instead. One person at the meeting later states, “If we had gone in and nabbed this guy, or just cut his head off, the Qatari government would not have complained a bit. Everyone around the table for their own reasons refused to go after someone who fundamentally threatened American interests...” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/02] Around May 1996, Mohammed's patron, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, makes sure that Mohammed and four others are given blank passports and a chance to escape. Qatar's police chief later says the other men include Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda's number two and number three leaders, respectively. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; ABC News, 2/7/03] Bin Laden twice visits al-Thani in Qatar. [ABC News, 2/7/03; New York Times, 6/8/02]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Louis J. Freeh
          

Mid-1996-September 11, 2001: Mohammed Travels World; Involved in Many Al-Qaeda Operations      Complete 911 Timeline

       After fleeing Qatar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed travels the world and plans many al-Qaeda operationss. He previously was involved in the 1993 WTC bombing, and the Operation Bojinka plot. [Time, 1/20/03] And now, he is apparently involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998), the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), and other attacks. One US official says, “There is a clear operational link between him and the execution of most, if not all, of the al-Qaeda plots over the past five years.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/02] He lives in Prague, Czech Republic, through much of 1997. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] By 1999, he is living in Germany and visiting with the hijackers there. [New York Times, 6/8/02 (B); New York Times, 9/22/02] Using 60 aliases and as many passports, he travels through Europe, Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and South America, personally setting up al-Qaeda cells. [Time, 1/20/03; Los Angeles Times, 12/22/02]
People and organizations involved: USS Cole, al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

Early 1998: CIA Ignores Ex-Agent's Warning 9/11 Mastermind Is "Going to Hijack Some Planes," Visiting Germany      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Robert Baer.
in December 1997, CIA agent Robert Baer, newly retired from the CIA and working as a terrorism consultant, meets a former police chief from the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar. He learns that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was being sheltered by then Qatari Interior Minister Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani in 1996 (see January-May 1996). However, the ex-police chief knows other details, based on what Qatari police and intelligence learned when Mohammed was in the country. Mohammed was leading an al-Qaeda cell in Qatar together with Shawqui Islambuli, the brother of the Egyptian who had killed Anwar el-Sadat. They also were linked to bomber Ramzi Yousef. But what worries the former police chief is that Mohammed and Islambuli are experts in hijacking commercial planes. He tells Baer that Mohammed “is going to hijack some planes.” Further, he is told that Mohammed has moved to the Czech Republic, and has also travelled to Germany to meet bin Laden associates there. In early 1998 Baer sends this information to a friend in the CIA Counterterrorist Center, who forwards the information to his superiors. Baer doesn't hear back. He says, “There was no interest.” [UPI, 9/30/02; Vanity Fair, 2/02; Baer, 2002, pp 270-71] Baer also tries to interest reporter Daniel Pearl in a story about Mohammed before 9/11, but Pearl is still working on it when he is kidnapped and later murdered in early 2002. [UPI, 9/30/02] Baer's source later disappears, presumably kidnapped in Qatar. It has been speculated that the CIA turned on the source to protect its relationship with the Qatari government. [Gertz, 2002, pp 55-58] It appears bin Laden visits al-Thani in Qatar between the years 1996 and 2000. [ABC News, 2/7/03] Al-Thani continues to support al-Qaeda, providing Qatari passports and more than $1 million in funds to al-Qaeda. Even after 9/11, Mohammed is provided shelter in Qatar for two weeks in late 2001. [New York Times, 2/6/03] Yet the US still has not frozen al-Thani's assets or taken other action.
People and organizations involved: Ramzi Yousef, Counterterrorist Center, Qatar, Anwar el-Sadat, Shawqui Islambuli, Daniel Pearl, Osama bin Laden, Persian Gulf, al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Robert Baer
          

November 1, 1998-February 2001: Atta and Other Islamic Militants Are Monitored by US and Germany in Hamburg Apartment      Complete 911 Timeline

