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Profile: Dominique de Villepin


Positions that Dominique de Villepin has held:

  • French Foreign Minister




Quote, September 29, 2002

   “We do not want to give carte blanche to military action. We cannot accept a resolution authorizing as of now the recourse to force without (the issue) coming back to the UN Security Council.” [CNN, 9/30/02]

Associated Events

Quote, October 22, 2002

   “Our goal is the return of the UN weapons inspectors and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and not regime change in Iraq. It is in this context that we are negotiating this resolution.” [Associated Press, 10/21/02]

Associated Events

Quote, February 5, 2003

   “Let us double, let us triple the number of inspectors. ... Let us open more regional offices. Let us go further than this, could we not, for example, put up, set up, a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas that have already been inspected? Let us very significantly reinforce the capacity for monitoring and collecting information in Iraq. ... We must move on to a new stage and further strengthen the inspections. ... Given the choice between military intervention and an inspections regime that is inadequate because of a failure to co-operate on Iraq's part, we must choose the decisive reinforcement of the means of inspections.” [BBC, 2/5/03, New York Times, 2/6/03c]

Associated Events

Quote, February 6, 2003

   “A second resolution? We are not at the time for that right now.” [Washington Post, 2/7/03]

Associated Events

Quote, February 14, 2003

   “We do not need a second resolution at this stage, if UN arms inspectors come back to the Security Council and say they cannot work anymore in Iraq, we can use all means, including force, to get compliance from Iraq. ... This is not the time for (a resolution) is at stake is war and peace. We are trying to give peace a chance.” [Interpress News Service, 2/15/03]

Associated Events




No related entities for this entity.


Dominique de Villepin actively participated in the following events:


October 26, 2002      Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

       France circulates an alternative draft resolution to the US-British version that drops the assertion that Iraq is “in material breach” of Resolution 687 and changes the order of some paragraphs to provide a different emphasis. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin tells reporters: “There is still work to be done, progress to be made and we have said so to our American friends for weeks.... If there is no breakthrough, we shall obviously officially submit our own document.” [Washington Post, 10/25/2002]
People and organizations involved: Dominique de Villepin

January 19, 2003      Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

       During a meeting with foreign ministers from 13 of the 15 Security Council member states, US Secretary of State Colin Powell encounters strong resistance to the Bush administration's view that the inspections are not working and that Iraq is not cooperating. Russia, China, France and Germany all express their satisfaction with how the inspections are proceeding and say that their preference is that the inspectors be permitted to continue their work. Only Britain appears willing to provide support for Washington's position, reiterating the American stance that Saddam is running out of time. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is the most vocal in his opposition to the Bush administration's attempt to rationalize the need for war. In an interview, he says the UN should remain “on the path of cooperation” and that France will never “associate [itself] with military intervention ... not supported by the international community.” He adds,“We think that military intervention would be the worst possible solution.” Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov also disagrees with the Bush administration's insistence that military force will be needed, explaining: “Terrorism is far from being crushed. We must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might threaten the unity of the entire [anti-]terrorism coalition. In this context we are strictly in favor of a political settlement of the situation revolving around Iraq.” Germany's Joschka Fischer similarly states: “Iraq has complied fully with all relevant resolutions and cooperated very closely with the UN team on the ground. We think things are moving in the right direction, based on the efforts of the inspection team, and [they] should have all the time which is needed.” The Bush administration remains unconvinced by these arguments. Powell tells reporters: “We cannot fail to take the action that may be necessary because we are afraid of what others might do. We cannot be shocked into impotence because we are afraid of the difficult choices that are ahead of us.” [New York Times 1/20/03; Washington Post 1/20/03]
People and organizations involved: Dominique de Villepin, Igor Ivanov, Joschka Fischer, Colin Powell

