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Profile: Nawaf Alhazmi

 
  

Positions that Nawaf Alhazmi has held:



 

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Nawaf Alhazmi actively participated in the following events:

 
  

1993-1999: Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for al-Qaeda      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Nawaf Alhazmi (left), and Khalid Almihdhar (right).
Of all the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have the longest records of involvement with al-Qaeda. CIA Director Tenet calls them al-Qaeda veterans. According to the CIA, Alhazmi first travels to Afghanistan in 1993 as a teenager. In 1995, he travels with Almihdhar to Bosnia and fights against the Serbs. Almihdhar makes his first visit to Afghanistan training camps in 1996, and then fights in Chechnya in 1997. Both swear loyalty to bin Laden around 1998. Alhazmi fights in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance with his brother, Salem Alhazmi. He fights in Chechnya, probably in 1998. He returns to Saudi Arabia in early 1999 and shares information about the 1998 US embassy bombings. [CIA Director Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; Observer, 9/23/01; ABC News, 1/9/02]
People and organizations involved: George Tenet, Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Osama bin Laden, Northern Alliance, Khalid Almihdhar, al-Qaeda
          

1996-December 2000: Majority of Hijackers Disappear into Chechnya      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Saeed Alghamdi training in an Afghaninstan al-Qaeda camp.
At least 11 of the 9/11 hijackers travel to Chechnya between 1996 and 2000:
Nawaf Alhazmi fights in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan for several years, starting around 1995. [Observer, 9/23/01; ABC News, 1/9/02; CIA Director Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Khalid Almihdhar fights in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan for several years, usually with Nawaf Alhazmi. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; CIA Director Tenet Testimony, 6/18/02]
Salem Alhazmi spends time in Chechnya with his brother Nawaf Alhazmi. [ABC News, 1/9/02] He also possibly fights with his brother in Afghanistan. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Ahmed Alhaznawi leaves for Chechnya in 1999 [ABC News, 1/9/02] , and his family loses contact with him in late 2000. [Arab News, 9/22/01]
Hamza Alghamdi leaves for Chechnya in early 2000 [Independent, 9/27/01; Washington Post, 9/25/01] or sometime around January 2001. He calls home several times until about June 2001, saying he is in Chechnya. [Arab News, 9/18/01]
Mohand Alshehri leaves to fight in Chechnya in early 2000. [Arab News, 9/22/01]
Ahmed Alnami leaves home in June 2000, and calls home once in June 2001 from an unnamed location. [Washington Post, 9/25/01; Arab News, 9/19/01]
Fayez Ahmed Banihammad leaves home in July 2000 saying he wants to participate in a holy war or do relief work. [Washington Post, 9/25/01; St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01] He calls his parents one time since. [Arab News, 9/18/01]
Ahmed Alghamdi leaves his studies to fight in Chechnya in 2000, and is last seen by his family in December 2000. He calls his parents for the last time in July 2001, but does not mention being in the US. [Arab News, 9/18/01; Arab News, 9/20/01]
Waleed M. Alshehri disappears with Wail Alshehri in December 2000, after speaking of fighting in Chechnya. [Washington Post, 9/25/01; Arab News, 9/18/01]
Wail Alshehri, who had psychological problems, went with his brother to Mecca to seek help and both disappear, after speaking of fighting in Chechnya. [Washington Post, 9/25/01]
Majed Moqed is last seen by a friend in 2000 in Saudi Arabia, after communicating a “plan to visit the United States to learn English.” [Arab News, 9/22/01] Clearly, there is a pattern: eleven hijackers appear likely to have fought in Chechnya, and two others are known to have gone missing. It is possible that others have similar histories, but this is hard to confirm because “almost nothing [is] known about some.” [New York Times, 9/21/01] Indeed, a colleague claims that hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah and would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh wanted to fight in Chechnya but were told in early 2000 that they were needed elsewhere. [Washington Post, 10/23/02; Reuters, 10/29/02] Reuters has reported, “Western diplomats play down any Chechen involvement by al-Qaeda.” [Reuters, 10/24/02]
People and organizations involved: Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, Majed Moqed, Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Waleed M. Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, Mohand Alshehri, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alnami, Salem Alhazmi, Ahmed Alhaznawi
          

Early 1999: NSA Monitoring Hears 9/11 Hijacker Names, This Information Is Not Shared with CIA or FBI      Complete 911 Timeline