      
The Marienstrasse building.
Mohamed Atta and al-Qaeda operatives Said Bahaji and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh move into a four bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse, in Hamburg, Germany, and stay there until February 2001 (Atta is already living primarily in the US well before this time). Investigators believe this move marks the formation of their Hamburg al-Qaeda cell [New York Times, 9/10/02; Los Angeles Times, 1/27/02] Up to six men at a time live at the apartment, including other al-Qaeda agents such as hijacker Marwan Alshehhi and cell member Zakariya Essabar. [New York Times, 9/15/01 (F)] During the 28 months Atta's name is on the apartment lease, 29 Middle Eastern or North African men register the apartment as their home address. From the very beginning, the apartment was officially under surveillance by German intelligence, because of investigations into businessman Mamoun Darkazanli that connect to Said Bahaji. [Washington Post, 10/23/01] The Germans also suspect connections between Bahaji and al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] German intelligence monitors the apartment off and on for months, and wiretaps Mounir El Motassadeq, an associate of the apartment-mates who is later put on trial in August 2002 for assisting the 9/11 plot, but apparently do not find any indication of suspicious activity. [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/02] Bahaji is directly monitored at least for part of 1998, but German officials have not disclosed when the probe began or ended. That investigation is dropped for lack of evidence. [Associated Press, 6/22/02; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] It is now clear that investigators would have found evidence if they looked more thoroughly. For instance, Zammar, a talkative man who has trouble keeping secrets, is a frequent visitor to the many late night meetings there. [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/02; Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp 259-60; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Another visitor later recalls Atta and others discussing attacking the US. [Knight Ridder, 9/9/02] 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is in Hamburg several times in 1999, and comes to the apartment. However, although there was a $2 million reward for Mohammed since 1998, the US apparently fails to tell Germany what it knows about him (see 1999). [Newsweek, 9/4/02; New York Times, 11/4/02] Hijacker Waleed Alshehri also apparently stays at the apartment “at times.” [Washington Post, 9/16/01 (B); Washington Post, 9/14/01] The CIA also starts monitoring Atta while he is living at this apartment, and does not tell Germany of the surveillance. Remarkably, the German government will claim it knew little about the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell before 9/11, and nothing directed them towards the Marienstrasse apartment. [Daily Telegraph, 11/24/01]
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Mamoun Darkazanli, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Germany, al-Qaeda, Said Bahaji, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Central Intelligence Agency, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Zakariya Essabar, Mounir El Motassadeq
          

1999: Mohammed Repeatedly Visits Atta, Others in al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell      Complete 911 Timeline

       Khalid Shaikh Mohammed “repeatedly” visits Mohamed Atta and others in the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. [Associated Press, 8/24/02] US and German officials say a number of sources place Mohammed at Atta's Hamburg apartment, although when he visits, or who he visits while he is there, is unclear. [Los Angeles Times, 6/6/02; New York Times, 11/4/02] However, it would be logical to conclude that he visits Atta's housemate Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, since investigators believe he is the “key contact between the pilots” and Mohammed. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/03] Mohammed is living elsewhere in Germany at the time. [New York Times, 9/22/02] German intelligence monitors the apartment in 1999 but apparently does not notice Mohammed. US investigators have been searching for Mohammed since 1996, but apparently never tell the Germans what they know about him. [New York Times, 11/4/02] Even after 9/11, German investigators complain that US investigators do not tell them what they know about Mohammed living in Germany until they read it in the newspapers in June 2002. [New York Times, 6/11/02]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta
          

2000-September 10, 2001: Hijackers Possibly Spend Time in Philippines      Complete 911 Timeline

       The names of four hijackers are later discovered in Philippines immigration records, according to Philippine Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo. However, whether these are the hijackers or just other Saudis with the same names has not been confirmed. Abdulaziz Alomari visits the Philippines once in 2000, then again in February 2001, leaving on February 12. [Associated Press, 9/19/01; Philippines Daily Inquirer, 9/19/01; Daily Telegraph, 9/20/01] Ahmed Alghamdi visits Manila, Philippines, more than 13 times in the two years before 9/11. He leaves the Philippines the day before the attacks. [Daily Telegraph, 9/20/01; Arizona Daily Star, 9/28/01] Fayez Ahmed Banihammad visits the Philippines on October 17-19, 2000. [Daily Telegraph, 9/20/01; Arizona Daily Star, 9/28/01] Saeed Alghamdi visits the Philippines on at least 15 occasions in 2001, entering as a tourist. The last visit ends on August 6, 2001. [Daily Telegraph, 9/20/01] Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi may also have been living in the Philippines, and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed occasionally stays there. While in the Philippines, it is possible the hijackers meet with associates of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden's brother-in-law (see December 16, 1994-May 1995). Khalifa has been closely linked with the Philippines chapter of the International Islamic Relief Organization, which gets much of its money from the Saudi Arabian government. The organization has recently been accused of being a front for al-Qaeda. Amongst other connections to terrorism, Khalifa helped fund the Islamic Army of Aden, a group that claimed responsibility for the bombing of the USS Cole. [Boston Herald, 10/14/01] Khalifa has been connected through phone calls to Hambali, a major terrorist who attended a planning meeting for the 9/11 attacks in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), also attended by two hijackers connected to the Islamic Army of Aden. [Cox News Service, 10/21/01; PBS Frontline, 10/3/02 (C)] (The US had Khalifa in custody for about six months in 1995.) Nothing more has been heard to confirm or deny the hijackers' Philippines connections since these reports.
People and organizations involved: Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alghamdi, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Saeed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Marwan Alshehhi, Ahmed, International Islamic Relief Organization, Islamic Army of Aden
          