February 14, 2003      Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

       UNMOVIC Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei present an update to the UN Security Council on the progress of weapons inspections in Iraq. The content of their presentation includes no evidence to substantiate US and British claims that Iraq poses a serious threat to the US or Europe. After the report is presented, the majority of the UN Security Council members feel that the use of military force will not be needed to effectively disarm Iraq. [United Nations, 2/14/03; Financial Times, 2/14/03]
UNMOVIC report by Hans Blix -
After conducting some 400 inspections at over 300 Iraqi sites since December 2002, the inspection teams still have not found any evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction or that Iraq has programs to develop such weapons. [Associated Press, 2/14/03; Financial Times, 2/14/03; AP, 2/14/03; Interpress News Service, 2/15/03; Guardian, 2/14/03b]
The inspectors are unaware of any reliable evidence that the Iraqis have had advanced knowledge of the timing and locations of weapons inspections. “In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming,” Blix says. [Associated Press, 2/14/03; Guardian, 2/14/03b; Financial Times, 2/14/03; Reuters, 2/14/03b; Guardian, 2/15/03b]
The Iraqi government agreed to reduce the number of “minders” present in interviews with Iraqi scientists. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
The UNMOVIC weapons inspection teams have begun destroying Iraq's declared arsenal of mustard gas. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
South Africa has made an agreement with Iraq to assist it in its disarmament efforts. [Guardian, 2/14/03b; Financial Times, 2/14/03]
Several proscribed weapons and other items remain unaccounted for, including more than 1,000 tons of chemical agents. Blix explains that if they do not exist, Iraq needs to provide him with credible evidence that they have been destroyed. “Another matter and one of great significance is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.” [Financial Times, 2/14/03; Associated Press, 2/14/03; Guardian, 2/14/03b]
Based on the data contained in Iraq's declaration of arms, experts have concluded that two varieties of Iraq's Al Samoud II missile systems are capable of exceeding the 150km range limit that was imposed on Iraq in 1991 after the First Gulf War (see February 12, 2003). But contrary to what Powell recently stated in his February 5 presentation to the UN, test stands located at the Al Rafah facility have not been associated with the testing of missiles with the ranges Powell suggested (see 10:30 a.m. February 5, 2003). [Financial Times, 2/14/03; Guardian, 2/15/03b; Associated Press, 2/14/03]
More interviews with Iraqi scientists, especially ones involved in its former biological weapons programs, are needed. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
Recent private interviews with Iraqi scientists have been helpful to weapons inspectors. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
The amount of intelligence being supplied by foreign agencies have recently increased and the new information is helping inspectors. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
Blix challenges the conclusions made by Powell in his February 5 presentation (see 10:30 a.m. February 5, 2003) to the UN with regard to US satellite pictures showing the movement of trucks and supplies at suspected weapons sites prior to inspections. He says, “The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of an imminent inspection.” [Reuters, 2/14/03b; Guardian, 2/15/03b; Guardian, 2/14/03b; Associated Press, 2/14/03; Financial Times, 2/14/03]
Iraq produced a list of 83 people who it says participated in the destruction of large quantities of anthrax and VX precursors in 1991. [Financial Times, 2/14/03]
Inspections are increasing inspectors' knowledge of Iraqi arms. [Guardian, 2/14/03b]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report by Mohamed ElBaradei -
ElBaradei's team has found no evidence of an illegal nuclear weapons program. “We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq.” [Financial Times, 2/14/03; IAEI, 2/14/03]
Iraqi officials have provided IAEA inspectors with immediate access to all sites it has sought to examine. [IAEI, 2/14/03; Financial Times, 2/14/03]
The IAEA is still investigating why Iraq attempted to import aluminum tubes during the summer of 2002. The agency is awaiting an explanation from Iraq as to why the tubes—alleged by Iraq to have been destined for a conventional weapons artillery program—were fabricated according to such high quality specifications. [Financial Times, 2/14/03; IAEI, 2/14/03]
Referring to the documents that had been discovered in the home of Faleh Hassan (see January 16, 2003), Mohamed ElBaradei states: “While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq's laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment program” . [BBC, 2/17/03; Guardian, 2/15/03b; IAEI, 2/14/03]
Reaction - After the two reports, most UN Security Council members say they believe inspections are working and that the use of military force is unnecessary. Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, says: “There is an alternative to war: disarming Iraq through inspections. [War] would be so fraught with risk for the people, the region and international stability that it should be envisaged only as a last resort. ... We must give priority to disarmament by peaceful means.” His comments are followed by a huge applause. “French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin's impassioned speech seeking more time for inspections elicited rare applause from diplomats in the chamber,” reports the Associated Press. By contrast, the more hawkish remarks of US Secretary of State Colin Powell—who was said to have appeared “annoyed” during parts of Blix's report— “did not receive any applause.” Powell, in his response to the report, had stated: “We cannot wait for one of these terrible weapons to turn up in our cities.... More inspections—I am sorry—are not the answer.... The threat of force must remain.” After the reports, Germany, Syria, Chile, Mexico, Russia, France and Pakistan, favor continuing the inspections while Spain and Bulgaria back the US and British position. [Interpress News Service, 2/15/03; US Department of State, 2/14/03; Associated Press, 2/14/03; Fox News, 2/15/03]
People and organizations involved: Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, Colin Powell, Dominique de Villepin  Additional Info 