       As the NSA continues to monitor an al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen owned by hijacker Khalid Almihdhar's father-in-law, they find references to Almihdhar and the hijacker brothers, Salem and Nawaf Alhazmi. According to analysts, around late 1999 these men are among their very best sources on al-Qaeda, with “notorious” links to the organization and direct links to the 1998 US embassy bombings. [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04] In early 1999, the NSA intercepts communications mentioning the full name “Nawaf Alhazmi.” More communications involving the names Nawaf, Salem, and Khalid together and alone are intercepted during 1999. However, this information is not shared with the CIA or FBI. As a result, as an important al-Qaeda meeting approaches in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), the CIA does not know the last name of the “Nawaf” attending the meeting. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 10/17/02 (B); 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Associated Press, 9/25/02] In mid-January, after the Malaysian meeting is over, the CIA reports to the NSA what it has learned about Almihdhar, and asks the NSA for information about him. Some information about him is given back and some is not. The NSA still fails to report Alhazmi's last name. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] The NSA continues to monitor calls from these hijackers to this safe house after they move to the US in the first half of 2000.
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Salem Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

April 3-7, 1999: Three Hijackers Obtain US Visas      Complete 911 Timeline

       Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar obtain US visas through the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (B)] All three are already “al-Qaeda veterans” and battle-hardened killers. Almihdhar's visa is issued on April 7, and he thereafter leaves and returns to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. [Stern, 8/13/03] Nawaf Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash. The US learns about Almihdhar's visa in January 2000. The Jeddah Consulate keeps in its records the fact that Nawaf and Alhazmi obtain US visas several days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi
          

November 1999: Hijackers Said to Lease Apartment in San Diego, Two Months Before Alleged Arrival in US      Complete 911 Timeline

       The Washington Post refers to hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar when it later reports, “In November 1999, two Saudi Arabian men moved into a ground-floor apartment at the Parkwood Apartments, a town house complex near a busy commercial strip in San Diego .” [Washington Post, 9/30/01] Alhazmi's name is on the apartment lease beginning in November 1999. [Washington Post, 10/01] The Los Angeles Times similarly notes, “A man by [the name Alhazmi] moved to the Parkwood Apartments in San Diego in 1999, according to manager Holly Ratchford.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01] Some reports even have them visiting the US as early as 1996. [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01; Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01] However, FBI Director Mueller has stated the two hijackers did not arrive in the US until the middle of January 2000, after an important meeting in Malaysia. While some news reports mention that the hijackers first arrive in late 1999 [Los Angeles Times, 11/24/02; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] , over time, mentions of the lease beginning in 1999 will slowly fade from media accounts.
People and organizations involved: Robert S. Mueller III, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

December 11, 1999: Watch List Importance Is Stressed but Procedures Are Not Followed      Complete 911 Timeline

       The CIA's Counter Terrorism Center sends a cable reminding all personnel about various reporting obligations. The cable clearly states that it is important to share information so suspected members of US-designated terrorist groups can be placed on watch lists. The US keeps a number of watch lists; the most important one, TIPOFF, contains about 61,000 names of suspected terrorists by 9/11. [Knight Ridder, 1/27/04; Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] The list is checked whenever someone enters or leaves the US “The threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” and even a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is connected with a US-designated terrorist group warrants being added to the database. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] Within a month, two future hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, are identified, but the cable's instructions are not followed for them. The CIA initially tells the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that no such guidelines existed, and CIA Director Tenet fails to mention the cable in his testimony. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; New York Times, 5/15/03]
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, George Tenet, TIPOFF
          

Late 1999: Saudis Claim to Add Two Hijackers to Watch List and Inform CIA      Complete 911 Timeline

       Former Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al Faisal later claims that around this time his intelligence agency tells the CIA that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have been put on a Saudi terror watch list. Turki says, “What we told [the CIA] was these people were on our watch list from previous activities of al-Qaeda, in both the [1998] embassy bombings and attempts to smuggle arms into the kingdom in 1997.” However, the CIA strongly denies any such warning. [Associated Press, 10/16/03 Sources: Turki bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz al Saud] Turki admits no documents concerning this were sent to the US, but claims the information was passed via word of mouth. [Salon, 10/18/03] The US does not put these two on their watch list until August 2001.
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

January 2-5, 2000: CIA Tracks Alhazmi and Almihdhar to al-Qaeda Meeting; Fails to Place Them on Terror Watch List      Complete 911 Timeline

       Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar travel to an important al-Qaeda meeting (see January 5-8, 2000) in Malaysia. Alhazmi is in Pakistan with a ticket to Malaysia for January 2. CIA and Pakistani officials plan to have his passport scrutinized as he passes through the airport, but he changes his ticket departure date twice. Officials get confused and are not there when he leaves the country, so they still don't learn his last name. Meanwhile, Almihdhar is watched when he leaves a safe house in Yemen. Agents from eight CIA offices and six friendly foreign intelligence services are all asked to help track him, in the hopes he will lead them to bigger al-Qaeda figures. [Stern, 8/13/03] United Arab Emirates officials secretly make copies of his passport as he is passing through the Dubai airport on his way to Malaysia and immediately report this to the CIA. Therefore, by the time he reaches Malaysia, the CIA knows his full name, and the fact that he has a multiple entry visa to the US that is valid from April 1999 to April 2000. Even though the CIA now knows Almihdhar has a one-year visa to the US and presumably plans to travel there, they do not place him on a terror watch list, despite receiving guidelines the previous month on the importance of doing so. [Bamford, 2004, pp 224]
People and organizations involved: United Arab Emirates, al-Qaeda, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency
          