January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Monitored by Authorities; Information Passed to US      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Attendees of the Malaysian meeting. From left to right top row: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Left to right bottom row: Hambali, Yazid Sufaat, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. No pictures of bin Atash or Fahad al-Quso are available, the names of other participants have not been released.
About a dozen of bin Laden's trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/02; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/02; CNN, 8/30/02] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the meeting and then passes the information on to the US. Attendees of the meeting include:
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this meeting. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the meeting begins.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - A top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known Mohammed is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the meeting was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of Mohammed should have proved the meeting's importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/02] Although the possible presence of Mohammed at this meeting is highly disputed by US officials, one terrorism expert testifies before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of Mohammed's interrogations since his capture, and that Mohammed admits leading this meeting. [New York Post, 7/10/03; Newsweek, 7/9/03] Many media reports identify him there as well [Independent, 6/6/02; CNN, 11/7/02; Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 10/29/03; CNN, 8/30/02] (for instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed's presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack's mastermind ... doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/03]
Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian militant better known as Hambali. [BBC, 8/15/03] He was the main financier of Operation Bojinka. [CNN, 3/14/02; CNN, 8/30/02] Philippine intelligence officials learned of Hambali's importance in 1995, but did not track him down or share information about him. He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003. [CBS News, 8/15/03; CNN, 8/14/03]
Yazid Sufaat, - A Malaysian man who owned the condominium where the meeting was held. [New York Times, 1/31/02; Newsweek, 6/2/02] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat's presence at this meeting is later missed in September. Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/02]
Fahad al-Quso - A top al-Qaeda operative. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] Al-Quso will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000, but the FBI is not given a chance to interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/03]
Tawifiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad.” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden's inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden's bodyguards, and served as bin Laden's personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole attack. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995 [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/18/02] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash's presence at this meeting is later missed in January 2001. Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go. [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/02] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003. [New York Times, 5/1/03]
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the meeting may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [CNN, 11/7/02; Newsweek, 11/26/01; Die Zeit, 10/1/02; Time, 9/15/02; Washington Post, 7/14/02] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Another account noting he was photographed at the meeting further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/01] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/02] One account says he is recognized at the time of the meeting, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel, 10/1/02] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh's presence at this meeting will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 [Washington Post, 7/14/02; Newsweek, 9/4/02; Guardian, 10/15/01] , so better surveillance or follow-up from this meeting could have prevented that attack as well.
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - An al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, may have attended this meeting, according to some documents [Australian, 12/24/02; Newsweek, 10/7/02] , but his presence at the meeting is uncertain. [Associated Press, 10/2/02] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don't want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi - He is possibly at the meeting, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/02] US intelligence intercepts from before the meeting indicate that he had plans to attend the meeting. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, is also said to attend. He is reportedly meant to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)]
More? - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also known to have been at the meeting. [Cox News Service, 10/21/01] (The Islamic Jihad had merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/01]
People and organizations involved: Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Yazid Sufaat, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, al-Qaeda, Malaysian Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Salem Alhazmi, Fahad al-Quso, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, Abu Bara al Taizi, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Egyptian Islamic Jihad
          

July 2000: Potential Informant Ignored by Australian and US Authorities      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Jack Roche.
Jack Roche, an Australian Caucasian Muslim, tries to inform on al-Qaeda for Australia or the US, but is ignored. In April, Roche returned from a trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Malaysia, where he took an explosives training course and met with bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and other top al-Qaeda leaders. In Pakistan, Mohammed discussed attacking US jets in Australia and gave Roche money to start an al-Qaeda cell in Australia. Roche also met Hambali in Malaysia and was given more money there. Early this month, he tries to call the US embassy in Australia, but they ignore him. He then tries to contact The Australian intelligence agency several times, but they too ignore him. In September 2000, his housemate also tries to contact Australian intelligence about what he has learned from Roche but his call is ignored as well. Australian Prime Minister John Howard later acknowledges that authorities made a “very serious mistake” in ignoring Roche, though he also downplays the importance of Roche's information. Roche is later sentenced to nine years in prison for conspiring with al-Qaeda to blow up an Israeli embassy. [BBC, 6/1/04; Los Angeles Times, 6/7/04]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, al-Qaeda, John Howard, Jack Roche, Mohammed Atef
          

