The Center for Cooperative Research
U:     P:    
Not registered yet? Register here
Advanced Search

Main Menu
History Engine Sub-Menu
Miscellaneous Sub-Menu
End of Main Menu

Submit a timeline entry
Donate: If you think this site is important, please help us out financially. We need your help!
Email updates

Click here to join: Suggest changes to existing data, add new data to the website, or compile your own timeline. More Info >>


Profile: Kenneth Pollack


Positions that Kenneth Pollack has held:

  • CIA Iraq expert
  • Director for Persian Gulf Affairs, National Security Council
  • Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council
  • Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
  • Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution




Quote, September 17, 2002

   “We've really got our work cut out for us. I've always opposed going down the inspections route, because at the end of the day, you are betting that Saddam won't give in, and his past record always indicated he would give in. What's so interesting now is that he's given in at the ideal moment: really early, when it messes us up.” [New York Times, 9/18/02]

Associated Events

Quote, June 2003

   “It's looking like in truth the Iraqi (weapons) program was gray. The Bush administration was trying to say it was black.” [Knight Ridder, 6/6/03]

Associated Events

Quote, October 2003

   The Bush administration dismantled “the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information. They created stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership. Their position is that the professional bureaucracy is deliberately and maliciously keeping information from them. ... They always had information to back up their public claims, but it was often very bad information. They were forcing the intelligence community to defend its good information and good analysis so aggressively that the intelligence analysts didn't have the time or the energy to go after the bad information.” [New Yorker, 10/20/03]

Associated Events

Quote, January 2004

   “Throughout the spring and fall of 2002 and well into 2003 I received numerous complaints from friends and colleagues in the intelligence community, and from people in the policy community ... [that] many Administration officials reacted strongly, negatively, and aggressively when presented with information or analysis that contradicted what they already believed about Iraq. Many of these officials believed that Saddam Hussein was the source of virtually all the problems in the Middle East and was an imminent danger to the United States because of his perceived possession of weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism.... Intelligence officers who presented analyses that were at odds with the pre-existing views of senior Administration officials were subjected to barrages of questions and requests for additional information. They were asked to justify their work sentence by sentence: ‘Why did you rely on this source and not this other piece of information?’ ‘How does this conclusion square with this other point?’ ‘Please explain the history of Iraq's association with the organization you mention in this sentence.’ Reportedly, the worst fights were those over sources. The Administration gave greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities. In many cases intelligence analysts were distrustful of those sources, or knew unequivocally that they were wrong. But when they said so, they were not heeded; instead they were beset with further questions about their own sources.” [Atlantic Monthly, 1/2004]

Associated Events




Related Entities:


Kenneth Pollack actively participated in the following events:


Not a participant in any events.

Except where otherwise noted, the textual content of each timeline is licensed under the Creative Commons License below:

Creative Commons License Home |  About this Site |  Development |  Donate |  Contact Us
Terms of Use