January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Monitored by Authorities; Information Passed to US      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Attendees of the Malaysian meeting. From left to right top row: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Left to right bottom row: Hambali, Yazid Sufaat, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. No pictures of bin Atash or Fahad al-Quso are available, the names of other participants have not been released.
About a dozen of bin Laden's trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/02; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/02] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/02; CNN, 8/30/02] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the meeting and then passes the information on to the US. Attendees of the meeting include:
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this meeting. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the meeting begins.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - A top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known Mohammed is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the meeting was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of Mohammed should have proved the meeting's importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/02] Although the possible presence of Mohammed at this meeting is highly disputed by US officials, one terrorism expert testifies before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of Mohammed's interrogations since his capture, and that Mohammed admits leading this meeting. [New York Post, 7/10/03; Newsweek, 7/9/03] Many media reports identify him there as well [Independent, 6/6/02; CNN, 11/7/02; Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 10/29/03; CNN, 8/30/02] (for instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed's presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack's mastermind ... doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/03]
Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian militant better known as Hambali. [BBC, 8/15/03] He was the main financier of Operation Bojinka. [CNN, 3/14/02; CNN, 8/30/02] Philippine intelligence officials learned of Hambali's importance in 1995, but did not track him down or share information about him. He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003. [CBS News, 8/15/03; CNN, 8/14/03]
Yazid Sufaat, - A Malaysian man who owned the condominium where the meeting was held. [New York Times, 1/31/02; Newsweek, 6/2/02] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat's presence at this meeting is later missed in September. Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/02]
Fahad al-Quso - A top al-Qaeda operative. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] Al-Quso will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000, but the FBI is not given a chance to interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/03]
Tawifiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad.” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden's inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden's bodyguards, and served as bin Laden's personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole attack. [Newsweek, 9/20/01] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995 [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/18/02] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash's presence at this meeting is later missed in January 2001. Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go. [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/02] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003. [New York Times, 5/1/03]
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the meeting may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [CNN, 11/7/02; Newsweek, 11/26/01; Die Zeit, 10/1/02; Time, 9/15/02; Washington Post, 7/14/02] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Another account noting he was photographed at the meeting further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/01] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/02] One account says he is recognized at the time of the meeting, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel, 10/1/02] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh's presence at this meeting will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 [Washington Post, 7/14/02; Newsweek, 9/4/02; Guardian, 10/15/01] , so better surveillance or follow-up from this meeting could have prevented that attack as well.
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - An al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, may have attended this meeting, according to some documents [Australian, 12/24/02; Newsweek, 10/7/02] , but his presence at the meeting is uncertain. [Associated Press, 10/2/02] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don't want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi - He is possibly at the meeting, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/02] US intelligence intercepts from before the meeting indicate that he had plans to attend the meeting. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, is also said to attend. He is reportedly meant to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission Report, 6/16/04 (B)]
More? - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also known to have been at the meeting. [Cox News Service, 10/21/01] (The Islamic Jihad had merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/01]
People and organizations involved: Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Yazid Sufaat, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, al-Qaeda, Malaysian Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Salem Alhazmi, Fahad al-Quso, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, Abu Bara al Taizi, Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, Egyptian Islamic Jihad
          

January 8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit Ends; CIA Fails to Add Attendees to Watch List      Complete 911 Timeline

       The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, traveling under their real names. al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash also travels with them and the three sit side by side in the airplane, but bin Attash travels under the false name “Salah Said.” [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Associated Press, 9/20/02] The CIA knows that a “Nawaf” has attended the meeting, but does not know his last name. Shortly afterwards, the CIA is told of this airplane flight, and the fact that the person sitting next to Almihdhar on the plane is named “Nawaf Alhazmi.” CIA Headquarters asks the NSA to put Almihdhar on their watch list. [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04] However, neither Alhazmi nor Almihdhar are placed on a terror watch list. The CIA still fails to tell the FBI that Almihdhar has a valid US visa, and fails to give them Alhazmi's last name. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Stern, 8/13/03] The CIA searches for the names in their databases but get no “hits.” Yet they don't search the much larger NSA databases, which had vital information on them. [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Nawaf Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Tawifiq ("Khallad") bin Attash
          

January 15, 2000: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Travel to US Undetected      Complete 911 Timeline