October 2000-February 2001: Moussaoui Travels to London and Afghanistan      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Zacarias Moussaoui passing through a London airport (date unknown).
Zacarias Moussaoui had been staying in Malaysia so that he could take flight training classes at the Malaysian Flying Academy in Malacca. However, he is unhappy with the quality of training there. He takes the $35,000 given to him by his hosts, Yazid Sufaat and Hambali, and spends it to buy fertilizer to construct bombs. Then he gives up and travels to London in early December, where he meets with Ramzi Bin al-Shibh (who stays in London from December 2 to 9). Hambali sends a messenger to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Afghanistan to complain about Moussaoui's attitude. On December 9, Moussaoui leaves London. He makes his way to Afghanistan and meets with Mohammed. Mohammed decides to send him to take flight training classes in the US instead. He is given $35,000 in cash to pay for flying lessons by someone in Pakistan. After he enters the US in February, bin al-Shibh wires him another $14,000 from Germany. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Washington Post, 3/28/03; Knight Ridder, 9/9/02]
People and organizations involved: Yazid Sufaat, Zacarias Moussaoui, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

May-July 2001: 9/11 Attacks Originally Planned for Early Date      Complete 911 Timeline

       In 2001, bin Laden apparently pressures Khalid Shaikh Mohammed for an attack date earlier than 9/11. According to information obtained from the 9/11 Commission (apparently based on a prison interrogation of Mohammed), bin Laden first requests an attack date of May 12, 2001, the seven-month anniversary of the USS Cole bombing. Then, when bin Laden learns from the media that Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would be visiting the White House in June or July 2001, he attempts once more to accelerate the operation to coincide with his visit. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)] The surge of warnings around this time could be related to these original preparations.
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, USS Cole, Ariel Sharon, Osama bin Laden
          

Summer 2001: NSA Fails to Share Intercepted Information About Calls Between Atta and Mohammed      Complete 911 Timeline

       Around this time, the NSA intercepts telephone conversations between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, but apparently does not share the information with any other agencies. The FBI has a $2 million reward for Mohammed at the time, while Atta is in charge of operations inside the US. [Knight Ridder, 6/6/02; Independent, 6/6/02] The NSA either fails to translate these messages in a timely fashion or fails to understand the significance of what was translated. [Knight Ridder, 6/6/02]
People and organizations involved: National Security Agency, Mohamed Atta, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

June 12, 2001: CIA Learns Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Is Sending Operatives to US to Meet Up With Operatives Already Living There      Complete 911 Timeline

       A CIA report says that a man named “Khaled” is actively recruiting people to travel to various countries, including the US, to stage attacks. CIA headquarters presume from the details of this report that Khaled is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. On July 11, the individual source for this report is shown a series of photographs and identifies Mohammed as the person he called “Khaled.” [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/22/04; USA Today, 12/12/02] This report also reveals that
al-Qaeda operatives heading to the US would be “expected to establish contact with colleagues already living there.”
Mohammed himself had traveled to the US frequently, and as recently as May 2001.
He is a relative of bomber Ramzi Yousef.
He appears to be one of bin Laden's most trusted leaders.
He routinely tells others that he can arrange their entry into the US as well. However, the CIA doesn't find this report credible because they think it is unlikely that he would come to the US. Nevertheless, they consider it worth pursuing. One agent replies, “If it is KSM, we have both a significant threat and an opportunity to pick him up.” The CIA disseminates the report to all other US intelligence agencies, military commanders, and parts of the Treasury and Justice Departments. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later request that the CIA inform them how CIA agents and other agencies reacted to this information, but the CIA does not respond to this. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (B)] On July 23, 2001, the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia will give Mohammed a US visa (he uses an alias but his actual photo appears on his application) (see July 23, 2001). Also, during this summer and as late as September 10, 2001, the NSA will intercept phone calls between Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, but the NSA will not share this information with any other agencies (see Summer 2001).
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, Ramzi Yousef, US Department of Justice, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office, US Department of the Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency
          