March 7, 2003      Events Leading to Iraq Invasion

       UNMOVIC chief arms inspector Hans Blix provides a quarterly report to the UN Security Council on the progress of inspections in Iraq, as required by UN Security Resolution 1284 (1999). It is the twelfth such report since UNMOVIC's inception. Blix's report to the Council does not contain any evidence to support US and British claims that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction or the programs to develop such weapons. IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei also reports to the Council and says there are no signs that Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/03]
UNMOVIC report by Hans Blix -
There is no evidence that Iraq has mobile biological weapons factories, as was recently alleged by Colin Powell in his February 5 presentation (see 10:30 a.m. February 5, 2003) to the UN. “Several inspections have taken place ... in relation to mobile production facilities,” Blix says. “No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found.” He further explained that his inspectors had examined numerous mobile facilities and large containers with seed processing equipment. [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03; Agence France Presse, 3/7/03; Blix, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/03]
The Iraqi government has increased its cooperation with inspectors since the end of January. It is attempting to quantify the biological and chemical weapons that it says were destroyed in 1991. [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03]
Iraq's destruction of several Al Samoud II missiles represents a real step towards disarmament. “The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament,” he says. “We are not watching the destruction of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed.” [New York Times, 3/8/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; UNMOVIC, 3/7/03]
Blix says that the UN inspectors needed a few more months to finish their work. “Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions,” he says, concluding, “It will not take years, nor weeks, but months.” [Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; UNMOVIC, 3/7/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03]
Iraqi scientists have recently accepted inspectors' requests to be interviewed without “minders.” “Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, seven during the past week,” Blix explains. [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/03]
Some Iraqi scientists have agreed to interviews without “minders” —but more cooperation is needed. He says, “While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq.” [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03] Iraq needs to turn over more documents. “Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began.” [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03] There is no evidence of underground weapons facilities. Blix says: “There have been reports, denied by Iraq, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on underground structures suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspectors examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar was used in several locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found.” [UNMOVIC, 3/7/03]
IAEA report by Mohamed ElBaradei -
There is no evidence that the aluminum tubes imported by Iraq in July 2001 were meant for a nuclear weapons program. ElBaradei says: “Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets. ... Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in question.” [Reuters, 3/7/03; New York Times, 3/8/03; CNN, 3/7/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03; The Washington Post, 3/8/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; IAEA, 3/7/03]
There is no evidence that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Niger. Documents provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency by the US were determined to be forgeries. The documents were a collection of letters between an Iraqi diplomat and senior Niger officials discussing Iraq's interest in procuring a large amount of uranium oxide (see Early October 2002). “Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that documents which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic,” ElBaradei explains. “We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.” (see June 12, 2003) [IAEA, 3/7/03; The Washington Post, 3/8/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/03; Reuters, 3/7/03; New York Times, 3/8/03; Globe and Mail, 3/8/03; Guardian, 3/8/03; Associated Press, 3/8/03]
The IAEA has yet to come across evidence of a nuclear weapons program. “After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq,” ElBaradei states. “[T]here is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.” [The Washington Post, 3/8/03; Associated Press, 3/8/03; Globe and Mail, 3/8/03; Associated Press, 3/7/03; Los Angeles Times, 3/7/03; IAEA, 3/7/03]
In a direct response to allegations made by Colin Powell on February 5 (see 10:30 a.m. February 5, 2003) related to the attempted procurement of magnets that could be used in a gas centrifuge, ElBaradei, says: “The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing.” [IAEA, 3/7/03]
Iraq's industrial capacity “has deteriorated” at the inspected sites because of lack of maintenance and funds. [IAEA, 3/7/03]
Reaction - Both sides claim that the reports give further support to each of their respective stances on the issue of Iraqi disarmament. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin tells the Council that the reports “testify to the progress” of the inspections. He states that France will not support another resolution because “we cannot accept any ultimatum, any automatic use of force.” Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says that the reports demonstrate that inspections have been “fruitful.” The Bush administration does not alter its position, despite statements by the two inspectors that Iraq is cooperating with inspections and complying with demands to disarm. Colin Powell, responding to the inspectors' reports, reiterates the administration's position that the inspections are not working and that Saddam is not cooperating. “We must not walk away,” Powell says. “We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region, threatening the world.” He claims that Iraq's behavior is a “a catalog still of noncooperation” and repeats the administration's allegation that the “Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” Back at the White House, Ari Fleischer tells reporters, “As the president has said, if the United Nations will not disarm Saddam Hussein, it will be another international organization, a coalition of the willing that will be made up of numerous nations that will disarm Saddam Hussein.” [CNN, 3/6/03; US Department of State, 3/7/03; CNN, 3/7/02]
People and organizations involved: Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, Ari Fleischer, Dominique de Villepin, Igor Ivanov, Colin Powell  Additional Info 

February 25, 2004      Haiti Coup

       French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin outlines a proposal he will submit to the UN on February 26, which calls for Aristide's resignation and recommends that an international security force be dispatched to Haiti to help stabilize the country. According to the minister, President Aristide “bears heavy responsibility for the current situation” and it is his responsibility “to accept the consequences while respecting the rule of law.” Villepin adds: “Everyone sees quite well that a new page must be opened in Haiti's history.” [New York Times, 2/26/04] Notably, a few months before, Aristide's government had called on France to pay some $21 billion in reparations to Haiti (see November 2003). [London Review of Books, 4/15/2004]
People and organizations involved: Dominique de Villepin

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