       A week after the meeting in Malaysia, hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly together from Bangkok, Thailand, to Los Angeles, California. [MSNBC, 12/11/01] Because the CIA has lost track of them in Thailand, no one in the US government realizes they are coming to the US. The CIA will learn this information in early March, but still will take no action. [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency
          

Early February-Summer 2000: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Live Openly in San Diego      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Nawaf Alhazmi in the 2000-2001 San Diego phone book.
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar move to San Diego and live there openly. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Hijacker Hani Hanjour joins them as a roommate in February 2000 but apparently does not stay long. [San Diego Channel 10, 9/18/01; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/21/01] The hijackers use their real names on their rental agreement [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] , driver's licenses, Social Security cards, credit cards [Newsweek, 6/2/02] , car purchase, and bank account. Alhazmi is even listed in the 2000-2001 San Diego phone book. [Newsweek, 6/2/02; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] Neighbors notice odd behavior: They have no furniture, they are constantly using cell phones on the balcony, constantly playing flight simulator games, keep to themselves, and strange cars and limousines pick them up for short rides in the middle of the night. [Washington Post, 9/30/01; Time, 9/24/01 (B); Time, 9/24/01]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, William Safire, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

April-May 2000: Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are ‘Dumb and Dumber’ as Pilot Students      Complete 911 Timeline

       On April 10, 2000, Nawaf Alhazmi takes a one hour introductory lesson at the National Air College in San Diego. Eight days later, he receives a $5,000 wire transfer in from Ali Abdul Aziz Ali in the United Arab Emirates. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02] In May, Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar arrive at Sorbi's Flying Club, a small school also in San Diego. They announce that they want to learn to fly Boeing airliners. [Washington Post, 9/30/01] They are there with someone named “Hani” —presumably hijacker Hani Hanjour—but only the two of them go up in an airplane. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] Instructor Rick Garza says that the dream to fly big jets is the goal of practically every student who comes to the school, but he notices an unusual lack of any basic understanding of aircraft in these two. When he asks Almihdhar to draw the aircraft, Almihdhar draws the wings on backwards. Both speak English poorly, but Almihdhar in particular seems impossible to communicate with. Rather than following the instructions he was given, he would vaguely reply, “Very good. Very nice.” [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/01] The two offer extra money to Garza if he will teach them to fly multi-engine Boeing planes, but Garza declines. [Washington Post, 9/30/01] “I told them they had to learn a lot of other things first... It was like Dumb and Dumber. I mean, they were clueless. It was clear to me they weren't going to make it as pilots.” [Observer, 10/7/01 Sources: Rick Garza]
People and organizations involved: Nawaf Alhazmi, William Safire, National Air College, Sorbi's Flying Club, Rick Garza, Khalid Almihdhar, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali
          

Summer-December 2000: FBI Asset Withholds Information About 9/11 Hijackers Living in His San Diego House      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Abdussattar Shaikh's house in Lemon Grove, California.
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar move to the house of Abdussattar Shaikh in San Diego. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01] Shaikh, a local Muslim leader, is later revealed to be a “tested” undercover “asset” working with the local FBI. [Newsweek, 9/9/02] Shaikh inexplicably fails to tell his FBI handler important details about the hijackers and appears to be lying about many matters concerning them. In early media reports, the two are said to have moved in around September [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01; Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] but the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry implies that Shaikh lied about this, and they moved in much earlier. Alhazmi stays until December; Almihdhar appears to be mostly out of the US after June. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Neighbors claim that Mohamed Atta is a frequent visitor, and Hani Hanjour visits as well. [Associated Press, 9/29/01; Chicago Tribune, 9/30/01; Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01; San Diego Channel 10, 9/27/01; San Diego Channel 10, 10/11/01] However, Shaikh denies Atta's visits, the FBI never mentions them, and the media appears to have forgotten about them. [Associated Press, 9/29/01] Echoing reports from their first apartment, neighbors witness strange late night visits with Alhazmi and Almihdhar. [Associated Press, 9/16/01 (D)] For instance, one neighbor says, “There was always a series of cars driving up to the house late at night. Sometimes they were nice cars. Sometimes they had darkened windows. They'd stay about 10 minutes.” [Time, 9/24/01 (B)]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Federal Bureau of Investigation, William Safire, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Abdussattar Shaikh
          

(Before September 2000): Army Intelligence Unit Said to Discover Hijackers Renting Rooms at New Jersey Motels      Complete 911 Timeline