July 23, 2001: Mohammed Given US Visa      Complete 911 Timeline

      
The photograph of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed on his 2001 US visa application.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is granted a visa to enter the US, despite being under a federal terrorism indictment, having a $2 million reward on his head, and being one of only a dozen people in the world on a US domestic no-fly list (see April 24, 2000). There is no evidence that he actually uses his visa to travel to the US. Investigators speculate that he may have considered a trip to shepherd some aspect of the 9/11 plot. He applied for the visa using a Saudi passport and an alias (Abdulrahman al Ghamdi), but the photo he submitted is really of him. He uses the new, controversial Visa Express program that allows Saudis to apply for US visas without having to appear in person at any point during the application process (see May 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/04] Just a month earlier, the CIA passed a warning to all US intelligence agencies, certain military commanders, and parts of the Justice and Treasury Departments saying that Mohammed may be attempting to enter the US (see June 12, 2001). However, either this warning isn't given to immigration officials or else they fail to notice his application. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/04]
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, US Department of Justice, US Department of the Treasury
          

August 25, 2001: 9/11 Paymaster Has Ties to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed      Complete 911 Timeline

       A supplemental Visa credit card on a “Mustafa al-Hawsawi” bank account is issued in the name of Abdulrahman A. A. al-Ghamdi, which the FBI says is an alias for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The FBI believes this helps prove Mohammed is a superior to the 9/11 paymaster. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02; Houston Chronicle, 6/5/02] The identity of “Mustafa al-Hawsawi” is highly contested, but may well be Saeed Sheikh. Mohammed and Sheikh appear to work together in the kidnapping of reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002.
People and organizations involved: Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Abdulrahman A. A. al-Ghamdi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Daniel Pearl, Saeed Sheikh, Federal Bureau of Investigation
          

August 28, 2001: CIA Fails to Connect Mohammed, bin al-Shibh, and Moussaoui      Complete 911 Timeline

       In April 2001, the CIA analyzed some “intriguing information associated with a person known as ‘Mukhtar.’ ” The CIA didn't know who this was at the time, only that he was associated with top al-Qaeda deputy Abu Zubaida and that he seemed to be involved in planning al-Qaeda activities. On August 28, 2001, the CIA receives a cable reporting that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's nickname is Mukhtar (which means “brain” in Arabic). However, apparently no one at the CIA's bin Laden unit makes the connection between this new information and the April 2001 information. The 9/11 Commission writes, “Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Muhktar/KSM had communicated with a phone that was used by [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh, and that bin al-Shibh had used the same phone to communicate with [Zacarias] Moussaoui [who is in US custody by this time.]” [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/22/04; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (B)]
People and organizations involved: Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Zacarias Moussaoui, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 9/11 Commission, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, al-Qaeda
          

September 10, 2001: NSA Monitors Call as Mohammed Gives Final Approval to Launch Attacks      Complete 911 Timeline

       Mohamed Atta calls Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Afghanistan. Mohammed gives final approval to Atta to launch the attacks. This call is monitored and translated by the US, although it is not known how quickly the call is translated, and the specifics of the conversation haven't been released. [Independent, 9/15/02]
People and organizations involved: United States, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohamed Atta
          

January 23, 2002: Reporter Daniel Pearl Is Kidnapped While Investigating the ISI      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Daniel Pearl.
Wall Street Journal report Daniel Pearl is kidnapped while investigating the ISI's connection to Islamic militant groups. [BBC, 7/5/02; Guardian, 1/25/02] Saeed Sheikh is later convicted as the mastermind of the kidnap, and though it appears he lured Pearl into being kidnapped beginning January 11, the actual kidnapping is perpetrated by others who remain at large. [Vanity Fair, 8/02; Wall Street Journal, 1/23/03] The Guardian later suggests that Pearl must have been under ISI surveillance at the time of his kidnapping. “Any western journalist visiting Pakistan is routinely watched and followed. The notion that Daniel Pearl, setting up contacts with extremist groups, was not being carefully monitored by the Secret Services is unbelievable—and nobody in Pakistan believes it.” [Guardian, 4/5/02] Both al-Qaeda and the ISI appear to be behind the kidnapping. The overall mastermind behind the kidnapping seems to be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, also mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. [CNN, 1/30/03; Time, 1/26/03]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Saeed Sheikh, Daniel Pearl, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
          

January 31, 2002: Reporter Daniel Pearl Is Murdered by Pakistani Kidnappers      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Reporter Daniel Pearl moments before he is killed.
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is murdered. He is reported dead on February 21; his mutilated body is found months later. Police investigators say “there were at least eight to ten people present on the [murder] scene” and at least 15 who participated in his kidnapping and murder. “Despite issuing a series of political demands shortly after Pearl's abduction four weeks ago, it now seems clear that the kidnappers planned to kill Pearl all along.” [Washington Post, 2/23/02] Some captured participants later claim 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the one who cuts Pearl's throat. [MSNBC, 9/17/02; Time, 1/26/03]
People and organizations involved: Daniel Pearl, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