       According to an anonymous Able Danger official speaking to the Bergen Record, a US Army intelligence unit tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks worldwide discovers that several of the 9/11 hijackers are taking rooms at motels in New Jersey and meeting together there. The intelligence unit, called Able Danger, which uses high-speed computers to analyze vast amounts of data, notices that Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi take a room at the Wayne Inn (see (Before September 2000-12 Months Later)). After the existence of the Able Danger unit comes to light in 2005, Bergen Record columnist and reporter Mike Kelly says, “The connect-the-dots tracking by the team was so good that it even knew Atta conducted meetings with the three future hijackers. One of those meetings took place at the Wayne Inn. That's how close all this was—to us and to being solved, if only the information had been passed up the line to FBI agents or even to local cops. This new piece of 9/11 history, revealed only last week by a Pennsylvania congressman and confirmed by two former members of the intelligence team, could turn out to be one of the most explosive revelations since the publication last summer of the 9/11 commission report.” [Bergen Record, 8/14/05] The other two hijackers said to be present at the meetings, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, periodically live in the town of Paterson, only one mile away from Wayne (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). However, contradicting this account, a lawyer representing members of Able Danger later testifies, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” [Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05; CNN, 9/21/05] Some media accounts have stated that the Able Danger program determined Atta was in the US before 9/11. For instance, Fox News reported in August 2005, “[Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer] is standing by his claim that he told them that the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks had been identified in the summer of 2000 as an al-Qaeda operative living in the United States.” [Fox News, 8/17/05]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Marwan Alshehhi, Able Danger, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Mohamed Atta, Anthony Shaffer
          

Autumn 2000: FBI Informant Fails to Share Valuable Information on Hijackers      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Abdussattar Shaikh.
While hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar live in the house of an FBI informant, Abdussattar Shaikh, the informant continues to have contact with his FBI handler. The handler, Steven Butler, later claims that during summer Shaikh mentions the names “Nawaf” and “Khalid” in passing and that they are renting rooms from him. [Newsweek, 9/9/02; Associated Press, 7/25/03 (B); 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] On one occasion, Shaikh tells Butler on the phone he cannot talk because Khalid is in the room. [Newsweek, 9/9/02] Shaikh tells Butler they are good, religious Muslims who are legally in the US to visit and attend school. Butler asks Shaikh for their last names, but Shaikh refuses to provide them. Butler is not told that they are pursuing flight training. Shaikh tells Butler that they are apolitical and have done nothing to arouse suspicion. However, according to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, he later admits that Alhazmi has “contacts with at least four individuals [he] knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom [he] had previously reported to the FBI.” Three of these four people are being actively investigated at the time the hijackers are there. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] The report mentions Osama Mustafa as one, and Shaikh admits that suspected Saudi agent Omar al-Bayoumi was a friend. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Los Angeles Times, 7/25/03] The FBI later concludes Shaikh is not involved in the 9/11 plot, but they have serious doubts about his credibility. After 9/11 he gives inaccurate information and has an “inconclusive” polygraph examination about his foreknowledge of the 9/11 attack. The FBI believes he has contact with hijacker Hani Hanjour, but he claims not to recognize him. There are other “significant inconsistencies” in Shaikh's statements about the hijackers, including when he first met them and later meetings with them. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry later concludes that had the informant's contacts with the hijackers been capitalized upon, it “would have given the San Diego FBI field office perhaps the US intelligence community's best chance to unravel the September 11 plot.” [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] The FBI later tries to prevent Butler and Shaikh from testifying before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry in October 2002. Butler ends up testifying but Shaikh does not. [Washington Post, 10/11/02 (B)]
People and organizations involved: Osama ("Sam") Mustafa, Steven Butler, Omar al-Bayoumi, William Safire, Abdussattar Shaikh, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

March 2001-September 1, 2001: Hani Hanjour and Other Hijackers Live in Paterson, New Jersey      Complete 911 Timeline

      
The apartment building in Paterson, New Jersey, where some of the hijackers lived.
Hani Hanjour and Salem Alhazmi rent a one-room apartment in Paterson, New Jersey. Hanjour signs the lease. Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Mohamed Atta are also seen coming and going by neighbors. One unnamed hijacker has to be told by a neighbor how to screw in a light bulb. [Associated Press, 10/7/01 (B); Washington Post, 9/30/01] The 9/11 Commission's account of this differs from previous press accounts, and has Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi (instead of his brother Salem) first moving to Paterson in mid-May. Salem Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Almihdhar, and probably Ahmed Alghamdi are all seen living there as well during the summer. [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/24/04, p. 230] Other reports have Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi living periodically in Falls Church, Virginia, over nearly the exact same time period, from March through August 2001 (see March 2001). During this time, Mohamed Atta and other hijackers live in Wayne, New Jersey, a town only one mile from Paterson (see (Before September 2000-12 Months Later)).
People and organizations involved: William Safire, Salem Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Almihdhar
          

Mid-March 2001: Hijackers Meet with ID Forger      Complete 911 Timeline

       Hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi stay for four days in the Fairfield Motor Inn, Fairfield, Connecticut. They meet with Eyad M. Alrababah, a Jordanian living in Bridgeport, who has been charged with providing false identification to at least 50 illegal aliens. This meeting takes place about six weeks before the FBI says Moqed and Alghamdi enter the US. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02; Associated Press, 3/6/02]
People and organizations involved: William Safire, Eyad M. Alrababah, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alghamdi
          

April 1, 2001: Hijacker Gets Speeding Ticket, but His Illegal Status Is Not Noticed      Complete 911 Timeline

       Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi is stopped by an Oklahoma police officer for speeding. His license information is run through a computer to determine whether there are any warrants for his arrest. There are none, so he is issued a ticket and sent on his way. The CIA has known that Alhazmi is an al-Qaeda operative possibly living in the US since March 2000, but has failed to share this knowledge with other agencies. [Newsweek, 6/2/02; Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02] He also has been in the country illegally since January 2001, but this also does not raise any flags. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02]
People and organizations involved: Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency
          

April 12-September 7, 2001: Hijackers Collect Multiple Drivers' License Copies      Complete 911 Timeline

      
The most famous image of Mohamed Atta came from his Florida driver's license.
At least six hijackers get more than one Florida driver's license. They get the second license simply by filling out change of address forms:
Waleed Alshehri—first license May 4, duplicate May 5;
Marwan Alshehhi—first license, April 12, duplicate in June;
Ziad Jarrah—first license May 2, duplicate July 10;
Ahmed Alhaznawi—first license July 10, duplicate September 7;
Hamza Alghamdi—first license June 27, two duplicates, the second in August; and
“A sixth man” with a Florida duplicate is not named. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] Additionally, some hijackers obtained licenses from multiple states. For instance, Nawaf Alhazmi had licenses from California, New York, and Florida at the same time, apparently all in the same name. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01; Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02; Newsday, 9/21/01; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01]
People and organizations involved: Waleed M. Alshehri, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Hamza Alghamdi, Ziad Jarrah
          

May-August 2001: Hijackers Take Practice Flights and Enjoy Las Vegas Diversions      Complete 911 Timeline

       A number of the hijackers make at least six trips to Las Vegas. It is probable they met here after doing practice runs on cross-country flights. At least Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid Almihdhar and Hani Hanjour were involved. All of these “fundamentalist” Muslims drink alcohol, gamble, and frequent strip clubs. They even have strippers perform lap dances for them. [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/4/01; Newsweek, 10/15/01]
People and organizations involved: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, William Safire, Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi
          

May 6-September 6, 2001: Some Hijackers Work Out at Gyms, Some Merely Hang Out      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Ziad Jarrah's computer record at the US1 Fitness gym.
The hijackers work out at various gyms, presumably getting in shape for the hijacking. Ziad Jarrah appears to train intensively from May to August, and Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also take exercising very seriously. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01; New York Times, 9/23/01] However, these three are presumably pilots who would need the training the least. For instance, Jarrah's trainer says, “If he wasn't one of the pilots, he would have done quite well in thwarting the passengers from attacking.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01] For instance, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi work out for only four days in early September. [Associated Press, 9/21/01] Three others—Waleed Alshehri, Wail Alshehri and Satam al-Suqami— “simply clustered around a small circuit of machines, never asking for help and, according to a trainer, never pushing any weights. ‘You know, I don't actually remember them ever doing anything... They would just stand around and watch people.’ ” [New York Times, 9/23/01] Those three also had a one month membership in Florida—whether they ever actually worked out there is unknown. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01]
People and organizations involved: Salem Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, William Safire, Mohamed Atta, Waleed M. Alshehri, Central Intelligence Agency, Marwan Alshehhi, Satam Al Suqami, Wail Alshehri
          

July 7, 2001: Random Police Check Almost Uncovers Hijacker Meeting Near New York City      Complete 911 Timeline

       Police officer Dave Agar in South Hackensack, New Jersey, is searching the parking lots of cheap motels, looking for suspicious cars. He submits the license plate number of a 1988 Toyota parked outside the Jade East motel to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computer database frequently used by every level of law enforcement. He discovers that Nawaf Alhazmi owns the car. The computer record shows no outstanding warrants for Alhazmi (though it does give other information, including his address in San Diego). Agar makes a record of his search and continues his patrol. It is later discovered that Abdulaziz Alomari registered a room in the Jade East motel from July 6-13, and Khalid Almihdhar stayed most of that week with Alhazmi at the nearby Congress Inn. It is also discovered that Almihdhar, Alhazmi, and two or three other men had dinner together at a local diner. Police speculate the hijackers were holding a meeting to discuss their plot. One officer later says, “You wonder what would have happened if the check had turned up something on Alhazmi. We certainly would have brought him in for questioning.” [Bergen Record, 5/18/04] In late August, an FBI agent will look for Alhazmi and Almihdhar in the New York City area, but he will fail to check NCIC or car registration records that would have revealed the record of Agar's search mentioning Alhazmi's name (see August 29, 2001).
People and organizations involved: Dave Agar, Abdulaziz Alomari, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, National Crime Information Center
          