March 28, 2002      Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

       In Faisalabad, Pakistan, a joint team of US and Pakistani Special Forces engage in a firefight with Abu Zubaida, a Palestinian believed to be an al-Qaeda logistics expert. Zubaida is shot, captured, briefly interrogated, and then handed over to US officials. He is then taken to Bagram base in Afghanistan. What happens after that is uncertain, but it is believed that he is flown to Jordan. More high-value prisoners like Zubaida are being held in prisons in Amman and in desert locations in the eastern part of Jordan. [The Observer, 6/13/2004] At all times, Zubaida remains under control of the CIA. The FBI, which until now has competed with the CIA over the lead role in interrogations of terrorist suspects, decides not to have a part in Zubaida's interrogation. A senior FBI counterterrorism official later says, “Once the CIA was given the green light ... they had the lead role.” [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] National Security Adviser for combating terrorism Army Gen. Wayne Downing is apparently intimately involved in the questioning of Zubaida. “The interrogations of Abu Zubaida drove me nuts at times,” he recalls. “He and some of the others are very clever guys. At times I felt we were in a classic counter-interrogation class: They were telling us what they think we already knew. Then, what they thought we wanted to know. As they did that, they fabricated and weaved in threads that went nowhere. But, even with these ploys, we still get valuable information and they are off the street, unable to plot and coordinate future attacks.” Since Zubaida is shot in the groin during his arrest in Pakistan, he requires painkillers. US officials will later suggest to the Washington Post that his painkillers “were used selectively.” One official explains, “in a deadpan voice,” that “pain control [in wounded patients] is a very subjective thing.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002] As a result, he reportedly shares information leading to the arrest of other al-Qaeda members, [Washington Post, 12/26/2002] including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Jose Padilla, [New York Times, 6/27/2004] Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Rahim al-Nashiri, Omar al-Faruq and Muhammad al-Darbi. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] Downing, who resigns in June 2002, affirms, “We know so much more about them now than we did a year ago: the personalities, how the networks are established, what they think are important targets, how they think we will react.” [Washington Post, 12/26/2002]
People and organizations involved: Abu Zubaida, Muhammad al-Darbi, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Jose Padilla, Wayne Downing, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Omar al-Faruq, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
          

April, June, or August 2002: Al Jazeera Reporter Claims to Conduct Interview with 9/11 Masterminds      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
It is originally reported that Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda interviews 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and 9/11 associate Ramzi Bin al-Shibh at a secret location in Karachi, Pakistan, in either June [Times of London, 9/8/02] or August. [Guardian, 9/9/02] Details and audio footage of the interview come out between September 8 and 12, 2002. The video footage of the interview al-Qaeda promised to hand over is never given to Al Jazeera. [Associated Press, 9/8/02] Both figures claim the 9/11 attacks were originally going to target nuclear reactors, but “decided against it for fear it would go out of control.” Interviewer Fouda is struck that Mohammed and bin al-Shibh remember only the hijackers' code names, and have trouble remembering their real names. [Australian, 9/9/02] Mohammed, who calls himself the head of al-Qaeda's military committee and refers to bin al-Shibh as the coordinator of the “Holy Tuesday” operation, reportedly acknowledges “[a]nd, yes, we did it.” [Fouda And Fielding, 2003, pp 38] These interviews “are the first full admission by senior figures from bin Laden's network that they carried out the September 11 attacks.” [Times of London, 9/8/02] Some, however, call Fouda's claims into doubt. For example, the Financial Times states: “Analysts cited the crude editing of [Fouda's interview] tapes and the timing of the broadcasts as reasons to be suspicious about their authenticity. Dia Rashwan, an expert on Islamist movements at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said: ‘I have very serious doubts [about the authenticity of this tape]. It could have been a script written by the FBI.’ ” [Financial Times, 9/11/02] Mohammed is later variously reported to be arrested in June 2002, killed or arrested in September 2002, and then arrested in March 2003. After this last arrest report, for the first time Fouda claims this interview took place in April, placing it safely before the first reports of Mohammed's capture. [Guardian, 3/4/03; Canada AM, 3/6/03] Bin al-Shibh also gets captured several days after Fouda's interview is broadcast, and some reports say he is captured because this interview allows his voice to be identified. [Observer, 9/15/02; CBS News, 10/9/02] As a result, Fouda has been accused of betraying al-Qaeda, and now fears for his life. [Independent, 9/17/02] As the Washington Post states, “Now Al Jazeera is also subject to rumors of a conspiracy.” [Washington Post, 9/15/02] Yet after being so reviled by al-Qaeda supporters, Fouda is later given a cassette said to be a bin Laden speech. [MSNBC, 11/18/02] US officials believe the voice on that cassette is “almost certainly” bin Laden, but one of the world's leading voice-recognition institutes said it is 95 percent certain the tape is a forgery. [BBC, 11/29/02; BBC, 11/18/02]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Yosri Fouda
          

April 11, 2002: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Connected to New Bombing in Tunisia      Complete 911 Timeline

       A truck bomb kills 19 people, mostly German tourists, at a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. It is later claimed that al-Qaeda is behind the attack, and that the suspected bomber speaks with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed by phone about three hours before the attack. [Associated Press, 8/24/02]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, al-Qaeda
          

June 4, 2002: 9/11 Mastermind Publicly Identified      Complete 911 Timeline

      
The photo of Mohammed on the right has been flipped to better compare it with the photo on the left. Reporter Yosri Fouda says that the photo on the right is an “electronically enhanced version” of the photo on the left. [Guardian, 3/4/03] Both have generally been portrayed as different photos in the media.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is publicly identified as the “mastermind” behind the 9/11 attacks. He is believed to have arranged the logistics while on the run in Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In 1996, he had been secretly indicted in the US for his role in Operation Bojinka (see January 6, 1995), and the US began offering a $2 million reward for his capture in 1998, which increased to $25 million in December 2001. [New York Times, 6/5/02; Associated Press, 6/4/02 (B)] There are conflicting accounts on how much US investigators knew about Mohammed before 9/11. Mohammed is Pakistani (though born in Kuwait [CBS News, 6/5/02] ) and a relative of Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the WTC in 1993. [New York Times, 6/5/02] Though not widely reported, Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, says Mohammed also has ties to the ISI, and they had acted to shield him in the past. [UPI, 9/30/02]
People and organizations involved: Operation Bojinka, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

June 16, 2002: 9/11 Mastermind Reported Captured      Complete 911 Timeline

       In September 2002, articles appear in the Pakistani and Indian press suggesting that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is actually captured on this day. Supposedly he has been sent to the US, though the US and Pakistan deny the story and say Mohammed has not been captured at all. [Economic Times, 9/10/02; Times of India, 9/9/02; Daily Times, 9/9/02] If it happened, Mohammed may have been captured before a reported interview with Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda.
People and organizations involved: Yosri Fouda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

September 11, 2002      Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

       Suspected top al-Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is captured in Pakistan and transferred to US custody. According to US officials interviewed by the New York Times, Mohammed is subjected to the technique called “waterboarding,” which entails being “strapped to a board and immersed in water ... to make the subject believe that he might be drowned.” [New York Times, 6/27/2004] Mohammed is believed to have been interrogated in Thailand. [The Observer, 6/13/2004]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

March 1, 2003: Mohammed Reportedly Arrested in Pakistan, Doubts Persist      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Mohammed's alleged arrest in Pakistan.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is reportedly arrested in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. [Associated Press, 3/1/03] Officials claim that he is arrested in a late-night joint Pakistani and FBI raid, in which they also arrest Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, the purported main financer of the 9/11 attacks. [MSNBC, 3/3/03] However, some journalists immediately cast serious doubts about this arrest. For instance, MSNBC reports, “Some analysts questioned whether Mohammed was actually arrested Saturday, speculating that he may have been held for some time and that the news was made public when it was in the interests of the United States and Pakistan” [MSNBC, 3/3/03] There are numerous problems surrounding the US-alleged arrest of Mohammed:
Witnesses say Mohammed is not present when the raid occurs. [Guardian, 3/3/03 (B); Associated Press, 3/2/03; Australian Broadcasting Corp., 3/2/03; New York Times, 3/3/03; Associated Press, 3/2/03 (B)]
There are differing accounts about which house he is arrested in. [Associated Press, 3/1/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/3/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/2/03]
There are differing accounts about where he was before the arrest and how authorities found him. [Washington Post, 3/2/03; New York Times, 3/3/03; New York Times, 3/4/03; Time, 3/1/03; Washington Post, 3/2/03]
Some accounts have him sleeping when the arrest occurs. [New York Times, 3/3/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/2/03; Reuters, 3/2/03; Daily Telegraph, 3/4/03]
Accounts differ on who arrests him—Pakistanis, Americans, or both. [CNN, 3/2/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/2/03; New York Times, 3/2/03; Daily Telegraph, 3/3/03; Associated Press, 3/3/03 (C); Times Of London, 3/3/03 (B)]
There are previously published accounts that Mohammed may have been killed in September 2002. [Daily Telegraph, 9/16/02; Christian Science Monitor, 10/29/02; Los Angeles Times, 12/22/02; Asia Times, 3/6/03; Daily Telegraph, 3/4/03; Asia Times, 10/30/02]
There are accounts that he was captured the year before. [Australian Broadcasting Corp., 3/2/03; Associated Press, 9/16/02; Daily Times, 9/9/02; Times of India, 9/9/02] These are just some of the difficulties with the arrest story. There are so many problems with it that one Guardian reporter says, “The story appears to be almost entirely fictional.” [Guardian, 3/6/03]
People and organizations involved: Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