August 2001: Six Hijackers Live Near Entrance to NSA      Complete 911 Timeline

       At least six 9/11 hijackers, including all of those who boarded Flight 77, live in Laurel, Maryland, from about this time. They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi. Laurel, Maryland, is home to a Muslim cleric named Moataz Al-Hallak who teaches at a local Islamic school and has been linked to bin Laden. He has testified three times before a grand jury investigating bin Laden. NSA expert James Bamford later states, “The terrorist cell that eventually took over the airliner that crashed into the Pentagon ended up living, working, planning and developing all their activities in Laurel, Maryland, which happens to be the home of the NSA. So they were actually living alongside NSA employees as they were plotting all these things.” [BBC, 6/21/02; Washington Post, 9/19/01]
People and organizations involved: Moataz Al-Hallak, Osama bin Laden, Pentagon, National Security Agency, James Bamford, Khalid Almihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salem Alhazmi, William Safire
          

August 24-25, 2001: Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets      Complete 911 Timeline

       Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar buys his 9/11 plane ticket on-line using a credit card; Nawaf Alhazmi does the same the next day. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02] Both men are put on a terrorist watch list this same day, but the watch list only means they will be stopped if trying to enter or leave the US. Procedures are in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with airlines and airports and such sharing is common, but the FAA and the airlines are not notified about this case, so the purchases raise no red flags. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)] An official later states that had the FAA been properly warned, “they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [Washington Post, 10/2/02]
People and organizations involved: Federal Aviation Administration, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

Early September 2001: Accounts Place Three Hijackers on East and West Coasts at the Same Time      Complete 911 Timeline

       The standard accounts place hijackers Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Khalid Almihdhar on the East Coast for the entire time in the weeks before the attacks [Newsday, 9/23/01 (B); Associated Press, 9/21/01; St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01; New York Times, 9/21/01; New York Times, 11/6/01; CNN, 9/26/01] However, neighbors at the San Diego apartment complex where the three lived are clear in their assertions that all three were there until days before 9/11. For instance, one article states, “Authorities believe Almihdhar, Hanjour and Alhazmi ... moved out a couple of days before the East Coast attacks.” [San Diego Channel 10, 11/1/01] Ed Murray, a resident at the complex, said that all three “started moving out Saturday night-and Sunday [September 9] they were gone.” [San Diego Channel 10, 9/14/01; San Diego Channel 10, 9/20/01] This is the same day that Alhazmi is reportedly seen in an East Coast shopping mall. [CNN, 9/26/01] As with previous reports, neighbors also see them getting into strange cars late at night. A neighbor interviewed shortly after 9/11 said, “A week ago, I was coming home between 12:00 and 1:00 A.M. from a club. I saw a limo pick them up. It was not the first time. In this neighborhood you notice stuff like that. In the past couple of months, I have seen this happen at least two or three times.” [Time, 9/24/01] To add to the confusion, there have been reports that investigators think Almihdhar is still alive and the Chicago Tribune says of Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Hanjour: “The most basic of facts—the very names of the men—are uncertain. The FBI has said each used at least three aliases. ‘It's not going to be a terrible surprise down the line if these are not their true names,’ said Jeff Thurman, an FBI spokesman in San Diego.” [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/01]
People and organizations involved: William Safire, Nawaf Alhazmi, Jeff Thurman, Khalid Almihdhar
          

September 10, 2001: Three Hijackers at Same Hotel with Senior Saudi Official      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Sami Omar Hussayen, nephew of Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen.
Three hijackers, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi, check into the same hotel as a prominent Saudi government official. [Washington Post, 10/2/03] Investigators have not found any evidence that the hijackers met with the official, and stress it could be a coincidence. [Daily Telegraph, 3/10/03] However, one prosecutor working on a related case asserts, “I continue to believe it can't be a coincidence.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/2/03] The official, Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, is interviewed by the FBI shortly after 9/11, but according to testimony from an FBI agent, the interview is cut short when Hussayen “feign[s] a seizure, prompting the agents to take him to a hospital, where the attending physicians [find] nothing wrong with him.” The agent recommends that Hussayen “should not be allowed to leave until a follow-up interview could occur.” However, that “recommendation, for whatever reason, [is] not complied with.” Hussayen returns to Saudi Arabia a few days later, as soon as the US ban on international flights has ended. [Washington Post, 10/2/03] For most of the 1990s, Hussayen was director of the SAAR Foundation, a Saudi charity that is being investigated for terrorism ties. A few months after 9/11 he is named a minister of the Saudi government and put in charge of its two holy mosques. Hussayen had arrived in the US in late August 2001 planning to visit some Saudi-sponsored charities. Many of the charities on his itinerary, including the Global Relief Foundation, World Muslim League, IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organization), IANA (Islamic Assembly of North America), and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), have since been shut down or investigated for alleged ties to Islamic militant groups. [Washington Post, 10/2/03] His nephew, Sami Omar Hussayen, is indicted in early 2004 for using his computer expertise to assist militant groups, and is charged with administering a website associated with IANA, which expressly advocated suicide attacks and using airliners as weapons in the months before 9/11. Investigators also claim the nephew was in contact with important al-Qaeda figures. [Washington Post, 10/2/03; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 1/10/04] IANA is under investigation, as well as the flow of money from the uncle to nephew. [Daily Telegraph, 3/10/03] The uncle has not been charged with any crime. [Wall Street Journal, 10/2/03]
People and organizations involved: Federal Bureau of Investigation, SAAR Foundation, Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, Global Relief Foundation, World Muslim League, International Islamic Relief Organization, Islamic Assembly of North America, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Sami Omar Hussayen, Khalid Almihdhar, William Safire, Nawaf Alhazmi
          

Before September 11, 2001: Hijackers Drink, Watch Strip Shows on Eve of Attacks      Complete 911 Timeline

       A number of the hijackers apparently drink alcohol heavily in bars and watch strip shows. On September 10, three of them spend $200 to $300 apiece on lap dances and drinks in the Pink Pony, a Daytona Beach, Florida strip club. While the hijackers had left Florida by this time, Mohamed Atta is reported to have visited the same strip club, and these men appear to have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. [Boston Herald, 10/10/01] Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta are seen entering the Hollywood, Florida, sports bar Shuckums already drunk. They proceed to drink even more hard alcohol there . Atta and Alshehhi are seen at Sunrise 251, a bar in Palm Beach, Florida. They spend $1,000 in 45 minutes on Krug and Perrier-Jouet champagne. Atta is with a tall busty brunette in her late twenties; Alshehhi is with a shortish blonde. Both women are known locally as regular companions of high-rollers. [Daily Mail, 9/16/01] A stripper at the Olympic Garden Topless Cabaret in Las Vegas, Nevada, recalls Marwan Alshehhi being “cheap,” paying only $20 for a lap dance. [Cox News, 10/16//01] Several hijackers reportedly patronize the Nardone's Go-Go Bar in Elizabeth, New Jersey. They are even seen there on the weekend before 9/11. [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01; Boston Herald, 10/10/01] Majed Moqed visits a porn shop and rents a porn video. The mayor of Paterson, New Jersey, says of the six hijackers who stayed there: “Nobody ever saw them at mosques, but they liked the go-go clubs.” [Newsweek, 10/15/01] Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar often frequented Cheetah's, a nude bar in San Diego. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Hamza Alghamdi watched a porn video on September 10. [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01] University of Florida religion professor Richard Foltz states, “It is incomprehensible that a person could drink and go to a strip bar one night, then kill themselves the next day in the name of Islam ... People who would kill themselves for their faith would come from very strict Islamic ideology. Something here does not add up.” [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/16/01]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Hamza Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed
          

7:35 a.m.: More Hijackers Have Checkpoint Problems; Allowed to Board Anyway      Complete 911 Timeline

      
Hijacker brothers Salem (white shirt) and Nawaf Alhazmi (dark shirt) pass through security in Dulles Airport in Washington.
According to the 9/11 Commission's review of airport security footage, the remaining three Flight 77 hijackers pass through a security checkpoint at Dulles Airport. Hani Hanjour is selected for further inspection by FAA's Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) program. His two carry-on bags fail to set off any alarms. One minute later, Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi enter the same checkpoint. They are selected for further inspection because one of them does not have photo identification nor is able to understand English and a security agent finds both of them suspicious. [San Francisco Chronicle, 7/23/04] Salem Alhazmi successfully clears the magnetometer, and he is permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf Alhazmi sets off the alarms for both the first and second magnetometers. He is subsequently subjected to a personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. He finally passes. His shoulder strap carry-on bag is swiped by an explosive trace detector and returned without further inspection. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the Alhazmi brothers' passports had suspicious indicators, and that they could have been linked to al-Qaeda upon closer inspection. [Baltimore Sun, 1/27/04; 9/11 Commission Report, 1/27/04] To date, video footage of the Flight 77 hijackers has been released to the public, but none of the footage of other hijackers going through security has been.
People and organizations involved: William Safire, Salem Alhazmi, al-Qaeda, Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, Nawaf Alhazmi, Washington Dulles International Airport
          

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