Between March 2003 and June 25, 2003: Top al-Qaeda Prisoners Deny al-Qaeda-Iraq Link      Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

       US officials admit that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida have said in interrogations that bin Laden vetoed a long term relationship with Saddam because he did not want to be in Hussein's debt. [Newsweek, 6/25/03]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida
          

March 27, 2003: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Says Moussaoui Not Involved in 9/11      Complete 911 Timeline

       The Washington Post reports that information obtained from interrogations of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed further undermines the government's case against Zacarias Moussaoui for his alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Apparently, Mohammed told his interrogators that Moussaoui was not part of the 9/11 hijacker group, but was in the US for a second wave of attacks that were planned for early 2002. Details of any such plan have not been revealed. Legal experts agree that at the very least, “on the death penalty, [this information] is quite helpful to Moussaoui.” In spite of Mohammed's revelations, the government still feels that it can convict Moussaoui of being involved in a conspiracy with al-Qaeda. [Washington Post, 3/28/03]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Zacarias Moussaoui, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

May 11, 2004: Administration Gives Top Prisoner Access to Some, Denies Custody to Others      Complete 911 Timeline

       In a secret agreement with the White House, the 9/11 Commission obtains the right to question at least two top al-Qaeda leaders in US custody. The two men are believed to be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, two accused masterminds of the 2001 attacks. [Baltimore Sun, 5/12/04] The results of the commission's questioning of these suspects are published in a 9/11 Staff Statement released in June 2004. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)] However, in an ironic twist, during a 9/11-related lawsuit hearing held in June, US authorities refuse to acknowledge whether or not they have Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in custody. [Associated Press, 6/15/04; Associated Press, 4/23/04] Insurance companies representing 9/11 victims had requested that the US Justice Department serve a summons against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, but a judge rules that the US government does not have to disclose whether it is holding alleged terrorists in custody. [Associated Press, 4/23/04; Associated Press, 6/15/04]
People and organizations involved: US Department of Justice, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, 9/11 Commission, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, al-Qaeda
          

June 2004      Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

       Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey Jr. releases a newly declassified Pentagon report that states that al-Qaeda “master planner” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was “very skeptical” about Jose Padilla's dirty bomb plan when they met in Pakistan in March 2002, and suggested instead that Padilla bomb apartment buildings through conventional means. Padilla tells US interrogators later that he “proposed the dirty-bomb plot only as a way to get out of Pakistan and avoid combat in Afghanistan, yet save face with Abu Zubaida.” He says he also had “no intention of carrying out the apartment-building operation.” Nevertheless, the release of the Pentagon report is apparently intended to draw attention to Padilla's high-level al-Qaeda connection in an attempt to influence deliberations by the Supreme Court on the Padilla case. [Newsweek, 6/9/2004] This action by the Justice Department is heavily criticized at the time as being an inappropriate interference of the executive with the judiciary branch. [New York Review of Books, 7/15/2004]
People and organizations involved: James B. Comey Jr., Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, Jose Padilla
          

June 11, 2004      Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

       US News and World Report reports that according to unnamed US and Jordanian intelligence sources, Al Jafr prison, in the southern desert of Jordan, is used as a CIA interrogation center. About 100 detainees have allegedly been processed there, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri. “Most stay just a few days before being shipped out to longer-term facilities,” the magazine reports. [US News and World Report, 6/2/2003]
People and organizations involved: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

October 13, 2004      Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere

       The Israeli Ha'aretz reports that at least 11 men are being held in incommunicado in a Jordanian detention center on behalf of the US. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin (also known as “Hambali”) are presumed to be one of those detained. [Reuters, 10/13/2004]
People and organizations involved: Peter Hoekstra, Siddig Siddig Ali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
          

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